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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, I describe the ongoing struggle over legal recognition of rights for 
same-sex couples in Italy and demonstrate how in Italy, a nation where (for a myriad of 
historical, social, and political reasons) there is little faith in the ability of state institutions to 
reckon with societal change, European Union (EU) law offers a means for circumventing 
national politics to create policy change in an area of law long subject to political impasse.  I use 
the topic of the struggle for same-sex marriage in Italy as a lens through which to conduct an 
ethnographic investigation of the globalizing effects of the EU, and more specifically of EU law 
and policy, on Italian society and the Italian legal system.  I argue that recent legal and policy 
changes with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples in Italy are a direct consequence of the 
stimulus of the EU on the national judicial system and evidence a burgeoning judicial activism.  
Such activism occurs at the expense of national politics in Italy and this is therefore a story about 
compromised sovereignty and the judicialization of politics, but it is also about something more; 
i.e., the formation of new post-national identities in the face of an emergent supranational entity.  
As a supranational entity, the EU exists in constant tension with its member states, and 
relations between the EU and its nation-states are continuously negotiated.  Much of this happens 
through law in general and the courts in particular, where conflicts are presented for resolution.  
The account I present here is based on participant-observation, interviews, and over four and a 
half years of tracking online discussions and media sources dealing with LGBTI rights in Italy 
and in Europe between May 2009 and February 2014.  Between July 2009 and February 2011, I 
spent over a year in Italy, living first in Rome and later in Turin, and working with various 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, and Intersex (LGBTI) rights advocates in Italy and the EU.  
In an effort to provide a holistic account of the contemporary struggle for recognition of rights on 
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behalf of same-sex couples in Italy, I approach the subject from the perspectives of the main 
protagonists:  the activists, the Italian courts, and the EU and Europe.   
I begin with a description of the problem (Chapter 2), looking closely at the activities of 
Italian LGBTI activist groups currently fighting for marriage equality, and focusing specifically 
on the Affermazione Civile campaign initiated by Italian LGBTI activist groups, Associazione 
Radicali Certi Diritti (Certi Diritti) and Avvocatura per i Diritti LGBT (Rete Lenford).  Due to 
particularities in the Italian constitution, the desired goal of the Affermazione Civile campaign is 
marriage equality, and anything less will prove discriminatory with respect to same-sex couples.  
Because much of the resistance to same-sex marriage is due to opponents' perceived need to 
protect the so-called "traditional" family, I consider the relevance of “the family” as a central 
institution and the role of marriage in structuring family relationships in Italy (Chapter 3).  While 
the Italian family has changed significantly, Italian family law has not, and this is problematic 
for “non-traditional” families who are denied the full plethora of rights made available to alleged 
traditional families.  Despite substantial changes in family structure, Italian politicians have been 
unable to reform Italian family law, and the Italian courts have stepped in to fill the void.  The 
Italian Constitutional Court, Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione), 
and several lower-level courts have recently issued historic decisions recognizing certain rights 
on behalf of same-sex couples residing in Italy.  In their decisions, Italian courts are displaying 
signs of a flourishing judicial activism and attendant judicialization of politics (Chapter 4).  The 
decisions of the Italian courts in this area are important not only to the advancement of LGBTI 
rights in Italy, but also to the further delineation of a transnational EU citizenship and processes 
of European integration.  For this reason, I also look closely at the EU, and explore how various 
institutions within the EU structure and generate contemporary debate over marriage equality in 
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the member states (Chapter 5).  I devote special attention to the activities of the European Court 
of Justice, as well as to the European Court of Human Rights, because it is the European courts, 
more than any other European or EU institution, which have influenced and advanced the 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Europe and Italy (Chapter 6).  I return to the 
struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, and look specifically at the 
relationship between Church and State in contemporary Italian politics and its role in the struggle 
over recognition of rights for same-sex couples (Chapter 7).  In the Conclusion, I tie everything 
together to show how recent changes with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples in Italy 
are the direct result of the EU’s influence on the nation-state in general and its judicial system in 
particular.  This points to larger issues regarding sovereignty and territoriality, and demonstrates 
how profound changes in the status of the nation-state occur through often unintended and 
peripheral post-national identity formations in which the state itself is implicated.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 In its broadest terms, this is a dissertation about the life of laws and laws of life.  It delves 
into a very specific, very intimate, and (at the present moment) much contested area of family 
law that is undergoing reconsideration in many parts of the world:  that is, what is/ought to be the 
legal definition of “marriage”?  As will become clearer, while the topic of this dissertation is the 
struggle for same-sex marriage in Italy, the dissertation is not only about same-sex marriage.  
Rather, I use this topic as a lens through which to conduct an ethnographic investigation of the 
globalizing effects of the European Union (EU) and, more specifically, of EU law and policy, on 
the Italian legal system and Italian society more broadly.  I argue that recent legal and policy 
changes with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples in Italy are a direct consequence of the 
stimulus of the EU on the national judicial system and are evidence of a burgeoning judicial 
activism.  Such activism occurs at the expense of national politics in Italy and this is, therefore, a 
story about compromised sovereignty and the judicialization of politics, but it is also about 
something more, that is, the formation of new post-national identities in the face of an 
increasingly emerging supranational entity.   
 As a supranational entity, the EU exists in constant tension with its member states, and 
relations between the EU and the nation-states are continuously negotiated.  Much of this 
happens through law in general and the courts in particular, where conflicts are presented for 
resolution.  This dissertation considers the effects of the EU on the “nation-ness” of Italy while 
simultaneously exploring how social actors in Italy are helping forge a European identity.  I will 
show how EU law governing free movement of persons is given new life in the context of the 
struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples, as Italian activists invoke the free 
movement provisions to assert rights as EU citizens in Italian courts.  Due in large part to the 
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efforts of such activists, the Italian Constitutional Court, Italy’s Supreme Court of Cassation 
(Corte Suprema di Cassazione), and several lower-level courts have recently issued historic 
decisions recognizing certain rights on behalf of same-sex couples residing in Italy -- rights that 
before now have been denied by the majority of political actors in the Italian nation-state.  In the 
process of using EU law to advance recognition of rights for same-sex couples, Italian courts are 
reinforcing a transnational Europe citizenship.  The legal maneuverings of Italian activists, and 
the resulting court decisions, carry consequences for the (related) projects of European 
integration and Europeanization, as the lives of those subject to the law assume new legal and 
social identities. 
 In the following chapters I describe the ongoing struggle for legal recognition of rights on 
behalf of same-sex couples in Italy and demonstrate how in Italy, a nation where (for a myriad of 
historical, social, and political reasons) there is little faith in the ability of state institutions to 
reckon with societal change, EU law offers a means for circumventing national politics.  I 
illustrate how the EU has created an opening for Italian LGBTI1 (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transsexual, and Intersex) activists, previously skeptical about the law’s ability to generate 
social transformation, to embrace law as a mechanism for change, with several significant 
results.  First, through their activities Italian activists are demonstrating a new degree of faith in 
the rule of law.  Second, the Italian courts are increasingly making law, something that civil law 
courts are generally not deemed to do.  And, finally, through the use of EU law and the resultant 
                                                 
1 There are various forms of this acronym in circulation and one's choice of acronym has political implications.  For 
example, one could use GLBTI (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex), GLBTQ (in which the "Q" stands 
for "Queer"), or any variety of combinations and orderings of these letters.  In truth, I choose to privilege "LGBTI" 
over "GLBTI" mainly because this is what I am used to doing; however, I recognize that placing the "L" first can be 
seen as a symbolic attempt to undo the privileging of gay men over lesbians.  In places where I drop the "B," "T," or 
"I" it is to accurately reflect the constituency to which I am referring. 
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recognition of rights as EU citizens, Italian activists and courts are helping further to delineate a 
European citizenship and forge a European identity.  
Arriving in Italy 
 Like so many who come to Italy from the United States, I harbored romantic notions.  I 
had (somewhat) deliberately chosen a research site reputed to be replete with all that I hold dear:  
friendly people, striking scenery, good food, good wine, and good coffee.  A friend’s gift, I had 
recently finished reading Eat, Pray, Love (Gilbert 2006).  The protagonist of my own adventure, 
I was going to have a similar experience, minus the ascetically challenging weeks in a Sangha 
that followed Elizabeth Gilbert’s time in Italy.   Notwithstanding the vast amount of reading, 
studying, writing, and thinking about Italy and its history that I had done in preparation to begin 
fieldwork, part of me still clung to the idealistic vision portrayed in films and novels.  Perhaps 
this was because, underwriting much of the anthropological literature on Italy, one senses a love 
of the place, despite its foibles, imperfections, and convoluted history.  Why should it be 
different for me?   
My relationship to Italy, however, has been much like a marriage, which is perhaps an 
appropriate analogy considering that this dissertation is, in part, about the institution of marriage.  
I have experienced highs and lows, love and hate, joy and frustration and, in-between, a lot of 
tedium.  I am better for the relationship, although I am not quite sure yet in what way(s).  Like 
me, my partner (Italy) is a diehard Type A personality who at times attempts to masquerade as a 
Type B (and sometimes succeed in fooling self and others that this is the case).  Although not 
divorced, I have been separated from Italy for over a year now and, with distance, I find that I 
tend to remember the good more than the bad, harbor a huge fondness in my heart, and long to 
return.   
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My first visit to Italy was a solo trip in late May 2008.  I had received a bit of grant 
money from my department to conduct “pre-dissertation” research.  I decided to go to Rome, 
mainly because I thought this is where everything major “happened” in Italy.  I flew from 
Chicago through London and into Rome.  I left one day and arrived the next.  After I picked up 
my bags, I had little trouble locating the train and purchasing a ticket that would allow me to 
travel to Termini Station, the main railway station and hub for public transportation in Rome.  I 
was feeling a bit smug because I even knew about the yellow machines and had properly 
“validated” my ticket before boarding the train.  I was not prepared for Termini:  crowded, 
frenetic, and hot.   
I lugged my bags off the train (of course, I had packed too much – so much for romantic 
ideals of “traveling light”) and worked my way to the front of the station and the exits to Rome.  
The blinding sunlight, noise and heat, combined with jetlag, left me feeling dazed.  Before 
leaving the U.S., I had booked a room within walking distance of Termini and had MapQuested 
the route.  Much of the front of the station, however, was under construction, and I was unable to 
orient myself.  I stopped to ask a police officer where I could find the street that would lead me 
to the Bed and Breakfast where I was staying and was brushed off with a curt "Non lo so" 
(translated:  “I don’t know”).  I wandered aimlessly for what seemed like hours but in reality 
were mere minutes.  
As it turned out (and as I discovered 15 minutes and a couple of false starts later), the 
street I was looking for ran right up to the station.  Getting to the place where I was staying was 
simply a matter of departing the station through the correct exit and walking straight down the 
street approximately 4 blocks, turning right at the end of the street, walking another 2 blocks, and 
crossing the street to the gate.  I walked up to the gate.  Jet-lagged, sweating, and frustrated (Why 
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was I wearing a black “traveler’s” jacket from Chicos?  Why did I think this looked smart?  Why 
had I brought so much luggage?), I approached the entrance, located the correct buzzer and 
pushed firmly.  I glanced at my surroundings.  Set back from the rather busy street, a couple of 
buildings peeked out over a wall.  Pretty vines and flowers (do not ask me to name these, 
because I can barely identify a daisy) clung to the walls.  “I can do this,” I thought.   
A gruff male voice spoke to me through the intercom.  “Si?” said the voice.  “Sono 
Lauren Anaya.  Ho una prenotazione" (translated:  "I am Lauren Anaya.  I have a reservation.”), 
I replied.  The voice responded in English, directing me to enter and head to the left to the 
interior entrance.  I was buzzed through the first gate, wandered a bit to the left and then (for 
reasons I cannot fathom or explain) headed to the right, searching for the building entrance.  “I 
said left!”  I was startled to hear the gruff voice from the intercom coming from behind me, this 
time accompanied by a body.  I turned to see a striking man, middish-30’s, approximately 6 feet 
tall and of slender (although not skinny) build.  I could see that he was handsome with his dark 
hair, brown eyes, and Roman nose, his features buried beneath a mound of facial hair.  He took 
off ahead of me and I followed like a chastised puppy, feeling even more self-conscious in my 
ridiculous outfit with my ridiculous amount of luggage, grungy, sweaty and in desperate need of 
a shower and a nap.   
We walked through a tranquil courtyard shaded by a large tree – it was not the most 
elegant or beautiful garden but at this point the restfulness of its ambience appealed to me.  
Using a key, he opened a door and ushered me in.  He grabbed my large bag, noting that it was 
“broken” (one of the wheels had come askew during my voyage), directed me into the world’s 
smallest elevator, pressed the button, and sent me with my purse and “smaller” bag on my way.  
He proceeded to use the stairs, lugging my large broken bag up.  I was not convinced I would 
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ever see him again but was relieved to meet him at the floor to the entrance of the Bed and 
Breakfast (B&B).  Using another key, he opened a door which led to the wing that housed the 
B&B.  The door opened into a long, wide hallway, with rooms on either side.  He pointed to a 
cushy leather loveseat on the left and told me to sit.  There was a computer screen hung on an 
arm and he whipped out a keyboard and told me that I could use the Internet to let my family 
know I had arrived.  He then offered me some juice.  The juice, a blend of mango and pear, 
served its purpose and I knew I was in good hands.  I noticed a woman rushing around, cleaning 
the rooms.  It was at this point that the man introduced himself as T.  T sat on a chair on the other 
side of an open door to one of the rooms.  He told me my room would be ready in a few minutes 
and suggested that I relax a bit.  I did not know it at the time, but this was the beginning of my 
friendship with T, one of the most warm-hearted, interesting, funny, and talkative people I would 
meet during the course of my fieldwork.  Throughout my time in the field, T was an incredibly 
generous consultant.  He introduced me to many of his attorney and other friends and from there, 
my contacts snowballed.   
Through T and his friends and business acquaintances, I learned a lot about what life is 
like in Italy for Italians.  In the months that followed, T and I enjoyed many long talks over 
coffee, lunch, and dinner, on the telephone and via Skype.  When I first met T, he and his long-
term girlfriend had recently broken up.  T was selling his Bed and Breakfast business, and was 
uncertain about what to do next.   At that time, T could not have predicted that the person who 
bought his business would swindle him out of the money owed for the sale, a substantial sum 
that T would need to begin a new business venture.  T was forced to pursue recompense through 
the Italian court system and, although he eventually prevailed (almost two years later) in the 
court case, when I last spoke to him he was still trying to find a way to collect the money owed 
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to him.  Since losing his business, T has been managing a hotel outside of Rome, and earns a 
salary of around € 1,000 per month.  He is well-educated, having attended university, and speaks 
fluent English.  While there is nothing "ordinary" about T, he is in many ways typical of young 
Italians:  he is educated, middle-class, underemployed and, at the time I am writing this, 
cohabitating with his now not-so-new girlfriend.  He is caught in the economic cross-fire of a 
nation-state that has been unable to adequately adapt to globalizing forces yet he (like Italy) 
remains, if not exactly filled with hope, resilient.         
The Anthropology and Modern Historiography of Italy 
 Previous studies dealing with the anthropology and modern historiography of Italy have 
addressed a plethora of themes, including:  Sicily and Sardinia, pastoral life and peasants, the 
mafia, immigration, fascism, politics, the “Southern Question,” and modernity.  Some examples 
include the work of Anton Blok on behavior codes in Sicily, the Mafia, and honor and violence 
(2010, 2008, 2001, 2000, 1974); the work of Jeffrey Cole and Sally Booth on immigrants in Italy 
(2007, 2006, 1999); works by Ben-Ghiat (2001), Corner (1993), De Grazia (1992), Doumanis 
(1997)  and Forcucci (2010) on themes related to fascism; and projects by Kertzer (1996, 1980) 
and Muehlebach (2012, 2009) dealing with subjects related to Italian politics.2  In recent years 
                                                 
2   For additional examples, please see: 
 
1. Themes related to Sicily:  Cole (2007, 2006, 1997); Saitta (2010); and Schneider and Schneider (2003, 
1996, 1994, 1975);  
 
2. Themes related to Sardinia:  Angioni (2000); Magliocco (2005); Mientjes (2010, 2004, 1998); Satta 
(2001); and Sorge (2009, 2008); 
 
3. Themes related to pastoral life:  Carlestål (2011); Krause (2005a); and Mientjes (2010, 2004, 1998);  
 
4. Themes related to the Mafia:  Gambetta 1996 and Schneider and Schneider (2003, 1994); 
 
5. Themes related to the “Southern Question”:  Schneider, ed. (1998); Moe (2002); and Rota (2011); 
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there has also been a surge of scholarship focused on issues concerning Italian 
reproduction/fertility and the family, as well as on the subject of neoliberalism and its effects.  
Elizabeth Krause (2007, 2005a, 2005b, 2001) has been especially prolific in producing 
scholarship dealing with themes related to reproduction, fertility and the family in Italy.  Other 
noted scholars writing on these subjects include Bernini (2008), Buratta and Boccuzzo (2001), 
Cole and Booth (2006), Dalla Zuanna (2006), Forcucci (2010), Horn (1994), Kertzer (1993, 
1984), and Seymour (2005).  Anthropologists of Italy who have taken an interest in the subject of 
neoliberalism and its effects on Italian society include Herzfeld (2010), Molé (2012, 2010), 
Muehlebach (2012, 2009), and Stacul (2007).    
 The most recent studies depict Italy as a geopolitical space besieged by and responding to 
globalizing forces.  These key domains intersect and influence one another in dialogical fashion, 
making it difficult to distinguish between rhetoric and reality, to the extent that such a distinction 
exists. Philosopher Remo Bodei (2006) talks about Italy’s locus as a Mediterranean society 
strategically positioned between North Africa and the East.  He observes that, over the past 
decade, Italy has experienced an influx of undocumented immigrants who, for many Italians, 
seem to threaten Italian sovereignty and also the rights, prerogatives and privileges of its citizens.  
Similarly, in his examination of Senegalese immigration to Italy, Donald Carter (1997) describes 
how processes occurring in the developing world have affected the constitution of modern Italy.  
Carter approaches this problem from both the perspective of the immigrants and in terms of the 
role immigration plays in Italian imaginings of the State, observing that the Senegalese are 
                                                 
6. Themes related to the subject of modernity:  Ben-Ghiat (2006, 2001); Horn (1994); and Krause and 
Marchesi (2007); and 
 
7. Themes related to immigration:  Ben-Yehoyada (2011); Carter (1997); Cole (2007, 2006, 1997); Dalla 
Zuanna (2006); Faedda (2012); Giordano (2008); Grillo (2002); and Saitta (2010, 2005). 
  
9 
 
relegated to the position of “Other” in Italian society and thereby placed into a preexisting 
“north/south” narrative, whereby they now occupy the position previously held by Italians from 
the rural south.  But many Italians view the Senegalese immigrants with contempt and 
resentment, and the Senegalese have been racialized in a much more explicit way than southern 
Italians ever were.  In Italian discourse about the State, social problems such as health care and 
housing are deflected as an “immigrant” problem, which in turn leads to a silencing of the actual 
immigrants and their problems.  According to Carter, Italian discourses concerning immigrants 
and immigration play a central role in the imagining of the modern Italian state.   
Gerard Delanty (1996) has a similar, but slightly different, interpretation of the 
immigration issue and contends that hostility toward immigrants in Europe is related to the rise 
of a new nationalism in Western Europe, which is itself a product of social fragmentation 
wrought by the neoliberal attack on the welfare state (1996).  In this vein, hostility against 
immigrants is more a function of the imagined implications of multiculturalism for the welfare 
state than it is about cultural superiority.  In a situation of limited resources, there is a sense in 
the population that the national model of the welfare state is in serious jeopardy due to its 
incapacity to meet the social demands of all groups (Delanty 1996:3.5).  Delanty asserts, 
however, that the threat of immigrants is for the most part a construction of the media.  
 Antipathy toward immigrants is exacerbated by the increasing precariousness of the work 
situation in Italy, and a feeling that there are not enough resources to go around.  Noelle Molé 
recently explored the phenomenon of workplace mobbing.3  According to Molé, mobbing exists 
as a gendered cultural discourse that has to do with the increased precariousness of the 
                                                 
3 “Mobbing,” according to Molé (2007:1), is defined as work harassment or the marginalization, hostility, and 
isolation of workers by colleagues and superiors with the hope of coercing the worker to resign. 
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workplace during a period of neoliberal reforms where government programs intended to expand 
Italy’s neoliberal economy frequently conflict with welfare state laws designed to protect the 
worker (2012).   The phenomenon of mobbing points to a critical historical moment that began in 
the late twentieth century when labor rights, health care, and job protections came into conflict 
with social, economic, and political risks.  
Although the phenomenon of mobbing is a negative consequence of neoliberal reform, 
Italians have also responded to the effects of neoliberalism in positive ways.  Italians (contrary to 
assertions that they do not "do" collective action) are increasingly adopting voluntarism as a 
coping mechanism to deal with the State’s inability to provide necessary social welfare 
programs.  In The Moral Neoliberal, Andrea Muehlebach maps the rise of voluntarism in the 
Lombardy region of Italy (2012).  Muehlebach perceives a competing ideological division 
between Catholic and Socialist groups and explains how socialist volunteers interpret their 
volunteer work as an articulation of social solidarity, whereas Catholic volunteers see their 
unpaid work as a manifestation of charity and love.  Regardless of the specific framing of the 
volunteer activities, by nurturing a spirit of selflessness, the volunteers’ interpretations make the 
mobilization of an “ethical” citizenry possible, a deployment that enables the State to solidify 
some of its most controversial neoliberal reforms by substituting volunteer forms of collective 
caretaking for public social welfare systems.  But, as Muehlebach also shows, the inclusion of an 
anti-capitalist narrative into the heart of the neo-liberalizing State leads to some unexpected 
consequences.  The volunteers Muehlebach describes are not complacent members of a new 
mass consumption society but instead negotiate within a social dynamic that is both ethically and 
politically indeterminate.   
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The unsettled social dynamic brought about by neoliberal forces has had and continues to 
have consequences for the contemporary Italian family as well.  Italy is a country where young 
people often live at home until they marry in their thirties. This is often due to economic 
necessity:  young people have difficulty finding jobs where they will make enough money to 
support themselves and, as a result, many depend on their parents for support well into early 
adulthood.  The precariousness of the workplace and the lack of social services described by 
Molé and Muehlebach are significant factors in Italians’ delaying of marriage and child-bearing, 
which in turn has led to the perception of a "fertility crisis" in Italy.   
The perceived "fertility crisis" is seen as especially dire in light of the declining welfare 
state and the aging population.  As an antidote to the crisis, Italian policymakers passed a “baby-
bonus” law in 2003, which offered money to Italian or European citizens who gave birth to, or 
adopted, a second child.  This was the country’s first pro-natal policy since the Fascist regime’s 
legislation encouraging women to have more children.  Interestingly, however, in 2004, Italian 
lawmakers turned around and passed an “anti-natalist” law that substantially limited access to 
assisted reproduction technologies.  Various authors have classified regulatory schemes for 
assisted reproduction in Western Europe as permissive or conservative in orientation (Fenton 
2006). Within the larger context of Europe, Italy suddenly went from a system of almost total 
regulatory permissiveness to having the most restrictive access to reproductive technologies in 
Western Europe.  Under the new provisions, only stable heterosexual couples of a fertile age are 
able to use their own (and not donor) gametes to assist reproduction.  Elizabeth Krause and 
Milena Marchesi argue that, together, these paradoxical policies demonstrate a project of 
“national rejuvenation” that defines desirable and undesirable populations (Krause and Marchesi 
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2007).  In the eyes of Italian politicians, married, heterosexual Europeans (and, more 
specifically, Italians) are desirable, whereas non-Europeans, singles, and LGBTI persons are not. 
Italy and the EU 
 Italy has been profoundly transformed as a result of its membership in the European 
Union (EU), especially in terms of its economy.4  Despite the relationship between EU 
membership and many of the dramatic changes occurring in Italy, recent anthropological studies 
of modern Italy have for the most part ignored the significance of this connection, especially 
with respect to the ways in which the EU structures and affects (both directly and indirectly) the 
making of national law and public policy outside the economic realm.  Like it or not, however, 
Italy is a part of the EU and the EU is a part of Italy.  Consequently, the relationship between the 
two warrants consideration in general, and anthropological consideration in particular.   
 In We, the Divided:  Ethos, Politics and Culture in Post-war Italy, 1943-2006 (2006), 
Remo Bodei offers an account of Italian politics and culture from the beginning of the Italian 
Republic to the present day.  His account begins where Fascism ends:  at the conclusion of 
World War II when Italy was forced to rebuild itself.  Bodei shows how the Italian people’s 
sense of national identity, which had always been somewhat insecure, came to be divided 
between competing political ideologies presented by Catholicism and Communism.  Italians 
were forced to reconcile these differences in the context of the onset of the Cold War, which 
pitted the prosperity and consumerism of the United States against a utopian vision of a more 
egalitarian society allegedly represented by the Soviet Union.   
                                                 
4  In Italy, neoliberal reform is closely related to Europe’s "market-radical variant of neoliberalism" (Bohle 2005: 
58) and such reform has been largely governed by Italy’s membership in the EU (Bosia 2005; Kierzkowski 2002; 
Van Apeldoorn 2002).  
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Bodei investigates the process of cultural negotiation and analyzes the ethos of the Italian 
people in the spheres of family, military, politics, religion, the judiciary, and organized crime.5  
The ethos of a people is not a monolithic entity devoid of fracture; rather, it encompasses various 
articulations and stratifications.  Bodei views each institution or group as an issuer and trader of 
ethical values, as well as a mechanism to control and stabilize the stresses to which these values 
are continuously subjected.  These groups and institutions, partial in nature, are in constant 
competition with one another.  Bodei notes that the messy diversity of these distinct points of 
view is rendered even more fragmentary by the complexity of history.   
Bodei situates the roots of the ethos of the Italian Republic in the death of Fascism when 
all official points of reference suddenly disappeared and Italian citizens were confronted with a 
conflict of values that stuck at the heart of the social structure.  The obligations toward the state 
imposed by Fascism were no longer available to orient individual behavior.  Bodei lays out the 
implications of this and explains the significance of the end of Fascism to the Italian psyche 
during the first years of the Republic.  In more recent work, Bodei expresses a pessimistic view 
of an “increasingly uncertain, uncontrollable, and threatening” future that, thanks to a series of 
factors, turns politics into “an activity of risk management” (2010:163).6  The lack of a solid 
organizing principle and therefore lack of credible ideology in national and international politics 
exacerbates this uncertainty (Bodei 2010:163).   
In the post-script to We, the Divided (written eight years after the book was originally 
published in Italian), Bodei emphasizes the fact that Italy has become increasingly subsumed by 
                                                 
5 Bodei defines “ethos” as “the set of customs, norms and models of behavior (not always conscious or always 
commendable) that guide the actions of individuals within a determinate historical community” (2006:12). 
 
6 Bodei lists these factors as including “the depletion of resources, the financial crisis, temporary employment, 
global warming, famine for hundreds of millions of people, and terrorism” (2010:163). 
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processes of economic globalization and expresses fear that political uses of new forms of 
technology will enable new forms of planned subjugation of the masses.  He sees the risk of 
creating a new breed of human whose legitimate primary and secondary needs are satisfied and 
who lives (through the aid of commercial television) to consume.  Bodei asserts that the EU 
evolved from a “Hobbesian” project aimed at deterring war between European nation-states to a 
“Kantian” entity that defends human rights, but he expresses concern that the EU may be falling 
back into a Hobbesian state of being brought about by the decline of the guarantees of the 
welfare state and the military policies of the former Bush administration.   
As I will show, while there are recognizable similarities between Bodei’s Italy and the 
Italy I experienced, there are also marked differences, many of which are at least enabled by, or 
are even a direct consequence of, Italy’s status as a member of the EU.  While Bodei adequately 
explores the Cold War context and the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
Italian Republican ethos, for the most part he ignores the more positive consequences of Italy’s 
entry into the EU.  Thus, in order to more fully explain the recent emergence of an Italian ethos 
that orients individual behavior and demonstrates a new degree of faith in public institutions, I 
situate this project within a historical trajectory that takes account of Italy’s status as a member 
of the EU, and demonstrates the continued salience of the “Kantian” version of the EU as a 
defender of rights, albeit in a perhaps more roundabout and unintentional way that emanates 
from the bottom-up instead of the top-down.     
This project is also an attempt to move beyond the type of inquiry that results in the 
repetition of stereotypes of Italians as lacking public spirit, as the victims of their own “amoral 
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familism."7  The Italian LGBTI activists I worked with demonstrate a high degree of solidarity 
and, as observed by Loredana Sciolla, are not so much “amoral familists” or lacking in civic-
mindedness as they are cynical and suspicious of institutions.  (1997:48, 62-64).  In the Italian 
context, LGBTI activists are (following Bodei) but one group, partial in nature, competing with 
other groups and institutions as a trader of ethical values.8  Their vision for the future of Italy is 
one amid many; however, as I will demonstrate here, theirs is a vision that is slowly gaining 
traction, with real-world consequences.  Of course, theirs is a vision made possible by the 
continued salience of the "Kantian" version of the EU.  
Becoming European?  
Recent transformations in Italy wrought by the interrelated spheres of a changing 
composition of the population due to immigration, the precariousness of the individual’s 
economic life, and major demographic shifts in family life call former ways of being into 
question, thereby creating an opening to imagine new possibilities.  The LGBTI activists I 
                                                 
7  The term “amoral familism” was first used in 1958 by American anthropologist Edward Banfield to describe the 
behavior of villagers from a small, impoverished town in southern Italy.  Banfield defined “amoral familism” as “the 
inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or indeed, for any good transcending the immediate, 
material interest of the nuclear family (1958:10).”  Although Banfield’s thesis has been heavily criticized, the term 
“familism” has continued to be used in reference to not only Southern Italy, but Italy as a whole.  In his attempt to 
adapt the term to the realities of contemporary Italy, Paul Ginsborg, a British historian and scholar with over 30 
years’ experience in Italy, and the well-known author of History of Contemporary Italy (1990) and the updated Italy 
and its Discontents (2003), has suggested that “famililism” should be seen as a particular form of relationship 
between family, civil society and the state (2003:97).  In this view, “familism” is a form of relationship where the 
values and interests of the family take precedence over the relatively weak civil society and compensate for a 
profound distrust in the state.  Ginsborg sees the relatively high percentage of Italians who live with their parents 
until marriage, and often within the same building or within a few blocks from their parents after marriage, the 
relatively low divorce rates in Italy, and the fact that 83% of Italian businesses are family-owned, with less than 50 
employees (and are places where family loyalty, patriarchal control, and distrust of government prevail) as evidence 
of the continued salience of Italian “familism” (2003).  To the extent that one can say “familism” is still a factor in 
Italy, I submit that it signals a response to the failure of the nation-state to meet the needs of its citizens rather than 
the inherent inability of citizens to join together for the common good. 
 
8 Of course, LGBTI activists in Italy are not a single, cohesive group.  While there is frequent overlap and 
communication, there are a multitude of organizations working on a range of issues relevant to LGBTI persons in 
the various regions and cities throughout Italy.  I provide more detail on the history and current status of LGBTI 
activism in Italy in the following chapter.   
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describe here, like Muehlebach’s volunteers, are not complacent mass consumers.  They operate 
within an indeterminate political world that bespeaks an uncertain future and carries 
unanticipated consequences.     
As I will illustrate in chapter 5, the fragmentation of the nation-state is evident in 
quotidian conversations and events, and corresponds to a nation-state beleaguered by political 
impasse that continues to delegitimize and demoralize state institutions, creating a chasm in the 
(following Bodei) ethos of the Italian people.  Italian Historian Emanuel Rota asserts that the 
crisis of the nation-state has become common sense in Italy and that the inability of Italy to solve 
specific historical problems (of which the “Southern Question” is an example) has undercut the 
ideological basis for the nation-state (2011).  In light of the weakness of the Italian state, the 
failure of the nation-state in Italy is no surprise and the future of Italy is already post-national 
(Rota 2011).  This does appear to be the case.  Rota writes: 
 In the past few decades the intellectuals who have been discussing globalization have 
predicted the demise of the nation-state.  Italy is probably the first western country where 
such predictions have become common currency.  Given the fragility of Italian national 
identity and the weakness of the Italian state, the foundering of the nation-state in Italy 
should not be a surprise.  The celebrations for the 150th anniversary of political 
unification and their limited and controversial success in capturing the Italian political 
imagination should serve as reminder that nation-states are, despite their efforts to appear 
timeless and transcendental, recent, historically-specific creations (2011:1). 
In the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples, the crisis of the nation-
state manifests as a crisis of Italian identity.  A fragile national identity renders the nation-state 
vulnerable to outside influences.  And while its influence may be waning, a substantial part of 
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Italy remains beholden to the Roman Catholic Church (hereinafter "Church").  Due in large part 
to historical contingencies such as those mentioned by Rota, Italy lacks a strong national identity, 
which has heretofore enabled the Church to assert its social will in a manner that is 
disproportionate to its popular support by taking advantage of the fragmented nation-state.  
Conservative politicians in Italy enlist the Church (and vice-versa) as an ally to provide a vision 
of national identity based on the patriarchal family and Catholic social values.    
The EU, however, calls into question the status of the nation-state, and brings the 
possibility of new national and supranational identity formations to the forefront.  And while 
uncertainty has its downside, it also generates opportunity:  to state it bluntly, the EU has made it 
possible for Italians to imagine an Italy that is no longer beholden to the Vatican in matters 
concerning family life and law.  Through its provision of legal tools that empower activists to 
advance the recognition of LGBTI rights in Italy, the EU enables a fissure in the Vatican’s 
stronghold over national politics, thereby paving the way for new identity constructions that 
serve to further the cause of European integration and, in the process, alter the Italian ethos. 
Several anthropological studies of the EU have focused on EU identity formation.9  To 
date, there have been three basic anthropological approaches to EU identity construction (Wilken 
2012).  The first approach looks at attempts to bring about this identity through various cultural 
policies such as the adoption of EU symbols and the launching of campaigns designed to foster 
popular awareness of an EU identity.  For example, anthropologist Cris Shore argues that 
European integration is a project of the elite that is best understood as a cultural project designed 
to create a “European” people for a “European” state (2004, 2000, 1993).  This is because in 
                                                 
9 Here, I mean the EU as a discrete entity and do not intend to conflate the EU with “Europe.” The distinction will 
be taken up in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
  
18 
 
most political systems, especially democratic systems, “culture” is the fundamental building 
block upon which legitimacy is established (Shore 2000:3).  In its attempts to develop a 
European identity to buttress processes of integration, and thereby strengthen itself, the EU has 
increasingly relied on cultural politics, which include the creation of EU symbols, invented 
traditions, and a rewriting of history, as well as the development of Euro-statistics, EU 
citizenship, and a single currency in the form of the Euro (Shore 2000).  Shore questions whether 
the EU’s supranational ideal can ever be realized in the absence of a popular European 
consciousness.10  As his work evolves over time, Shore expresses greater skepticism about this 
possibility. Early on, Shore is guardedly optimistic:  anthropological theories stress that political 
realities are symbolically constructed and “it is reasonable to assume that with a steady 
consolidation and expansion of the European tier of authority the more recently created 
European political reality will herald a gradual but steady undermining of authority of existing 
nation states” (1993:790-791).  Later he claims that the people of Europe are unlikely to ever 
embrace the EU’s cultural policies.  According to Shore, the factors that give substance and 
legitimacy to the nation-state are not only social and historical, but are also embedded in 
everyday culture: 
                                                 
10 Shore queries:   
 
[C]an conditions be created for shifting popular loyalties and transcending the nation-state, as some 
theorists and EU enthusiasts predict?  Can love of Europe as a patria be engineered?  And if so, how might 
this be achieved?  What factors could precipitate the creation of “Europeanness” as a new category of 
subjectivity, or self-awareness?  It has become fashionable to conceptualise nation-states as “imagined 
communities,” to use Anderson’s (1983) phrase, invented through print capitalism, mass communication, 
mass education, historiography, conscription and other nation-building technologies.  But what insights 
does the history of nation-state-formation offer for understanding the invention of Europe as a geopolitical 
category?  (2000:3-4).  
 
  
19 
 
 Because of its history, and because its institutions have been adapted and reformed by 
successive generations, it has succeeded (where the EU has signally failed) in getting 
closer to its citizens and winning their consent to be governed.  That process took many 
decades to achieve (2004:40).   
But what if the institutions of the nation-state have never been fully adapted and reformed? What 
if the nation-state itself has a weak identity?  This is the scenario that exists in contemporary 
Italy and I contend that, while Italians are not any more likely to embrace the EU’s cultural 
symbols than, for example, the French or the English, they are perhaps more susceptible to the 
idea of a pan-EU identity that is capable of compensating for the nation-state’s inadequacies.11   
The second approach to the formation of an EU identity focuses directly on EU 
institutions themselves, and looks at how officials within these institutions work to bring about 
EU integration (Wilken 2012:133).  Since the 1990s several anthropologists undertook fieldwork 
inside EU institutions.  The team of Marc Abélès, Irène Bellier, and Maryon McDonald looked at 
the EU Commission and European Parliament.12  Abélès, Bellier, and McDonald were 
specifically asked by then-President of the Commission Jacques Delors to determine whether or 
not there existed a specific Commission culture and to assess the impact of different languages 
and national cultural traditions on working relationships and how a European identity might 
materialize in this context (Cini 2001).  Other anthropological work in the area of identity 
construction in EU institutions includes the work of Danish anthropologist Signe Ejersbo (1993), 
the work of American anthropologist Stacia Zabusky (1995, 2000), and the work of Swedish 
                                                 
11 Or, I submit, more willing to make use of a pan-European identity when necessary and/or convenient. 
 
12 Cris Shore also conducted fieldwork in the European Parliament and the Commission; however, as noted above, 
his work was primarily focused on EU cultural policies as opposed to the identity and construction of EU 
institutions. 
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anthropologist Renita Thedvall (2006, 2007).  Early work following this approach focused 
predominantly on identification with EU institutions.  More recent work looks at the increasing 
correspondence between national and European institutions, and considers the possibility of 
framing identity in reference to a transnational political space (Wilken 2012).   
While the foregoing are “from above” approaches, the third approach adopts a “bottom 
up” perspective and looks at the way that European integration provides a new framework for 
identity construction as persons and organizations increasingly define themselves in relation or 
opposition to the EU (Wilken 2012:126).  Anthropologist Lisanne Wilken observed that 
autochthonous minorities were among the first groups studied by anthropologists looking at the 
construction of European identity “from below” (2012:137).  Such groups include “kin-state 
minorities” that ended up on the wrong side of the national border following centuries of war in 
Europe, stateless “micronations,” and linguistic minorities that have struggled to keep their 
languages alive in the face of nation-states’ attempts to eradicate them.  European unification 
provides an opportunity for these groups to reframe their culture and identity.  Through their 
engagement in various forms of political cooperation with the EU, many of these groups have 
been able to reposition themselves vis-à-vis the nation-state and reframe their identities in a 
European context.  Wilken notes, “In a European Union stressing unity in diversity as the 
cultural ideal for cooperation and integration, autochthonous minorities have the opportunity to 
become co-creators of a new political reality.  They can reconstruct themselves as ‘Welsh 
Europeans’ or ‘Catalan Europeans’ and gain cultural recognition within a broader European 
context” (2012:137).  Representatives of autochthonous minorities cooperate with the EU in a 
variety of ways, including the setting up of EU-wide, NGO-like institutions and through the 
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creation of a European-wide political party (the European Free Alliance) that represents their 
interests in the European Parliament. 
Anthropologists who adopt a “from below” approach to the study of EU identity 
construction have also been interested in radical nationalists who frequently define themselves in 
opposition to the EU (e.g. Holmes 2000, 2008; McDonald 2006).  Radical nationalist groups 
seek to protect national or regional cultures against perceived threats from immigrants, 
“Eurocrats,” and elites, and emphasize intercultural incompatibilities between “natives” and 
“foreigners.”13   In doing so, such groups express a belief in a common foundation for European 
cultures and view European nations as belonging to an imagined “family of cultures” that share a 
common heritage based in Greek and Roman civilization and in Christianity (Wilken 2012:138).  
While the “imagined Europe” of radical nationalists is quite different from the “imagined 
Europe” of the EU, such groups nevertheless contribute to the real-world and discursive 
construction of European identity.  Recently, anthropologists have begun to investigate how 
various immigrant groups residing in EU member-states position themselves in relation to 
integration processes and sometimes end up creating European identities.  By way of example, 
Christina Moutsou (2006) has studied the relevance of the EU to the identity construction on the 
part of Turkish and Greeks immigrants living in Brussels, and Máiréad Nic Craith (2009) has 
looked at how immigrant intellectuals interpret their lives in Europe and as Europeans.   
The intervention that I make here adopts a hybrid approach.  It is top-down in its analysis 
of how EU law acts on the legal system of a member state and how that in turn promotes an EU 
identity.  At the same time, it is bottom-up in its exploration of the ways in which social actors in 
                                                 
13  "Eurocrat" is an informal, pejorative term used to describe a bureaucrat in the EU's European Civil Service. 
  
22 
 
Italy are making use of EU law to gain recognition of rights and in the process resituating their 
Italian identity within a larger EU identity.  What is a bit different from the scenario that I 
describe is the fact that, while there is in general cooperation between LGBTI activist groups in 
Italy and the EU, in this particular situation, Italian LGBTI activist groups are acting on their 
own, unsolicited by any EU institution or official.  The processes I describe here are not part of a 
larger cultural project initiated by the EU.  In fact, the EU has been generally reluctant to 
interfere with the family law of its member states, applying principles of “subsidiarity” and 
asserting that family law is a matter best left to the states’ discretion.  And while there is a stated 
interest in becoming more “European,” at least in terms of the recognition of rights for LGBTI 
persons, EU identity formation largely occurs as a side-effect (rather than as a goal) of the 
activists’ activities.  In addition, the delineation of an EU citizenship that overrides the interests 
of the nation-state in this particular area of law (and thereby fosters European identity) requires 
the cooperation of the Italian courts.  While the activists play a fundamental role in carving out a 
transnational citizenship, in the end it is the Italian courts that are largely responsible for 
advancing processes of European integration.   
The Judicialization of Italian Politics 
While this study contributes to both the anthropology of Italy and anthropology of the EU 
in the area of EU identity construction, it also contributes to themes of judicial activism in civil 
law courts and to the increasing judicialization of Italian politics.  Over the past several years, the 
evolving role of the Italian judiciary as policy-shaper and policy-maker has become a topic of 
interest for scholars (Marmo 2007; Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997a, 1997b).  Although the 
increasing importance of court decisions and the role that they play in the formulation of public 
policy is one of the major trends characterizing contemporary democracies (Tate 1995; Vallinder 
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1995), the degree to which judicial activism has manifested in Italy is arguably unique (Pederzoli 
and Guarnieri 1997b). While judicial activism in Italy is partially explained by the fact that EU 
membership has resulted in a modification of Italian hierarchical legal sources that positions EU 
law at a national constitutional level (and leads to the subrogation of national law in certain 
areas), in the case of the struggle over rights for same-sex couples, it is obvious that something 
more is at stake.  As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 4, the decisions coming out of the Italian 
courts go well beyond the mere invocation and enforcement of EU law and evidence an 
increased judicialization of Italian politics.   
In Italy, the rise in judicial activism and the increasing judicialization of politics is related 
to what Jürgen Habermas and others have described as a crisis of legitimation (Plant 1982). 
When the authority of legislatures, presidents, prime ministers, civil servants, and other political 
actors is undermined and the political process is deadlocked or otherwise blocked, the courts 
provide an alternative avenue for the formulation of policy choices.14  Judicial activism in Italy 
in this case is largely a response to the failure of the legislative and executive to adapt to 
changing social conditions.  
Scholars who have studied the Italian situation have, for the most part, focused on what it 
is about the internal structure of the Italian legal and political systems that make for a unique 
case of judicial activism in Italy. Such scholars attribute increased activism to the creation and 
development of Italy’s Constitutional Court following World War II (Del Duca and Del Duca 
2006; Volcansek 1991), as well as to changes in the institutional setting that now guarantee a 
                                                 
14  Although not particularly relevant in the context of recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, it should 
be mentioned that judicial activism can also serve to legitimize policies enacted by the legislature, thereby fostering 
political stability. 
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larger measure of judicial independence (Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997a). Scholars also view 
Italian judicial activism as a response to political corruption, terrorism, and widespread 
organized criminality, which in turn led to granting strong powers to public prosecutors (Clark 
2003; Del Duca and Del Duca 2006; Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997a, 1997b).15  Still other 
scholars have opted to frame the judicialization of Italian politics as concomitant with processes 
of "Americanization" (Newell 2005). It is worth noting that the studies I have just referred to 
have all dealt specifically with the Italian criminal law system. This is because the criminal 
system has been where judicial activism, at least in its most negative sense, has been regularly 
alleged, largely in response to the inadequacies of the Italian criminal justice system and 
perceived overreaching on the part of judges. Few, if any, studies have dealt with the subject of 
judicial activism in Italy outside the criminal justice system as I do here.   
Making Italians Means Making Families? 
 It is important to point out that the battle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples 
(and the more specific fight for marriage equality) takes place in the context of a larger demand 
for family law reform in Italy.16  Family law plays a central role in establishing norms, 
influencing opinion, and reinforcing a particular vision of social organization (Bradley 2004).  
Laws defining who is a family member often determine levels of social entitlement, and thus 
                                                 
15  Although there was a wholesale reform of Italy’s criminal justice system in 1989, and the new code now 
advocates the adversarial arrangement of Anglo-American systems, the Italian judiciary still exhibits the 
interventionist attitude of the pretore d’assalto (assault judge) and the revised criminal justice system continues to 
grant the judiciary extraordinary power in that the same body has the authority (in full independence) to select the 
cases to be filed and to adjudicate them, thereby limiting the passivity of the judge as a check on his/her lack of 
political accountability (Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997b). 
 
16 Family law is defined here as the multi-faceted area of law that deals with family relations and governs matters 
such as inheritance, marriage, reproduction, divorce, spousal maintenance, the division of marital assets, child 
custody, and child support. 
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have direct bearing on the material well-being of entire categories of people.  The principles of 
social order that are implicit in a national family law reflect the degree to which the state is 
willing to intervene in the autonomy of the family:  “[a]t issue will be [the state’s] approach to 
gender equality and commitment to pluralism, not least in relation to ethnic groups and sexual 
orientation” (Bradley 2004).   
 As a nation-state, Italy remains deeply divided regarding how “family” should be 
defined.  It is no secret that, as an institution, the family occupies a special position in Italy.  In 
1948, after the fall of the fascist state, Italy enacted a new Constitution.  Unlike the U.S. 
Constitution, which has never mentioned “family” or any of its traditional parts (i.e., “husband 
and wife,” “spouses,” “marriage,” “parent and child”), the Italian Constitution of 1948, Article 
29, explicitly recognizes the rights of the family "come società naturale fondata sul matrimonio" 
(translation:  "as a natural society founded on marriage").17  Marriage is based on the moral and 
legal equality of husband and wife, within the limits laid down by law for ensuring the unity of 
the family.  Article 30 provides that it is the duty and right of parents to raise and educate their 
children, even if born out of wedlock.  Finally, in Article 31, the State is charged with assisting, 
by economic and other provisions, the formation of the family and fulfillment of its duties, with 
particular consideration for large families.  The State is also charged with establishing the 
necessary institutions for the protection of mothers, infants, and children.18 
                                                 
17 In Italian, Article 29 reads as follows:  "La Repubblica riconosce i diritti della famiglia come società naturale 
fondata sul matrimonio.  Il matrimonio è ordinato sull'eguaglianza morale e giuridica dei coniugi, con i limiti 
stabiliti dalla legge a garanzia dell'unità familiare" (translation:  "The Republic recognizes the rights of the family 
as a natural society founded on marriage [matrimony].  Marriage [Matrimony] is based on the moral and legal 
equality of the spouses, within the limits laid down by law to guarantee the unity of the family"). 
 
18  Article 31 (in Italian):  "La Repubblica agevola con misure economiche e altre provvidenze la formazione della 
famiglia e l'adempimento dei compiti relativi, con particolare riguardo alle famiglie numerose.  Protegge la 
maternità, l'infanzia e la gioventù, favorendo gli istituti necessari a tale scopo" (translation:  "The Republic shall 
encourage family formation and the fulfillment of related duties, with particular consideration for large families, 
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The 1948 Constitution is a product of compromise that was shaped by Christian 
democratic, liberal (understood as the heir of 19th Century liberalism) and socialist-communist 
ideologies.  During the Constituent Assembly, each group fought to influence the final text to 
reflect its values.  As a result the parts of the Constitution relating to family and marriage (which 
were heavily influenced by Christian democrats) reflect Roman Catholic-oriented natural law 
themes, whereas other parts such as those dealing with workers rights’ are more indicative of 
socialist thought.  Interesting, however, is the fact that, while the Italian Constitution explicitly 
mentions marriage, it does not specifically define marriage or recognize a particular type of 
marriage as valid.  Further, there is no mention of gender in the provision regarding marriage.  
LGBTI activists have seized on this in support of their claims for marriage equality to argue that 
same-sex marriage is not contrary to the constitution.19    
Since World War II, the “liberalization” of standards on sexuality and family life has 
played a significant role in Italy’s so-called “modernization” (Gilbert 2007).  By “liberalization,” 
I simply mean the reform and loosening of strictures.  Despite the fact that most Western 
European nation-states introduced laws providing for divorce during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, Italy refused to do so.  In December 1970, the Italian Parliament introduced a 
law legalizing divorce.  The divorce law forced the renegotiation of the relationship between a 
husband and wife, which led to a reassessment of the rights of the family in 1975, and to the 
establishment of the principle of equal rights for married couples, as well as the rejection of the 
                                                 
through economic measures and other benefits.  The Republic shall protect mothers, children and the young by 
adopting the necessary provisions"). 
 
19 While the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage, several articles of the Civil Code do 
reference individuals of opposite sex in relation to marriage.  For example, Articles 107 and 108 refer to the "wife" 
and "husband" as actors of the celebration and Artlces 231 and ff refer to "filiation."  
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absolute power of the husband and disparity in the treatment of adultery cases (Bodei 2006).  
Italians saw these changes in law as a pivotal moment in the nation’s history.  Not only did the 
divorce law involve a rethinking of the relationship between husband and wife, it also shifted the 
relationship between Church and State.  The law’s enactment signaled a State victory for 
jurisdiction over the institution of the family.  This victory was subsequently reinforced in May 
1980, when 67.9% of the Italian population approved a referendum legalizing abortion.   
Perhaps because these reforms came upon the heels of the social movements of the 
1960s, historians of Italy have tended to view it as a late twentieth century issue, “as an indicator 
that the nation had finally shed the last vestiges of medievalism and become fully ‘modern’” 
(Seymour 2005:298).  However, as Mark Seymour points out, the debates over divorce in the 
1960s and 1970s were the grand culmination of a sporadic but significant series of deliberations 
that began with Italian reunification in 1860 (Seymour 2005:298).  Most scholars who have 
studied the debates leading to the legalization of divorce and abortion in Italy ignore the broader 
historical trajectory and instead focus on politico-institutional aspects of the debates.  In this 
vein, the history and development of Italian family law is often read as a clash between two 
worldviews:  “the struggle between a conservative concept of human nature, underpinned by 
Catholicism, in which marriage constrains sexual urges for the benefit of society, against a more 
liberal ideal of marriage as the product of the continuing exercise of individual free will” 
(Seymour 2005:298).  While this struggle between opposing worldviews within the nation-state 
is intrinsic to the development of family law in Italy, I choose here to adopt a broader framework 
in order to capture the present dynamic in which the push to reform Italian family law occurs.  I 
position Italy, not as a nation-state performing sovereignty in the area of family law, but rather as 
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a viable member of a supranational entity negotiating its status as a nation-state in an 
increasingly globalized world.    
The focus of this project could have been different.  For example, anthropologists 
working on gender and sexuality might opt to frame the study in terms of rights or, more 
explicitly, what Italian activists’ invocation of certain rights says about what it means to be 
LGBTI in contemporary Italy.  Other scholars may have decided to look at this as a study of 
contemporary social movements, perhaps implicitly or explicitly comparing the struggle over 
rights for same-sex couples in Italy to “social movement” theory in other parts of the world such 
as Latin America.  Still others may have wanted to approach this as a study about Italian 
modernity and urbanity.  Any of these framings could make sense.  I, however, have chosen to 
talk about the social engineering role played by law in the construction of gender and identity in 
the context of a nation-state’s relationship to a supranational entity.  I am fascinated by the 
interplay between law and society, and the ways that law can be used to maintain the status quo 
and to create new ways of being in the world.  Using the struggle over recognition of rights for 
same-sex couples as a window on larger processes of Europeanization and European integration, 
this dissertation provides insights regarding the effects of internationalization on the legal system 
of a nation-state.   
Fieldwork 
The account I present here is based on participant-observation fieldwork, interviews, and 
over four- and-a-half years of tracking online discussions and media sources dealing with LGBTI 
rights in Italy, and in Europe more broadly, between May 2009 and February 2014.  Between 
July 2009 and February 2011, I spent over a year in Italy, living first in Rome and later in Turin, 
and working with various LGBTI rights advocates in Italy and the EU.  When I first 
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conceptualized this project, I did not speak Italian.  I applied for and received summer and 
academic year Foreign Language Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowships.  I spent the summer of 2008 
at the University of Virginia Summer Language Institute in a near-immersion accelerated 
language program.  I continued my study of Italian during the following academic year, 
preparing for my first trip to Italy.  Thereafter, I continued to study, read, and practice speaking 
Italian in an effort to improve my ability to communicate in the field.  For me, learning Italian 
was one of the most challenging aspects of the project. 
Part of the challenge arose from the fact that I was not a “traditional” graduate student.  I 
was thirty-nine when I began graduate school.  I am a single parent to a (now) eleven year old 
boy.  My son was two-and-a-half years old when I began graduate school, and has played an 
integral part in my PhD journey.  At various times, he has been forced to attend classes, lectures, 
meetings, and social engagements with me.  Finding time to read, study, work, and live up to the 
expectations of a PhD program while parenting an active, intelligent child with a mind and 
preferences of his own has been an exhilarating, exhausting, and sometimes fraught experience.  
The fact that I also had to learn a foreign language (to which I had no previous exposure) placed 
me well outside my comfort zone.   
The PhD program in anthropology was a complete shift in career for me.  I graduated 
from college in 1988, with a degree in business, and thereafter attended law school. Upon 
graduation from law school in 1991, the United States Department of Justice hired me as part of 
the Attorney General’s Honors Program.  I spent the bulk of my career (over ten years) working 
as an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), first in New Mexico, and then in Arizona.  As 
an AUSA I was in federal court several times each week and represented the United States in a 
multitude of criminal cases dealing with immigration, drug trafficking, firearms offenses, fraud, 
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tax evasion, sexual assault, domestic violence, physical assault, child abuse, child pornography, 
and juvenile justice.  While I generally enjoyed this work, it has been a lifelong dream to pursue 
a PhD in anthropology so I decided to apply to graduate school.   
My return to graduate school constituted a significant lifestyle change.  Not only was I 
abandoning a relatively secure career path, at mid-life I suddenly found myself supporting a 
child on a graduate student’s stipend/salary.  Most of my cohorts were 7-14 years younger than 
me.  I went from being a relatively autonomous, successful, attorney to the role of student.  It 
was disorienting at best.  To become an anthropologist, I had to learn to let go of “thinking like a 
lawyer,” and this was not easy.  Initially, I intended to make a complete break from the law but 
as I progressed through graduate school, I found myself increasingly drawn to legal 
anthropology, and became especially interested in the role judges and courts play in shaping law 
and society.  In addition, I had always been fascinated by the EU and interactions between EU 
law and the law of its member states.  In particular, I was aware of and excited by the prospect of 
the EU as an imagined community at the forefront of human and civil rights.   
Originally, I planned to do my dissertation on the harmonization of EU family law; 
however, as I began working in this area, I became aware of the ongoing struggle over rights for 
same-sex couples in Italy.  Compared to other long-term members of the EU, Italy seemed to be 
an anomaly in terms of recognizing rights for same-sex couples.  The subject combined all of my 
pet interests, including law, religion, human rights, courts, judges, activism, and notions of 
justice.  Consequently, I decided to focus on the struggle for recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples in Italy.  My choice of topic seemed odd to some of my friends outside the academy.  I 
identify as a heterosexual and am also Roman Catholic.  Some of my Catholic friends, 
especially, wondered how I reconciled my religious identity with my adamant support for 
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LGBTI persons and engagement with LGBTI activism.  My response was and continues to be 
that I do not see the two as at odds with each other; hence, there is no need for reconciliation.    
During the first part of my six month stay in Rome, I was accompanied by my son, who 
was seven years old at the time.  My mother and my father (who had agreed to accompany me to 
help with the care of my son) also came along.  The original plan was that my family would 
remain with me for the entire six months; however, several events conspired to lessen the time 
my family stayed with me in Italy.  Shortly before we were due to leave, my father was 
diagnosed with frontal lobe dementia.  My mother, son, and I were struggling to come to terms 
with this horrible condition that robbed my father of his short-term memory and many of his 
social graces.  Immediately prior to the diagnosis, he was functioning same as always.  He had 
successfully tiled the bathrooms in our house and completed a number of other household 
improvement projects.  Seemingly overnight he was unable to recount what had been said or 
done from one hour to the next.     
The second thing that altered our plans was the difficulty in obtaining a visa for my son.  
My first encounter with the Italian Consulate in Chicago was a disaster.  After carefully reading 
the information presented on their website, making the requisite appointment, completing the 
visa application form, gathering and photocopying (and double-checking) what the website told 
me were the necessary supporting documents, and sitting (somewhat) patiently in the waiting 
area of the Consulate for most of the morning, I learned from the Consulate worker at the office 
window that it would be near-impossible to obtain a visa for my son.  To acquire the visa, I 
would first need to obtain a permesso di soggiorno (a residence permit) from the local police 
where we would be living (in Italy) and then return (to the United States) to initiate the visa 
application process.  This would take several months as there was no guarantee regarding the 
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processing time for the permesso di soggiorno.  I was incredulous.  As a graduate student, I 
could not afford (financially or time-wise) to travel back and forth for the visa.   
Fortunately, my mother offered to return to the U.S. with my son and father at the end of 
the three (3) month time period allowed for U.S. passport holders without a visa to stay in Italy, 
leaving me so I could finish the initial round of fieldwork in Rome on my own.  I did not relish 
the idea.  At this point, the longest period I had been away from my son was one time for two 
weeks.  As a single parent, I felt especially guilty.  My son depended on me.  In addition to the 
day-to-day activities and interaction, I was going to miss being with him on Halloween, 
Thanksgiving and his birthday.  As it turned out, in addition to the over 3 months in Rome 
without my son, the following year, I spent approximately six months in Turin on my own 
without my family.  I survived, but not without a lot of angst and guilt.   
     In Italy, the organization I was most involved with was Associazione Radicale Certi 
Diritti (Certi Diritti), a civil rights organization, with multiple objectives, including, but not 
limited to:  preventing  and combating of all forms of violence, abuse, and discrimination based 
on gender identity and/or sexual orientation; assisting victims of violence; promoting the 
freedom and sexual responsibility of the person; instigating and supporting initiatives to fight 
discrimination; and helping and defending individuals, couples, and other organizations and 
institutions in the advancement and protection of rights associated with gender identity and/or 
sexual orientation.  While in Italy, I was able to interview several leaders and activists, and to 
participate in Certi Diritti's national conferences.  Over the past couple of years, I have assisted 
Certi Diritti with the translation of numerous press releases and other documents from Italian 
into English. In chapter 2, I explain in detail how and why I came to be involved with Certi 
Diritti.  I also spent time on the streets with LGBTI activists in Turin, assisting with and 
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participating in grassroots events designed to bring public awareness to issues confronting 
LGBTI persons in Italy.     
My first experience with LGBTI activism at the European level came about in a 
somewhat fortuitous manner.  It just so happened that ILGA-Europe was holding its 15th Annual 
Conference in Turin during the time I was there doing fieldwork.  ILGA-Europe is the European 
Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association, a non-
governmental umbrella organization comprised of approximately 408 organizations from 45 of 
the 49 countries in Europe.  The theme of the 15th Annual Conference, which was held October 
27-30, 2011, was "Human Rights and ‘Traditional Values':  Clash or Dialogue?," which was 
directly relevant to my research on the struggle over rights for same-sex couples in a Catholic 
country.  Thinking it would be a good way to meet a lot of people and make relevant contacts for 
the future, I decided to volunteer to help out with the conference.  I did not know what to expect 
when I sent off an e-mail to the local organizers introducing myself and offering assistance; 
however, I received a quick response and was put into contact with the “two V’s.”  Both Vs are 
attractive, intelligent, Italian women in their late 20s, committed to LGBTI activism.  Before I 
knew it, I was part of the "local staff" for the conference.  In the weeks that followed, I bonded 
with several members of the local staff and forged valuable relationships that were vital to my 
research.  I also began to realize the labyrinth of LGBTI activism at the European level, a 
relatively organized web of relationships and activities that in many ways mirrors the EU and 
Europe.   
I was fortunate to have generous contacts at the University of Rome “La Sapienza” who 
introduced me to members of the law faculty. I was invited to sit in on law classes and observe 
the teaching of law in Italy, which I learned differs in fundamental ways from the way that law is 
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taught in U.S. law schools.  This helped me to better apprehend the roles of law and legal 
practitioner (including judges) in Italian society.  Members of the law faculty, along with 
practicing attorneys I met, helped me better understand the development and current status of 
family law in Italy.  I also spent time in Italian civil and criminal courts, speaking with and 
shadowing attorneys.  I observed a variety of proceedings and it was here that I was able to 
glimpse firsthand the role played by the Italian courts in the larger legal area and better 
appreciate Italian skepticism about the ability of law to accomplish anything.    
In order to gain a broader perspective, I reached out to members of the Roman Catholic 
Church hierarchy as well, and was able to meet and speak with some of its active members.  
Being “on the ground” in Italy, I was able to see how the Church mobilizes its political power 
through politicians and the activities of key affiliates such as Alleanza Cattolica (AC), an Italian 
civic and cultural organization made up of Catholic lay people whose ultimate goal is to realize 
the social doctrine of the Catholic Church in society (i.e., establish a Christian temporal order).20  
Alleanza Cattolica has become increasingly vocal in its opposition to proposed legislation in 
Italy that would grant recognition to same-sex cohabitating couples.  In Rome, I participated in a 
six week seminar sponsored by the Lay Center at Foyer Unitas.  The sessions provided an 
overview of the teachings of the Church on Christian discernment and decision-making, and 
touched on Church teachings related to issues of human sexuality and marriage.  During the 
course of this seminar it became apparent to me that I needed to know more about canon law, 
                                                 
20  Alleanza Cattolica works to follow the papal teachings and periodically offers instruction to its members.  One of 
its main goals is to provide formation in the face of the predominant secularization of Europe.  The association 
organizes conferences, meetings, and workshops on Christian and "natural" political culture, and on historical events 
or news items, interpreting them in light of the "changeless social moral."  It publishes a magazine titled Cristianità.   
(See http://www.alleanzacattolica.org/languages/english/ac_attivita.htm).   
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especially as it pertains to issues of human sexuality and the marriage law of the Church.  As a 
result, during the summer of 2011, I spent time as a visiting scholar in the Faculty of Canon Law 
at a prestigious European university.  This visit proved to be an ideal environment in which to 
test my interpretation of the socio-legal challenge presented by Church and State relations in the 
EU in general and Italian family law in particular.  I used this time to study and consult with 
faculty members in order to gain a better understanding of what is at stake, from the perspective 
of the Church, in the worldwide battle over marriage equality for same-sex couples as well as the 
more specific question of family law reform in Italy. 
What is to Follow  
In an effort to provide a holistic account of the contemporary struggle for recognition of 
rights for same-sex couples in Italy, I have opted to approach the subject from the perspectives of 
the main protagonists:  the activists, the Italian Courts, and the EU.  In the following chapters, I 
“twist the dial,” so to speak, looking specifically at the struggle through the lens of the 
relationship between the respective protagonist and the law.  I ask specifically what each 
protagonist does with the law and what in turn is done to each protagonist in the name of law.  I 
look at the points of conflict as well as points of harmony within and between each group.  My 
goal is to help readers better understand this phenomenon and the conditions under which it is 
unfolding  
In chapter 2, I provide a description of the problem, looking closely at the activities of 
Italian LGBTI activist groups currently fighting for marriage equality, and focusing specifically 
on the Affermazione Civile campaign initiated by Italian LGBTI activist groups Associazione 
Radicali Certi Diritti and Avvocatura per i Diritti LGBT (Rete Lenford).  Through the 
Affermazione Civile project, Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford have deliberately embraced court 
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action as a mechanism for change in an area of law that has long been subject to political 
impasse.  By framing the relevant issues in terms of “rights,” these groups are able to take 
advantage of the opening created by the EU and use law to access the national legal system.  Not 
only do the activities of Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford demonstrate unprecedented faith in the 
ability of state institutions and the rule of law to serve as societal transformers, they also 
reinforce a (notion of) European citizenship based on rights that originate in secular humanistic 
notions of social justice.  Albeit not necessarily intentional, the activities of these activist groups 
also further the formation of a European identity and thereby carry consequences for the project 
of European integration.     
I begin chapter 2 with a short discussion concerning some of the different legal statuses 
used to recognize same-sex relationships to make clear what I mean by rights for same-sex 
couples.  I do this in order to better explain the significance of marriage equality (as opposed to 
some other recognition for cohabiting same-sex couples) in Italy.  One of the points I make is 
that, due to particularities in the Italian Constitution, any result less than full marriage equality 
will ultimately prove discriminatory with respect to same-sex couples.  In this same chapter, I 
offer a brief history of the struggle over recognition of rights (in general) for LGBTI persons in 
Italy, noting the main players, their strategies, and some of their historical achievements.  This is 
necessary not only to illuminate connections and disconnections between the major protagonists, 
but also to explain the shifting nature of Italian LGBTI activism over the years and how it has 
come to be what it is at the present moment.  I then focus specifically on the struggle for 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples, looking primarily at Certi Diritti, Rete Lenford, and 
the Affermazione Civile campaign.      
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As will be made clear in chapter 2, much of the resistance to same-sex marriage is due to 
the opponents' perceived need to protect the so-called "traditional" family.  For this reason, in 
order to better understand the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, 
one must know something about the role(s) of family in contemporary Italy.  In chapter 3, I 
consider the relevance of “the family” as a central institution in Italy.  I begin with an overview 
of family life in contemporary Italy, highlighting the role of marriage in structuring family 
relationships.  I then show how, despite all of the stereotypes and posturing, the so-called 
"traditional" family has lost substantial ground in Italy.  Today, in Italy, as in the rest of the EU, 
there exists a plethora of family arrangements.  Despite this, the family retains an important 
support role that makes up for the State's inability to deal with the ongoing economic crisis in 
Italy.  One of the points that I make in this chapter is that, while the Italian family has changed 
significantly, Italian family law has not.  I explain why this is problematic and illustrate how 
certain politicians make use of notions of the traditional family in an attempt to foster a sense of 
Italian nationalism based on Catholic social values.  This in turn prevents politicians from taking 
action and adopting much-needed reforms in area of family law, including the recognition for 
families headed by same-sex couples.   
I turn my attention to the response of the Italian courts in Chapter 4.  In recognizing 
certain rights for same-sex couples, Italian courts display signs of a flourishing judicial activism 
and attendant judicialization of politics.  I begin this chapter with an overview of the Italian 
judicial system and follow up in the subsequent sections with discussions regarding the 
education, selection and training of judges, as well as the role(s) played by judges in the Italian 
system. This background is necessary to fully appreciate the character and degree of judicial 
activism manifested in response to the Affermazione Civile project.  After an exploration of the 
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meanings of “judicial activism” and “judicialization,” I apply these terms to the Italian context in 
order to explain the significance of the court decisions in the Affermazione Civile campaign.  The 
courts’ decisions are important not only to the advancement of LGBTI rights in Italy, but also to 
the further delineation of a transnational EU citizenship and processes of European integration.   
In chapters 5 and 6, I move away from Italy and take a closer look at the EU.  In chapter 
5, in conjunction with a brief discussion of what the EU is, I explore how various institutions 
within the EU structure and generate contemporary debate over marriage equality in the member 
states.  In Chapter 5 I also make the point that the fragmented nation-state in Italy renders its 
citizens more susceptible to the influence of the EU. In the case of Italian LGBTI activists 
seeking recognition of rights for same-sex couples, “Europe” is frequently invoked as a trope of 
progressivism to advance the recognition of rights they possess as citizens of the EU.  This is in 
large part due to the failure of lawmakers in the nation-state to adequately meet the demands of a 
changing society and to recognize (through law) the existence of contemporary family 
formations.  Through their activities, and with the cooperation of the Italian and European courts, 
Italian LGBTI activists reinforce and further delineate an EU citizenship that serves the project 
of European integration in its “Kantian” mode as a defender of rights.   
In chapter 6, I devote special attention to the activities of the European Court of Justice, 
as well as to the European Court of Human Rights.  I do this because it is the European courts, 
more than any other European or EU institution, which have influenced and advanced the 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Europe and Italy.  In this chapter, I also briefly 
discuss efforts to “harmonize” family law in the EU and offer a statement of the current legal 
situation.  While there have been attempts to “harmonize” the family law of the member states, 
to date such efforts have made little progress.  The EU continues to invoke notions of 
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subsidiarity to declare family law as a matter best left to the discretion of the member states.  
This is problematic as it affects the free movement of European citizens and their “family” 
members, and creates disparate categories of EU citizenship that privilege allegedly traditional 
hetero-normative families and all-too-often disenfranchise so-called alternative families.  
Through the case law articulated by the European courts, one can see a piecemeal attempt to 
create a more unified system of recognition for same-sex couples in the face of the unwillingness 
of the legislative bodies to take on the task of harmonizing the substantive family laws of the EU 
member states.       
Chapter 6 is a bit of an anomaly.  In general, this project is situated within a much larger 
milieu of studies dealing with relationships between law and society and legal anthropology.  To 
this end, it is indebted to the work of legal anthropologists and other social scientists that has 
come before it.  As with preceding anthropological work of this nature, this dissertation 
investigates a specific setting to get at larger issues such as power, control, and justice.  It looks 
at how rules and laws are normalized, as well as at who establishes the rules, who can overrule 
them, and the possibilities for intervention (see Moore 2005).  I follow a trend in legal 
anthropology that attempts to reckon with transnational processes and uses law as a means to 
study fields of action that are not always amenable to direct observation. 21  In chapter 6, 
however, I move away from the typical anthropological approach and embrace a method that is 
usually undertaken by legal scholars.  Here I use doctrinal analysis to get at what is going on in 
recent European and Italian court decisions dealing with rights for same-sex couples.22     
                                                 
21 E.g., Coutin (2000); Merry (1992, 1997), Ong (1999). 
 
22  In general, “legal doctrine” is composed of judicial decisions.  To this end, “doctrinal analysis” consists of 
analyzing court decisions to see how they create rules or standards and establish legal precedents.  
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By the time s/he has reached chapter 7, the reader will no doubt have noted that LGBTI 
activists in Italy see the Church as their major opponent and as the primary obstacle to the 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  I, however, am not convinced that the struggle in 
Italy is really between the Church and proponents of marriage equality.  In Chapter 7, I return to 
the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, and look at the particular 
relationship between Church and State in contemporary Italian politics.  The point I make here is 
that, while the Church has been a thorn in the side of LGBTI activists fighting for rights, and has 
definitely influenced political processes in Italy, in many ways the Church has been reified in the 
discourse surrounding the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy.  I 
take this up in this chapter and talk about recent Church events (most notably the unexpected 
resignation of Pope Benedict the XVI and his replacement by Pope Francis) that perhaps signal a 
change in Church attitudes and responses to same-sex couples, as well as to the future of the EU.   
In the Conclusion, I tie everything together to illustrate how recent changes with respect 
to the treatment of same-sex couples in Italy are the direct result of the EU’s influence on the 
nation-state in general and its judicial system in particular.  This points to larger issues regarding 
sovereignty and territoriality, and demonstrates how profound changes in the status of the nation-
state occur through often unintended and peripheral post-national identity formations in which 
the state itself is implicated.   
I conclude the dissertation on an optimistic note.  Law and policy with respect to same-
sex couples in Italy and the EU continue to develop, even as I write this.  There can be little 
doubt that law and policy with respect to same-sex couples in Italy will have changed again by 
the time this is finished.  At the moment, Italian politicians are debating the possibility of civil 
unions, while Certi Diritti activists are demanding full marriage equality.  A little over four years 
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ago, when I began my research, recognition in the form of a civil union seemed unobtainable and 
full marriage equality was practically unthinkable.  Now, both are a remote possibility.   
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Chapter 2:  A Description of the Struggle over Rights for Same-Sex Couples in Italy 
In this chapter I describe the contemporary struggle over recognition of rights for same-
sex couples in Italy, and demonstrate how LGBTI activists are taking advantage of opportunities 
made possible by Italy’s membership in the EU to successfully advance the recognition of 
certain rights.  A thorough analysis of the struggle requires an investigation of the relationships 
between an array of phenomena, and one of my ultimate goals is to show the different 
perspectives from which the struggle emerges and is sustained.  However, while this chapter is 
intended in part as a general overview and introduction to the struggle, its main focus is on the 
Italian activists involved in the ongoing battle.  I will elaborate other relevant perspectives in the 
following chapters.   
Although there are additional LGBTI organizations fighting for the rights of same-sex 
couples in Italy, Associazione Radicale Certi Diritti (Certi Diritti) is currently leading the 
charge, in collaboration with Avvocatura per i Diritti LGBT (Rete Lenford), most notably 
through an innovative national campaign titled “Affermazione Civile,” which seeks to promote 
rights through the deployment of judicial initiatives.  The ultimate goal of the Affermazione 
Civile campaign is marriage equality in Italy.  The Affermazione Civile campaign’s success, 
while arguably limited (especially according to the activists involved), is unprecedented in Italy.  
For the first time, activists have been able to move the battle over recognition of rights for same-
sex couples beyond theoretical abstraction and political debate into the realm of concrete action.   
 LGBTI activism in Italy arose from the revolutionary militant struggles of the 1968 
students' revolts and demonstrations of organized workers.  Early Italian LGBTI activists (a 
number of whom are still active and leaders in the LGBTI movement today) sought to overthrow 
the traditional structures of the capitalist class system, including heteronormative structures such 
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as the traditional family.  As will be seen, however, in the current struggle for marriage equality, 
certain LGBTI activists are now embracing and seeking participation in the very structures their 
predecessors sought to do away with.  By framing their demands in terms of “rights,” these 
groups are able to take advantage of the opening created by the EU and use law to access the 
national legal system, which (as I illustrate in Chapter 4) has been undergoing a transformation 
of its own due in no small part to the influence of the EU.  How all of this happened is one of the 
topics I address in this chapter.  
I begin the chapter with a short discussion about some of the different legal statuses used 
to recognize same-sex relationships in order to make clear what I mean by rights for same-sex 
couples.  The recognition of rights for same-sex couples can take various forms, and it is 
important to understand some of the key differences between them.  I continue the chapter with 
an abbreviated history of the struggle over recognition of rights (in general) for LGBTI persons 
in Italy, noting the main players, their strategies, and some of their historical achievements.  I do 
this to demonstrate specific connections and disconnections between the leading players, as well 
as to explain the shifting nature of Italian LGBTI activism over the years.  I spend considerable 
time discussing one organization in particular, FUORI!, because of its direct links and continued 
influence on Certi Diritti (Certi Diritti).     
I then focus specifically on the struggle for recognition of rights for same-sex couples in 
Italy, looking primarily at Certi Diritti, Rete Lenford, and the Affermazione Civile campaign.  I 
note that the Affermazione Civile campaign is taking place alongside a broader campaign by 
Certi Diritti for comprehensive family law reform in Italy.  This is important to know in order to 
better contextualize the Affermazione Civile campaign in the broader scheme of Italian family 
law.  My aim here is to explain the significance of marriage equality (as opposed to, for example, 
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civil unions or some other form of recognition for cohabitating couples) as the driving objective 
of the Affermazione Civile campaign.  I contend that due to particularities in the Italian 
Constitution that simultaneously echo and influence Italian notions of the “family” as an 
institution based on marriage, any result less than full marriage equality will ultimately prove 
discriminatory against same-sex couples.  Certi Diritti activists are well aware of this and in the 
past couple of years have ramped up calls for marriage equality, decrying other forms of 
recognition.    
Another point I make in this chapter is that, by choosing to locate the struggle in the 
Italian courts, LGBTI activists have been able to effectively circumvent national political 
processes and the authority of the Church, in part by shifting focus from the nation-state to the 
supranational context.  While wholesale family law reform has not occurred, EU perspectives are 
beginning to creep into Italian law through judge-made law in the courts.  Why and how this 
occurs in a civil law country where judges are generally not deemed to make law, is the subject 
of Chapter 4.  I will conclude this chapter with a discussion and analysis of the preliminary 
results of the Affermazione Civile campaign. 
“Rights” for Same-Sex Couples 
 In a documentary made about the founding of FUORI!, Italy’s first gay liberation 
movement (2011), Italian actress Anna Cuculo notes that, when people talk about “rights,” about 
“gay” rights and “women’s” rights, there is great confusion.  They mix things up.  According to 
Cuculo, human rights should be the same for all human beings, regardless of gender or sexual 
orientation.  While I agree with the sentiment behind Cuculo’s statement, this is not how such 
rights have come into being with respect to same-sex couples.  Instead, a plethora of specific 
legal schemes have developed, in part to preclude having to grant full marriage equality to same-
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sex couples and in part to fill the legal void created by couples who reside together, share in the 
care of a child, or are otherwise connected in some way that, while not currently recognized as 
marriage, necessitates legal protection for the parties involved.  In addition to full marriage 
equality, forms of legal recognition for same-sex couples may include civil unions, registered 
domestic partnerships, and limited-rights statuses such as reciprocal beneficiary relationships.  
Each legal status has its own benefits and its own set of legal rights and responsibilities for those 
who choose to enter into such a relationship, and the benefits and rights that attach to each status 
vary (often in substantial ways) from one jurisdiction to the next.  In the following paragraphs I 
will attempt to bring some clarity to the most common forms of legal status enjoyed by same-sex 
couples.   
 A civil union is a legally recognized form of partnership that in many cases is similar to 
marriage in terms of the rights, benefits, and responsibilities associated with the arrangement.  
The terms used to designate this type of relationship are not standardized and vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Although sometimes conflated with registered partnership, domestic 
partnership, reciprocal beneficiary relationship, or some other status that provides fewer rights, 
benefits, or responsibilities, used here, civil union indicates a status akin to marriage in all things 
except name.  Critics of civil unions in the United States argue that having autonomous laws for 
marriage and civil union results in a “separate but (un)equal” scheme that forces same-sex 
couples to use a separate institution that in turn encourages substandard treatment of same-sex 
couples and their families.   In Italy, this is what leads to what many LGBTI activists refer to as a 
“Serie B” family.23  Proponents of civil unions assert that they provide a practical solution for 
                                                 
23 This is a reference to the Italian soccer league.  The best soccer teams play in “Serie A,” composed of Italy’s 
professional clubs (similar to the for-profit NFL, NBA, or MLB in the United States).  Smaller Italian cities often 
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same-sex couples by offering a mechanism to negotiate areas requiring legal recognition such as 
transfer of property, hospital visitation rights, and insurance, while avoiding the religious 
significance of marriage.   
 A registered domestic partnership is a legal relationship between two persons who reside 
together and share a domestic life but who are not married or in a civil union.  Again, the rights, 
benefits, and responsibilities associated with this status vary between jurisdictions.  In some 
places a domestic partnership is practically the same as a civil union, while in others a domestic 
partnership indicates lesser rights than a civil union but more than de facto cohabitation.  Perhaps 
one of the major differences between domestic partnerships and civil unions is that domestic 
partnerships often involve different-sex couples as well as same-sex couples.  This arrangement 
enables couples to agree contractually on issues regarding property ownership, support 
obligations, and other matters of concern to domestic partners.  One of the main purposes of a 
domestic partnership is to formally acknowledge the contribution of one partner to the property 
of another.  
 In addition to civil unions and registered domestic partnerships, there are various 
partnership statuses that confer more limited rights and responsibilities such as reciprocal 
beneficiary relationships.  As with civil unions and domestic partnerships, the specific benefits, 
rights, and responsibilities entailed in a reciprocal beneficiary relationship differ by jurisdiction.  
In general, reciprocal beneficiary relationships can be made between two consenting adults, both 
of whom must be competent to enter into a contract and not be a party to another reciprocal 
benefits relationship, civil union, or marriage.  In some jurisdictions, this status is used by those 
                                                 
have their own clubs, which, depending on their ability, compete in Serie B (the second tier), Serie C, and so on.  
The point is that Serie B designates a lesser, not quite as good as Serie A, type of relationship or family. 
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who are prohibited from marrying or entering into a civil union, and in some cases the status 
requires that the two parties also be related by blood or adoption.  In these situations, the 
reciprocal beneficiary relationship is used by close relatives (such as parent, grandparent, sister, 
brother, niece, nephew, aunt, and uncle) to confer certain rights, benefits, and responsibilities 
upon each other.24  Usually, the rights granted to reciprocal beneficiaries are much more limited 
than those granted to married couples or conferred by a civil union law.   
 What should be evident at this point is the fact that a multitude of legal statuses have 
developed as alternatives to marriage.  These legal regimes vary not only by status (i.e., civil 
union, domestic partnership, reciprocal beneficiary relationship) but also by jurisdiction, and 
offer different sets of benefits, rights, and responsibilities.  A civil union recognized in one part 
of the world may differ from what counts as a civil union in another.25  As I will detail below, a 
                                                 
24 For example, hospital visits/health care decisions, disposition of remains, durable power of attorney/terminal care 
document, inheritance, and joint ownership of property. 
 
25 Using the United States as an example, the following requirements must be met to establish a reciprocal 
beneficiaries relationship in the State of Vermont:  both parties must be at least 18 years of age; both must be 
competent to enter into a contract; neither can be a party to another reciprocal beneficiaries relationship, marriage, or 
civil union; the parties must be related by blood or adoption to each other; the parties must be prohibited from 
establishing a marriage or civil union with each other; and both must consent to the reciprocal beneficiaries 
relationship without force, fraud or duress.  Once entered into, the reciprocal beneficiaries relationship, gives the 
parties the same rights as a spouse with respect to hospital visits and making health care decisions for the patient; 
enables one party to make an anatomical gift of all or part of the other’s body for an authorized purpose upon that 
party’s death (unless the party legally refused to make an anatomical gift and has never revoked the refusal); gives a 
party the same rights as a spouse regarding disposition of remains in the event of the death of the other; a person’s 
reciprocal beneficiary cannot serve as a witness to the person’s durable power of attorney or health care or terminal 
care document; if the patient consents or is unable to consent or understand, his or her reciprocal beneficiary has the 
right to obtain complete and current information regarding the patient’s diagnoses, treatment, and any known 
prognosis and has the right to stay with terminally ill patients 24 hours a day; a reciprocal beneficiary is entitled to 
certain benefits under the Nursing Home Residents’ Bill of Rights; and a reciprocal beneficiary is considered a 
“family member” under Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Law. 
 
The Vermont situation can be contrasted to Hawai’i, which is similar in terms of requirements except for one 
important factor:  the parties entering into the reciprocal beneficiary relationship do not have to be related by blood 
or adoption.  This means that, unlike Vermont (where same-sex couples now have full marriage equality and are not 
entitled to enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship) , same-sex couples in Hawai’i have the option to enter 
into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship.  This relationship confers hospital visitation rights, the ability to sue for 
wrongful death, property and inheritance rights, and the extension of family health insurance benefits to one’s 
partner.     
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variety of these options have been introduced in the Italian Parliament; however, to date none of 
these proposals have actually been given due consideration by the Italian Parliament, and there is 
nothing akin to same-sex marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership in Italian law  
Clash or Dialogue? 
The LGBTI activists I worked with in Italy were vibrant, fun-loving, creative people, and 
were concerned about raising public awareness of LGBTI issues in constructive ways.  As the 
following scenario demonstrates, raising awareness can be an effective strategy toward change.  
One evening in October 2011, a couple of weeks before the ILGA-Europe Conference being held 
in Turin, V1, a local LGBTI activist I met during the course of fieldwork, invited me to go out 
with her to distribute materials about the conference and related events to some of the local 
clubs.  We had not yet met in person and made arrangements to meet a few blocks from my 
apartment, where V1 picked me up in her car.  While distributing materials, V1 told me about the 
pre-conference events they had planned to bring awareness of the ILGA-Europe conference and 
LGBTI issues to the community.  V1 told me that, in preparation for the conference, a group of 
activists from the conference organizing committee, along with other members from the 
community, had worked together to develop what they titled a “Clash or Dialogue?” night.  The 
event was scheduled for the following Friday evening (October 21). 
 One of goals of the “Clash or Dialogue?” night was to bring attention to LGBTI issues in 
traditionally non-LGBTI spaces in order to engage a part of the public not usually encountered 
by the LGBTI community.  To this end, the event was to be held in Piazza Vittorio Veneto, a 
large square in the center of Turin located near the River Po.  With a size of almost 40,000 
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square meters, Piazza Vittorio Veneto is one of the largest squares in Europe.  Lined on both 
sides with clubs, restaurants and shops, partially obscured by arcades, it is a popular spot for big 
events and a common meeting place, especially among youths.  It is not known as a usual 
meeting place for LGBTI persons, which is part of the reason that it was selected as the venue 
for the “Clash or Dialogue?” event.  The "Clash or Dialogue?" organizers recruited seventeen 
organizations and seven bars and clubs in the area of the piazza to propose various themes and 
host specific events.  The themes included LGBTI families, homophobia and violence against 
LGBTI persons, “coming out,” AIDS awareness and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, 
relationships between racism and homophobia, and transgender visibility.  Each theme was 
represented through cultural projects such as photo and art exhibitions, theater performances, the 
showing of videos, and music.  Tables were set up at several of the venues with representatives 
from the host organizations on hand to answer questions and provide theme-related written and 
other materials.  On the square itself, organizers set up a “living library” and a popular exhibit 
entitled “Guarda in Faccia la Violenza” (“Look at the Face of Violence”).  The "Clash or 
Dialogue?" night also promised a “flash mob” pillow fight on the piazza and was to be capped 
off with a disco dance party at the Jam Club.   
On the evening of October 21, I left my apartment and headed for the tram at 
approximately 9 p.m.  The weather was cool, but not bitter cold, and there was no sign of rain – a 
good omen.  As I disembarked from the tram, I noticed that the piazza seemed relatively quiet.  I 
spotted a group of people milling around a party tent pitched outside La Drogheria and 
wandered over.  V1 and a few of the people I had met the previous weekend while distributing 
materials were standing in a circle, talking, and planning the strategy for the evening.  I walked 
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toward them and was greeted and invited into the circle.  We seemed to be the only presence on 
the square.  I stood with fellow activists and took a look around.   
To my left, I observed that what I had thought were people from my vantage point across 
the piazza was in fact a grouping of silhouettes, each approximately 7-8 feet in height, spaced 2-
4 feet apart.  Each figure represented the likeness of an actual person who had suffered violence 
or discrimination due to his or her sexual orientation.  Attached to each figure was a brief report, 
relaying the individual’s story.  The Guarda in Faccia la Violenza exhibit is the creation of 
Barbara Marzocchi and Catia Campo.  Born of collaboration between ReteDonne Arcigay and 
ArciLesbica on the occasion of the 2008 Bologna Pride, the exhibit is intended as a visceral 
display of the daily violence frequently encountered by those perceived as “different” due to 
sexual orientation.  The diversity of figures is striking.  From “Maria,” who at age 27 decided to 
leave her convent after discovering that she was a lesbian and enduring psychological violence, 
to “Giulio,” a 43-year-old gay man who was physically attacked and beaten in a pizzeria while 
out with friends, the exhibit personalized the debate. 
To date, Italy has failed to pass legislation providing enhanced penalties for acts 
motivated by homophobic prejudice.26  Perhaps even more frustrating is the fact that there are no 
statistics regarding violence based on sexual orientation or gender identity to shed light on the 
situation.  As M, one of the LGBTI activists standing near me stated, “We have only our stories.”  
I took some time and read each of the “stories.”  I was struck by the variety and extent of 
violence inflicted.  Although I am not "LGBTI," I have many close friends who are gay, lesbian, 
bisexual, and transsexual.  Most are them are open about their sexuality.  It struck me that I had 
                                                 
26  I must point out that one of the arguments against such legislation is that “everyone is equal” in the eyes of the 
law.  In this vein, to single out a specific category of people for special treatment, such as through the enactment of 
“hate crimes” legislation designed to protect LGBTI persons, constitutes a juridical absurdity.    
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never asked any of them about violence they may have encountered due to their sexual 
orientation.  I realized how, in addition to being insensitive, I was also naïve about what life may 
be like for many LGBTI persons, especially in places such as Italy where there is no law or law 
enforcement to offer protection.  This type of awareness-raising was, of course, the point of the 
exhibit.  I also realized that even in Italy, a place where people have little faith in the ability of 
law to change anything, there is a sense of urgency in the LGBTI community that laws are 
needed, not only to ensure equality, but also to guarantee protection.     
After viewing the exhibit, I joined M and L, two LGBTI activists I had met the previous 
week at the Turin Youth Center while conducting fieldwork.  Next to the Guarda in Faccia la 
Violenza exhibit, the "Clash or Dialogue?" event organizers had set up a “biblioteca vivente” 
(“living library”) under the tent.  The idea behind the living library was so event-goers could 
“talk” to someone they might not have the courage to approach in everyday life.  Volunteers 
served as “living books” that could be “checked out” for a half an hour of conversation.  The 
“books” were listed in a catalog from which event goers could choose and the catalog offered 
titles such as “drag queen,” “young lesbian,” “Muslim boy,” and “Romanian girl.”  The person 
checking out the "book" was free to ask questions in order to learn more about the person 
represented in the living book.  During the time I had been looking at the Guarda in Faccia la 
Violenza exhibit, a number of people had come into the tent area and several appeared to be 
waiting to “check out books.”  This surprised me.  The living library was a nifty idea, but I could 
not imagine many of my friends and acquaintances availing themselves of an opportunity like 
this when out for a drink or dinner on a Friday night.   
I asked L about the people under the tent.  I wanted to know if they were mostly living 
library volunteers and/or members of the LGBTI community supporting the event.  L assured me 
  
52 
 
that most of them were random people from the street who had stumbled upon the event.  I 
expressed my amazement at the success of the “living library” and told L that I was not sure that 
a similar event would meet with the same success in my home community.  L said, “Italians love 
to talk.”  She told me that living libraries had been set up in other parts of Europe with less 
success but that, in Italy, it was different because people "needed" to talk.  (I always thought that 
I, too, enjoyed talk but I am not sure I would feel compelled to “check out” a living book and 
interrogate the person, even though it is quite similar to what anthropologists do.) 
As the evening wore on, the piazza became increasingly filled with revelers.  People were 
spilling out of the venues lining the piazza, and everywhere there were groups of people talking 
and laughing and otherwise enjoying the evening.  I walked around to the other "Clash or 
Dialogue?" venues to take a look at the information they were offering and to chat with different 
people.  Everyone appeared to be having a good time and I, too, enjoyed myself.  While I did not 
make it to the disco dance party at the Jam Club, I did get in on the flash mob pillow fight, which 
drew a huge crowd and was a lot of fun. 
Throughout the evening, I was reminded of Jürgen Habermas' (1989[1962]) 
conceptualization of the "public sphere" as a space where meanings are articulated, disseminated, 
and negotiated.  In the "public sphere," private individuals come together as a public to identify 
and discuss societal problems, and to debate the general rules governing social relations.  
Through this discussion, participants in the public sphere influence political action.  Gerard 
Hauser further developed the notion of “public sphere” by emphasizing its rhetoricality.  Hauser 
defines the public sphere as a: 
 discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual 
interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment.  Public spheres are discursive 
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sites where society deliberates about normative standards and even develops new 
frameworks for expressing and evaluating social reality.  It presupposes that active 
members of society who lack official status may form as publics through their 
participation in rhetorical encounters that define a public sphere.  It understands public 
opinion to be a discursive judgment made by social actors and an inference by those who 
are investigating what a public thinks (1998:85). 
According to Hauser's view, the public sphere is formed by active members of society around 
issues rather than by the identity of the population engaging in the dialogue (1998).  Rhetorical 
public spheres are created by any interactions whereby the public engages each other, and such 
interaction can take the form of a basic "street rhetoric" that creates a space for dialogue between 
competing publics.  More importantly, this rhetorical model of the public sphere depends on 
active members of society, rather than survey researchers or public spokespersons, to establish 
the terms for public opinion (Hauser 1998:86).   
 The "Clash or Dialogue?" event was a deliberate attempt to create just such a public 
sphere, and a seemingly successful effort at that.  I was surrounded by dialogue.  Everywhere I 
looked on the large piazza, people were talking to one another:  asking questions, seeking 
information, and debating.  While I do not want to overstate the event's achievements, for the 
most part, the dialogue was respectful and there were no signs of protest or violence.  People in 
Turin wanted to talk about LGBTI issues.  The "Clash or Dialogue?" event would not have met 
with such success 10-20 years ago.  As will be seen in the following sections, the approach, 
projects, and activities of Italian LGBTI activists have changed dramatically in recent years.   
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A Brief History of LGBTI Activism in Italy 
FUORI! 
Italy’s first gay liberation movement came to life on April 15, 1971.  Following the 
publication in La Stampa of the review of a book written by a psychoanalyst who claimed to 
have secretly recorded sessions with one of his patients and to have “cured” the patient of 
homosexuality, Italian activist Angelo Pezzana began calling his friends, telling them that they 
needed to do something.27  Pezzana had information on other LGBTI movements in other parts 
of the world such as Canada, France, and the United States, and he also had contacts with several 
journalists throughout Italy.  He called a meeting of his friends and they decided to organize.  
Referring to the U.S. experience, they named the organization “FUORI!,” which translates to 
“Out!” or “Come Out!” in English.  Next they had to find a meaning for the acronym and they 
settled on Fronte Unitario Omosessuale Rivoluzionario Italiano, which translates roughly to 
“Italian United Homosexual Revolutionary Front.”  In a documentary detailing the founding and 
history of FUORI!, Pezzana admits that “revolutionary” might not have been the precise word to 
describe the organization; however, it was appropriate because changing society required a 
revolution in thought (2011).   
In order to get the word out, the FUORI! founders published a magazine (also titled 
“FUORI!”) and distributed it in person around Italy at places where LGBTI persons were known 
to congregate.  Within a few months, twenty groups had been formed throughout Italy (FUORI! 
2011).  For its first public demonstration FUORI! members wanted to do something that would 
garner interest outside of Italy.  In April 1972, the Centro Italiano di Sessuologia (Italian Center 
                                                 
27  La Stampa is an Italian newspaper published daily in Turin, and distributed throughout Italy and other European 
nations.   
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of Sexology) sponsored a conference on sexual deviance in Sanremo that was partially funded by 
Catholic groups.  The conference followed the introduction of a law to criminalize 
homosexuality in Italy and the organizers included a group of psychiatrists in favor of the law.  
This was to be an international meeting and attracted the attention of gay activist groups from 
other European countries.  The events surrounding the conference became later known as the 
Italian Stonewall (Consoli 2000).   
The conference featured British psychiatrist Philip Feldman who announced a new form 
of electroshock therapy that promised to “cure” homosexuality.  Shortly thereafter, a group of 
forty protestors (from the FHAR,28 FUORI!, the MHAR,29 the IHR,30 and the British Gay 
Liberation Front) stormed the room with posters and flyers, shouting “Normal” and 
“Psychiatrists, we have come to cure you!”  The police were called and arrested several of the 
demonstrators after beating them in front of television cameras (Consoli 2000; Malagreca 2006; 
Rossi Barilli 1999).  The protest attracted the interest of the media, including Italy’s national 
broadcaster RAI and, for the first time, the Italian press spoke about homosexuality.  As Pezzana 
observed, the subject of homosexuality moved from the crime news to the national news in the 
Italian media (FUORI! 2011).   
                                                 
28 Front Homosexuel d'Action Révolutionnaire, or Homosexual Front for Revolutionary Action in English.  The 
FHAR was a Parisian movement founded in 1971, and known for having given radical visibility to LGBTI activism 
in the 1970s.  Its informal leaders included Guy Hocquenghem and Françoise d'Eaubonne.  FHAR eschewed the 
bourgeois heterosexist patriarchal state.  It dissolved in 1976, when members began to disassociate due in part to the 
increasing prevalence of men that obscured feminist and lesbian issues.   
29 Mouvement Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire, or Homosexual Movement of Revolutionary Action in 
English.  The MHAR was a radical Belgian group inspired by the French FHAR that made a brief appearance in the 
1970s. 
  
30 International Homosexuelle Révolutionnaire. 
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In 1974, FUORI! joined forces with Partito Radicale, a liberal non-Marxist group 
founded in May 1968.  Until that time, FUORI! existed as a political outcast.  As Pezzana 
recalls, “We were considered lechers by the right, sinners by the center, and a petty bourgeois 
movement by the left” (FUORI! 2011, my translation).  The partnership between Partito 
Radicale and FUORI! was, however, not without internal controversy.  There were many 
members of FUORI! who did not agree with the “reformist”31 agenda advanced by Partito 
Radicale.  One such person was Mario Mieli, a leading intellectual figure at the forefront of the 
Italian gay liberation movement throughout the 1970s.  Mieli combined a radical theoretical 
viewpoint with an often provocative public persona (he once ate his own excrement and that of a 
dog in public), and is known for his Marxist account of homosexuality and homosexual 
oppression, Elementi di Critica Omosessuale (1977), which was subsequently translated into 
English as “Homosexuality and Liberation:  Elements of a Gay Critique” (1980).  This work is 
widely considered one of the most important texts from the Italian gay community.  In it, Mieli 
combines Freud’s notion of “polymorphous perversion” with Marxist economics to argue that 
homosexual liberation is a necessary part of a wider human emancipation, one which depends on 
a revolution allowing the full expression of a natural human transsexuality.      
Mieli was present at the founding of FUORI!, and helped organize additional 
memberships in Rome, Padua, Venice, and Milan.  He participated in the April 1972, 
demonstration at Sanremo against the psychiatric condemnation of homosexuality and the use of 
                                                 
31  In Italy, “reformist” is a word with negative connotations.  A reformist agenda is one that seeks to make gradual 
change or changes to certain aspects of society, as opposed to rapid fundamental changes.  It is distinguished from 
radical social movements, of which revolutionary movements are an example.  Generally speaking, reformist ideas 
are based in liberalism, a political philosophy based on ideas of liberty and equality. 
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aversion therapy to “cure” homosexuals.  When, however, FUORI! united with the Partito 
Radicale, Mieli was critical and condemned the move as “counter-revolutionary.”  According to 
Pezzana, at that time there was a fundamental disagreement among members of FUORI!.  Some 
considered Mieli’s views extreme.  Mieli argued that they should fight against heterosexuality 
and destroy its rule.  Pezzana, on the other hand, held more moderate beliefs.  He thought LGBTI 
persons should live as such in a society that also includes heterosexuals.  The internal debates 
became heated.  Mieli believed the gay movement should remain independent of political parties 
and, with others, staged a secessionist congress that fragmented FUORI!  Mieli subsequently left 
FUORI! and helped organize the Collettivi Omosessuali Milanese (Homosexual Collectives of 
Milan), which produced La Traviata Norma:  ovvero, Vaffanculo… ebbene sì!,32 a parody of 
heterosexuality that used audience engagement to deconstruct the minute signs of 
heteronormativity.33  Others who disapproved of the relationship with Partito Radicale left with 
him (FUORI! 2011).34   
                                                 
32  One possible, but flawed, translation:  "The Misguided Rule, that is:  Fuck Off…  Well, Yes!"  The title’s 
numerous puns make accurate translation difficult. 
 
33 By 1981, Mieli became increasingly pessimistic about his cause and, in 1983, he told friends about a book that 
was to be published titled Il Risveglio dei Faraoni (“The Awakening of the Pharaohs”), which he described as an 
autobiographical novel featuring the risen Christ.  As evidenced by a letter to a friend, Mieli feared adverse reaction 
to his book and believed that its publication might lead someone to cause him harm.  On March 11, 1983, he wrote a 
letter to a friend stating that he had decided not to publish the book.  On March 12, 1983, Mieli took his own life at 
the age of 30, dying from asphyxiation caused by inhaling gas in his apartment in Milan.  Shortly after Mieli’s death, 
the largest gay organization in Rome (itself founded in 1983 by the merger of the pre-existing organizations FUORI! 
and Collettivo Narciso) changed its name to Circolo di Cultura Omosessuale Mario Mieli (Homosexual Cultural 
Circle “Mario Mieli”) in his honor.  Since 1989, Circolo Mario Mieli has offered home care services for persons 
living with AIDS, counseling services, legal assistance, and self-help groups for people living with HIV.  It also 
manages a home for the homeless.   
 
34 Another issue that worked to divide FUORI! was its perceived lack of response to the needs of lesbians and 
feminists.  Lesbian feminist Anna Siciliano has stated that she felt there was no breathing room in FUORI! for 
women in part because the issues of concern to lesbians were assimilated into those of the male gay groups.  A 
women’s branch, “FUORI! Donna,” was subsequently established.   
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In 1976, LGBTI rights entered the Italian political agenda.  Partito Radicale became the 
first political party to run women and LGBTI candidates for parliament, and was subsequently 
dubbed the party of “faggots and whores.”  Despite this, the political elections of 1976 were 
pivotal:  Partito Radicale was the “novelty” party and this presented the opportunity to get its 
message out.  The party received a great deal of media coverage and articles about 
homosexuality, divorce, and abortion began to appear with greater frequency.  Uniting with 
Partito Radicale gave FUORI! political legitimacy.  Pezzana, along with Carlo Sismondi, led 
efforts to emulate the “pride” strategies imported from the United States and Northern European 
gay movements, and directed resources toward uniting Italian LGBTI activists for purposes of 
cultural interventions as opposed to interminable theoretical abstractions.  The new gay political 
motto was “abassando il tiro,” which can be translated as “down to earth” (Malagreca 
2006:142).  In the words of Sismondi, “Between the danger of a shallow pragmatism and that 
other one, terrible, of an escape into abstraction or mysticism, I clearly prefer the former one” 
(Malagreca 2006:142, citing Rossi Barilli 1999:102).  As a result, they were able to create a 
structure of social services and cultural programs that included health care centers, entertainment 
sites, and information offices.   
Many of the divisions that plagued FUORI! and were partially responsible for its 
eventual demise were related to the language of political struggle and representations of 
difference.  Over time, FUORI! began to adopt strategies developed by the gay liberation 
movement in the United States, and its revolutionary ideals began to shift.  By the end of the 
1970s some parts of Italian gay activism had surrendered the radical politics of the 1970s in 
favor of a “politics of identity” imported from the United States (Merlini 1977).  “Being gay” 
became more important than the production of a “revolutionary subject,” and the claiming of 
  
59 
 
identity followed a three-step process:  first, acknowledge yourself as gay; second, come out in 
public; and third, take pride in your identity (Malagreca 2006).  Miguel Malagreca notes:  “This 
line of self-inquiry gave rise to a new form of political activism, less oriented towards the factory 
and more interested in the celebration of the ‘individual,’ more oriented towards the constituency 
of a new ‘gay’ identity and less interested in the previous project of universal liberation 
(2006:129).”   
This shift in the language of politics and representation of difference produced mixed 
consequences.  On the one hand, the revolutionary potential of the early Italian movement 
subsided.  Instead of remaking of society, efforts were directed to becoming an accepted 
participant in the prevailing society.  On the other hand, the comparison of the Italian gay 
framework with others enabled the advancement of a critique of civil, social and human rights in 
Italy.  It was the enabling of this critique of civil, social and human rights that, in later years, 
created an opening for the EU to insert itself.  The shifting language of politics and 
representation of difference in Italian LGBTI activism also paved the way for the founding of 
Italy’s first all-encompassing national LGBTI organization:  Arcigay. 
Arcigay Arcilesbica35     
When I first arrived in Italy to conduct dissertation research, I fully expected to work 
with Arcigay Arcilesbica (Associazione lesbica e gay italiana, hereafter referred to as Arcigay), 
Italy’s largest national gay organization.  Arcigay was founded in 1985 as a non-profit 
organization with the goals of combatting homophobia, heterosexism, prejudice, and anti-gay 
                                                 
35 At a conference in Rimini held April 1994, the Association changed its name to “Arcigay Arcilesbica,” and 
became the only association in Italy that elects its executive on the basis of a 50% quota for each sex. 
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discrimination.36  As an organization, it is committed to achieving equal status and equal 
opportunities for all individuals, regardless of sexual orientation.  Arcigay serves as an umbrella 
organization for over one hundred political/cultural and recreational centers throughout Italy, and 
by 2007, its membership exceeded 160,000.37  Arcigay strives to promote the visibility of LGBTI 
persons in society, and works to set up social initiatives and welfare services, frequently 
operating alongside other civil rights movements.  According to its stated values and principles: 
Arcigay believes in a secular, democratic society where individuals’ liberties, human and 
civil rights are recognized, promoted and guaranteed without discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, gender identity or other personal and social condition, and where the 
personality of every individual can be achieved within a framework of peaceful 
relationship with the social and natural environment.38   
To this end, Arcigay is independent of “any government, political ideology, economic interest or 
religion.”39  
Arcigay came into being during the beginning phases of the AIDS epidemic.  No doubt, 
this influenced the nature and strategies of its early activities.  Following their counterparts in the 
                                                 
36  The first Arcigay club was informally founded in 1980 in Palermo by Don Marco Bisceglia, a Catholic priest who 
disagreed with the Church hierarchies, as a reaction to the suicide of two young Sicilian lovers who had taken their 
own lives after being ostracized by their families and the community in their small city of Giarre.  Farmers found the 
bodies of the two lovers, embracing each other under a lemon tree in a grove, fifteen days after the suicide.  A 
twelve-year old nephew of one of the victims later stated that he had killed them at their insistence by shooting them 
with a family gun in order to put an end to their suffering.  Next to the bodies lay a letter in which the young lovers 
assumed full responsibility and explained their reasons.  The event received extensive media coverage in the Italian 
press.    
 
37  For the sake of reference, the July 2013 population estimate for Italy is 61,482,297 (CIA World Factbook 2013). 
 
38 Arcigay website, http://www.arcigay.it/who-we-are/, accessed December 5, 2013. 
 
39 See note 38 above. 
 
  
61 
 
United States, Arcigay activists strove to “degay” AIDS.40  This meant that Arcigay activists 
purposely withdrew from the liberationist maneuvers and criticism of heterosexist structures of 
the previous decades and chose instead to focus on removing homosexuality from discussions 
about AIDS.  This in turn enabled the development of a national alliance across various gay 
groups in Italy.  In the few existing histories of the gay rights movement in Italy, there are 
several references to the “pragmatics” of the 1980s (Rossi Barilli 1991; Grillini 1990).  These 
references further point to the shift (mentioned above in the discussion of FUORI!) from the 
radical leftist politics of the 1960s and 1970s (with their corresponding ideological basis for 
political action) to a quest for real-world solutions to concrete problems.   
Arcigay has an extensive network of affiliated clubs (which include discos, bars, and 
saunas) that are sometimes a source of consternation when a patron is required to purchase a 
temporary Arcigay membership card in order to gain admission.  These enable social interaction 
and foster a sense of community among the LGBTI population.  The rapid growth of Arcigay at 
the turn of the 21st century demanded organizational and management changes.  In order to keep 
up, Arcigay established national working groups for specific areas such as health, law, foreign 
affairs, communication, education, and immigration.  These structural changes enabled Arcigay 
to diversify and work on an entire range of LGBTI issues. 
Among Arcigay’s stated objectives are marriage equality and civil unions.  At the present 
moment, same-sex couples residing in Italy have no shared rights to property, social security or 
                                                 
40 The word “degaying” was first used by activists Ben Schatz and Eric Rofes to refer to the conscious decision of   
LGBTI activists in the United States in the 1980s to focus on AIDS rather than other issues of importance to the 
community such as homophobia (Vaid 1995).  
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inheritance.  While many of the Italian regions41 have passed resolutions in support of a French-
style PACS (a civil solidarity pact that constitutes a form of civil union) and several 
municipalities42 have passed laws providing for civil unions, these actions are essentially 
symbolic as the regions do not have legislative power over the issue.  In 1986, Arcigay, along 
with the Inter-parliamentary Women’s Communist group, presented the first Italian proposal for 
legally registered partnerships to the Italian parliament.  In 1988, after lobbying by Arcigay, 
Socialist Deputy Alma Cappiello Agate introduced the first bill (PDL N. 2340, Directive on the 
de facto family, 12 February 1988), which called for the acknowledgement of cohabitation 
between “persons.”  The bill subsequently failed, but only after receiving extensive press 
coverage where journalists wrote about “second class” marriage and debated the possibility of 
same-sex unions for the first time in Italian history.   
In the following years, Arcigay continued to fight for recognition of rights on behalf of 
same-sex couples, and its legal team presented several other legal proposals to parliament, 
including those related to civil unions.43  Encouraged by the discussion in the European 
Parliament concerning equal marriage and adoption rights for LGBTI persons, the 1990s 
witnessed the presentation of a series of civil union bills in the Italian parliament.  During the 
                                                 
41 These regions include Tuscany, Umbria, Emilia-Romagna, Campania, Marche, Veneto, Puglia, Lazio, Liguria, 
and Abruzzo. 
 
42 As of 2013, 150 Italian municipalities and cities had introduced civil union registries formally recognizing same-
sex couples.  Major cities offering civil union registries include Bologna, Padua, Florence, Pisa, Bolzano, Palermo, 
Naples, Milan, and Genoa. 
 
43  Arcigay has used several strategies in its attempts to advance recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  For 
example, in February 1996, Arcigay collected 90,000 signatures in the space of a few months (15,000 of which were 
from Bologna alone) on a petition for the “Unioni Civili” (Civil Unions).  In March 1998, a legislative project on 
legally registered partnerships initiated by Arcigay was presented to the Chamber of Deputies. Among those who 
signed the proposal were the former President of the Chamber Nilde Jotti (PDS party) and the philosopher Lucio 
Colletti (Forza Italia party).  On May 22, 1999, Arcigay organized a national rally in Como in support of legally 
registered partnerships.   
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XIIIth parliamentary session alone, ten such bills were presented.  None of the proposed bills, 
however, ever made it as far as discussion on the house floor.  This was due in large part to the 
opposition and influence of the Catholic hierarchy on the ruling Christian Democrat coalition.  It 
was much the same throughout the first decade of the new millennium, culminating in the 
government approval of a draft bill to recognize same-sex partnerships that went by the name 
DICO (Diritti e Doveri delle Persone Stabilmente Conviventi, translated: “Rights and Duties of 
Stable Co-Habitants”) in February 2007.  I contend that the introduction of the DICO constituted 
a pivotal moment in the battle over rights for same-sex couples in Italy.  The proposed bill 
propelled national debate to a new level, and its subsequent failure forced LGBTI organizations 
to pursue alternative strategies and goals.  Two Italian filmmakers, Gustav Hofer and Luca 
Ragazzi, followed the debate to its bitter end and produced an award-winning documentary titled 
Improvvisamente l’inverno scorso (English:  Suddenly, Last Winter) (2008), which details the 
events that occurred in the aftermath of the DICO’s introduction.44  
The Film Suddenly, Last Winter 
Suddenly, Last Winter tells the story of Luca and Gustav, two young gay men in their 30s 
living together in Italy.  The crux of the film begins in April 2006.  Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi has recently been ousted for the second time, and a center-left coalition has seized a 
slim majority.  Luca and Gustav are excited because the new center-left coalition has promised 
legislation that will provide civil unions and other rights to same-sex couples.  In February 2007, 
                                                 
44  The film has won awards, including the 2008 Belin International Film Festival “Manfred Salzgeher Award” 
(Special Mention), a “Silver Ribbon” from the 2009 Italian National Syndicate of Film Journalists for “Best 
Documentary,” and “Special Mention” for the category “Best Documentary” at the 2008 Milan International 
Lesbian and Gay Film Festival. 
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following the introduction of laws recognizing same-sex unions in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Spain, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi partially delivers on the promise 
by introducing a modest piece of legislation commonly referred to as the DICO.  The DICO 
proposes to give cohabitating partners inheritance rights after nine years of living together, and 
alimony rights after three.  It will also allow one partner to make decisions regarding funeral 
arrangements and organ donation if the other should die. According to the proposed law, 
cohabitating partners would be required to go to the registry office to declare their de facto 
union, but no ceremony akin to marriage would be celebrated.  
Despite the fact that the legislation 1) attempted to maintain a clear distinction between 
the status of marriage and status of cohabitation, 2) represented a far cry from the civil 
partnership legislation introduced in other EU member states, and 3) was supported by a majority 
of Italians, its introduction prompted a wave of outrage on the part of the Roman Catholic 
Church (Church) and its allies in Italy.  The Vatican and political conservatives were quick to 
challenge the proposed law, asserting that recognition of rights for same-sex and heterosexual 
cohabitating couples would signal the end of the “family” and morality.  Then-Pope Benedict 
XVI (now Emeritus Pope Benedict XVI) stated that such legislation goes against “natural law” 
and that it weakens the family and penalizes children.  According to the Pope at the time, “No 
law can subvert the Creator’s law without damaging society.”  The President of the CEI (Italian 
Episcopal Conference), the official assembly of the Italian bishops of the Catholic Church, 
issued a letter firmly reminding Catholic politicians of their moral duty to vote against the 
proposed law, and the Vatican subsequently supported the letter.  Opposition to the DICO 
continued to mount and Italian Catholic traditionalists mobilized the Church’s organizational 
power to stage a massive “Family Day” demonstration in Rome.  The manifesto published for 
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the demonstration warned that the Italian family was at risk from the “crisis of the West,” 
defined as “the reduction in the number of marriages and demographic decline” (Gilbert 2007).  
In an attempt to understand this fervent response, Luca and Gustav decide to make a 
documentary.  
The documentary, which focuses on the meaning of family and Italy’s particular 
entanglement of Church and State, shows Luca and Gustav following the weekly Senate 
proceedings, attempting to interview politicians, attending anti-DICO rallies, and asking 
questions of the people they meet in the street.  One anti-DICO rally depicts participants 
shouting “no children, no family.”  At another rally Luca and Gustav speak with Roberto Lastel, 
the leader of Militia Christi, a non-partisan Catholic political movement and one of the first 
groups to protest against the DICO.  Lastel states that he is in favor of a family founded on 
nature: “A man and a woman. A mother and a father.”  According to Lastel, “Our future depends 
on this.”  When pressed about his stance on same-sex parenting, he responds, “It’s a perversion.  
A gay couple is a deviation.”  The documentary viewer gets a front-row seat to the intolerant 
homophobic attacks launched from the pulpits and Italian national TV talk shows on a daily 
basis.  Maria Chiara Acciarini, the then-Undersecretary for the Italian Ministry of the Family, is 
seen imploring fellow-politicians, “We worked hard to enter the economic Europe.  Don’t we 
want to enter the political and civil Europe as well?”  
One of the most revealing scenes in the documentary comes in the interview with MP and 
Honorary President of Arcigay Franco Grillini.  Luca and Gustav ask Grillini if he is surprised by 
the negative response to the DICO. Grillini remarks: “They demand that the Italian Parliament 
follows the directives of the Vatican State.  Nothing like this takes place in any other European 
or Western country.  This dynamic exists only in Islamic countries.”  Grillini also notes that 
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LBGTI persons should not have to go to the courts for recognition of their rights.  According to 
Grillini, “justice takes an endless amount of time here.”  Later, after I had spent time working 
with various LGBTI rights advocates in Europe and Italy, I realized these are commonly held 
sentiments.  
Due to considerable opposition in the Senate, the bill was stopped before reaching the 
floor for a vote.  Later in 2007, the bill was merged with other civil union proposals and the 
Senate Judiciary Committee looked at a new draft referred to as Contratto di Unione Solidale 
(Solidary Union Contract).  This also failed, however, when in February 2008, an early election 
was called and dissolved the sitting Parliament.  In May 2008, Italians put the Berlusconi 
government back in power.  Berlusconi and his allies were notoriously opposed to the 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples.45  Further, despite the brief Prodi interlude, 
Berlusconi’s return signaled a decisive shift in Italian political culture toward neoliberalism, and 
the directing of governmental powers by mass media and corporate interests (Malagreca 2006). 
This was the situation when I arrived in Italy during the summer of 2010, to commence 
fieldwork.  Italian LGBTI activists appeared to have hit a political wall and, while Arcigay has 
done much to advance LGBTI interests in Italy and was continuing to fight for recognition on 
behalf of same-sex couples, in truth there was not much I could do in terms of participant-
observation with the organization. 46   As a consequence, during my initial months in Italy, I 
                                                 
45 For example, in response to critics who called for his resignation after it was revealed that a teenage belly dancer 
had spent the night at his home, Berlusconi stated, “I work extremely hard and if every now and then I look at the 
face of a beautiful girl, then it is better to be passionate about beautiful girls than gay” (METRO, Nov. 3, 2010, 
“Silvio Berlusconi’s Gay Jibes Spark Disbelief,” http://metro.co.uk/2010/11/03/silvio-berlusconis-gay-jibes-spark-
disbelief-in-italy-570180/, accessed November 6, 2013). 
46  From the beginning, Arcigay has worked with the Italian Ministry of Health and the “Superior Institute for 
Health” to organize AIDS (and other STD) awareness and prevention campaigns, including hosting training courses, 
providing autonomous advisory services, and sponsoring telephone helplines, street campaigns, and research 
projects.  Arcigay has also been active in offering training courses for social workers and health counselors, as well 
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spent some time researching and trying to figure out what was going on, activism-wise, in this 
area.  Throughout this period, I became aware of and interacted with several other LGBTI rights 
organizations in Italy.47  It was also during this time that I came across Certi Diritti.         
Certi Diritti                                         
 I first encountered Associazione Radicale Certi Diritti (Certi Diritti) at one of their 
annual meetings.48  This particular meeting was held in Rome, at the Hotel Palatino on 
November 27-28, 2010.  The theme was “Cittadini in Europa, Fantasmi in Italia:  Fermiamo La 
Peste Italiana!” (Citizens in Europe, Phantoms in Italy:  Stop the Italian Plague!)  The agenda 
looked promising and included lectures by leading Italian experts and activists on a range of 
topics such as “Laicità e progresso,” (Secularism and Progress), “Cultura di genere e diritti glbt” 
(The Culture of Gender and LGBT Rights), “L’intersessualità nella società Italiana”  
 (Intersexuality in Italian Society), and “Omofobia e Omogenitorialità:  prospettive liberali” 
(Homophobia and Same-Sex Parents:  Liberal Perspectives).  There were also workshops on 
topics ranging from gay marriage and civil rights in Europe and the world to the legal 
recognition of transgendered persons.   
                                                 
as school staff.  Arcigay has worked with student unions, teachers associations, and parents of LGBTI persons, and 
since 1999, Arcigay’s training course for secondary school teachers on sexual orientation have been recognized by 
the Italian Ministry of Education.  Arcigay organizes political events such as pride marches and national and local 
initiatives to increase awareness and lobbying activity in Parliament.  Arcigay is also a member of the Forum for 
Youth Associations promoted by the Ministry for Social Policy.  It has been involved in various European projects 
in the fight against discrimination based on Article 13 of the European Union Treaty, and is a member of the 
International Gay and Lesbian Association (ILGA). 
47 These organizations include, but are not limited to:  Famiglie Arcobaleno, an association of families headed by 
same-sex parents; AGEDO (Associazione di Genitori Omosessuali), an association of parents, relatives and friends 
of LGBTI persons; and Rete Genitori Rainbow, a network of gay, lesbian, and transgender parents, with children 
from heterosexual unions.  
 
48  That is, the 4th Congress of the Associazione Radicale Certi Diritti 
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I had little trouble locating the hotel and signs posted inside the entrance directed me to 
the specific area where the meeting was being held.  A handsome young man in his early thirties 
was seated behind the registration desk.  He smiled warmly as I approached the table and asked 
if he could help.  I told him I was interested in participating in the meetings and we introduced 
ourselves.  Y and I ended up chatting for a bit.  I told him about my research project and Y told 
me that he had recently finished his PhD and was working on similar issues to mine.  We 
exchanged e-mail addresses.  He then asked me if I wanted to “join” Certi Dritti and, after 
completing a short form and paying my membership dues, I became a card-carrying member of 
Associazione Radicale Certi Diritti.   
 I found a seat toward the back of the main room where the joint session of the Congress 
was taking place.  I noticed that there were between 80-100 other people in the room.  Yet, 
despite the number of people, there was a feeling of intimacy.  The speakers addressed their 
audience with passion, without appearing to rely on note cards or prepared statements.  With one 
exception, there were no PowerPoint slides or other visual aids to draw the audience’s attention 
from the speaker presenting.  The audience showed approval or dismay by clapping and shouting 
comments in response to the speakers’ remarks.  One gentleman in particular, seated in the front 
row, frequently commented by shouting out to the speakers as if he were the only participant in 
the room and was engaged in a personal conversation with them.   
One of the recurring refrains at this meeting was vexation with the Italian political 
process.  The organization was frustrated by its inability to maneuver within the Italian political 
world.  As previously discussed, in Italy the state is perceived as possessing a low degree of 
legitimacy and Italian citizens react to it with distrust (Ginsborg 2003).  Certi Diritti is no 
exception, and much of the annual meeting was devoted to discussing how best to disrupt and/or 
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circumvent the impasse over recognition of rights for same-sex couples created by the Italian 
state.  Certi Diritti members expressed dissatisfaction that Italy was unable to join other EU 
member states in recognizing some form of same-sex civil union or marriage.  The general 
perception was that Italy was somehow backward and “outside” of Europe.  There was an 
express desire to “join” Europe. 49 
Certi Diritti was founded on March 1, 2008, as a non-profit organization.  The 
association was established “in the wake of indignation” caused by the failure of the Italian 
Parliament to address many unsolved problems relating to sexual freedom and responsibility, 
including the recognition of rights for LGBTI persons.  In part, Certi Diritti was a response to 
the failure of the DICO discussed in the first chapter.   Certi Diritti has active members scattered 
throughout Italy and depends on volunteers for its continued existence.  The organization 
describes itself as “radical” because of its objectives and methods of non-violent civil 
disobedience.  While this chapter is mostly about Certi Diritti’s activities in the battle for 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples, it is important to point out that Certi Diritti  is a civil 
rights organization, with multiple objectives, including, but not limited to:  preventing  and 
combating of all forms of violence, abuse, and discrimination based on gender identity and/or 
sexual orientation; assisting victims of violence; promoting the freedom and sexual responsibility 
of the person; instigating and supporting initiatives to fight discrimination; and helping and 
                                                 
49  Activists were mainly referencing the EU here and, more specifically, the Western European member states that 
have adopted legislation recognizing rights on behalf of same-sex couples.  The subject of Europe and the EU is 
taken up in detail in Chapter 5 but, for purposes here, it can be noted that the "Europe" being referred to by activists 
primarily includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.  Generally, it does not include many of the other European countries, 
especially those in Central and Eastern Europe that lag behind the aforementioned countries in terms of recognizing 
rights on behalf of same-sex couples.     
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defending individuals, couples, and other organizations and institutions in the advancement and 
protection of rights associated with gender identity and/or sexual orientation.   In addition, Certi 
Diritti makes a point of adding an “E” (for “eterosessuali,” meaning “heterosexuals”) to the end 
of the LGBT acronym because the organization believes in the equality of all persons.   
Certi Diritti is actively involved in several projects of specific concern to LGBTI 
persons, including political and cultural initiatives against homophobia and participation in pride 
parades and conferences, as well as projects involving the extension of sexual freedom such as 
campaigns for condoms in schools, sexual education, and protections for sex workers.  Although 
much of its work is focused on improving conditions for LGBTI persons in Italy, the 
organization has substantial transnational ties and ambitions.  Certi Diritti participates as part of 
the Intergroup on LGBT rights to the European Parliament and is an active participant in ILGA-
Europe (the European arm of the International Lesbian and Gay Association).  Certi Diritti also 
collaborates with various non-governmental organizations, including Global Rights, Amnesty 
International, and AllOut.org, and has a network for the exchange of information with 
correspondents in all continents.   
Certi Diritti is a descendant of FUORI!  As discussed above, FUORI! joined forces with 
the Partito Radicale in 1974.  From the beginning, Partito Radicale positioned itself as opposed 
to the Italian political establishment, which it viewed as both corrupt and conservative.  For the 
most part, the party enjoyed close relationships with other parties on the Italian left, frequently 
working to unite them, although it was often rejected by the Communists due to its belief in both 
social and economic libertarian policies.  Partito Radicale was also known for its belief in direct 
democracy, which it frequently expressed through the introduction of referenda.  In 1989, the 
Partito Radicale became the Transnational Radical Party, the current incarnation of which is the 
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Radicali Italiani, founded in 2001.  It is worth knowing something about the Radicali Italiani 
because Certi Diritti works closely with the party on many of its initiatives.  
Like its predecessor, Radicali Italiani is an atypical party for Italy that has never 
managed to capture substantial popular support.  The following data illustrates this point.  In the 
2008 general election, the Radicali Italiani stood for re-election in list with the Partito 
Democratico (PD).  Pursuant to an agreement with the PD’s then-leader Walter Veltroni, six 
deputies and three senators were elected.  In the 2009 European Parliament election, the Radicali 
Italiani ran separately from the PD, received only 2.4% of the vote, and failed to return any 
members of parliament.  More recently, in the 2013 Italian general election, the Radicali Italiani 
contested on a stand-alone electoral list called Giustizia, amnistia e libertà (Justice, Amnesty, 
and Freedom), and ultimately received 0.2% of the vote, returning no senators or deputies.  
Finally, due to inadequate funds, the party was unable to take part in the 2014 European 
elections.   
The party is generally viewed as leftist by those on the right, and as right-wing by those 
on the left.  It is the only Italian party with an explicitly anti-clerical agenda (most of the other 
Italian parties either support the Church or remain ambivalent toward it).  The party is an ardent 
supporter of human and civil rights, which for the party includes support for abortion, same-sex 
marriage, euthanasia, and the elimination of capital punishment, artificial insemination, the 
legalization of "soft" drugs, and stem cell research.  The party's strong support for libertarian 
policies (including policies supporting the free market, low taxes, and privately funded health 
care), however, puts it at odds with other Italian center-left parties.  The Radicali Italiani are pro-
American and pro-European, and propose an American-style reform of the Italian political 
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system.  They are a constituent member of the Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational and 
Transparty (PRNTT). 50     
Since December 2011, Certi Diritti has also been a constituent member of the PRNTT, “a 
nonviolent organization following Gandhian principles.”51  The PRNTT is a political body but 
does not participate in national, regional, or local elections; instead, it strives to engage with and 
increase awareness about various political policies and it encourages its members to pursue 
nonviolent actions that inspire transnational and international institutions to comply with laws 
and principles.   Since 1995, the PRNTT has been registered as an NGO with “consultative 
status” with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  In this capacity, the 
PRNTT has been able to facilitate the presentation of claims by a large number of people and 
organizations working in the arena of democracy and human rights to diplomats, international 
media, and other non-governmental organizations, and has been able to secure representation on 
behalf of many such organizations at the UN Human Rights Commission.    
PRNTT embraces the rule of law and principle of legality as stated in international law, 
and proclaims “the respect of justice and law as the insuperable source of the legitimacy of 
                                                 
50 In addition to Certi Diritti, a few of PRNTT’s constituent members include:  Hands Off Cain (Nessuno tocchi 
Caino), a coalition of citizens and parliamentarians fighting to abolish the death penalty worldwide; No Peace 
Without Justice, an association fighting to end female genital mutilation; and the Luca Cosconi Association 
(Associazione Luca Coscioni), an organization dedicated to affirming the freedom of scientific research, promoting 
the teaching of the scientific method, asserting self-determination in health care, and implementing the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, especially in less developed countries.  PRNTT’s projects 
also include the fight against drug prohibitions, preservation of the environment, universal access to reproductive 
healthcare (including family planning), and the enabling of international jurisdictions to allow for supranational 
protection of democratic rights.   
51  Website of the Nonviolent Radical Party Transnational and Transparty, http://www.radicalparty.org/en, accessed 
January 2, 2014.  PRNTT uses the following adjectives to describe itself on the main page of its website under the 
heading and logo:  Gandhian-Nonviolent, Transnational, Cross-Party, Democratic, Environmentalist, Ecologist, 
Democratic Federalist, Secular, European Federalist, Liberal Democratic, Liberal Socialist, Libertarian, Anti-
Authoritarian, Anti-Prohibitionist, Anti-Partycratic,  Anti-Militarist, Anti-Clerical, International Language.    
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institutions.”  The PRNTT is actively concerned with maintaining a transnational character and is 
cognizant of the effects of globalization on democratic institutions.  An aspect of PRNTT’s work 
that bears special mention here because it has influenced the work of Certi Diritti is the 
organization’s promotion of “real democracy,” not just in places generally held to be 
undemocratic, but also in nation-states such as Italy, where there is allegedly a long tradition of 
democracy.52  PRNTT observes that the deterioration of “real democracy” must be dealt with as 
a “real disease” affecting the democratic ideal, and sees the supranational protection of 
                                                 
 
52 In the general motion adopted by the 39th Congress of the PRNTT held in Rome on December 8-11, 2011, the 
PRNTT notes: 
 that the Radical Party, over twenty years after its evolution into party transnational and transparty to tackle 
the dramatic global challenges that increasingly arise, still represents the only political subject that anybody 
can join all over the world, with the only constraint of the exercise of one’s full freedom of civil conscience 
… 
 that the breach of constitutional principles and fundamental freedoms more and more often occurs even in 
those Countries that have been relying upon formally democratic structures for a longer period of time: 
 that therefore the degeneration of [“real democracy”] through the constant and multi-decade violation of 
the principle of the rule of law and the hollowing-out of institutions, shows a legal pathology of democratic 
ideals … 
PRNTT then specifically singles out Italy in the ensuing paragraphs of the motion: 
that this is a striking phenomenon in Italy, where the party decided to increase its commitment in the last 
few years so that the Country may be able to be defined as democratic and enforcing the rule of law; 
that the situation of unlawfulness of the State as regards the administration of justice and the conditions of 
prisons is a phenomenon that does not only concern Italy alone but … concerns the entire world …. 
PRNTT goes on to state that it considers amnesty “a precious tool able on the one side to bring the Italian State back 
to the respect for the principle of legality and, on the other side, to lay the basis for structural reform of the judicial 
system, in a country where nearly 10 million people are involved in pending civil and criminal proceedings”   
(Website of the Nonviolent Radical Party Transnational and Transparty, 
http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/39th-congress-nonviolent-radical-party-transnational-and-transparty-
summoned-rome-8th-11th-d, accessed January 6, 2014). 
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democratic rights (which the organization defines as “universal rights historically acquired as 
‘natural’”) as one of its main goals.  PRNTT views the protection of democratic rights as the 
guarantee that people have access to democratic order and legal institutions in order to advance 
their political and social situations.  These ideas and principles no doubt continue to influence the 
choice and execution of Certi Diritti’s projects. 
 In a recent motion arising from its annual meeting held April 5-7, 2013, in Naples, Certi 
Diritti  explains the decision to become a constituent member of the PRNTT and notes that 
membership in the PRNTT is consistent with the more complex evolution of the association as 
represented by motions passed at the last two annual Congresses.  These motions commit Certi 
Diritti to work toward being more present in the political and judicial protection of the sexual 
rights of all, as well as more active in the transnational dimensions of campaigns directed toward 
this goal, at both the level of the nation-state in places where homophobia and sexual phobia are 
more serious and at the level of international organizations that have the means to intervene (e.g., 
the UN and the EU).  Certi Diritti’s mission also coincides with the objectives of the PRNTT in 
promoting legal action at the European courts for the assertion of rights denied in some EU 
member states and in actively promoting and participating in meetings, conventions, and 
conferences on the issues of civil and human rights, with special reference to the sexual freedom 
of the person.  One of Certi Diritti’s major initiatives is the recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples in Italy.  As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to this chapter, Certi Diritti has 
initiated a specific campaign, Affermazione Civile (translation:  "Civil Claim"), which aims to 
achieve recognition of rights for same-sex couples by pursuing cases in the Italian courts.     
 At the 2010 meeting, as well as in later conversations, the Certi Diritti activists I worked 
with frequently voiced the belief that Italian politics remains beholden to the Roman Catholic 
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Church, and that this is what marks Italy as different from other European states.  There can be 
little doubt that the Church's views on marriage and family prevail in Italy, at least for the 
moment.  As I will discuss in the following chapter, Church influence inhibits politicians from 
enacting a less burdensome divorce law and has led to adoption in Italy of one of the most 
restrictive laws on assisted reproduction in Europe.  The position of the Church and the 
relationship between the Church and Italian politicians is taken as a foregone conclusion among 
LGBTI activists in Italy.  At their meetings, Certi Diritti posted signs and handed out refrigerator 
magnets with the slogan “No Vatican, No Taliban.” There were constant references to Italy as a 
“clerical” state in need of secularization.   
The vehemence against the Church was ramped up at Certi Diritti's Fifth Congress, 
which was held in Milan, on December 3-4, 2011.  In fact, a big banner hung from the table 
where the speakers sat, stating "Preservativo?  Sì Grazie.  Vaticano?  No Grazie" (translation: 
"Condom?  Yes, thank you.  Vatican?  No, thank you").  I also noticed more frequent references 
to Europe.  The theme of the 2011 Congress was "Piú Diritti.  Piú Democrazia.  Piú Sviluppo.  
Nuove alleanze contro vecchie discriminazione" (translated:  "More Rights.  More Democracy.  
More Development.  New alliances against old discrimination)."  It just so happened that this 
meeting came on the heels of the ILGA-Europe meeting held in Turin.  Many of the Certi Diritti 
activists had attended and were active participants in the ILGA-Europe meeting, and there was 
carry-over from the European meeting.     
The 2011 meeting emphasized the fight for marriage equality and was preceded by a one-
day conference at the Università degli Studi di Milano that discussed a comparative law 
approach to judicial recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  At this conference, several 
attorneys who are active in the struggle and members of Rete Lenford presented talks on same-
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sex couples in Europe, differences between the French and German models recognizing 
cohabitation rights for same-sex couples, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, and cross-border aspects of recognition for same-sex couples.  The end of the day 
featured a roundtable where attendees heard directly from some couples who had been involved 
with judicial projects.  One of the representatives of the "couples" was Gian Mario Felicetti.  
Felicetti has been actively involved in coordinating the Affermazione Civile project since its 
inception.  Along with his partner, he filed an action with the European Court of Human Rights, 
asking for recognition of their right to marry.  He is also the author of La Famiglia Fantasma:  
DiCo, Pacs e Matrimoni Omosessuali.  La Politica Italiani in Crisi (2007) (translation:  "The 
Phantom Family:  DiCo, Pacs and Same-Sex Marriage.  Italian Politics in Crisis"). 
The cover of La Famiglia Fantasma  features a map of the EU that indicates in shades of 
green (for "yes") and red (for "no") the member states that recognize rights on behalf of same-
sex couples.  Italy is front and center and colored red.  According to Felicetti, hundreds of 
thousands of same-sex Italians live in stable, loving partnerships as if they were apparitions:  
without history, without law, and without a future.  They are there, but cannot be seen.  This is 
because Italy refuses to grant institutional recognition to their relationships.  In the book, 
Felicetti offers a "path" to these unmarried couples, leading them from invisibility to the public 
sphere of civil society.  He argues that Italy must first redeem its history by recognizing that 
unmarried and same-sex couples are an indispensable part of the nation's cultural identity and 
that censorship in this area leads to a weak civilization.  The second step is to gain recognition in 
the law.  This requires people to first know the laws and institutions of the state.  Felicetti argues 
that the Italian Constitution does not establish marriage as a union between a man and a woman, 
and explains that marriage between persons of the same-sex is not forbidden by Italian law.  The 
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final step on Felicetti's proposed path is to conquer the future.  This requires Italians to build 
their own vocabulary with respect to LGBTI issues in order to free themselves from the fear of 
difference and open a peaceful and honest dialogue.  Felicetti, like other Italian LGBTI activists, 
blames the current situation on the undue influence of the Church over Italian politicians: 
      I segretari dei partiti del centrodestra ripetono come pappagalli ciò che poche ore prima 
ha detto il papa o il cardinale di turno.  I partiti del centrosinistra hanno paura, tanta 
paura di essere democratici, come i loro colleghi del resto della UE, schiavi di una 
morale che hanno preso in prestito dalla religione, incapaci di affermare la loro identità 
politica, la loro etica di politici laici (2007:backcover).53  
At the actual congress, many of the presentations centered on the topic of rights for same-
sex couples, and the congress featured a session on the test cases initiated pursuant to the 
Affermazione Civile project.  The Affermazione Civile campaign is a deliberate attempt to 
circumvent national politics by moving the battlefield from the legislature to the judiciary, and, 
to the extent necessary, from Italy to the EU.  The campaign began with a call for same-sex 
couples residing in Italy who were willing to go public and request registration of their 
relationships at the appropriate government offices.  Certi Diritti and the parties who participated 
in the campaign fully expected and were not disappointed when the relevant government offices 
refused to issue official documents recognizing their respective relationships.  Once the 
documents were denied, volunteer attorneys from Rete Lenford were assigned to assist the 
couples in pursuing their matters in court.  So far, approximately 30 same-sex couples in Italy 
                                                 
53 Translation:  "The secretaries of the parties of the center-right repeat like parrots what the pope or cardinal on-
duty said a few hours before.  The center-left parties are afraid, so afraid to be democratic, like their colleagues in 
the rest of the EU, slaves of a morality that they have borrowed from religion, unable to assert their political identity, 
their ethic of secular politics." 
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have been involved with this project.  Before I tackle the specific details of the Affermazione 
Civile project and its preliminary results, however, I must point out that the fight for marriage 
equality occurs within a larger push for comprehensive reform of Italian family law, which 
includes the laws governing divorce, access to reproductive technologies, and recognition of 
rights for non-married cohabitating couples, among other things.54    
The Amore Civile Project 
Convinced of the need for comprehensive reform, Certi Diritti worked with other 
associations, legal and other experts such as sociologists and psychologists, and politicians from 
different parties, to draft a proposal for the comprehensive reform of Italian family law.  The 
substance of the proposed law was published in a book entitled Amore Civile:  dal Diritto della 
Tradizione al Diritto della Ragione (translation:  “Civil Love:  From the Law of Tradition to the 
Law of Reason”), edited by Italian attorneys and experts in family law Bruno de Filippis and 
Francesco Bilotta.55  The proposed reform addresses what the working group sees as the most 
pressing issues in relation to the family:  the recognition of de facto unions and multiple models 
of marital union, speedier divorce (including the unification of the processes of separation and 
divorce), access to medically assisted reproduction, allowing adoption by single persons, 
provisions for living wills, equality between men and women with respect to the transmission of 
the surname, changes in the system of inheritance, the declaration of "children's rights," and, last 
but not least, marriage equality.  The reform proposal was submitted to the House and Senate by 
                                                 
54 In Italy, almost all divorces require a continuous three (3) year legal separation.  The present status of divorce law 
in Italy creates a somewhat paradoxical situation where certain LGBTI rights activists are simultaneously fighting 
for marriage equality and speedier divorce. 
 
55 Bilotta is also a founding member of Rete Lenford. 
 
  
79 
 
Radicali Italiani parliamentarians with the hope that the proposed reform would become a Bill 
and initiate debate in Parliament.  To date, nothing significant has happened, and the family law 
remains essentially the same as it did in the mid-1970s.  
In the blurb about Amore Civile posted on the Certi Diritti website, the editors are 
compelled to call attention to the fact that the work is based on the principle of a secular state.  
The Amore Civile project deliberately attempts to move away from a family law premised on a 
particular religious (Catholic) ideology to a family law that addresses the actual needs of 
contemporary Italians.  One of the main arguments advanced by proponents of this project is that 
the traditional family is no longer the “natural order of society.”56  Further, the family’s existence 
is no longer premised on reproduction.  According to proponents of Amore Civile, the institution 
of family has been irrevocably altered due to an increase in civil marriages, the cohabitation of 
couples, children born out of wedlock, single-parent families, stepfamilies, adoption, and assisted 
reproduction technologies:  socially and culturally the family no longer exists as an instrument 
for reproduction of the species.  Humans are by nature cultural beings and family forms have 
always adapted to changes in society.  In order to progress, for example, Italy must reform its 
bureaucratic and hetero-normative divorce law, and adopt a law that does away with the 
requirement of a three-year separation and favors mediation and self-determination.   
The Amore Civile perspective on what constitutes a family is not only in sharp contrast to 
the Catholic vision of family, but also represents a departure from the nation-state’s view of the 
family as a “natural society founded on marriage” enshrined in Article 29 of the Italian 
Constitution of 1948.  The “family” envisioned in Amore Civile is one created by free choice and 
                                                 
56 I take up this subject in depth in the next chapter. 
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love, and one that warrants protection as a private right.  But, as the proponents of Amore Civile 
point out, Catholic Italy (with its so-called “Family Day” demonstration calling for protection of 
the traditional patriarchal family), is also the same country that lags behind the rest of Europe 
with respect to its lack of childcare, unequal distribution of housework between men and women, 
low female participation in the workforce, low fertility rates, and low rates and speeds for 
adoption.   
Some LGBTI activists in Italy believe that the Italian "backwardness" in the area of 
family law can be used to an advantage.  As Yuri Guiana, the current secretary of Certi Diritti, 
noted in a Huffington Post blog spot published online, the present legal landscape presents an 
almost "virgin land" on which to build a comprehensive reform of family law that can meet the 
needs of society.57  Such reform would clear up the matter of "illogical and anachronistic" 
provisions that haunt the Civil Code, such as the norm that automatically gives a child to the 
mother (and consequently to the woman's husband) if the child is born within 180 days of the 
celebration of marriage and before the expiration of 300 days after the dissolution of a marriage.  
In addition, such reform would enable couples to make their relationships as they fit, and allow 
couples to enter into pre-marital agreements with a possible view toward divorce (something that 
is not allowed under Italian family law at the moment).    
Why Marriage? 
 In the past couple of years Certi Diritti has increasingly called for full-blown marriage 
equality.  In a press release dated November 28, 2013, Certi Diritti uses the National Council of 
Notaries declaration of a day of "Cohabitation Agreements" to shame politicians.  Certi Diritti 
                                                 
57 Guaina, Yuri, 2012, “Per un amore civile,” L’Huffington Post.  Electronic document, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.it/yuri-guaiana/per-un-amore-civile_b_2282585.html, accessed January 10, 2014. 
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points out that initiatives such the National Council of Notaries' declaration call attention to the 
legislature's failure to act.  Moreover, while cohabitation agreements are great, they are not 
enough.  Simply put, they do not resolve all of the legal issues same-sex couples must contend 
with such as rights to inheritance and pensions.  Certi Diritti calls on the legislature to recognize 
marriage equality for same-sex couples and refers to marriage as the most significant institution 
in the life of a couple. 
 One of the questions I am frequently asked when I explain or present a paper about my 
research is, “Why marriage?”  To paraphrase an acquaintance who works for ILGA-Europe:  
there is something lost when an LGBTI couple “buys into” marriage, because marriage 
constitutes an acceptance of heterosexist norms that erases the specialness of being queer.58  The 
institution of marriage assumes the structure and role of the state:  it requires asking the state for 
its approval of the relationship.  This is potentially dangerous because it is an accommodation of 
the state that may result in further assimilation in other areas of life.  Nancy Polikoff contends:  
“[T]he desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the worst of 
mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that betrays the 
promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism” (1993:1536).  Moreover, the 
“right” to marry will not automatically lead to greater acceptance of same-sex couples by 
society, and such couples will continue to face discrimination from and be ostracized by those 
who do not approve of same-sex relationships.     
                                                 
58  In his comment, my acquaintance was using the word “queer” to reference a political position, as well as a sexual 
orientation.  The political position he references is one that advocates an escape from binary thinking by recognizing 
sexual orientation and gender identity as potentially fluid.   
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There is an abundance of scholarly literature on this theme (e.g., Polikoff 1993; 
Thompson 2004; Warner 2000) and, while I do not wish to discount it, my overriding focus is on 
relationships between law and society as seen through the lens of the struggle for same-sex 
marriage, rather than on queer theory or social activism per se.  For my purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that marriage equality is essential to the thousands of couples who want or require a legal 
instrument recognizing their relationship.  The legal benefits of marriage are numerous, to both 
the couple and to society, and there is no legitimate reason why same-sex couples should not 
partake of these benefits if they so desire.59  Further, one can argue that anything short of 
marriage is an inadequate substitute:  “Marriage is a deal between a couple and society, not just 
between two people:  society recognizes the sanctity and autonomy of the pair-bond, and in 
exchange each spouse commits to being the other’s nurse, social worker and policeman of first 
resort.  Each marriage is its own little society within society” (Rauch 2004[1997]:180).  This 
                                                 
59  One of the ways marriage benefits societies is through the creation of legal kin.  Society has an interest in kin-
creation because family members frequently serve as caretakers for one another, thereby reducing state 
responsibility for this function.  As will be made clear in the next chapter, this is important in Italy, where the family 
functions as a significant safety net in the absence of adequate state services.         
 
Some of the obvious benefits to the couple include access to a loved one in case of an emergency, the sharing of 
insurance policies at reduced rates, co-ownership of property, tax benefits, inheritance rights, and mutual support 
obligations.  In Italy, the legal inability to marry denies same-sex couples many things, not least of which is dignity 
of affect.  Same-sex couples are also barred from access to the marital property regime, inheritance, social security 
and reversibility of pension, protections and guarantees for the weaker partner in case of separation, equality  with 
other couples in employment rankings and public competitions, the right to family leave at work, creation of family 
businesses, access at hospital or prison, decision-making ability in the case of incapacitation of one of the partners, 
succession of lease and the right to remain in the shared house in the case of death of the contracting partner, and 
family discounts.   
 
In the U.S. context, Nancy F. Cott observed in her testimony before the Vermont House Judiciary Committee on 
January 17, 1997, that the word “marriage” appeared 1,034 times in federal statutes and there were 1,034 different 
kinds of benefits, responsibilities, rights, and so forth associated with marriage in the federal code.  
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statement is especially true in Italy, where the “family” occupies a special position enshrined 
within the national Constitution.   
As mentioned in the introduction, in 1948, after the fall of the fascist state, Italy enacted a 
new Constitution.  Unlike the United States Constitution, which has never mentioned “family” or 
any of its traditional parts (i.e., “husband and wife,” “spouses,” “marriage,” or “parent and 
child”), the Italian Constitution of 1948, Article 29, explicitly recognizes the rights of the family 
as a natural society founded on marriage.  In Article 31 of the Constitution, the State is obligated 
to support the formation of the family and the "fulfillment of its duties" through economic and 
other forms of assistance.  Although potentially problematic for heterosexual couples who 
choose not to wed, this constitutional ordering of Italian society is especially untenable for those 
couples who do not even have the option to marry.  The problem is in part the constitutional 
language that recognizes the rights of the family as a society founded on marriage.  The 
language of Article 29 rules out the possibility of constitutional protection as a “family” for those 
couples who are legally incompetent to enter into marriage.  Thus, even if a same-sex couple in 
Italy were able to enter into a legally valid civil union, registered domestic partnership, or some 
other similar arrangement, the couple and any offspring would not be considered a “family” 
according to Article 29 of the Italian Constitution of 1948, and would not be entitled to the 
"rights" of the family referenced therein.  In some contexts, the label may not be important; 
however, in Italy societal references and symbolic representations of the family based on 
heterosexual marriage are so prevalent as to be overpowering.  Miguel Malagreca explains: 
 One of the sad lessons of queer Italy is that heteronormativity is so overwhelming at so 
many levels of everyday life and so omnipresent that it vertebrates culture providing a 
totalizing backbone of experiences, language, rituals and history that is difficult to 
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overcome.  In the presence of a historically impermeable heterosexist matrix where the 
heterosexual family occupies a cultural central role, Italian GLBTQs are prevented from 
breaking out from the language and rituals of heterosexuality (2006:272). 
I submit that these factors are also what make marriage equality the ultimate goal of the 
Affermazione Civile campaign:  anything less than full marriage equality will doom same-sex 
relationships to “Serie B,” and will ultimately fail to satisfy the mandates of European law 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.  I take this up with more vigor in the 
following chapters. 
The Affermazione Civile Project   
 The Affermazione Civile project is an example of a type of activism that is geared toward 
the pragmatic, or practical, rather than the theoretical.  Stefania Bernini, a European historian, 
has argued that critical engagement of the family stimulated by the social movements of the late 
1960s culminated in a series of legal reforms in Italy that redefined individual rights vis-à-vis the 
family in the 1970s and 80s (2008).  The introduction of divorce and legalization of abortion 
were thereby the result of a “far-reaching critique of the family as an institution and its 
relationship with the state” that was actively pursued by the social movements of the 1960s and 
the women’s movement in particular (Bernini 2008:305).  The end of the reform process 
coincided with the dying out of the social movements of the 1960s.  In the Affermazione Civile 
and Amore Civile projects, however, one can see a resurgence of interest in the reform process on 
the part of Italian activists.  This type of activism was made possible by the shift in the language 
of politics and representation of difference that abandoned the revolutionary potential of the 
early Italian LGBTI movement (with its goal of remaking society) in favor of directing efforts 
toward becoming accepted participants in the prevailing society.  By consciously linking the 
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Italian LGBTI framework with other existing frameworks around the world, most notably the 
U.S. framework, activists have been able to capitalize on the language of "rights" (civil, social 
and human) and use this as an entry into the justice system to advance recognition.60  As I show 
in Chapter 4, adopting the language of "rights" gives Italian LGBTI activists access to "Europe," 
which is used as a trope to call attention to Italy's "backwardness" in light of European 
progressiveness.61  The Affermazione Civile project represents a shift from the political to the 
judicial, and is best explained through an examination of the cases initiated pursuant to the 
project.  While it has taken time, the first results have been encouraging.   
First Results 
On March 23, 2010, Italy’s Constitutional Court considered whether restricting civil 
marriages to “husband and wife” rather than “spouses” discriminates against same-sex couples 
and therefore infringes on principles of equality and non-discrimination protected by the Italian 
Constitution.62  These issues were referred to the Constitutional Court from four separate lower 
courts with pending cases (all initiated as part of the Affermazione Civile campaign) concerning 
the denial of marriage banns (a necessary step for being permitted to marry in Italy) to same-sex 
                                                 
60 The notion that change happens by people adopting a legalistic approach is not without controversy.  Critiques see 
it as an “American” (as in “U.S.”) approach that flies in the face of a very liberal and anti-American pre-existing 
culture in Italy that is both unique and worth preserving. 
  
61 Again, this is not without controversy.  Here, Italy is judged from a Northern European legalistic approach that is 
arguably obsessed with notions of modernity versus non-modernity, and that creates a traditional time-line where to 
be modern is to be better.  
 
62 The Italian Constitutional Court was the creation of the Italian Constitution of 1948, and was in part a response to 
the high priority placed on protecting human rights in the wake of the post-World War II Fascist era. The constituent 
assembly that approved the Constitution rejected the U.S. system under which an ordinary court can refuse to apply 
a law that it considers to be unconstitutional. The constituent assembly thought it necessary to concentrate 
constitutional matters in one court and to create a separate body with authority to nullify a law erga omnes (a Latin 
legal term meaning “in relation to all” that refers to rights and responsibilities that can be enforced against anyone, 
rather than against a specific person or party). Its principal function is the abrogation of unconstitutional laws. 
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couples by their respective city halls.63  Through the parties involved in these cases, Certi Diritti 
and the attorneys from Rete Lenford with which it collaborated argued that there is no legal 
impediment to marriage equality in Italy.  They were able to do so because, under Italian law, 
there is neither a legal definition of marriage nor an express restriction on same-sex marriage.  
Moreover, there is no specific legal requirement that the parties seeking to marry be of opposite 
sex.   
On April 14, 2010, the Constitutional Court issued its judgment.  Although the court did 
not immediately recognize a right to civil marriage as requested by Certi Diritti, it did not rule 
out the possibility.  More importantly, for the first time, the Court recognized the constitutional 
dignity of same-sex partnerships, and urged the Italian Parliament to take action.  Further, it 
called for judicial protection of rights for same-sex couples in the absence of action on the part of 
Italian politicians to recognize such rights.  In its decision, the Constitutional Court clearly 
indicated that if reform is not forthcoming the Court may opt to act more forcefully in the next 
case.  Encouraged by the dicta in the decision of the Constitutional Court, Certi Diritti has 
continued with the judicial campaign in other types of cases.   
Approximately two years later, on February 2, 2012, the First Instance Court in Reggio 
Emilia (Il Tribunale di Reggio Emilia) recognized the right to family reunification of a same-sex 
spouse. The court ruled in favor of a Uruguayan man and his Italian husband, granting the 
Uruguayan partner the right to obtain a residence permit in Italy.  The couple was legally married 
in Spain and had moved to Italy.  The application for residence was initially denied by the local 
police, but the couple appealed to the court.  The court found that denial of the permit violated 
                                                 
63 These courts included the Tribunal of Venice, Tribunal of Ferrara, the Court of Appeal of Trento, and the Court of 
Appeal of Florence.  
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EU norms governing freedom of movement and based its decision on the application of the EU 
Freedom of Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC).  The court stated that the object of the 
decision was not the recognition of the status of the Uruguayan citizen under Italian family law 
but, rather, only the right to free circulation under EU law recognizing such persons as “family 
members.”  
Thus, while the court did not recognize the couple as “married,” it did recognize the 
Uruguayan partner as a “family member” that entitled him to certain rights under EU law.  The 
granting of a residence permit to a non-EU citizen same-sex spouse of an Italian citizen was the 
first of its kind in Italy.  This is an important recognition, even if it is only for purposes of legal 
residence in Italy, because it is the first time a body of the Italian state has been required to issue 
a document that recognizes same-sex couples.  Of course, the fact that the Reggio Emilia court is 
a court of first instance meant that the decision was appealable.  However, a subsequent Italian 
Supreme Court case renders a successful appeal unlikely. 
A month after the Reggio Emilia decision, in March of 2012, Italy’s Supreme Court of 
Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) determined that, while a same-sex couple who married 
outside of Italy could not be considered legally wed in Italy, same-sex couples legally married 
abroad have the right to “a family life” and, “in specific situations,” to “be treated the same as 
couples married by law.”64  The court further recognized the inviolable right of same-sex couples 
to live freely as a couple.  The court did not go so far as to require municipalities to register 
                                                 
64
 The Court of Cassation is the court of last resort in the Italian judicial system.  While it does not have authority to 
overrule the trial court’s interpretation of evidence, it can correct a lower court’s interpretation of law.  The role of 
the Court of Cassation is to make sure that lower courts correctly follow legal procedure and to harmonize the 
interpretation of laws by the lower courts.  Although its decisions are binding only on the case being considered, the 
lower courts find the Court of Cassation’s judgments persuasive.   
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same-sex marriages contracted abroad and reiterated that this is a matter of family law left to the 
exclusive competence of the EU member state.  Instead, the Court (similar to the Reggio Emilia 
court) relied on application of the rules governing the free movement of EU citizens and their 
families, which were ratified in Italy and therefore, according to the Court of Cassation, must be 
given effect.  
 Further, there are indications that the Italian judiciary is taking this call seriously.  In a 
subsequent case also initiated as part of the Affermazione Civile campaign, the Court of Appeal 
for Milan cited the Court of Cassation case and the 2010 judgment of the Constitutional Court 
for the proposition that the court will guarantee certain rights for same-sex couples, treating them 
in some circumstances as married couples.65  Based on references to these cases, the Court of 
Appeal for Milan found that a mutual fund could not deny benefits to the same-sex partner of 
one of its members in a situation where the two are permanently residing together.   
There is evidence that these court decisions are being noticed and enforced by state 
actors, thereby demonstrating their salience as public policy.  As of May 4, 2013, over 70 same-
sex couples have come forward, asking Certi Diritti for information or assistance in obtaining a 
residence permit for a non-Italian partner, and at least fifteen couples have obtained residence 
permits (recognizing the partner as a "family member" of a European citizen ) pursuant to the 
Affermazione Civile campaign.  These couples have been diverse:  some were married in an EU 
member state that recognizes same-sex marriage, some were married outside of Europe, and 
others were subject to a civil union.  The inquiries prompted Certi Diritti to publish guides for 
obtaining a residence permit on behalf of a same-sex partner ("Informazioni per ottenere la 
                                                 
65 Judgment 7176, August 31, 2012. 
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‘Carta di soggiorno per familiari di cittadini europei' (Decreto Legislativo 30/2007) per coppie 
miste dello stesso sesso") and for marrying in Portugal, the only nation in Europe (besides 
Norway) that does not require residence to celebrate marriage.   
Some of the local questura (the police departments that handle the issuance of residence 
permits in Italy) are now issuing permits on their own without requiring court action.  On August 
30, 2012, the police in Milan issued a residence permit to the Serbian same-sex spouse of an 
Italian-Canadian citizen.  The permit was issued on the same day for which it was applied, and 
was approved pursuant to the EU provisions granting free movement to EU citizens and their 
families.  The couple had been married in Canada in 2009, but had been living in Italy for some 
time.  Yuri Guiana, the current Secretary of Certi Diritti, observed in a press release about the 
incident that the decision of the police headquarters in Milan strengthens the judgment of the 
Court of Reggio Emilia.  
Another recent case involved a woman from the Seychelles who entered into a valid 
PACs with an Italian citizen in France.  Prior to this case, all of the applications submitted for 
permission to reside in Italy involved same-sex couples who had married abroad.  According to 
the position advanced by Certi Diritti, European legislation is clear and includes recognition of 
any type of valid union duly attested by the state.  Therefore, under the EU free movement 
provisions, the couple is legally entitled to live as such in Italy. The police in Milan agreed, and 
granted the residence permit on September 28, 2012.  Certi Diritti celebrated this victory by 
noting that the couple had become part of the historical path being undertaken by LGBT persons 
to bring about marriage equality in Italy.  
Government agencies in Italy also recognize this development.  In November 2012, a 
circular of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Italy was made public. The circular indicated that, in 
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accordance with the rulings of the Reggio Emilia court, the Constitutional Court, and the Court 
of Cassation, the questura are required to issue a residence permit to the foreign same-sex 
partner of an EU citizen.  The circular further stated that, although Italian law does not recognize 
civil unions or provide for the protection of the rights of same-sex couples, recent decisions of 
the Italian courts have recognized certain rights on behalf of same-sex couples as the judiciary 
has taken action to fill the legal void in this area of law.   
Certi Diritti cites the Affermazione Civile cases as a clear example of the ways in which 
European law is increasingly becoming part of the Italian legal system with respect to the 
protection of the fundamental rights of the citizen.  I submit that these cases also demonstrate a 
degree of boldness on the part of the Italian judiciary that points to an acceleration of judicial 
activism and demonstrates the ways in which the EU is influencing the judicial making of public 
policy in Italy.  This, however, is the subject of Chapter 4.  While at the present time the laws 
governing free movement in Europe remain the primary means for same-sex couples to gain 
recognition (at least in terms of residency) in Italy, the fact that there has been movement is 
significant because this expansion has occurred without and despite the participation of the 
legislature.  Also, as can be seen in the decision issued by the Court of Appeal in Milan, there is 
some indication that the lower courts are aware of and responding to the Constitutional Court’s 
and the Court of Cassation’s call to action to treat same-sex couples married abroad in similar 
fashion to those deemed married under Italian law.  It remains to be seen how far the Italian 
courts will take this.  For example, will the Italian courts recognize parental rights in gay 
adoptions conducted abroad?  There is a sense among activists working on this project that these 
recent victories are fragile and preliminary, and that clerical backlash is to be expected.  
  
91 
 
In the meantime, encouraged by its successes, the Affermazione Civile campaign has been 
rebranded "Affermazione Civile 2.0,” and is continuing in several directions.  On one front, the 
campaign will continue to make demands pursuant to the Court of Cassation's promise to treat 
same-sex couples in stable relationships the same as married couples in certain circumstances.  
To this end, Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford will pursue actions in the Italian courts, seeking 
recognition of rights such as pension entitlements and inheritance rights for the children of same-
sex couples.   Certi Diritti will also continue to seek registration in Italy of marriages and civil 
unions contracted abroad.  Finally, Certi Diritti will continue to push for full marriage equality in 
the Italian and European courts.  On yet another front, Certi Diritti commits to the continued 
pursuit of family reunification for same-sex couples in those situations where one partner is a 
citizen of the EU and the other is not.   
In early March 2014, I was asked by Certi Diritti to translate a “LGBTI Roadmap” for a 
national strategic litigation project.  The “Roadmap,” which was made possible due to a grant of 
money from ILGA-Europe, identified several areas that are ripe for the introduction of test cases.  
These areas range from the affirmation of the principle of non-discrimination and the reform of 
family law to the adoption of procedures for the registration of gender reassignment that are 
more respectful of human dignity.  The proposed “Roadmap” is ambitious in that it represents a 
first attempt to coordinate an overall strategy involving many different Italian LGBTI 
associations at the national level.  While Certi Diritti is not completely abandoning legislative 
reform as a means to achieving the recognition of rights, its current focus on a national strategic 
litigation plan indicates a relatively newfound confidence in the courts as arbiters of justice and 
agents of change. 
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The Affermazione Civile campaign is remarkable in its reliance on the Italian courts to 
effect the advancement of rights for same-sex couples.  As mentioned, it is no secret that Italians 
see the state as lacking legitimacy and respond to it with distrust (Ginsborg 2003; Barański 
2001), and social activism in Italy has historically been characterized as cynical toward state 
institutions and lacking faith in the rule of law (Sciolla 1997:48, 62-62), mirroring the larger 
society’s perceptions of government and governmental entities.  As I will talk about in Chapter 
4, Italian distrust of government and governmental entities extends to the legal profession and 
law, and the judiciary is no exception.  Consequently, by deliberately embracing court action as a 
mechanism for change in an area of law that has long been subject to political impasse, Italian 
LGBTI activists are demonstrating new faith in the ability of state institutions and the rule of law 
to serve as societal transformers. 
The Affermazione Civile project attempts to circumvent national politics by moving the 
battlefield from the legislature to the courts.  In addition, through their invocations of Europe and 
EU law, Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford seek an intervention that ultimately redefines relations 
between the EU and its member states.  By demanding recognition for same-sex couples as 
rights-bearing citizens, they further delineate a European identity, while simultaneously forcing 
the nation-state to recognize them as citizens with rights.  These groups attempt to undermine the 
Church’s influence over politics in Italy through the creation of a stronger European citizenship 
based on rights that originate in secular humanistic notions of social justice.  The legal 
maneuverings of Italian activists and the resulting court decisions therefore carry consequences 
for the [related] projects of European integration and Europeanization as the lives of those 
subject to the law assume new legal identities embedded within a supranational framework.  In a 
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commentary on the Milan Court of Appeals case, Rete Lenford attorney Massimo Clara writes, 
“Clearly it is not over, but we are on the right path (author’s translation).”66  
In the next chapter, I want to back up and look at the role and place of family in 
contemporary Italy.  I will describe some of the processes that have altered the institution of 
family in Italy and the EU in recent years.  I will also look at the current status of the family in 
Italian law and talk about attempts to reform Italian family law so that it is more responsive to 
the actual needs of families in Italy.  Along with this, I will look at how Italian politicians 
mobilize notions of the traditional family in an attempt to foster a sense of national identity based 
on Catholic social values.  
  
                                                 
66 Massimo Clara, “La coppia more uxorio è sia etero sia omo:  un nuovo passo della giurisprudenza,” Certi Diritti 
website, April 8, 2012, http://www.certidiritti.it/notizie/comunicati-stampa/item/1442-la-coppia-more-uxorio-
%C3%A8-sia-etero-sia-omo-un-nuovo-passo-della-giurisprudenza, accessed March 6, 2014. 
  
94 
 
Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Photo of "Maria" from Guarda in Faccia la Violenza exhibit (photo  
by author). 
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Figure 2.   Certi Diritti logo. 
 
 
                                                                                        
Figure 3.  Certi Diritti protest signs.  (Personal Collection).67   
                                                 
67 The signs read (from left to right and top to bottom):  “No Vatican No Taliban,” “Legalization of Prostitution,” 
“Marriage!,” “A New Law for Trans Persons.  Model Spain,” “Equality!, and “Reform of Family Law.”  
 
  
96 
 
 
Figure 4.  Badge from Certi Diritti IV Congress in Rome, held November 27-28, 2010, with the meeting theme 
“Cittadini in Europa, fantasmi in Italia.  Fermiamo la peste italiana!” (translated “Citizens in Europe, Phantoms in 
Italy:  Let’s Stop the Italian Plague!”) (Personal Collection). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Paraphernalia from Certi Diritti meetings.  (Personal Collection). 
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Figure 6.  Cover of Gian Mario Felicetti's book La Famiglia Fantasma (2007).   
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Chapter 3:  The (Not So) Traditional Family and the Failure of Italian Family Law 
On October 2, 2013, I was half-watching late-night television’s Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart when a segment caught my attention.  It was Lewis Black’s “Back in Black” piece 
poking fun at the “Barilla Pasta” scandal.   By way of background, the “Barilla Pasta” scandal 
arose from comments made by Guido Barilla, the 55-year-old chairman of the Barilla company, 
asserting that he would never feature a gay couple in ads for his firm’s pasta.  “I would never do 
[a commercial] with a homosexual family, not for lack of respect but because we don’t agree 
with them,” Reuters reported Barilla as saying during an interview on Italian radio program La 
Zanzara that aired on September 25, 2013.68  “Ours is a classic family where the woman plays a 
fundamental role,” Barilla stated, adding that if gays “like our pasta and our advertising, they’ll 
eat our pasta. If they don’t like it, then they will not eat it and they will eat another brand.”  
Barilla’s comments sparked outrage and gay-rights activists throughout the world announced a 
boycott.  Users of social media labeled Barilla “horrendously sexist and homophobic” and 
renamed the brand, “hate pasta.”  Barilla quickly posted a statement on the company’s Facebook 
page, apologizing for hurting anyone’s “sensitivity,” but maintained that “traditional families” 
have always been identified with the Barilla brand.  The apology was deemed insufficient by 
many, and Forbes contributor Laura Heller reported in a blog that Luca Di Leo, the head of 
media relations for Barilla, had requested that she post a more detailed video apology from 
Barilla seeking to make amends with customers who were offended.  In the video, Barilla states:   
I have heard the countless reactions around the world to my words, which have depressed  
                                                 
68 Golding, Bruce, and Post Wires, “Barilla:  ‘Gays Can Eat Someone Else’s Pasta,’” NewYork Post, September 26, 
2013, http://nypost.com/2013/09/26/barilla-chairman-gays-can-eat-someone-elses-pasta/, accessed February 27, 
2014. 
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and saddened me.  It is clear that I have a lot to learn about the lively debate concerning  
the evolution of the family.  In the coming weeks, I pledge to meet representatives of the  
group that best represent the evolution of the family, including those who have been 
offended by my words. 
While the “Barilla Scandal” is interesting in and of itself for what it says about notions of family 
in Italy, Lewis Black’s segment made it all the more so. 
 Black took aim at the pasta maker and drew laughs when he pointed out that it was not 
just Barilla’s anti-gay rhetoric that was so reprehensible, but also the fact that he had opened the 
door to terrible “hot water” puns.  Two things in particular struck me when watching the 
segment.  The first was Black’s lead-in that anyone who has ever been to Italy would “have good 
reason to believe it is the most gay-friendly country in the world” because “it’s basically nothing 
but beautiful men in neckerchiefs and fitted suits riding around on Vespas and kissing each other 
on the cheek.”  Although clearly intended as comedy, I had to wonder if people outside Italy 
(mainly people in the United States, who are Black’s primary audience) really do think of it as a 
“gay friendly” country, or whether it was Black’s way of pointing out certain stereotypes 
regarding Italian culture that could be seen as ironic in light of Italy’s poor record with respect to 
treatment of LGBTI persons.  I was also struck by the representations of the “classic Italian 
family” chosen for the segment.  Black argues that it would be foolish to think that the “classic 
Italian family” would be so nice and sweet and traditional if it were not for the “gays.”  He 
shows a montage of “Italian” families (which are actually “Italian-American” families) fighting 
at the dinner table.  The families depicted are mostly U.S.-based representations from film and 
reality television.  Black then takes a look at the families depicted in some of Barilla’s past 
commercials and discovers that, instead of “traditional families,” the ads feature “horny women 
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ready to bang the first handsome stranger who knows how to throw a handful of twigs into a pot 
of boiling water.”  According to Black, “It’s Fifty Shades of Tortellini.”69  
 I use the Barilla Pasta scandal as a lead-in to this chapter because it demonstrates an 
important point:  misconceptions about the “classical" or "traditional" Italian "family" abound.  
While some of the representations circulating in the popular media are exaggerated typecasts 
presented for our amusement, others, like Barilla’s “classic family,” cannot be so easily laughed 
off.  In the preceding chapter, I noted how the Catholic Church launched a forceful and effective 
campaign against the proposed DICO.  The Church asserted that passage of the DICO would 
signal the end of the family and of morality, and vowed to use its power to protect the 
“traditional” family based on marriage between a man and a woman.  The Church lived up to its 
promise when lay Catholic groups and family associations organized a huge “Family Day” 
demonstration in Rome, which was attended by hundreds of thousands of mothers, fathers, sons, 
and daughters.70  The demonstration succeeded in making a point about the allegedly traditional 
Italian family, and the point made was this:  regardless of the various types of familial 
arrangements present in Italian society, the notion of the “traditional” family is salient and there 
are large numbers of Italians who are willing to “scendere in piazza,” or “take to the streets,” to 
protest perceived threats to its continued existence (even if its existence is primarily as an ideal 
rather than reality).     
It should be obvious by now that, in order to better understand the struggle over 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, one must know more about the role(s) of 
                                                 
69 Here, Black is spoofing Fifty Shades of Gray, a 2011 erotic romance novel by British author E. L. James.  
 
70 Organizers claimed that as many as 1.5 million people attended the rally.  See Falconi, Marta, “Italians Rally 
Against Marriage Bill,” Washington Post, May 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/12/AR2007051200460_pf.html, accessed February 27, 2014. 
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family in contemporary Italy.  Protection of the "traditional" family is, after all, what the 
opposition claims its objection to same-sex marriage is all about.  The family remains a (if not 
“the”) central institution in Italian society.  At the same time, the Italian family continues to exist 
within a legal framework that defines it as a “natural society founded on marriage” (Art. 29, 
Italian Constitution of 1948).  As revealed in Chapter 2, societal references and symbolic 
representations of the family based on heterosexual marriage in Italy are so prevalent as to render 
any other way of being a family practically unimaginable.  I submit that legal representations of 
the family as a “natural society founded on marriage” also contribute to the ideological 
domination of the so-called “traditional” family.  In Chapter 2 we saw how some parts of Italian 
LGBTI activism surrendered the radical politics of the 1970s (aimed at changing society) in 
favor of identity politics (aimed at gaining acceptance as participants in society through 
recognition of rights, which include the right to form a family and recognition for same-sex 
couples).   
Political discourse in Italy, however, continues to reject the notion of same-sex families, 
especially the idea of same-sex couples as parents, alleging that the children of “homosexual 
families” would suffer from discrimination (Danna 2011).  This perspective is aligned with 
Catholic social teachings of the family as an institution that supports procreation and the raising 
of children.   The alleged "natural" foundation of the family is the married heterosexual couple.  
In this view, the purpose of marriage is filiation.  According to Catholic doctrine, because same-
sex couples cannot produce children, they are "unnatural" and "sterile" and therefore incapable 
of entering into marriage.  
One of the points I make in this chapter is that, while family life in Italy has changed 
dramatically in recent years, family law has not.  Family law plays a central role in the 
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structuring of society.  Family law accompanies taxation and labor market policies, and laws 
defining who is a family member frequently determine social entitlements.  Family law thus 
carries repercussions for income and equality, and has a direct bearing on the welfare of entire 
categories of people.  The Italian Constitution, in Article 31, promises to support family 
formation through economic measures and other benefits.  Of course, constitutional protections 
and entitlements depend on how "family" is defined.  Discord between what families are and 
what the law says they are is therefore problematic, not just for same-sex couples, but for all 
“non-traditional” families who are effectively erased by the State and as a consequence live as 
“ghost” or "phantom" families (following Felicetti  2007) in the eyes of the law.  
The second point I make in this chapter concerns the use of the family as a major site of 
political contestation in Italy.  As I will demonstrate, some of the most fundamental changes in 
family structure are not so much the result of shifting moral or ethical perspectives, but rather 
one of the consequences of neoliberal reforms put into play by the State to deal with economic 
crises.  A prime example of this is the large percentage of adult children in Italy who continue to 
reside in the parental home well into their 30s and 40s.  The precariousness of the workplace and 
lack of social services described by Molé (2012) and Muehlebach (2012) lead to a postponement 
of independent living and are significant factors in Italians’ delaying of marriage and child-
bearing.  Because of delays in marriage, Italians tend to be in their thirties when they marry, 
which means less time for having children.  This translates into fewer children.  Lower fertility, 
when combined with longer life expectancies, leads to "longer, thinner" multi-generational 
family formations in place of the nuclear family (mother-father-children) construction.  
I do not mean to suggest that the State bears total responsibility for recent shifts in family 
structure nor that these shifts are based exclusively on economics.  Instead, my intent following 
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Bernini (2008) is to point out how certain political actors within the Italian state use the family as 
a site of contestation to distract and influence voters, and to provide a vision of Italian national 
identity based on Catholic social teachings.  The result is an impasse that prevents politicians 
from taking action and adopting much-needed reforms in areas of family law, including the 
recognition for families headed by same-sex couples.  By framing the issue as one of moral or 
ethical concern rather than as a matter of economics or citizen well-being, politicians are able to 
transfer blame to the individual, and to use calls to protect the so-called traditional family to 
deflect attention from the state’s impotence and failure to live up to the ideals of the Italian 
Constitution.  The “smoke and mirrors” tactics deployed by Italian politicians create an impasse 
that frustrates the efforts of those seeking change.  In response, individual families and advocates 
of family law reform (similar to LGBTI rights activists) are forced to resort to other avenues 
such as the courts.  As seen in Chapter 2, such strategies work to undermine the state.  
I begin this chapter with an overview of family life in contemporary Italy, emphasizing 
the role of marriage in structuring family relationships.  I will show how, despite all of the 
stereotypes and posturing, the so-called traditional family (to the extent that it ever existed) no 
longer exists en masse.71  This does not mean the family is no longer important.  As I will also 
show, the Italian family continues to be a central pillar of society, occupying a critical support 
                                                 
71  According to Mario B. Mignone, “the traditional Italian family has usually been defined by the following 
characteristics: 
 extended and patriarchal; 
 unbreakable and relatively large; 
 largely determined by agrarian conditions; 
 structured vertically; 
 built on Catholic faith and values 
 highly suspicious of the outside world” (2008:296). 
 
Here, I take the “traditional family” to be one that is founded on heterosexual marriage and includes children. 
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role that compensates for the state’s inability to deal with high unemployment rates (especially 
among youth) and provide necessary services.  In the following section of this chapter, I offer a 
synopsis of the development of family law in Italy in order to explain its current status, as well as 
the discontinuity between what families are and what the law says they are.  Next, I look at how 
politicians mobilize notions of the traditional family to influence voters and effectively "erase" 
non-traditional families.   I conclude with a discussion of three recent cases involving child 
custody issues to further illustrate how change with respect to recognition of same-sex couples 
continues to be advanced by the Italian courts, even outside the Affermazione Civile campaign.     
The (Not So) Traditional Neoliberal Italian Family  
The family is one of the pillars of Italian society.  Indeed, the Italian family frequently 
serves as a metaphor and role model for society and the state (Mignone 2008).  As discussed in 
the introduction to this dissertation, over the past few decades Italy has experienced considerable 
political, social, and cultural transformation due to several factors, which include changes in the 
composition of the population resulting from immigration (Carter 1997; Colatrella 2001; Cole 
and Booth 2006, 2007; Faedda 2012; Grillo 2002; Tossutti 2001), the erosion of the welfare state 
in favor of a neoliberal state that is no longer able to guarantee workers’ rights and social well-
being (Blim 2002; Ginsborg 2003; Molé 2012; Muehlebach 2012; Sassen 1998) , and major 
demographic changes in family life (Bernini 2008; Dalla Zuanna 2006; Ginsborg 2003; Krause 
2001, 2005a, 2005b; Krause and Marchesi 2007).  Many of the demographic changes in family 
life are not peculiar to Italy but typical of the EU as a whole -- for example, the aging society 
linked to declining fertility rates and longer life expectancies.  Within the EU it is common 
knowledge that although the aging population is partially attributable to the fact that people are 
living longer, it is compounded by low levels of fertility.  Low fertility levels throughout the EU 
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are resulting in a decreasing share of younger people in the population.  Other demographic 
phenomena, such as the large number of adult children residing with their parents, are more 
specific to Italy.   
Although many of the demographic trends found in Italy mirror what is going on in the 
EU in general, there is a sense among Italians that recent developments are more extreme in 
Italy.  For example, life expectancies are especially high in Italy (the nation ranks 11th in the 
world in terms of life expectancy), and the average Italian can expect to live 81.95 years (2013 
CIA World Factbook Italy).  This is an increase of almost 10 years (from a total life expectancy 
of 72.08) since 1972.72  Over the past decades, Italy has simultaneously experienced record-low 
fertility rates, measured as the number of live births per woman.  In 1972, the total fertility rate 
in Italy was 2.38.  A little over twenty years later (by 1995) it reached a world-record low of 
1.19.73  In recent years, the fertility rate has shown signs of rising slightly, and the estimated 
fertility rate for 2013 is 1.41 (CIA World Factbook Italy 2013).  Fertility rates in Italy and the 
rest of the EU remain, however, well below population replacement levels.  Low fertility in Italy 
is commonly framed as a “crisis,” and perceived as especially dire in light of the aging 
population and declining welfare state (Krause 2005b).   
The crisis of the nation-state in Italy is made to appear even grimmer when one looks at 
“age-dependency ratios.”  Age-dependency ratios measure the age structure of a population and 
are used to study the level of support given to young and/or older persons by the working 
population.  These ratios are expressed in terms of the relative size of young and/or older 
                                                 
72  Index Mundi, Health Indicators, Mortality, Life Expectancy at Birth, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/italy/life-
expectancy-at-birth#SP.DYN.LE00.IN, accessed February 25, 2014. 
 
73  ISTAT, Noi Italia, Total Fertility, http://noi-
italia2013en.istat.it/index.php?id=55&user_100ind_pi1%5Bid_pagina%5D=717, accessed February 25, 2014. 
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populations in relation to the size of the working age population.  The old age dependency ratio 
is the ratio of the number of people at an age when they are generally economically inactive 
(usually defined as age 65 and older), compared with the number of people of working age 
(usually those in the 15-64 year range).  By way of example, in 2011, the old-age dependency 
ratio for the EU member states considered as a whole was 26.2.  This means that there were 
approximately four persons of working age for every person aged 65 and older.   For Italy, the 
same ratio was 30.9. In terms of the old-age dependency ratio among EU member states, Italy 
was second only to Germany (with an old-age dependency ratio of 31.2).74    
The combination of young and old age dependency ratios is called the total age 
dependency ratio.  It relates to the total number of individuals who are likely to be dependent on 
the support of others for their daily living.  In 2011, the total dependency ratio for the 27 EU 
member states considered together was 49.6, meaning that there were approximately two 
working age persons for every dependent person.  By contrast, the total dependency ratio for 
Italy was 52.3.  By 2050, the total age-dependency ratio is projected to exceed 100 in Italy, Japan 
and Spain.75  This means that, by 2050, the number of “dependents” will exceed the number of 
people capable of providing support to them in these countries.  This, of course, carries major 
consequences for the future of the welfare state, in large part because the increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio will contribute to increased public expenditures in health, long-term care, and 
pensions.   
                                                 
74  European Commission, Eurostat, File:  Population age structure indicators, 2011.png, online document, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Population_age_structure_indicators,_2011
.png&filetimestamp=20130129113545, accessed February 26, 2014. 
 
75 OECD (2007), “Age-Dependency Ratios,” in Society at a Glance 
2006: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2006-4-en, accessed 
February 27, 2014.  
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None of the above is anything new, and scholars have addressed the issue of 
demographic decline in Italy, especially in terms of low fertility (Krause 2005b; Krause and 
Marchesi 2007; Schneider and Schneider 1996, 1995).  Anthropologist Nicholas Townsend 
(1997) argued that studies dealing with fertility decline should look at reproduction as a cultural 
construction of a biological process rather than a universal given.  Anthropologists Jane and 
Peter Schneider (1995) did just that in their adoption of a historical and political economy 
approach to the issue of fertility decline in a rural village in Sicily.  The Schneiders observed that 
Sicily was one of the last places in Western Europe to experience fertility decline and sought to 
position Sicily within the overall structure of fertility decline in Europe.  The Schneiders found 
that peasants and workers in Sicily were largely at the disposal of and dependent on the elites for 
their livelihood.  This in turn led to a loss of agency on the part of the peasants and workers, and 
“[t]he result was the interdependent reproduction of the two classes” (Schneider and Schneider 
1995:200).  “Situational powerlessness made members of [the working class] slower than the 
others to respond to imbalances that emerged between people and resources once mortality rates 
began to decline” (Schneider and Schneider 1995:200).    
In Festival of the Poor (1996), the Schneiders note that there was a stigma associated 
with having a lot of children that attached to the poor.  “Instances where the peasant and working 
classes continued to exhibit high fertility, even as their large families seemed to make them more 
impoverished, raised the spectre of irrational demographic behavior” (Schneider and Schneider 
1996:7).  The poor, with their numerous children, were thought to lack control and respectability.     
By contrast, the upper classes had fewer children and “it became axiomatic to award 
respectability to families with four or fewer children, while disparaging the parents (or the 
mothers) or large birth cohorts, especially when they were poor” (Schneider and Schneider 
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1996:9).  In Sicily, as well as the rest of Italy, Italians began to associate smaller families with 
fewer children with being modern.  
In A Crisis of Births (2005b), Elizabeth Krause offers a critique of demography’s 
tendency to seek mono-causal explanation of fertility decline (namely in “modernization”) and 
its devotion to statistics at the expense of other considerations (such as cultural factors).  Her 
book is an attempt to explain fertility decline in terms of culture.  Similar to the Schneiders, 
Krause claims that underlying Italy’s low fertility there lies a silent revolution against the 
patriarchal family, a rejection of the rural past, and an embracing of the small family as a symbol 
of decency.  In the discourse surrounding the “crisis of births,” Krause sees the creation of panic 
over immigration that embodies a subtle racial politics.  Krause asks readers to consider, “Why, 
when much of the Western world is clinging to the (albeit vanishing) menace of overpopulation, 
are Italy and its European counterparts so bent on describing the demographic situation as a 
crisis?” (2005:184). According to Krause: 
To frame low fertility as a crisis erases a host of histories that explains why family-
making among Italians has come to take on its current form.  This book [A Crisis of 
Births] reminds people that low fertility is the outcome of a deep, horizontal, quiet 
revolution that began nearly a century ago against the rigid pecking order of the 
patriarchal family.  It is a consequence of society’s embrace of an egalitarian model of 
the family, and of a generation’s grappling with the implications for the cultural politics 
of gender in a context where the so-called culture of responsibility weighs most heavily 
on women (2005:184).  
My reason for elaborating on the work of Krause and the Schneiders in this section is to 
reinforce what I see as a larger point underlying Townsend’s (1997) argument, that is, the so-
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called traditional family is but a cultural construction.  This is something that anthropologists 
have argued for years and I will take this up in more depth in Chapter 7 when I discuss 
anthropological perspectives on marriage and kinship in relation to the Church’s ideology of the 
so-called traditional family.  My contribution to the anthropological conversation regarding 
contemporary kinship and family is to show how the law both structures and is structured by 
changing family formations.   
Regardless of the prognosis for the welfare state, the rapid increase in life expectancy 
combined with low fertility has resulted in a dramatic change in the composition of Italian 
families.  The most notable change is that the family has become smaller in size and 
chronologically extended.  Over the past decades, the extended family has become significantly 
“longer and thinner” in terms of the increased longevity and contact between generations and the 
substantial decrease in the number of children (Bernini 2010).  Family structures have been 
further altered by a dramatic decline in the number of marriages, a significant increase in the 
number of babies born outside of marriage, and a rise in the number of divorces and separations. 
As noted, in Italy, marriage denotes the formation of the family unit.  Yet, increasingly, 
Italians are foregoing marriage.  In Italy the crude marriage rate (defined as the number of 
marriages per 1,000 inhabitants) plunged from 7.7 in 1960 to 3.4 in 2011.76  Also significant is 
the fact that the median age at which Italians first marry has risen from 32.1 years for males and 
28.9 years for females in 2000, to 35.1 years for males and 31.8 years for females in 2010 
(according to the most recent government statistics).77  This is an increase in average age of 
                                                 
76 European Commission, Eurostat, Marriage and divorce statistics, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_marriage_rate,_seleted_years,_1960
-2011_(per_1_000_inhabitants).png&filetimestamp=20130130111229, accessed February 26, 2014. 
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approximately 3 years in a ten-year period.  While divorce rates in Italy are among the lowest in 
the EU, between 1970 (divorce was not possible in Italy before 1970) and 2010, the crude 
divorce rate tripled from 0.3 to 0.9.78  The divorce to marriage ratio, an indicator of the number 
of divorces relative to the number of marriages in a given year, was 25 in 2010, which means 
that roughly 1 in 4 marriages in Italy ended in divorce.79   
Italy has also witnessed a sharp rise in the number of live births outside of marriage.  In 
1970, 2.2% of babies born in Italy were born outside of marriage.  By 2011, the percentage had 
grown to 26.3%, meaning that more than 1 in 4 babies born in Italy are now born outside of 
marriage.80  Recent demographic data show that fewer marriages, more divorces, more children 
born outside of marriage, and increasing mean age at first marriage represent the overriding 
trends in the EU member states.  So, despite the fact that Italy is tied for fourth among the EU 
member states in terms of lowest crude marriage rate, Italy is not unique with respect to these 
recent developments.81   
Sociologist Anna Laura Zanatta argues that Italian society is undergoing a “transition 
from the golden age of marriage to the dawn of cohabitation,” along with a shift from so-called 
                                                 
77 Istat, Italian National Institute of Statistics, Italy in Figures 2012, p. 6, http://www.istat.it/en/archive/30344, 
accessed February 27, 2014.  
 
78  European Commission, Eurostat, Marriage and divorce statistics, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_divorce_rate,_selected_years,_1960
-2011_(1)_(per_1_000_inhabitants).png&filetimestamp=20130130111212, accessed February 26, 2014. 
 
79 By comparison, the 2010 divorce to marriage ratio was 61 for Spain and 68 for Portugal. 
 
80  European Commission, Eurostat, Marriage and divorce statistics, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Live_births_outside_marriage,_1960-
2011_(%25_share_of_total_live_births).png&filetimestamp=20130130111239, accessed February 26, 2014. 
 
81  European Commission, Eurostat, Marriage and divorce statistics,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Crude_marriage_rate,_seleted_years,_1960
-2011_(per_1_000_inhabitants).png&filetimestamp=20130130111229, accessed February 26, 2014. 
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traditional family structures (represented by the nuclear family, consisting of a husband, wife, 
and their offspring) to a plurality of family arrangements (1997:7).  Interestingly, a 2010 poll by 
American Consumer Opinion of adults in 11 leading nations showed that Italy ranked last in 
terms of the percentage of couples who were satisfied with their marriage.82   Italian women 
were the most dissatisfied of all.  By contrast, Canada, the United States, and the U.K., all 
countries with historically higher divorce rates than Italy, had the highest percentage of happily 
married couples.83  Commenting on the poll results, Jerry W. Thomas stated:  “It seems that all 
the unhappy couples are getting divorced in the U.S., but not in Italy.  It may be that social and 
religious pressures force unhappy couples to stay married in Italy, compared to countries where 
attitudes are more accepting of divorce.”84  
While social and religious pressures are a reality, the fact remains (as previously 
discussed) that divorce is relatively difficult to come by in Italy.  In order to divorce, a couple 
must undergo a preliminary three-year legal separation, and would-be reformers’ calls for 
speedier divorce have been largely ignored by the political class.85  This may explain in part the 
reluctance to marry and, once married, the low divorce rates among Italian couples, even in cases 
                                                 
82  American Consumer Opinion, “Italy has the Lowest Percentage of Happily Married Couples, while Canada has 
the Highest, According to Study by American Consumer Opinion,” October 2010, 
http://www.acop.com/press/2010/10/married_couples/, accessed February 27, 2014.. 
 
83  Canada (2004):  2.2; United States (2008):  3.5; U.K. (2007):  2.4; and Italy (2006):  0.8.  
 
84 American Consumer Opinion, “Italy has the Lowest Percentage of Happily Married Couples, while Canada has 
the Highest, According to Study by American Consumer Opinion,” October 2010, 
http://www.acop.com/press/2010/10/married_couples/, accessed February 27, 2014. 
   
85 In Italy, almost all divorces require a continuous three-year legal separation.  The separation decree may be 
granted when the facts support a finding that continued cohabitation has been rendered intolerable or the situation is 
such that continued cohabitation would be adverse to the mental health or physical well-being of any children 
residing in the home.  It may also be granted upon the request of both spouses.  In only very rare cases (e.g., final 
criminal conviction on the part of one of the spouses, sex change by one of the spouses, divorce obtained abroad by 
a foreign spouse) is divorce granted without the previous separation decree.   
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of proclaimed unhappiness.  Increasingly, couples in Italy are opting to live together without 
marrying.   
Italian sociologists now prefer the term “families” to “family” to highlight the variety of 
new ways of living and new family experiences (Zanatta 1997:9).  These dramatic changes in the 
Italian family have been accompanied by the appearance of a new vocabulary used to describe 
the variety of family arrangements now present in contemporary Italy.  Laviosa writes:   
 The famiglia unipersonale is the smallest unit.  It consists of a single person, of any age, 
living alone.  It is often an option open to individuals who are without children and have 
never married, or are divorced, or widowed.  The famiglia monoparentale offers a 
solution to the single parent who finds him/herself in a situation of independent single 
parenthood, monogenitorialità.  The recent wave of couples without children constitutes 
an example of the micro-nuclear family, famiglia micronucleare (Laviosa 2003:542). 
In addition to the family structures noted above, there is the long family, or famiglia lunga, 
which consists of two or more generations living in the same household (for example, parents 
with their adult children as in the bamboccione situation described below).  There are also the 
reconstituted step family (famiglia ricostituita or famiglia ricomposta), expanded family 
(famiglia allargata or nuova famiglia estesa), and the open family (famiglia aperta).  These 
types of families frequently consist of parents with children from previous relationships who live 
together with their own newborn children.  These arrangements add social parents (genitori 
sociali) to the mix and such families struggle to define roles and share the responsibilities of co-
parenthood (co-genitorialità) (Pocar and Ronfani 1998:171).  Families confronted with these 
situations may also explore plural parenthood (pluri-genitorialità), a type of family structure 
characterized by multiple father and or mother figures cohabiting with siblings and half-siblings 
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(Pocar and Ronfani 1998:193).  “The effort to function as an operational family in a new kind of 
kinship is the challenge that contemporary Italian society faces” (Laviosa 2003:542).  For this 
reason, Laviosa argues, it makes more sense to talk about the decline of a particular family 
archetype as opposed to a crisis of the family (Laviosa 2003).   
The Curious Case of Bamboccione 
One of the more distinctive aspects of family life in Italy is the large percentage of adult 
children who live at home well into their thirties or forties.  In most cases, these are young adults 
who have been unable to secure suitable employment that would enable them to maintain a 
separate household, but there are also a significant number of families where older adult children 
reside with and care for elderly parents, as well as cases of the more clichéd mammone, or 
“mamma’s boy,” a man attached to his mother’s apron strings and incapable of being 
independent or making a life for himself.  A 2012 report undertaken by social and market 
research firms Coldiretti and Censis claims that almost one-third of Italian adults (31%) live with 
their parents.  Of those between the ages of 18 and 29, 60.7% reported living with parents.86  The 
percentages decrease as the age brackets rise, with 25.3% of those between the ages of 30 and 44 
and 11.8% of those between the ages of 45 and 64 reporting living with parents.   
In 2007, then-Minister of the Economy, Tommaso Pado Schioppa, caused an outrage 
when he referred to adults who live at home with their parents as bamboccioni (big babies).87  
The term, which suggests that young adults remain at home to take advantage of free room and 
                                                 
86 Andrea Vogt, “Third of Italian Adults Live with their Parents, Report Finds,”Guardian, September 12, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/third-italians-live-with-parents, accessed February 27, 2014.  
 
87 Corriere della Sera.it, “Mandiamo i bamboccioni fuori di casa,” October 4, 2007, 
http://www.corriere.it/politica/07_ottobre_04/padoa_bamboccioni.shtml, accessed February 27, 2014.  
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board and other services provided by a doting mother, subsequently gained currency.  A huge 
billboard at street side below the Parioli hill in Rome depicting a young adult male stretched out 
and dozing on a comfortable-looking sofa declares, “for your bamboccione,” implying that that 
everyone has one (a “bamboccione,” that is) and that s/he (mostly “he”) deserves the best care.  
More recently, in his first public appearance at a conference on apprenticeship organized by the 
Lazio Region held January 24, 2012, Michel Martone, Deputy Minister for Labor and Welfare 
from November 29, 2011, to April 28, 2013, referred to young adults who fail to graduate from 
university by age 28 as “sfigati” (“losers”).  Labor Minister Elsa Fornero argued that young 
people should not be afraid of looking for work far away from home, suggesting that they should 
be prepared to cut family ties and move abroad if necessary to find suitable work opportunities.  
Fornero was subsequently criticized when it was pointed out that her own daughter works at the 
same university where she and her husband are employed.88  While the phenomenon of adult 
                                                 
88  Judith Harris, “Moms, Jobs and Bamboccioni,” I-Italy, February 21, 2012, http://www.i-
italy.org/bloggers/19880/moms-jobs-and-bamboccioni, accessed February 27, 2014.  Nepotism within the Italian 
university system is an interesting aside.  Gian Antonio Stella points out that, like other sectors in Italy, the 
university system is not immune from extreme nepotism.  In 2009, Nina Luca, a journalist with Corriere della 
Sera.it, published a book entitled Parentopoli.  When University is a Family Affair, which offers an uncompromising 
report on the controversial selection procedures employed by universities in Italy.  Luca points out that, far too 
often, university jobs go to wives, children, in-laws, friends or “friends of friends.”  In many cases, the instances 
Luca references border on the absurd.  For example, Luca mentions the Massari family, which “earned the 
University of Bari a place in the Guinness Book of Records” by placing eight members of the family in the 
economics faculty and Luigi Frati, the rector and dean of the faculty of medicine at La Sapienza, who shares his 
workplace with his wife Luciana Angeletti, his son Giacomo, and his daughter Paola, who celebrated her wedding in 
the great hall of the pathology department.  Equally interesting are the justifications offered by the faculty who 
engage in such practices.  According to Pasquale Mistretta, the rector of Cagliari, “many famous children have gone 
off the rails because of inferiority complexes towards their parents.  Some have even ended up taking drugs.  … [so] 
when a father retires, it is logical to give preferential treatment”  to his children.  Professor Giuseppe Nicotina is 
quoted as stating:  “The children of university teachers are cleverer because they have minds shaped by the family 
atmosphere typical of us professors.”  The attitude expressed here is that extreme nepotism is justified as a 
birthright.  Gian Antonio Stella (English translation by Giles Watson), Corriere della Sera.it, Italian Life, “Shame of 
Family Appointments at Universities,” March 19, 2009, 
http://www.corriere.it/english/09_marzo_19/university_445d6c14-149e-11de-9dd5-00144f02aabc.shtml, accessed 
September 9, 2013. 
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children living with their parents is real, what it says about Italian families and society is not so 
straightforward.     
Italians have used multiple generations living together in one household as a means of 
caring for children and the elderly.  In an environment of precarious employment, it is 
predictable that this practice would extend to unemployed adult children.  In November 2013, 
Italy’s unemployment rate hit 12.7%, its highest level in 37 years.  Youth unemployment was 
significantly greater, and jumped to an all-time high of 41.6%.89  Italy’s employment rate (a 
measure of the proportion of Italians in work as a proportion of the population) is among the 
lowest in the industrialized world.  In 2012, it fell from 56.5% to 56.3%, its lowest level in 13 
years.90  The Italian government provides unemployment benefits in the form of cash transfers 
based on contributions.  As in most countries, however, only those who have previously been 
employed are eligible for unemployment benefits, and the system is threatened due to persistent 
high unemployment rates.  Over the past 30 years, most of the increases in social security 
spending have been the direct result of rising unemployment and public debt rose substantially in 
the 1980s due to the government’s efforts to meet demands for services without raising taxes 
(Niero 1996).  
Living with one’s parents is often a necessity in a country where jobs are hard to come 
by, especially among the nation’s youth.  Many young adults have no real choice:  
unemployment is high and welfare benefits are nonexistent.   They cannot find a job and they 
                                                 
89  Ian Silvera, “Italy's Youth Unemployment at 42% as Jobless Rate Hits 37-Year High,” International Business 
Times, January 8, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/italys-jobless-rate-hits-37-year-record-high-youth-unemployment-
reaches-41-6-1431445, accessed February 27, 2014. 
 
90 Ian Cumming, “Italy Jobless Rate Jumps to Record High of 11.7 Percent in January,” CNBC.com, March 1, 2013, 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100510658, accessed February 27, 2014.  
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cannot turn to the state for help so they are forced to remain in their parents’ homes. “Young 
people in Italy no longer represent the future,” lamented commentator Ilvo Diamonati in an Op 
Ed piece that appeared in La Repubblica on February 13, 2012.  Long gone are the days of 
lifetime employment contracts.   Perhaps this is what motivated the judge in the recent case of an 
Italian father who was ordered to pay €12,000 in arrears and resume paying a monthly living 
allowance to his 32-year old student daughter.91  Gianmario Mariniello, the national coordinator 
for the youth wing of the center-right Future and Freedom Party says that the bamboccione 
phenomenon reflects a degrading society that has failed to provide sufficient opportunities for its 
young.92    
In contemporary Italy, the phenomenon of bamboccione has less to do with failure on the 
part of parents or children than with the failure of the nation-state.   Analysts argue that the real 
challenge for Italy is to increase participation in the labor market, especially among women, the 
young, and the elderly.  This was in fact a big issue in the 2013 general election.  According to 
CNN Journalist Tim Hume, this was the only issue on the agenda:  "[Italy] The eurozone's third 
largest economy is hurting, with unemployment surpassing 11% -- and hitting 37% for young 
people.  Voters are weighing the question of whether to continue taking Monti's bitter medicine 
of higher taxation and austerity measures, while a contentious property tax is also proving a 
subject of vexed debate."93  In the latest round of political confrontation, so-called 
                                                 
91 Tom Kington, “Italian Father Ordered to Pay Allowance to 32-Year-Old ‘Big Baby,’” Guardian, January 17, 
2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/17/italian-adults-living-at-home, accessed February 27, 2014. 
 
92 Andrea Vogt, “Third of Italian Adults Live with their Parents, Report Finds,” Guardian, September 12, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/19/third-italians-live-with-parents, accessed February 27, 2014. 
 
93 Tim Hume, "Italy's Election:  What are the Issues?  And Will Anyone Win a Majority?" CNN, February 20, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/20/world/europe/italy-election-explainer/, accessed January 16, 2014. 
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“bamboccione” offer a convenient scapegoat for government officials, who seem to have little 
problem attributing blame for the failure of the state to the “big babies” and “losers” who 
allegedly prefer to nap on the couch rather than move far away from home (and away from their 
support network) to seek employment.   
While none of my consultants in Italy could be labeled as actual bamboccione, a couple 
of their individual family situations warrant mention because they offer a glimpse into what life 
is like for young and not-quite-so-young adults in Italy.  I will begin by noting that all but three 
of the 40 or so friends, acquaintances, and consultants that I met or hung out with on a semi-
regular basis in Italy were single (never married) and did not have children.  Most were in their 
thirties and early forties, although I did have a few contacts who were over fifty and some who 
were in their twenties.  Some of this had to do with the subject of my dissertation and the fact 
that many of the people I came into contact with and befriended were LGBT, and some of this 
was probably also due to the fact that, both times I was in Italy, I lived in a big city.  However, 
many of my contacts were not LGBT, and when I take into consideration the even larger number 
of neighbors, contacts I met through participant-observation work, academic affiliations, friends, 
and lawyer consultants I met in Rome and Turin, the low percentage (around 15-20%) of married 
couples (or couples with children) I encountered in Italy is rather extraordinary, especially since 
most of these individuals were in their thirties and forties.  Only two of my close contacts had 
children:  one (a woman in her late-thirties) had a son who was six at the time, and the other (a 
man in his fifties) had two teenage sons.  In what follows, I will discuss the family situations of 
two of the individuals I met during fieldwork.  Their respective family lives, which I choose to 
highlight because they are typical of many of my unmarried Italian contacts, provide interesting 
insight into contemporary family arrangements in Italy.       
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D is an attorney living in Rome.  She has her own practice and lives in a small apartment 
that doubles as her office.  I met my friend D through our mutual friend T.  Initially, I was 
somewhat intimidated about meeting her.  T had described her to me on more than one occasion 
as the Italian version of “Lara Croft,” referencing the video game adventuress who comes to life 
in a movie (the part of Lara Croft is played by U.S. actress Angelina Jolie) where she races 
against time and fights villains to recover important artifacts.94  I need not have been 
apprehensive, however, because D turned out to be incredibly warm and kind.  
D is an attractive woman in her early forties.  She is adventurous.  She is skilled in the 
use of firearms and has trained police officers and other government officials in the use and the 
laws surrounding the use of firearms in Italy.  She likes to kickbox and one cannot help but 
notice the large practice bag standing off to the side of the door leading into her law office.  She 
also sky dives.  I reference these facts because they point to D’s status as an independent woman.   
D is not, nor has she ever been, married.  She has no children.  She does, however, 
maintain a close relationship with her parents, who also live in Rome.  D has two younger sisters, 
both in their late thirties.  One is married and one is not.  They also both live in Rome and 
maintain a close relationship with their parents and with D. D talks to her parents several times a 
day and has dinner with them one or more times each week.  Her parents frequently babysit her 
black Labrador and keep him overnight at their house.   
I visited and had dinner with D and her parents (and sisters and brother-in-law) at their 
home on several occasions.  I enjoyed going to their home because it was cozy and her mother 
was an excellent cook.  The dinner conversation was always lively and I was made to feel 
                                                 
94 See e.g., Lara Croft:  Tomb Raider, directed by Simon West (2001; London:  British Film Institute). 
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welcome.  One thing I noticed was that D never offered to help her mother with the dinner 
preparations, preferring to hole up in her father’s attic office speaking business with him while 
her mother bustled around downstairs, setting the table and preparing the food.  Once dinner was 
finished, D would again retreat upstairs with her father, while her mother was left to clean up the 
mess.  After the first time I had dinner at her parents’ house, I felt guilty and volunteered to help 
with the clean-up despite her mother’s polite protests that it was not necessary.  D’s sisters acted 
in much the same way, preferring to relax in the living room while their mother prepared dinner.  
I do not know whether this was unusual or particular to D’s family but I was struck by the 
amount of work undertaken by D’s mother, a woman in her early sixties, to maintain the house 
and keep everyone, including her adult children, well-fed.  I also know that D’s apartment was 
much too small to reciprocate the dinner and, judging by the dust that covered the pots and pans 
lying on the open shelves of her kitchen, D was not inclined to prepare an elaborate meal for 
herself, much less anyone else.   
As I got to know D better, I learned that she identified more with her father than her 
mother.  I also noticed that when D needed something her father would often produce a credit 
card, especially for bigger ticket items.  I do not point this out as a criticism of D, her father or 
their relationship.  Rather, I draw attention to this because I know that even as a relatively 
successful attorney with her own private practice, D did not make enough money to cover all of 
her living expenses.  Also, it cannot be said that D lived an extravagant lifestyle.  Her apartment 
and clothes, while nice enough, were very modest by U.S. standards and her car was at least 
seven years old.  She relied on her family for financial support to fill in the gaps and provide for 
certain necessities such as car repairs and expenses related to the care of her dog that she would 
otherwise not be able to afford.  D’s father was a prominent academic who, while not wealthy, 
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made enough money to support his family and, in addition to providing support for D, provided 
similar financial support for D’s sisters. 
One thing about D’s family that is increasingly typical of Italian families is the lack of 
children.  At the time I was doing fieldwork in Italy, neither D nor her sisters had children and 
only one was married.  After a lengthy visit to the U.S. and a romantic encounter, D returned to 
Italy and experienced a late menstrual cycle.  She confided in me that she feared she might be 
pregnant and that this would be okay with her because a baby would bring “something different” 
to her life.  I was surprised at how calm she was about the situation but, as a single mother 
myself, I must confess to feeling excited about the prospect of D having a baby.  She was, after 
all, in her early forties and it was becoming increasingly unlikely that she would find someone, 
marry, and have a child in the so-called “traditional” way.  I was even more surprised by D’s 
desire to have a baby.  In the months that I had known her she had never expressed an interest in 
babies or children.  Was this a longing that she had buried within herself, or was she simply 
trying to make the best of what she thought might turn out to be a tricky situation?  I never did 
find out because, as it turned out, D was not pregnant.  Three months later, however, D’s married 
sister (who had sworn up and down that she was never going to have children) was pregnant.  D 
was thrilled at the prospect of becoming an aunt.     
My consultant and friend T is allegedly more “traditional” in his outlook on life and 
approach to family than D.  T served for a short period of time in the Italian military and has also 
worked as a security officer at the Vatican.  He once confessed to me that he had voted for 
Berlusconi and that his political leanings were toward the right.  He wanted to marry and have 
children but was not in a position financially to do so.  He was fascinated by the fact that I had 
abandoned a solid career practicing law to go back to school for a PhD, especially in 
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anthropology, and could not believe that I had traveled to Rome (the first time) by myself to 
begin fieldwork without really knowing anyone in the city.  I think this is why he took an interest 
in and befriended me.   
When I first met him, T was in his late thirties and residing with his parents in an 
apartment in Rome.  As mentioned in the introduction, he had recently ended a long term 
relationship and was selling his Bed and Breakfast business.  He intended to live with his parents 
temporarily, until he got back on his feet.  Unfortunately, the person to whom he sold the Bed 
and Breakfast never paid him, and T suddenly found himself in a precarious financial position.  
He had little choice but to turn to his family for support.  Fortunately for T, he was able to find 
work managing a hotel.  Even so, he earns about 1,000 Euro a month and, based on his skills and 
talents, is grossly underpaid and underappreciated.  He is one of the few (if not the only) people 
on staff who speaks fluent English, can mix a cocktail, and is handy with a toolkit.   
Shortly after beginning work at the hotel, T developed a romantic relationship with the 
owner’s daughter, E.  In the latter half of 2009, T and E moved in together.  One evening over 
dinner T and I were discussing his relationship with E.  He was telling me about the great mini-
vacation in Barcelona from which they had just returned.  He indicated that he was serious about 
E and I asked him if he thought they might get married.  He told me he definitely wanted to, but 
could not until he recovered his life savings from the sale of the Bed and Breakfast.  I pressed 
him. “But you are already living together, what difference does it make whether you have that 
money or not?” I asked. T then explained to me that he did not feel “right” about getting married 
until he had the rest of his life (meaning his financial life) in order.  He went on to state that, 
before bringing a child into the world, he needed to make sure he could support a family.  It did 
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not matter to him that E and her family had money.  He felt very strongly that it was his 
responsibility to support any family he brought into being.   
Neither D nor T could be considered “young” adults.  Although certainly not old (D was 
in her early forties and T in his late thirties), both were past the average age for marrying and 
having a first child in Italy.  Both depended on their parents for economic and other support 
during times of need.  With respect to forming their own respective families, both were at a 
crossroads of sorts. As a woman in her early forties, D was facing down her alleged “biological 
clock.” This is what I suspect was behind her calm acceptance of the fact that she “might” be 
pregnant when she experienced a late menstrual cycle. D had expressed to me that she knew her 
parents would support her (emotionally, physically and financially) and would be more than 
happy to welcome a first grandchild into their home.  T, on the other hand, did not have the same 
issues with respect to his “biological clock.”  While not significantly younger than him, his 
partner E was in her mid-thirties and felt she could wait a couple of years before having a child.  
Neither D nor T, despite having college degrees and being exceptionally reliable and hard-
working, was able to support him/herself financially.  This, I discovered, was not uncommon in 
Italy.          
In Italy, the nation-state is no longer able to provide a secure safety net for those who 
have fallen victim to neoliberal globalizing forces.  It is easier for politicians who stand to 
benefit from further deregulation of the market to seek a scapegoat for the increasing disparities 
between the “haves” and “have-nots,” thereby absolving themselves of responsibility for finding 
solutions to the existing situation.  Italian families have retained a strong social role and continue 
to serve as the main provider of individual welfare.  As evidenced by the large number of adult 
children who reside with their parents (or receive substantial financial support from them), in a 
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nation-state where social institutions leave much to be desired, the Italian family has functioned 
and continues to function as a bulwark against adversity. 
The Legal Fiction of the Italian Family 
The loosening of strictures regarding sexuality and family life in Italy played a major role 
in Italy's "modernization" in the post-fascist era (Gilbert 2007).  Divorce was introduced for the 
first time in December 1970, forcing the renegotiation of the relationship between a husband and 
wife, which led to a reassessment of the rights of the family in 1975.  In addition to declaring the 
equality of husband and wife, the 1975 reform of family law (Law 151, Riforma del Diritto della 
Famiglia) recognized the contribution of the wife’s domestic labor and the equal contribution of 
partners to the maintenance of the family, asserted the duty of holding property in common, and 
abolished dowry payments, along with the view of marriage as an exchange between two groups 
entered into through the person of the woman (Passerini 1996).95  Even with these changes, 
commenters have observed that elements of inequality still remain in family law.  For example, 
the new law still required the wife and any offspring to adopt the husband's last name (Fortini 
1981).   Nonetheless, Italians saw these changes in law as signaling a critical moment in the 
nation's history.  The reforms, especially the divorce and abortion laws, altered the Church-State 
relationship and indicated the secularization of Italian society.  For the first time, the State had 
power over the institution of the family. 
Secularizing reforms in family law were bolstered by two separate but related 
modernizing forces.  Pollard notes that, following World War II and the onset of the Cold War, 
                                                 
95 Prior to this the usual financial regime applicable to marriage was the separation of assets of the spouses.  After 
the 1975 reform, civil marriage results in co-ownership of property pursuant to Article 159 of the Civil Code, unless 
the spouses agree to some other arrangement such as a Separation of Estates contract (that cannot be challenged or 
rendered void by any court at any time, for any reason).   
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Italy suddenly experienced an influx of U.S. cultural influences through various media such as 
film and television that Catholic Italy eschewed (2008:134-35).  He further points to the 
economic "miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s as the second modernizing force that led to increased 
industrialization and mass migrations from south to north and from rural areas to cities as 
workers sought jobs in the new industries (Pollard 2008: 132-34).  Pollard is convincing.  Both 
processes unsettled the relationship between Church and State.  This disruption was further 
intensified by the Second Vatican Council of 1962-65, which emphasized the role of the laity as 
"the people of God," and upheld the importance of individual conscience, provoking a crisis of 
authority within the Church (Pollard 2011).  In the 1960s and 1970s Italy experienced a sharp 
decline in membership in Catholic lay associations, and personal religious observation dropped 
substantially.96  Yet, despite these secularizing forces, the Church remains a major player in 
Italian politics: 
 Despite a decline in the number of vocations and subsequent ageing of the clergy, the 
network of diocese and parishes in the peninsula works effectively, supplemented by the 
activities of male and female members of religious orders and congregations.  New forms 
of lay associationalism like the Focolarini, Catholic Charismatics, the Comunità di 
Sant'Egidio and Communione e Liberazione have emerged to supplement the old.  Italian 
Catholicism still possesses 100 publishing houses, nine radio and television stations and a 
network of periodicals:  Famiglia Cristiana and Il Messaggero di Sant'Antonio have 
nearly two million subscribers between them.  In addition, the Italian Catholic Church 
                                                 
96 Adult Sunday mass attendance in Italy dropped from 69% in 1956 to 35% in 1972.  It has since fallen more, but 
not as much (Clark 1996:371).  
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remains a substantial provider of health, welfare and educational facilities.  All of this 
ensures that Catholicism remains a major force in Italian civil society (Pollard 2011:455). 
 In addition, to this day the Church remains an interested presence in the institution of 
marriage.  Prior to the Concordato entered into between the Italian State and the Church in 1929, 
civil marriage was not recognized by the Church and Church marriages were not recognized by 
the State.  This meant that the vast majority of marriages in Italy, which were religious in nature, 
were not recognized by the State.  Children born to such couples were baptized in the Church, 
and there was no record of their births with state officials.  The Concordato resolved this 
situation.  Although religious marriage still has no value for the State, separate marriage 
ceremonies are no longer required.  Upon request of the couple, the State Registrar may record a 
Catholic marriage.  Today, the most frequent form of marriage in Italy (taking place in 
approximately 66% of all marriages) is the so-called Matrimonio Concordatario, in which the 
ceremony is celebrated in Church but registered by the State Officer upon request.   
As Stefania Bernini (2010) points out, an understanding of the relationship between 
politics, family and the Church helps to explain some of the current issues plaguing Italian 
society, including the political deadlock evident in the struggle over recognition of rights for 
same-sex couples.  Following World War II, the Church found itself in the precarious position of 
having to reinstate itself within a new democratic polity.  The Church was able to reassert its 
power by establishing its authority over ethical issues, which gave it substantial footing in Italian 
decision-making processes. Today, "the legitimacy of the Church’s involvement on policy 
making in ethically sensitive areas seems to have become a fait accompli, while the fields open 
to such involvement have multiplied" (Bernini 2010). Conservative politicians in Italy continue 
to enlist the Church (and vice versa) as an ally to provide a vision of national identity based on 
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the patriarchal family and Catholic social values.  Italian politicians fear offending the Vatican 
and, although the Vatican does not campaign on behalf of political candidates, the influence of 
the Church hierarchy pervades so many levels of society that lawmakers are reluctant to 
challenge Church positions. 
Not surprisingly, Italian politicians have been vocal in their opposition to same-sex 
couples and same-sex marriage.  In a September 7, 2010, debate before the European Parliament 
on the rights of same-sex couples under the EU's freedom of movement provisions, three Italian 
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (joined by a Polish MEP) spoke out against the 
European Commission's monitoring of the resolution's implementation.  One in particular, Oreste 
Rossi (from Italy's Northern League party), stunned the European Parliament with a theological 
speech on the "natural" family.  According to reports, the speech was so poor in terms of 
argumentation and so full of anger against same-sex couples that it was reminiscent of speeches 
made by the most homophobic religious leaders.97     
In May 2012, then Minister for Equality Elsa Fornero wrote a letter to Avvenire, a 
Catholic newspaper, in which she condemned the extension of marriage to same-sex couples.  
Fornero stated, "Same-sex marriage could lead to a social crisis, which could worsen the debt 
and economic crisis.  We must defend individual people's rights, but we cannot make gay 
marriage equal to the traditional one."  What is interesting about Fornero's letter is the fact that a 
week prior to writing the letter Fornero had defended same-sex marriage on the International 
Day of Families.  However, following an attack from Avvenire, Fornero not only reversed her 
                                                 
97 ILGA-Europe Press Release (submitted by Arcigay International), "Italy is Again the Laughing Stock of Europe," 
August 9, 2010, http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/guide_europe/country_by_country/italy/italy_is_again_the_laughing_stock_of_europe, accessed 
February 27, 2014. 
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position but was compelled to write a letter for publication in the Catholic newspaper.  In August 
2012, 173 members of the Italian Parliament from the right-wing PDL party signed a document 
against marriage equality.  Although Matteo Renzi, the fast-rising secretary general of the left-
leaning Democratic Party promised to take up the issue of civil unions in his party's next 
electoral platform, he is destined to encounter resistance.  Maurizio Sacconi, a senator with one 
of Italy's center-right parties, warned that it would be risky to take up the issue of same-sex 
relationships at this point in time, arguing that the divisiveness of the issue would risk further 
disunity in Parliament at a "politically delicate" time.98  "For us, the priority is the family, which 
is formed by marriage between a man and a woman," Sacconi is quoted as stating.  "Principles of 
ethics are not negotiable for those who believe in them."99        
In some cases, political speech is virtually indistinguishable from hate speech.  In July 
2012, Santino Bozza, a member of the regional parliament of Veneto, described LGBTI people 
as "ill and perverted" and "in need of a cure."  That same month, journalist and politician 
Marcello Veneziani wrote:  "with gays humanity is committing suicide" and "homosexuality has 
been invented by nature for the destruction of human kind."  In August 2012, Forza Nuove, a far-
right party, hung posters in Pescara that read:  "Italy needs children, not homosexuals," and 
followed up in October 2012 by hanging a sign on a wall outside the Cassero in Bologna (the 
site of a popular gay venue and the location of Arcigay's offices) reading:  "perversions must be 
                                                 
98 At the present moment, it is unlikely that the Italian Parliament will go any farther than the hate-crimes legislation 
that is currently under consideration.  The legislation, which covers anti-gay speech and violence, was introduced in 
2013 and approved by the lower house of Parliament.  It is now with the Senate and may be blocked.  Much of this 
has to do with the fact that the governing coalition is barely hanging on by a thread and cannot afford to risk a 
contentious split.   
 
99 Henry Chu, "For Gays in Italy, Rights and Acceptance are Still Elusive," latimes.com, January 6, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-italy-gay-20140106,0,504437.story#axzz2rG0HtLKr, accessed January 23, 
2014. 
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cured."  In response to a question regarding a political disagreement with openly gay politician 
Nichi Vendola, Rocco Buttiglione, a conservative politician and professor of political science at 
St. Pius V University in Rome, asserted that he has "the right of saying that morally 
homosexuality is wrong in respect to what is the true good of the person."100  This statement was 
made during a live radio show broadcast on Radio 2.  That same month, Andrea Di Pietro, a 
town councilor in Vigevano tweeted:  "Vendola is as slimy as the Vaseline he uses!"  The 
attitudes expressed by the political parties and politicians quoted above carry over into general 
society and circulate widely among self-proclaimed Catholics.  An example of this is the recent 
popularity of a book written by "devout" Catholic journalist Costanza Miriano.  
When I was conducting fieldwork in Italy, I heard through my connections with Alleanza 
Cattolica101 about a book, Sposati e sii Sottomessa:  Pratica Estrema per Donne Senza Paura 
(2011) (translated "Get Married and Be Submissive:  An Extreme Practice for Women without 
Fear"), written by a woman named Costanza Miriano.  Miriano was born in 1970, in Perugia, 
Italy.  She majored in classical literature at the university in Perugia and then studied journalism.  
Later, she moved to Rome and began working for public television, where she worked on the 
state-owned television news channel TG3 (TeleGiornale 3) for fifteen years.  Now, however, she 
handles religious information on RAI Vatican.  Miriano is a self-avowed devout Catholic, is 
                                                 
100  In 2004, Buttiglione was nominated for a post as European Commissioner.  The post would have included a civil 
rights portfolio.  The nomination resulted in controversy as some groups, including many activist LGBTI 
associations, opposed him for his views against homosexuality, despite his claims that these were personal 
convictions and would not affect his job performance.  His nomination was subsequently withdrawn by the Italian 
government.   
 
101  Alleanza Cattolica is an Italian Catholic lay association.  The purpose of the organization is to study and spread 
Catholic social doctrine. 
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married, and has four children (2 boys and 2 girls).  She is an avid runner and has completed 
several marathons.  
The book is made up of a series of letters, written by Miriano to her mostly female 
friends about what it means to be a man and a woman, and delves into topics such as 
engagement, marriage, family life, bearing and raising children, and talks about sex as a gift 
from God.  According to Miriano, the title of the book was inspired by the letter of St. Paul to the 
Ephesians, wherein Paul calls on women to be submissive.  Miriano embraces this and argues 
that such submissiveness does not emanate from a place of weakness; rather, it is rooted in 
women's strength and stability, in the "fact" that women are soft and comfortable, in touch with 
their deep nature, able to put people in relationship, and can give life, both biologically and 
spiritually.  The book has sold around 70,000 copies in Italy, which is a respectable number by 
Italian standards, and has been translated into Spanish, French, Portuguese, Polish and 
Slovenian.  It has been printed sixteen times and when first published, the book received a very 
positive review from the Vatican's official newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano.  Zenit, a non-
profit news agency that reports on the Catholic Church and issues important to the Church from 
the perspective of Church doctrine, referred to the book as the "literary event" of 2011 in non-
fiction.  
While the book caused a bit of a media stir in Italy, it was nothing like the response it 
received in Spain.  Since its translation into Spanish and publication by Nuevo Inicio, three 
parties of the Spanish parliament have called for its withdrawal from circulation, alleging that the 
book incites violence against women.  The United Left party in Spain initiated a petition with the 
Spanish Public Prosecutor's office to block the sales of book.  The deputy of the PSOE (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español), Angeles Alvarez, announced that his party will also bring an 
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initiative to block the book, stating:  "We cannot allow organizations like the Church, who 
receive money from the state, to devote themselves to proselytize on inequality, discrimination, 
and sexism."102  The controversy over the book's release in Spain drove its sales to the top of the 
charts, making it a bestseller on Amazon.com in Spain.         
The publicity generated by the book has turned Miriano into a celebrity of sorts.  She has 
her own website and blogs frequently.103  Since writing the book, Miriano has been invited to 
speak in all sorts of venues throughout Italy.  She has granted several interviews, appearing as 
the quintessential "modern" woman on television with her make-up, high heels, and low-cut 
black suits that reveal a bare back.  She speaks of repealing the abortion law and supports Putin's 
anti-gay propaganda law.  She is willing to "crusade" to prevent babies from being given up for 
adoption to same-sex couples and forcefully decries the arrest of Franck Talleu, father of six, by 
French authorities for wearing a Manif pour Tous (translation:  "Demonstration for All") 
sweatshirt with a stylized logo depicting a mom and dad with two children holding hands.104  
Miriano is an embodied example of what Italian LGBTI activists are up against:  a well-
educated, working mother who dresses stylishly and runs marathons and who has become an 
outspoken advocate for traditional family values by advocating submission on the part of 
women.            
                                                 
102  Tempi, Editorial, “La Spagna non vuole ‘Sposati e sii Sottomessa,’” November 13, 2013, http://www.tempi.it/la-
spagna-non-vuole-sposati-e-sii-sottomessa-miriano-e-la-dittatura-dellideologia-di-genere-siccome-e-falsa-va-
imposta-con-forza#.UtlwIxDnbIU, accessed February 27, 2014.   
 
103 Costanza Miriano’s website and blog can be found at http://costanzamiriano.com/. 
 
104 Manif pour Tous is a French anti-gay organization made up of men known for staging ironically homoerotic 
protests.  The organization recently caught the attention of John Oliver, from the U.S.-based late-night television’s 
the Daily Show.  In a piece titled "GayWatch:  International Edition" that aired on June 13, 2013, Oliver queried:  
"How is it that France's anti-gay protests look even gayer than our pro-gay protests?"   
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As noted in Chapter 2, the introduction of divorce and legalization of abortion were the 
result of a “far-reaching critique of the family as an institution and its relationship with the state” 
that was actively pursued by the social movements of the 1960s and the women’s movement in 
particular (Bernini 2008:305).  While the end of the reform process coincided with the dying out 
of the social movements of the 1960s, the lack of critical engagement with the family on the part 
of social movements has not prevented Italian politicians from using the family as a tool of 
propaganda (Bernini 2008).  Today, the Italian family serves as a privileged site of political 
confrontation.  Politicians, aligned with the Church, have used controversies surrounding ethical 
issues such as medically assisted procreation, cohabitation, and marriage equality to establish a 
dominant Italian agenda regarding morality (Bernini 2010).  Over the past several years, 
conservative forces in Italy have rejected calls for recognition of de facto relationships and 
shorter divorce.  Unfortunately, the prevailing strategic approach to the family deployed by 
Italian politicians is oversimplified and dualistic, and thwarts the possibility of constructive 
engagement regarding the complex ways in which the Italian family has changed over the past 
years.  The result is that the actual transformations that characterize contemporary family life 
have been given short shrift, and politicians have failed to promote policies based on the actual 
needs of contemporary families.  The “families” that actually exist in Italy do not coincide with 
the “family” that continues to thrive in the imaginings of the Church, its followers and law-
makers.  It is unfortunate that the “imagined” family is the only family that continues to be 
recognized in Italian law. 
At the present moment, the question of how to adopt an agenda of modernization and 
expansion of individual rights without being declared an enemy of the family poses a dilemma to 
Italian political parties on the left (Bernini 2008).  In the political sphere the family is treated 
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more as an ideal than a social reality and confrontations regarding what the family “should be” 
do not coincide with what the family has become (Bernini 2008).  To this end, any effective 
reconceptualization of the relationship between family and society in Italy is most likely to 
emerge from the growing number of people whose family lives diverge from the ideal prescribed 
by Italian family law.  As I will show in the final section of this chapter, it is the Italian courts 
rather than politicians that have taken the lead to fill in gaps between what the law says families 
are and how they actually exist in society.  
The first of these cases involves a recent decision by the Court of Cassation on January 
11, 2013 (Corte di Cassazione Prima Sezione Civile, S.E.T. v. I.B., No. 631/2013).  In this case, a 
father challenged the award of exclusive custody to the mother of the child granted by the Court 
of Brescia on July 11, 2011.105  The mother was residing with her female partner and the father 
had, on a previous occasion, assaulted the mother's partner.  The father argued that living with 
the lesbian couple would harm the child.  In support of this argument, the father cited Article 29 
of the Italian Constitution, referencing the family as a "natural society founded on marriage."   
He also argued that the mother's sexual orientation was contrary to Constitutional norms that 
protect the family and marriage and that the child must be educated according to the father's 
religious views.106  The lower courts had previously denied the father's claims and ruled that 
sexual orientation was not a factor to be taken into consideration when determining issues 
regarding child custody and visitation.  The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal, finding that 
                                                 
105 By way of background, Article 30 of the Italian Constitution proclaims that to be a parent is both a right and a 
duty.  The notion of right is based on the idea that to be a parent is a commitment that an adult takes on with respect 
to his or her children, rather than to the other parent.  For this reason, parental rights and duties cannot be 
undermined by the separation of the parents.   
 
106 The father happened to be Muslim and residing in Italy as a resident (rather than a citizen).  There is no way to 
determine if and to what extent the father's religious affiliation influenced the Court's decision.    
  
133 
 
the father's justifications for denying the mother custody were simply irrelevant as the father was 
exploiting them to conceal his prejudice and violence against the mother's partner.   
This was the first time that an Italian court legally recognized the mother's same-sex 
relationship as a "family" in a child custody case.  Previous cases limited analysis to the parent 
and never qualified the parent's relationship.  Here, the Court specifically mentioned a "family 
centered on a same-sex couple" and went on to examine whether a family headed by a same-sex 
couple is harmful to the child's development.  The Court established that the father's claims were 
not based on scientific evidence or experience, but instead constituted "mere prejudice" in their 
assumption that a child raised by a same-sex couple would suffer developmental harm.  This 
perspective ignores what is to be determined, that is, that living in a family centered on a same-
sex couple would harm the child.   
 The case represents an additional step toward recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  
This is not insignificant.  Italian professor and attorney Matteo Winkler, who is part of Rete 
Lenford, commented on the Court of Cassation decision, stating:  "Nevertheless, as a reaction to 
a Parliament which does not seem to take this task seriously, Italy is moving toward a court-
created regime, articulated in general principles according to a case-by-case approach."107  The 
case is also significant when one considers the fact that adoption is regulated by Legge 184/1983, 
which allows only married heterosexual couples (who have been married for at least three years 
or have been a stable couple for at least three years, taking into account the period of pre-marital 
cohabitation) to adopt children.  Nonetheless, as the following two cases show, the Italian courts 
appear to be inching toward recognizing the validity of families headed by same-sex couples.    
                                                 
107 Matteo M. Winkler, "The Italian Supreme Court Rules on Gay Parenting," Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 69 (March 
2013), https://www.academia.edu/2970299/The_Italian_Supreme_Court_Rules_on_Gay_Parenting, accessed 
February 28, 2014. 
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In a decision reached in November 2013, the Juvenile Court of Bologna awarded 
temporary custody of a three-year-old child to a middle-age, same-sex couple.  While same-sex 
couples are prohibited from adopting children in Italy, the rules for temporary foster care are less 
strict.  This has to do with the fact that, while adoption severs the ties to the so-called “natural” 
family, foster care does not.  The purpose of foster care is protection of the child and, in many 
cases, the child continues to have a relationship with his or her parents during the period of 
fostering, with the goal of family reunification.  In the Bologna case, the judge's ruling was in 
line with the recommendation of the social services agency handling.  The agent assigned to the 
case took the position that the couple offered the child a home with "prosperity and peace."  
Social services noted that the men are friends with the child's family and the child is reportedly 
very fond of the men and calls them her "uncles."   
In yet another case brought before a court for minors in Palermo, Sicily, on January 14, 
2014, the court awarded temporary custody of a 16-year-old to a gay couple.  The gender of the 
teen was not made known.  The couple, however, both in their 40s, is in a stable relationship and 
sought custody of the teenager, who is alleged to come from a deprived family.  The case is 
believed to be the first of its kind in Sicily.  Again, while under Italian legislation only married 
couples are eligible to adopt children, temporary foster care can be awarded to any “family 
community” constituted by two persons who act as parents or by a single person. 
As with the Affermazione Civile cases, the child custody cases described above evidence 
the increasing importance of court decisions in the formation of public policy regarding the 
treatment of same-sex couples in Italy.  In awarding custody to a lesbian mother and her partner, 
and temporary custody as foster parents to two gay couples, the Italian courts are slowly 
supporting the idea of same-sex parents in Italy.  This is a marked shift in a country that has 
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heretofore been zealous in its efforts to prevent same-sex couples from adopting children or 
availing themselves of assisted reproductive technologies.  Yet, families headed by same-sex 
couples continue to find themselves living with a lot of uncertainty.  A child born to a same-sex 
couple is deemed under Italian law to have only one legal parent:  that is, the biological parent.  
This continues to present problems.   
Giuseppina La Delfa, President of Famiglie Arcobaleno, a national association of 
families headed by homosexual parents in Italy, describes the precariousness of her situation in a 
blog posted on Huffington Post in March 2013.108  La Delfa is a language teacher at the 
University of Salerno and lives with her same-sex partner and two children in southern Italy.  
The eldest child, a girl, is La Delfa’s biological offspring and the youngest, a boy, is the 
offspring of her partner, Raphaelle.  La Delfa observes that, even though her day-to-day life is 
peaceful and happy, she never forgets that her family is not recognized by the state as a family 
and therefore has no legal protection in Italy.  Despite the fact that she and Raphaelle have lived 
together for 30 years, if she were to die tomorrow, Raphaelle would be considered a complete 
stranger under the law and would not be able to inherit anything from La Delfa without paying 
exorbitant inheritance taxes.  La Delfa states: 
 Sometimes I wake up anxious and stressed, like I did last Sunday, when I woke up 
thinking about a dramatic situation that could happen but which I hadn’t really focused 
on before.  I turned to Raphaelle and said, “What would happen if you and I both died in 
a car accident?  Who would take care of [our son]?”  [Our son] doesn’t have any blood 
relatives.  Raphaelle is an only child, and her parents have passed away. …  
                                                 
108 La Delfa, Giuseppina, “A Day in a Queer Life in Italy:  Being a Lesbian Mom when Families like Mine Still 
Aren’t Recognized.”  Huffington Post, March 28, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/giuseppina-la-delfa/a-day-
in-a-queer-life-in-italy_b_2965290.html, accessed March 6, 2014. 
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 … 
 As soon as it was late enough in the morning – 9 o’clock – I called my sister in France 
and asked her, “If Raphaelle and I were both to die together in an accident, will you 
promise me that you’ll take [our son] along with [our daughter], that you won’t separate 
them, and that you’ll tell them the whole story of our family?”   
La Delfa’s sister reassured her that both children were part of the family.  La Delfa, however, 
soon had another uneasy thought.  Her sister is not legally her son’s aunt and there are no 
guarantees that an Italian judge would trust her with the child.   
This most recent line of Italian jurisprudence dealing with same-sex couples and children 
suggests that it is only a matter of time before the court intervenes in recognizing same-sex 
couples as co-parents.  Once the court acknowledges the existence of a “family centered on a 
same-sex couple,” as the Court of Cassation did in the child custody case discussed above, it 
becomes increasingly difficult, from a (legal) doctrinal perspective, to deny parental recognition 
to both partners in a situation where there is not a second biological parent involved (such as the 
case of La Delfa and her partner).  This position is reinforced by the Court of Cassation’s finding 
that it is “mere prejudice” to assume that a child raised by a same-sex couple will suffer 
developmental harm.  In the next chapter, I will look more closely at the role of the Italian courts 
in advancing recognition of rights for same-sex couples.   
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Figure 
 
 
Figure 7.  Satirical image of a Barilla pasta box stamped with "Bigotini" instead of "Rigatoni" that made rounds on 
the Internet following the Barilla Pasta Scandal.  Photo: Courtesy of @peacevehicle/Twitter, 
pic.twitter.com/w17Nz3rcOE. 
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Chapter 4:  Policy-Making in the Courts and the Judicialization of Italian Politics 
In Chapter 2, I explored how activists from Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford are using the 
Italian courts to achieve significant policy changes in the recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples and in Chapter 3 I offered examples of three recent cases involving the award of child 
custody to same-sex parents to show how the courts continue to push recognition outside the 
Affermazione Civile campaign.  Here, I want to shift focus from the LGBTI activists to the Italian 
courts.  I will show how recent policy changes with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples 
emanating from the Italian courts have been made possible due in large part to the influence of 
the EU on the national judicial system. As I will demonstrate, however, the decisions coming out 
of the Italian courts go well-beyond the mere invocation and enforcement of EU law.  I contend 
that the activities of the Italian courts in recognizing certain rights for same-sex couples 
constitute evidence of burgeoning judicial activism and follow a trend that began post-World 
War II toward the increased judicialization of Italian politics, a trend which has been accelerating 
due to the stimulus of the EU on the national judicial system.  Through the lens of the 
Affermazione Civile project, it is possible to trace the effects of judicial policy-making into 
Italian society and shed light on how the Italian legal and political systems (and ultimately, 
Italian culture) are being incrementally transformed through such processes.    
I begin this chapter with an overview of the Italian judicial system (in which I also talk 
about my own introduction to the Italian courts) in order to delineate what Certi Diritti and Rete 
Lenford were up against when they decided to pursue the Affermazione Civile project.  I follow 
up with two shorter sections in which I discuss legal training, selection, and the role(s) of the 
judge in Italy, background that is necessary to more fully appreciate the extraordinariness of the 
manifestation of judicial activism in Italy in general, and with respect to the Affermazione Civile 
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project in particular.  Next, I briefly interrogate the terms "judicial activism” and 
“judicialization” to explain how I am using the concepts here.  I conclude the chapter by 
reanalyzing the Affermazione Civile cases discussed in Chapter 2, in order to show how the 
activities of the Italian courts in this area demonstrate judicial activism and evidence an 
increasing judicialization of Italian politics that serves to reorient the nation-state in the 
supranational realm that is the EU.   
"May It Please the Court":  An Introduction to the Italian Judicial System 
While I was living in Turin, something extraordinary happened:  an Italian appeals court 
overturned the murder convictions of American student Amanda Knox and her former Italian 
boyfriend, Raffaele Sollecito.  Given my interest in the Italian court system, I had been casually 
following the case and had observed, along with many others, that the U.S. media portrayal of 
the case was very different from the way the case was depicted in the Italian media.   In fact, 
whereas the U.S. media generally portrayed Amanda as an innocent young student caught up in a 
labyrinth of incompetent prosecutors and a criminal justice system that leaves much to be 
desired, several of my Italian friends believed her guilty.  My Italian friends were not outliers 
with respect to this view:  polls in Italy disclosed that the majority of Italians believed Knox and 
Sollecito were guilty.  After the 2011 verdict acquitting Knox and Sollecito was pronounced, 
demonstrators outside the court directed chants of “Shame!  Bastards!” at the exiting judges and 
lawyers, expressing their displeasure with the judicial system.  After Knox and Sollecito were 
acquitted in 2011, Il Giornale ran a story titled “Amanda e Raffaele assolti.  Da condannare sono 
i pm” (“Amanda and Raffaele acquitted.  PM are to be condemned”).109  “PM” is an acronym for 
                                                 
109  Vittorio Macioce, “Amanda e Raffaele assolti.  Da condannare sono i pm,” Il Giornale, October 4, 2011, 
http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/amanda-e-raffaele-assolti-condannare-sono-i-pm.html, accessed July 8, 2014.  Il 
Giornale is a daily newspaper published in Milan.  The paper, founded in 1974 by Indro Montanelli (considered one 
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“Pubblico Ministero,” and references the Public Prosecutor.  In the Italian system, public 
prosecutors are, like judges, judicial officers.  Their job description requires them to promote 
justice, which may mean asking the judge for an acquittal if they become convinced of a 
defendant’s innocence, or agree that there is insufficient evidence to find a defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
Eighteen months after the appeals jury acquitted Knox and Sollecito, Italy’s Supreme 
Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) overturned the acquittals and ordered a new 
trial.110   In an article discussing the Knox case, Associated Press writer Victor L. Simpson 
observed that “[the Italian justice system] is a system where people cleared of serious crimes can 
have the threat of prison hanging over them for years, while powerful politicians such as former 
premier Silvio Berlusconi can avoid jail sentences almost indefinitely by filing appeal after 
appeal until the statute of limitations runs out.”111  “It’s one of the many failings of Italian justice 
that it never delivers conclusive, door-slamming certainty,” wrote journalist Tobias Jones in an 
                                                 
of the greatest Italian journalists of the twentieth century), has always been deemed to have a conservative slant.  In 
1987, Silvio Berlusconi purchased the newspaper and then resold it to his brother Paolo in 1994, in order to 
neutralize accusations of a conflict of interest.  Needless to say, the paper remains visibly loyal to Silvio Berlusconi.  
Montanelli, who was no fan of Silvio Berlusconi, founded a new daily, La Voca (The Voice) and spent his last years 
voicing opposition to Silvio Berlusconi’s politics.   
 
110 The Court of Cassation is the court of last resort in the Italian judicial system.  While it does not have authority to 
overrule the trial court’s interpretation of evidence, it can correct a lower court’s interpretation of law.  The role of 
the Court of Cassation is to make sure that lower courts correctly follow legal procedure and to harmonize the 
interpretation of laws by the lower courts.  Although its decisions are binding only on the case being considered, the 
lower courts find the Court of Cassation’s judgments persuasive.   
 
111 Victor L. Simpson, “Knox Case Means More Scrutiny for Italian Justice System,” Salon, March 27, 2013,    
http://www.salon.com/2013/03/27/knox_case_means_more_scrutiny_italian_justice_system_ap/,” accessed 
February 28, 2014.  
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article for The Guardian following the 2011 acquittal verdict.112  “What usually happens is that 
the door is left wide open to take the case to the next level, first to appeal and then to the 
cassazione, the supreme [appellate] court.”113  Jones asserts that there are several reasons for the 
inability of the Italian justice system to resolve cases.  He points out that, in part, it is a matter of 
meritocracy.  In Italy, government appointments are regularly made through nepotism rather than 
competence.  For this reason, argues Jones, it is inevitable that investigations are flawed and any 
decent lawyer can use this to his or her advantage.  In addition, juries are not properly 
sequestered, rendering them vulnerable to public opinion.  There is no doubt, according to Jones, 
that Italy’s courts are in urgent need of reform.114  
 As I mentioned earlier, I spent several weeks in Italian civil and criminal courts in Rome, 
speaking with and shadowing attorneys.  During my fieldwork in Rome, I became especially 
close to two attorneys.  One, my friend D mentioned in the previous chapter, had her own 
criminal law practice.  The other, F, was part of a general practice firm, consisting of four 
attorneys and a small support staff.  Both took me to court and introduced me to other practicing 
attorneys.  Both took the time to explain what was going on and to offer their insights into the 
presiding judges, opposing attorneys, and other participants in the cases I observed.  This 
experience was invaluable to understanding legal process in Italy, as well as to better 
                                                 
112  Tobias Jones, “Amanda Knox Case is Typical of Italy's Inconclusive Justice,” Guardian, October 4, 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/04/amanda-knox-case-italy-justice, accessed February 28, 
2014. 
113  See note 112. 
114 As one of my Italian contacts pointed out, this is a very “U.S.-based” take on the Italian judicial system.  On the 
flip side, one can argue that a criminal defendant in the Italian system remains innocent through three stages of 
judgment. 
  
142 
 
appreciating Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford’s decision to pursue policy change through the courts.    
In what follows, I describe two of my first encounters with the Italian judicial system, one 
involving a civil matter and the other a matter in criminal court.  Both were typical of my 
subsequent encounters with the Italian judicial system.    
Although my Roman friend and consultant T had warned me what to expect, I did not 
completely believe that things could be as bad as he described.  I thought for certain that he was 
exaggerating.  When I first told T I planned to go to the court to see what was going on, he 
laughed and told me that there was nothing really to see, that it was not like going to court in the 
U.S., and that I would be appalled by how things are done. T told me that it takes forever for a 
case to move through the system.  There is a seemingly insurmountable backlog of cases and an 
endless appeals process.  He explained to me that nothing was computerized and that court files 
existed in hard copy only.  Further, everything was hand-written.  He could not quite grasp why I 
would want to go and stand around and watch people write a bunch of stuff on paper.  I told him 
that, as an anthropologist, these were precisely the kinds of things I needed to see and 
understand.  He agreed to help by introducing me to some of the local attorneys he knew.  
After I returned to Rome to begin my fieldwork in earnest (and after I got to know him 
better), T confided in me that the new owner had never paid him for the sale of the Bed and 
Breakfast, and that he (T) was now in the unenviable position of trying to collect the money 
owed to him through the court.  The amount of money at issue was substantial and, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, T had planned to use it as seed money for another venture. T had filed a 
case in court in an attempt to recover the money owed to him, but was doubtful he would see the 
money any time soon.  Until such time, his hands were tied.  I could tell that the situation was 
getting to him.   
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As far as the case itself was concerned, the facts were in T’s favor.  Still, T did not trust 
the judge presiding over his case to do the right thing.  His distrust did not stem from anything in 
particular (he did not personally know the judge assigned to his case, nor had he heard any 
rumors about this particular judge).  In fact, it was the lack of relationship and lack of knowledge 
that concerned him.  T was convinced that he needed an “in” with the judge in order to prevail.  
He did not subscribe to the adage “justice is blind,” and desperately needed to win the case.  He 
did not want to take any chances.      
T thought it would be good for me to meet and speak with his attorney, and maybe 
accompany his attorney to court.  They had an appointment to meet to discuss T’s case and T 
invited me to tag along. T picked me up in his beat-up Smart Car and we navigated to the 
Vatican area.  It took us a while to find parking and, when we did, we had to walk several blocks 
to his attorney’s office.  The office was located inside a five-story stone building with a single 
locked door for an entrance.  The building was rather nondescript and, according to the buzzer, 
housed several small businesses. T rang the buzzer and announced the purpose of our visit when 
prompted.  We were admitted into the building and took the stairway to the third floor where we 
entered another door on the left into a tiny reception area.  A young woman dressed in a business 
suit came from behind a desk and introduced herself.  She told us to make ourselves comfortable 
while we waited for F.  I assumed she was employed as the law firm’s receptionist or legal 
assistant but later learned from F that she was a recent graduate from law school and was 
apprenticing with the firm as part of her requirement to become a full-fledged practicing 
attorney.           
 We waited about five minutes and F came out to greet us. T made the introductions, and 
F asked if I would mind waiting in the reception while he discussed T’s case with him in private.  
  
144 
 
Then, we could all talk in his office.  I continued to wait and F came out to retrieve me 
approximately 15 minutes later and escorted me to his office.  The office was not large but it was 
cozy and had a huge window that overlooked the street.  It was comfortably furnished with 
heavy wooden furniture.  Floor-to-ceiling book cases filled with law books lined the wall to the 
right side of the office entrance.  F invited me to sit down in one of the chairs facing his desk and 
T proceeded to tell F about my research.  T told F that he thought it would be interesting for me 
to follow F to court in order to get some sense of the Italian legal system.  Both F and T chuckled 
as if this was some sort of inside joke.  F looked at me and said, “You will need to take a Valium 
before you accompany me to court.”           
According to F, cases take years to resolve.  I asked him the reason for the delays and he 
told me that much of it has to do with the fact that the judges show up only two hours twice a 
week, and work from home the rest of the time.  The judges are organized in a sort-of “judges 
union” and if someone tries to tell them they have to work, they will strike.115  F explained that 
going to court in Italy would be nothing like what I was used to in the United States.  He told me 
that the procedures were antiquated and that going to court involved a lot of waiting around in 
crowded spaces.  Like T, he told me that nothing is computerized and that Court orders are 
written in longhand and signed by the judge.   F pulled out his agenda and gave me several dates 
to choose from.  We settled on a day later that same week and agreed that I would meet him at 
his office and we would walk over to court.  He reminded me again to “take a Valium” before 
the meeting. 
                                                 
115  As will be discussed in more detail below, the Italian Magistracy is organized into a national magistrates 
association known as the “ANM,” which is further divided into factions (known as “correnti”), each with its own 
organizational structure.  The factions arose due to conflicts within the judiciary over the career.  Through the 
factions, ANM expresses its demands to the Parliament and government. 
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T and I left F’s office and discussed the prospects for T’s case.  T told me that F is a 
straight shooter and, while T appreciated this, he had discussed the possibility of bringing in a 
second attorney who has an “in” with the judge on his case with F.  T has a friend who has a 
friend who is a young attorney just out of law school.  Apparently, this young attorney just out of 
law school has an uncle who is a magistrate and knows the judge assigned to T’s case. T told me 
he mentioned this to F and suggested bringing the second attorney onboard if it did not look like 
things were going to go T’s way.  According to T, F had not been overly keen on the idea and, 
for now, the case was going to go forward with F as the only attorney.  I could sense that T was 
not entirely comfortable with this arrangement and asked him why.  T told me he was worried 
that the defendant might know someone on the bench and be using his contacts to secure a 
favorable order from the judge.  While I do not know the extent to which these sorts of things 
happen in Italy, it was obvious that T fervently believed that civil cases were decided based on 
whom one knows rather than the merits of the case.  I was worried for T.  I knew he was 
miserable and depressed about his current situation and felt bad for him.  I told him I hoped he 
was wrong about the court case and that it would be resolved soon.          
On Thursday I arrived as planned at F’s office. F invited me to sit and explained to me 
the nature of the court case.  He was being asked to appear on behalf of another attorney who he 
did not particularly like.  The purpose of today’s hearing was to take the testimony of two 
witnesses and the witnesses were going to meet us at the courthouse.  F continually referred to 
today’s hearing as a “trial.”  I learned from F that civil trials like the one scheduled that day do 
not happen all at once.  Instead, several hearings are scheduled for the taking of testimony and 
evidence and these hearings are often spread out over substantial periods of time, which is part of 
the reason it takes so long to reach a resolution.         
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F and I walked over to the courthouse and F talked to me about the opposing attorney’s 
position with respect to the case en route.  We arrived at the courthouse, an ugly building that, 
judging by the architecture, had likely been erected in the 1960s.  As a former federal prosecutor 
who has spent her share of time in various courthouses, I was taken aback by the fact that there 
was no security check.  We simply walked in:  no one asked us for identification, there were no 
metal detectors, and no one was stationed at the door to search us.  Inside the building, the 
ceilings were low and paneled.  The floors were laid with a brown speckled industrial tile.  The 
effect was downright dreary and claustrophobic.  We began to seek out the courtroom where the 
hearing was to be held.  We were about 10 minutes early.  After a couple of false starts we went 
upstairs and searched the paper schedules taped outside the courtroom doors until we located the 
correct room.  Waiting outside, F found A2, his opposing counsel, and quickly introduced me.  
A2 was affable and appeared to be on good terms with F.  We noticed that there were four (4) 
hearings on the court’s docket, all scheduled for the same time.  There were several people (I 
counted ten) already crowded in the “courtroom.”     
Everyone was standing in small clusters, talking.  I looked around the courtroom and 
noticed that it was actually an office, and not much of one at that.  The room was long and 
narrow, approximately 14 feet long by 10 feet wide.  The brown speckled industrial tile found in 
the halls gave way to a yellowish-cream colored industrial tile in the courtroom.  The walls were 
painted a nondescript color (if one could even classify it as “color”).  A cracked black leather 
loveseat lined the wall to the left of the entrance toward the front of the room.  (Later, I had the 
opportunity to sit in that loveseat and observe the “proceedings.”  When I sat, I sank and was 
almost swallowed by the cushions.)  I noticed as I entered that there were two judges assigned to 
this space.  One of the judges sat toward the middle of the room on the right-hand side.  Our 
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judge’s desk was further back along the left wall, situated just past the loveseat.  The two desks 
faced toward each other.  Both were cement-colored metal desks.  In front of each desk sat bright 
blue plastic chairs of the type that were popular in government offices and schools in the U.S. 
throughout the 1970s.  On each desk sat a computer (circa late-1990s) and a telephone dating to 
about the same time period.  The “courtroom” also housed two two-drawer metal file cabinets 
(one for each judge), a Formica cabinet that likely held the judges’ personal items, and a 
bookcase embellished with a plastic top.  The room was decorated with two smallish (16” x 20” 
at best) dark oil paintings (one on the left wall and one on the right) that cast a certain heaviness 
to the décor  -- the attempt to “decorate” the room only made it worse, somehow bleaker.   
 After a short while, our judge called for quiet and eventually, we were ordered back into 
the hall while the judge heard the first case on her docket.  Before we left the office, F grabbed a 
file off the judge’s desk.  I asked him what it was and he told me it was the court’s case file.  F 
told me that, as far as this case was concerned, it was the only file in existence:  there were no 
copies and nothing was stored electronically.  Handwritten notes made up the bulk of what was 
contained in the file.  I wondered what would happen if there was a fire or if the file met with 
water.  The entire file was vulnerable.  I also wondered about fading ink and poor handwriting:  
it was well within the realm of possibility that someone in the future may not be able to decipher 
what had previously transpired in the case.  The record, or at least that part of it, would be lost.  
It also seemed odd to me that the attorneys could take the file from the judge’s desk and walk 
with it out of her office.  There was no system for “checking out” the file and it seemed to me 
that the file could easily be altered by an unscrupulous attorney.     
This was very different from my experience as a practicing attorney in the United States 
where, in addition to the court, the parties’ representatives maintain files.  The court also 
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maintains a log of what is in the file, and these days many of the documents are preserved in 
electronic form.  When I left the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 2005, the court where I worked was in 
the process of switching to an electronic filing system, which meant that all pleadings would be 
filed electronically instead of in hard copy as had been the previous practice.  Pleadings and 
court orders were, with rare exception, typed using a computer-based word processing program 
(and usually had to conform to certain rules regarding format).  At a given time, there were 
usually multiple copies of a document in existence.  Further, the court clerk would affix a stamp 
on the document to record the time and date of filing.  Record-keeping is a critical part of legal 
practice in the United States.                  
F, A2, and I found a tall table in the middle of the hall and gathered around it with the 
case file.  Like the courtroom, the hall was filled with lawyers, witnesses, and parties to the 
various cases that were being heard that day.  Many were standing at tables similar to the one we 
had located.  F and A2 began discussing the case and F began to write in the case file.  I asked 
what he was writing and he told me it was a record of what they were talking about.  After F and 
A2 finished their discussion of the case, the three of us chatted a bit and then walked back 
toward the courtroom, where we hovered outside awaiting our turn before the judge.   
The hearing had been set for 10:00 am but it was close to 1:00 pm before we were 
summoned back into the judge’s room.  While we were waiting, I asked F why the judge did not 
schedule the four hearings each for a specific time.  I mentioned that this would go a long way 
toward easing the crowding in the court house, something that surely added to everyone’s stress 
level.  F stated wryly that would be “too easy,” that it made too much sense, and that Italians are 
“too intelligent” to find the easy solution.  After all, he said, they (Italians) have been doing this 
for 1,000 years.  F then theorized that part of it had to do power issues and that making people 
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wait made the judges feel powerful.  According to F, the judges have no respect for the 
attorneys’ time and never think twice about making everyone wait around for them.  While F 
was telling me this, A2 was nodding in agreement.  While F’s assessment may or may not be 
completely accurate, like T’s comments, it evidenced an underlying cynicism and lack of faith in 
the judicial system. 
After waiting for what seemed like another hour, we were invited into the judge’s office.  
F, A2, and I entered, along with two additional people I had not met.  I learned from F that these 
were the witnesses who were going to give their testimony at today’s trial.  They had been 
waiting outside the entire time but I had not observed either F or A2 speak with them.  After a 
brief consultation with the judge, one of the witnesses was banished from the courtroom and 
asked to wait until called to offer testimony.  The remaining witness was asked to sit in one of 
bright blue chairs facing the judge’s desk.  F then introduced me to the judge, explaining to her 
that I was an anthropologist and an attorney from the United States doing research on the Italian 
legal system.  F had been concerned that the judge might be uptight about my presence, but she 
simply nodded in my direction and invited me to sit on the loveseat with the hungry cushions.   
A2 asked the judge for permission to ask questions of the first witness, which she 
granted.  He then proceeded to ask a series of questions.  Because there was no secretary, court 
transcriber, courtroom clerk, or recording equipment, F was tasked with making a written record 
(by writing longhand in the case file) of everything that was being said.  I observed that the 
witness was not placed under oath prior to giving testimony, nor was he reminded of having 
previously been placed under oath.  This was an interesting deviation from the way that 
testimony is secured in U.S. courts and made me pause to think about the role of the oath in 
court.  While A2 questioned the witness, the judge absently leafed through her agenda.  Every 
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now and then, F would ask for clarification of something that was said.  F noted aloud that he 
was running out of paper but there was no response from the judge or anyone else in the room.  I 
wondered what would happen if he did run out of paper:  the judges’ courtroom did not appear to 
be equipped with additional office supplies.  A2 finished asking questions.  F shared what he had 
written and A2 agreed that it accurately reflected what had just transpired and signed the record.  
The second witness was then called in and the first witness removed from the courtroom.  The 
same procedure was repeated.  The entire process took about 45 minutes.     
I noticed that the judge did not ask questions of either witness, nor was there any cross-
examination of the witnesses by F.  Later I asked F about this.  I wanted to know how the court 
was able to determine the credibility of a witness if there is no cross-examination.  He explained 
that the judge can tell by the person’s demeanor, what the witness says, what other witnesses say, 
and what the physical evidence shows.  The judge in this case, however, had appeared to be 
giving the case half her attention at best.  Throughout both examinations, she sat at her desk 
looking through her agenda and rarely, if ever, glancing at the attorneys or witnesses.  It was not 
clear that she heard anything the witnesses said, much less that she was able to judge their 
demeanor.  All of this was both foreign and fascinating to me, coming from the U.S. system 
where witnesses are prepped to withstand vigorous cross-examination and lawyers frequently 
strategize how to present a witness in his or her best light to appear credible to the fact-finder.        
Hungry and worn out, F and I walked across the street to a small trattoria for lunch.  
Outside it was still blustery and, as we crossed through traffic, F noted that I should be wearing 
something warmer.  Fortunately, the restaurant was as warm and cozy as the courthouse was 
sterile and dingy.  The walls were lined from floor to ceiling with bottles of wine and, after my 
experience at the courthouse, all I could think about was the pleasure of sipping a glass of wine 
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from one of those bottles.  I expressed this to F who agreed and then proceeded to tell me that 
eating is a “serious business.”  I must have smiled at his comment because he looked at me again 
(quite earnestly) and repeated, “I am serious:  eating is a serious business.”  We enjoyed a 
leisurely lunch and then parted ways after making arrangements for me to accompany F and 
another attorney to court the following week.  As it turned out, my first experience with the 
Italian judicial system was fairly typical of the experiences to follow.   
After spending time in civil courts, I decided it would be worth the time to visit the 
criminal court for purposes of comparison.  D, who as mentioned is a criminal defense attorney, 
agreed to take me to court in Rome with her.  The criminal court was more similar in appearance 
to what I was used to in the United States.  The judges hearing the case sat at the head of the 
courtroom on an elevated platform, facing the entrance.  Slightly in front of and to the left of the 
judges sat the witness, also facing the entrance to the room.  Directly in front of the panel of 
judges and to the left of the middle of the room was the plaintiff/government attorney’s table, 
which faced the judges, and to the right of the middle of the room was the defendant’s table, 
which also faced the judges.  The jury box was located on the right wall and faced the 
plaintiff/government’s and defendant’s tables.  There were a few rows of seats in the back of the 
courtroom, immediately to the left and right of the entrance that faced the judges.  The actual 
courtroom area was demarcated by a low wall that resembled the back of a church pew.  The 
back of the courtroom (behind the pew-like wall) was crowded with attorneys.  A member of the 
court staff was going around, trying to figure out who was who and inform them about the order 
of the proceedings.  It was chaotic.  Those involved with the pending court matter in the front of 
the courtroom paid no attention to what was happening in the back.     
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A few things worth noting, however, were quite different from the courtrooms I am used 
to.  For starters, a large crucifix hung conspicuously on the wall.  Behind the judges hung a 
plaque that stated “La legge è uguali per tutti” (translated:  "The law is equal for all").  D pointed 
this out to me and sniggered, stating, “Of course, this is not really true.”  There were no 
computers in the courtroom and, as with civil court, there was no recording equipment.  I 
noticed, however, that a person was sitting directly to the right of the judges and in front of the 
jury box.  This person was busy writing and I asked D about her.  D told me that this was the 
court reporter, the person tasked with making a record of what transpired in the courtroom. D 
and I sat and watched the proceedings, which were a bit difficult to follow because of the volume 
of chatter in the back of the courtroom.  
Through my direct experience with the Italian courts I learned that much of the criticism 
of the Italian judicial system is justified.  I could not understand why anyone would deliberately 
choose to pursue something as important as the recognition of rights through the Italian courts.  
To this end, the Affermazione Civile campaign baffled me.  Record-keeping processes are 
abysmal and, for the most part, the Italian courts do not enjoy conveniences such as updated 
computers, data storage systems, and courtroom technology that their counterparts in the U.S. 
take for granted.  It takes a long time for cases to move through the courts, and a judicial 
decision is often (as in my friend T’s case, where he ultimately won his case but then had to try 
to recover the money from the defendant) only the beginning of the remedy.  The Italian judicial 
system has a reputation for being painfully slow and unreliable.  In 2009, after U.S. financier 
Bernie Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison for turning his wealth management business 
into a huge Ponzi scheme and defrauding thousands of investors of billions of dollars, Italy’s 
Corriere della Sera (one of the leading national newspapers) ran a front-page cartoon mocking 
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Italy’s justice system. One side depicted a U.S. courtroom with a judge issuing a 150-year 
sentence after a six-month trial. The other side showed an Italian courtroom with a judge handing 
down a six-month sentence after a 150-year trial.   
Italy is a place where it can take years (if ever) to finalize a divorce or obtain reparation 
from a fraudulent business deal. A recent Reuters analysis of the Italian judicial system presents 
an even more dire picture. At the present time, there is a backlog of around nine million cases, of 
which 5.5 million are civil and 3.4 million criminal. In 2011, the state paid € 84 million in 
compensation for miscarriages of justice and legal delays. Between 2003 and 2011, the number 
of such claims rose from 3,500, to 50,000. Another € 46 million was paid out to people who had 
been unjustly imprisoned (Khazan 2013). On average, civil cases take more than seven years to 
resolve and criminal cases take five years to work their way through the system (Moody 2013). 
Italians are angered by the compromised court system. A 2009 poll taken by Euromedia research 
group revealed that Italian public trust in the Italian justice system had fallen to an all-time low 
of 16 percent (Momigliano 2009). 
Given the realities of the Italian judicial system, it is no wonder that Italians are 
frequently characterized as cynical toward the judicial system and as lacking faith in the rule of 
law (Sciolla 1997: 48, 62-64).  The fact that groups like Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford are now 
using the Italian courts in an attempt to achieve their goals is striking.  It is even more striking 
when one considers the structure of the Italian judicial system.  Unlike the situation in the U.S., 
until recently, litigation has rarely been undertaken in Italy as a means for advancing a political 
movement or cause.  This has to do with the structure and history of the Italian judicial system.  
In the following section, I provide a description of the structure of the Italian judiciary to better 
explain why, in the past, activists in general and LGBTI activists in particular have not looked to 
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the courts to advance the recognition of their rights.  Much of this has to do with the relationship 
between the ordinary courts (especially Italy’s Court of Cassation) and the Italian Constitutional 
Court, which is a relatively recent (post World War II) creation.  
The Structure of the Italian Judicial System  
      The structure of the Italian judicial system differs from that of the U.S. system, partly in 
terms of organization but also in terms of the role(s) played by “judges.”  Unlike the United 
States, Italy has a unified national court system (meaning that there are no regional, provincial or 
municipal courts), with different categories of jurisdiction:  the constitutional court, “ordinary” 
courts, and courts of special jurisdiction.116  The ordinary courts are overseen by judges who are 
competent for general civil and criminal matters, with the exception of those matters reserved for 
the jurisdiction of special judges.  The basic structure of the ordinary courts is split into three 
levels or tiers:  inferior courts of original and general jurisdiction (“Courts of First Instance”); 
intermediate appellate courts (“Courts of Second Instance”), which hear cases on appeal from 
                                                 
116  The “Special Courts” include: 
 
     1.  Courts of Administrative jurisdiction, exercised by the Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali – TAR (Regional        
          Administrative Courts).  These courts are really part of the executive department rather than the judiciary.  
          Decisions rendered by TAR may be appealed before the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State).   
 
     2.  Courts of Auditing jurisdiction, exercised by the Corte dei Conti (State Auditors' Department) for matters  
          concerning public accounts. 
 
     3.  Courts of Military jurisdiction, exercised by the Tribunali Militari (Military Courts), the Corti Militari di 
         Appello  (Military Appeal Courts), and the Tribunali Militari di Sorveglianza (Military Surveillance Courts),  
         for military offences committed by members of the Armed Forces. 
 
     4.  Courts of Fiscal jurisdiction, exercised by the Commissioni Tributarie Provinciali (Provincial Fiscal  
          Commissions) and the Commissioni Tributarie Distrettuali (District Fiscal Commissions), for matters  
          concerning taxes.  
 
     5.  Tribunale Regionale delle Acque Pubbliche (Regional Court of Waters) and the Tribunale Superiore delle 
          Acque Pubbliche  (High Court of Waters), competent for controversies on waters which are property of the 
          State.  
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inferior courts; and “Courts of Last Resort,” which hear appeals from the intermediate appellate 
courts on the interpretation of law.  Courts of First Instance include: 
1. Tribunali (“Tribunals” or “Courts”): default courts of general jurisdiction for all 
civil and criminal disputes, as well as disputes that do not have a determinable value.   
Generally, only one judge will preside over a case, but for matters of particular 
importance, a panel of three judges may hear the case.  Tribunali may also act as 
appellate courts for decisions made by the Giudici di Pace. 
2. Giudici di Pace (“Justices of the Peace”):  honorary judges with jurisdiction over 
less significant matters including minor civil claims, motor vehicle accidents, real estate 
boundaries, minor rental and co-habitation disputes, and minor criminal matters.  
Decisions of the Giudici di Pace may be appealed before the Tribunali.   
3. Tribunali per i minorenni (Juvenile courts):  courts with civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over all disputes and proceedings concerning minors (defined as under the 
age of 18), such as adoptions and emancipations. 
4. Giudici del Lavoro (Labor Tribunals):  courts that preside over cases that involve 
disputes between employers and employees and that do not fall within the jurisdiction of 
administrative courts.   
5. Sezione specializzata agraria (Land Estate Court):  a specialized section of the 
judiciary that hears all agrarian disputes.  
6.   Corti d’Assise (Courts of Assizes):  courts with jurisdiction over felony offenses.  
Corti d’Assise are composed of 2 professional judges and 6 lay judges.  Decisions of 
Corti d’Assise can be appealed to the Corte d’Assise d’Appello (Appeals Court of Assize) 
(see below).   
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The Courts of Second Instance include: 
1.  Tribunali, when acting as an appeals court for decisions of the Giudici di Pace. 
2.  Corti di appello (Courts of Appeal):  courts with jurisdiction over appeals from the 
Courts of First Instance, as well as jurisdiction over enforcement proceedings of 
decisions rendered by foreign courts and arbitrators and jurisdiction over proceedings for 
nullity or damages in competition matters.  It is divided into criminal, civil and labor 
divisions.     
3.  Corte d’assise d’appello, for appeals against decisions of the Corte d’assise.  This 
court is composed of 2 professional judges and 6 lay judges.  
The Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) is the highest court in Italy with 
competence over appeals on issues of law arising from second-instance court judgments and 
challenges raised regarding the jurisdiction of the Italian judges.  The Court of Cassation is the 
only court that functions at the nation-state level and is the court of last resort for civil and 
criminal cases.  Its job is to ensure the correct application of law in the lower and appellate 
courts through its review of decisions taken by the lower courts to determine whether points of 
law have been correctly decided by them.  It is the Court of Cassation that is responsible for 
consistent interpretation and application of law throughout Italy.  Located in Rome, it is housed 
in the Palazzo de Giustizia (Palace of Justice), which is often referred to as the “Palazzaccio,” or 
“Ugly Palace,” by Romans.  The Court of Cassation is divided between civil and penal sections. 
Judges usually sit in panels of five; however, a special panel of nine judges, known as the Sezioni 
Unite, decides matters concerning issues of jurisdiction, conflicting cases arising from the 
ordinary chambers, and cases of special importance.  At the present moment, the Court of 
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Cassation is comprised of approximately 400 professional judges who are neither elected nor 
chosen but rather appointed based on rank. 
As a matter of constitutional principle, all judgments issued by Italian courts must include 
an opinion setting forth the reasons justifying the decision.  Consequently, decisions rendered by 
the Court of Cassation contain a section devoted to developing the arguments that support the 
final judgment.  After a decision has been reached by the panel of judges presiding over a case, a 
member of the court is charged with writing the opinion of the court.  The assigned judge will 
then write the opinion stating the arguments that he or she believes demonstrate that the 
judgment is based upon good and lawful reasons.  After the judgment is signed by its author and 
the chairman of the chamber or of the panel, it becomes the opinion of the court.  Dissenting 
opinions are not allowed. 
The Italian Constitutional Court is a separate court created by the Italian Constitution of 
1948, and was in part a response to the high priority placed on protecting human rights in the 
wake of the post-World War II Fascist era.117  The constituent assembly that approved the 
Constitution rejected the U.S. system under which an ordinary court can refuse to apply a law 
that it considers to be unconstitutional.  In Italy, stare decisis is not a recognized principle.118  
Consequently, the Court of Cassation might strike a law as unconstitutional only to have the 
lower courts (or itself in a subsequent case) refuse to follow the decision.  In addition, the 
                                                 
117 Because Italy formally switched sides in 1943, it was not a conquered nation at the end of the war.  
Consequently, Italy was not required to dismantle its old law.  By writing a new constitution that provided for 
judicial review, Italy was able to avoid the task of completely replacing its existing (Fascist) statutory law all at 
once.  Instead, the Constitutional court was able to deal with these laws on a case-by-case basis over time.   
 
118 Stare decisis (a Latin phrase meaning “to stand by things decided”) is a legal principle by which judges are 
obligated to respect the precedent established by prior decisions.  This is understood to mean that courts should 
generally abide by precedent and not disturb that which is settled. 
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framers were concerned to maintain separation of powers.  For these reasons, the constituent 
assembly thought it necessary to concentrate constitutional matters in one court and to create a 
separate body with authority to nullify a law erga omnes.119  The framers also considered that the 
ordinary judiciary in Italy lacked the prestige and importance of its U.S. counterpart, and that 
many of the incumbent Italian judges had been designated, trained, and promoted under the 
Fascist regime and were unlikely to interpret the new Constitution in a progressive fashion 
(Cappelletti 1967).  Mainly due to the difficulty of selecting judges during an unsettled political 
period, the Constitutional Court was not realized until 1956.   
According to Article 134 of the Italian Constitution, the Constitutional Court has 
jurisdiction over: 
1. Controversies on the constitutionality of laws and acts having the force of laws 
issued by the State and Regions – when the court declares a law unconstitutional, the law 
is void and ceases to have effect the day after the publication of the Court’s ruling; 
2. Conflicts between the various divisions of the central government, between the 
State and Regions, and between the Regions; and 
3. Charges brought against the President of the Republic. 
The Constitutional Court is made up of 15 justices who are appointed for a nonrenewable term of 
nine years.120  Unlike the selection of ordinary court judges, which is based on competitive 
examination, election procedures in the selection of Constitutional Court justices ensure a close 
relationship with the political arena:  five of the justices are appointed by the President of the 
                                                 
119 Erga omnes is a Latin legal term meaning “in relation to all.” It refers to rights and responsibilities that can be 
enforced against anyone, rather than against a specific person or party. 
 
120 Originally the tenure was twelve years but it was shortened to nine years in 1967. 
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Republic, five are elected by the Italian Parliament according to special voting procedures that 
require an enhanced 3/5 majority (and thereby ensure a degree of pluralism), and five are elected 
by the ordinary magistracy.  The limited tenure and special election procedures are designed to 
“democratize” the Court.  Although the nonrenewable limited tenure should ensure a measure of 
independence, the fact is that the justices’ aspirations for post-Court careers may influence 
decision-making processes.  The Constitutional Court always sits as one court and never in 
panels.  Decisions are made based on majority vote; however, the vote is always in secret.  The 
judgment is, therefore, deemed to be the judgment of the court as a whole and it is impossible to 
know if the decision was unanimous or by a majority.  Any differences among members of the 
court in the decision-making process are never made public.  After a decision is made, one of the 
justices is charged with preparing a draft of the opinion, which is then examined and discussed 
by the other justices.  When agreement of the whole court is reached, the draft becomes the 
opinion of the court.  Dissenting or concurring opinions are never allowed.  Compared to their 
counterparts in Anglo-Saxon systems, Italian Constitutional Court decisions are very short.  
The Constitutional Court initially met with resistance from the executive branch, which 
repeatedly failed to enforce its decisions, as well as from the ordinary courts, which rebuffed its 
authority.  Cooperation on the part of the ordinary courts is essential to the Court’s proper 
functioning because cases involving questions of constitutionality can only reach the Court 
through indirect access, by referral from an ordinary or administrative court.  The ordinary courts 
thereby serve as a filter through which cases flow to the Constitutional Court.  By 1975, 
suspicion and resentment on the part of the ordinary courts had subsided and the flow of cases 
through indirect access increased.   
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As it has turned out, and despite the fact that its principal function is the abrogation of 
unconstitutional laws, when compared with the Parliament and Council of Ministers, the 
Constitutional Court appears to be the entity that has done the most to render the Constitution of 
1948 a living document.  This is in part because the Court determined that it had the power to 
strike down laws enacted prior to the 1948 Constitution.  Political inertia prevented the 
Parliament from repealing and replacing must of the Fascist era legislation and the Court stepped 
in to declare many of these laws unconstitutional.  As a result, the Constitutional Court has been 
critically dubbed as the “third Chamber [of the Parliament]” or the “omnipotent legislature” 
(Laurenzano 1983:5, 39).     
 That said, scholars have argued that the contemporary role of the Italian Constitutional 
Court is limited (see e.g., Mandel 1995).  According to Michael Mandel, this is because 
Constitutional litigation in Italy has a low political profile (1995:267).  The “test case” system, 
whereby a legal action whose outcome is likely to set a precedent or test the constitutionality of a 
statute is undertaken, does not exist.  In addition, Constitutional litigation rarely becomes the 
symbol for a political movement or cause, as it does elsewhere.121  Finally, while the position of 
Constitutional Court judge is prestigious, it is a relatively low profile position compared to its 
counterpart in the United States, and is effectively a part-time job that one holds as a stop in the 
course of a longer career in public service.  And, as noted above, the fact that the position is a 
one-time, nine-year assignment means that post-Court aspirations potentially influence a 
                                                 
121 A good example of this is the relationship between the movement for marriage equality in the United States and 
the recent Supreme Court decision, which found that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional.  
Over a relatively short period of time public opinion on same-sex marriage rights has changed dramatically in the 
United States, with a majority now stating that they favor legal recognition of marriage rights for same-sex couples.  
This relatively sudden shift in opinion is no doubt tied in part to the publicity surrounding the recent case. 
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justice’s decision-making.  This can be contrasted to the U.S. case where the position of Supreme 
Court Justice is held at the pinnacle of a distinguished legal career, and justices are granted life 
tenure, absent resignation, retirement, or impeachment. 
LGBTI activist groups in Italy are well-aware that, in other places, the courts have been 
successfully used to advance the rights of a minority population or disenfranchised group.  As I 
explained in Chapter 2, LGBTI activist groups in Italy function within a larger network of 
LGBTI activism in Europe and the world.  Certi Diritti, in particular, is associated with the 
Radicali Italiani, a party that is generally pro-American and pro-European.  In addition, Certi 
Diritti is a constituent member of the PRNTT, an organization that embraces the rule of law and 
strives to promote “real democracy” in state institutions.  The idea of using the courts to advance 
the recognition of rights is, therefore, nothing new.   
Of course, LGBTI activist groups in Italy such as Certi Diritti would likely abandon this 
strategy absent encouragement from the courts. In fact, although Certi Diritti activists were 
confident of the legal positions put forth in the Affermazione Civile cases (thanks in large part to 
the legal expertise of the attorneys from Rete Lenford), they fully anticipated having to push their 
way through the Italian judicial system into the European courts to obtain satisfaction.  However, 
despite the history and structural features of the Italian judicial system that discourage the use of 
the courts to advance political causes, and despite problems with respect to how the system 
functions in contemporary Italian society, the Affermazione Civile cases have been moving 
through the judicial system to resolution.  Not only are the cases being resolved in the Italian 
courts, they are also having a visible effect on public policy regarding the treatment of same-sex 
couples in Italy.  Further, whereas on average civil cases in Italy take seven years to resolve (see 
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above), the Affermazione Civile cases seem to be moving through the system at a reasonable pace 
of 2-3 years between initiation of the case and resolution.   
This begs the question:  “What is going on with the Italian judicial system?”  In Italy, 
lawyers and judges are trained to be “legal scientists,” and judges are expected to interpret and 
apply, rather than make, law.  Yet, as seen in the context of the Affermazione Civile cases, Italian 
judges are doing more than merely interpreting and applying the law.  Something has happened 
to enable a shift in Italian judges’ perceptions of their role in society.  As I will show in the 
following sections, the particular set-up that leads to this shift in perception and makes for an 
active judiciary in Italy cannot be explained by the way that judges are educated, trained, and 
selected in Italy.  However, these factors contribute to the creation of a judicial structure in Italy 
that enjoys substantial independence from the other branches of government, and the 
independence of the judiciary does partially explain the shift in perception regarding the role of 
judges in Italy.  For this reason, I devote the following sections to a discussion of these subjects.       
 Educating “Legal Scientists”  
Law is seen as a science with its own methodology in Italy.  Law school is not viewed as 
a professional training program but is instead understood as a “cultural institution where law is 
taught as a science” (Cappelletti 1965:89).  This perspective of law as science is systematically 
indoctrinated in every student of the law, whether he or she goes on to become an academic, a 
judge, or to practice law.  “Legal science” is pursued by legal scholars, not judges.  The scholar 
is responsible for elaborating the systematic, scientific legal structure and it is the scholar who is 
creative and held in high esteem.   
In Italy, as in other civil law countries, the professional divide is largely between 
practicing lawyers (i.e., those who choose to practice law by advising clients and representing 
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them in court if needed) and magistrates (i.e., judges).122  Those who opt to practice law, unlike 
their counterparts in common law countries, eschew the possibility of ever becoming a judge.  In 
Italy, the magistracy form a distinct professional class of (essentially) civil servants that includes 
those who occupy the familiar role of judge (and preside over cases in court) as well as those 
who work in the pubblico ministero (public prosecutor), the investigating magistrates who look 
into crimes and initiate and prosecute criminal matters.  (There are further divisions within the 
practicing profession not relevant here.)123   
The view of "law as science" continues after law school when one becomes a judge.  Like 
other judges in European continental civil law systems, the role of Italian judges is theoretically 
limited to interpreting laws enacted by the parliament.124  Italian judges, like practicing lawyers, 
are expected to accept and apply the interpretations articulated by legal scholars.  Judges thereby 
serve as the “mouth of the law,” faithfully consulting the codes and writings of the legal scholars 
to find the correct answer in a given case.125  In this vein, judges are technicians whose aim is to 
                                                 
122 Academics form yet another class; however, many academics in Italy also work as practicing attorneys. 
  
123  Practicing lawyers may be procurators (who represent clients in the development of proceedings and performs 
functions of a procedural, non-discretionary nature) or advocates (who actually defend clients by making oral or 
written arguments and thereby perform functions that require the exercise of expert discretion), or both.  To become 
a procurator, the law graduate must join the law office of a qualified procurator, where he or she will remain for at 
least two years and possibly longer until ready to take the law examination required for admission to the profession 
of procuratore.  Upon successful completion of the examination, the procurator must either spend six years in 
practice as a procurator or, after two years of practice, successfully complete additional examinations in civil, 
criminal, and administrative procedure, in order -to become an advocate, or avvocato.  In practice, the position of 
procurator is a stepping stone to becoming an advocate and it follows that most advocates are also registered as 
procurators and perform a dual function in handling cases.  A third category of practicing legal professional that 
should be mentioned is the notary.  Notaries are primarily responsible for conferring legal certainty (in the form of 
certification) upon legal facts and, in a sense, upon legal transactions, as well as pre-constituting the means of their 
legal proof (documentation). 
 
124 “The role of the judge is to apply the law to resolve conflicts” (Alpa and Zeno-Zencovich 2007:10).  
  
125  As observed by Cappelletti: 
 
This attitude, fundamental to the folklore of interpretation, has some interesting by-products.  The literature 
of interpretation, produced out of the abstractness, conceptualism, and cultural agnosticism that 
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perfect knowledge.  They have little discretion to resolve everyday disputes and are not supposed 
to make policy or law.  As I will show in the last section of this chapter where I discuss the 
Affermazione Civile cases in more detail, this is not what happens in actuality.   
Although divided along autonomous career paths, practicing lawyers and magistrates 
share a number of common qualifications for entry into the legal profession, and all must have 
earned a law degree from a recognized Italian university.  To obtain a laurea in giurisprudenza 
(an Italian law degree), a student must spend four years in study at the law faculty of an Italian 
university.  Teaching occurs in large lecture classes, and students are not required to attend 
lectures.  The lecturer usually gives three one-hour lectures in a week and, while he or she may 
be available immediately prior to and after class to assist students with problems, the lecturer is 
usually not available to see students at other times.  Indeed, because many are also leading 
practitioners of law (university teaching does not prohibit the practice of law), the lecturer is 
unlikely to be at the university other than when giving a lecture.  In Italy, the student studies a 
total of twenty-seven subjects, the last of which is a thesis on a legal topic.  After studying each 
subject the student must pass an oral exam, conducted by two to three examiners wherein the 
student is questioned on the subject for ten to fifteen minutes.  The examination, which is based 
on assigned textbooks, is focused primarily on the explanation and organization of definitions 
and concepts.  Italian legal education is not concerned with teaching students critical thinking or 
the techniques for problem-solving; rather, it is about the indoctrination of fundamental concepts 
and principles.   
                                                 
characterize Italian legal science, is rendered even more unreal by the fact that it is produced by persons 
who have no experience in the business of deciding cases.  The scholars having, so to speak, occupied the 
field, the judge, who might be able to supply useful insights into the judicial process, abandons it to them 
on the theory that they are better qualified than he (1967:245). 
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X, a lawyer/professor acquaintance of mine, had recently shared his views over lunch at a 
mutual friend’s home on what he perceived to be the fundamental difference between the 
training of lawyers in Italy and the United States.  According to X, the university system in the 
United States is all about the student.  The student is seen as a paying client the university strives 
to keep satisfied.  By contrast, in Italy, the system centers on the professor.  The students come to 
the professor to learn and, for the most part, occupy a passive role as receptors of knowledge.  
While I was aware of the formal differences in the teaching and training of legal professionals in 
Italy and the United States, the anthropologist in me was interested in experiencing law school in 
Italy.     
My attorney consultant D’s father happened to be a well-known professor at La Sapienza.  
One night while having dinner with D’s parents at their home, D’s father asked me about my 
research project.  He offered to arrange a meeting with Professor B from the law school with 
whom I might be able to connect and whose classes I might be able to observe.  Thereafter, I 
made contact with Professor B and arranged to meet him before his class on Wednesday 
afternoon.  I had a difficult time finding the building.  It was far from the Città Universitaria 
main campus and located in a part of Rome I had never been before.  The building itself turned 
out to be a huge industrial building with high sets of windows that clearly were designed to let 
light in but were far too high to be useful for looking in or viewing the outside world from inside.  
I had to search for the entrance and after I found it, was still uncertain because it resembled the 
entrance to a factory.  I walked through a garage where I encountered a security guard who 
walked past me without seeming to notice and down a ramp to what appeared to be an entrance 
booth.  I asked the man on duty how to get inside and he told me to continue through the garage 
and I would find the entrance on the right.   
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Inside, the classroom was an immense warehouse-like area with lofty ceilings that 
rendered the room even more cavernous, and a rubber floor of the type usually found in garages 
where cars are repaired.  I counted five sets of chair groupings, each 10 chairs deep with 10 
chairs in a row, set in parallel lines.  The chairs were plastic, maroon and white in color, with 
metal legs.  Each had its own “writing” tray, which could be folded neatly away to the side of the 
chair when not needed.  The font, back, and right side walls were painted white and the wall to 
the left of the room was painted maroon, as if there had been an attempt to decorate the room 
through the introduction of an “accent” wall and coordinated seating.  Three massive screens 
hung on the wall facing the seating area.  In front of the screens (also facing the seating area) sat 
a long desk, raised on a platform approximately eight inches above the floor.  Behind the desk 
were two office-type chairs.  A big backboard on a pedestal, longer than the long desk, was 
situated under the middle screen.   
I waited for Professor B to arrive.  The class was scheduled to begin at 4:00 pm.  
Professor B arrived just after 4:10 pm.  I observed that he was likely in his mid-sixties, bald with 
tufts of grayish-white hair on each side above his ears.  He wore a navy suit with a light blue 
shirt and a navy tie.  He walked up to the front of the room and was approached by a couple of 
students who had been lingering near the front of the room, apparently awaiting his arrival.  
Professor B talked with a female student for approximately five minutes and then to a male 
student for another five minutes.  Then, without fanfare, he stepped onto the platform, took a seat 
in one of the office-type chairs behind the long desk, pulled up the microphone and began to 
speak, launching into his prepared lecture.  The lecture was on bioethics and living wills.  
I looked around the room and observed that students were scattered throughout the 
seating area, many apparently preferring to sit in the outer reaches of the seating area.  I counted 
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approximately 30 students, of whom 9 were male and the rest female, ranging in age from 20-
something to possibly 40 years old.  I noticed that, for the most part, the students were sitting and 
listening to the lecture, but not taking a lot of notes.  No one was using a laptop, and the man 
sitting directly behind me was reading what appeared to be a newspaper.  Throughout the lecture, 
students entered and exited the classroom.  Professor B did not seem to notice.  At one point 
there were 60-70 students in the room, some standing in a group at the back, chatting among 
themselves.  At approximately 4:52, a huge pack of students entered the classroom and waited at 
the back.  The lecture concluded a few minutes before 5:00, and the students who were seated 
packed up and exited while the students lingering in the back assumed the vacated seats.  There 
were now approximately 150 students in attendance.   
During the transition, I walked up and introduced myself to Professor B.  We chatted for 
a bit about my project.  He seemed to find it interesting that my project involved law and 
anthropology and explained that, while there are a number of sociologists of law, there are not 
many anthropologists who do legal anthropology in Italy.  He went on to explain that, in his 
view, a lot of law professors in Italy are very narrow-minded in their approach to law, especially 
in the area of family law.  He suggested a couple of scholars in Italy with whom I might want to 
speak about my project, and we discussed meeting up again in the near future for further 
discussion.  I noticed that there were several students lined up behind me waiting to speak with 
Professor B so I thanked him and returned to my seat.   
After speaking with the waiting students, Professor B launched into his second lecture, 
again without fanfare.  He continued to lecture for the next hour about the Italian Civil Code, 
specifically about the “rights of the person.”  I noticed that the vast majority of students had 
brought books with them:  the “Codice Civile” (“Civil Code”) and “Manuale di Diritto Privato” 
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(“Manual of Private Law”).  Also, unlike the students attending the previous lecture, most of the 
students here were taking notes.  At one point during the lecture, Professor B referenced a 
specific provision as the “grand invention in new rights” and the students scrambled to locate 
this provision in their books.  Based on their ostensible eagerness, I assumed that these were 
first-year students.  The lecture finished at 6:03 pm.      
At no time during either lecture did Professor B refer to notes or make use of the 
blackboard and screens available in the classroom.  There was no attempt on his part to 
“entertain” the students with a joke or visual aid.  His demeanor was solemn.  Even more striking 
was the fact that he neither directed questions to the students nor elicited questions from the 
students at any point during either lecture.  In fact, the only interaction he had with the students 
was during the short time period before class and during the transition between lectures, when 
individual students approached to speak with him. 
The inaccessibility of law school professors to their students in Italy seemed odd to me.  
For example, in Professor B’s classes, he neither arrived early nor stayed late to talk with 
students.  The time he spent assisting students with questions or problems actually took time 
away from the lecture.  While the lack of contact between professor and student outside the 
lecture hall was different from my experience in the U.S., the more striking dissimilarity was the 
“lecture” format used in Italian law school classes.  Although law professors in the U.S. do 
lecture at times, most also employ some version of the so-called “Socratic method,” a dialectical 
method of teaching that (broadly conceived) involves the asking and answering of questions to 
stimulate critical thinking and bring ideas to light.126  Of course, in a system where law is taught 
                                                 
126 Perhaps because of its exaggerated portrayal in the 1973 movie The Paper Chase, the use of the Socratic Method 
in U.S. law schools is something that is frequently discussed and serves as a cause of anxiety for many first-year law 
students.  In fact, the method has become so infamous that the University of Chicago School of Law felt compelled 
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as a “legal science” and is based on codes, there is no real need for the so-called Socratic 
method.  One would not expect, for example, a physics class to be taught by Socratic method.  
The lecture method of instruction thus trains legal professionals to approach law as something to 
be mastered rather than as a tool for advocacy.  
Due in large part to the lack of professor-student contact, the Italian system forces the 
student to be self-reliant (this is one of its advantages).  In addition, oral exams require the 
student to acquire a level of verbal fluency in discussing complex concepts and principles 
(another advantage).  One of the principal disadvantages of the Italian system, however, is the 
fact that the learning process is mainly passive, with an emphasis on memorization that leaves 
little space for individual thinking.  Further, other than the thesis project, which is written under 
the supervision of a professor or professorial assistant, the student receives little training in the 
area of legal research.    
                                                 
to offer the following explanation/disclaimer of the Socratic Method on its website providing information for 
“Prospective Students”:  
 
Socrates (470-399 BC) was a Greek philosopher who, despite being considered one of the greatest and 
most important philosophers who ever lived, left no writings at all.  Much of what we know about his life 
and work comes from the writings of his disciples, Xenophon and Plato. …  Socrates engaged in 
questioning of his students in an unending search for truth. He sought to get to the foundations of his 
students' and colleagues' views by asking continual questions until a contradiction was exposed, thus 
proving the fallacy of the initial assumption. This became known as the Socratic Method, and may be 
Socrates' most enduring contribution to philosophy.  
 
Perhaps because of its over-the-top portrayal in the 1973 movie The Paper Chase, the very mention of the 
Socratic Method strikes fear in the hearts of those considering attending law school. John Houseman may 
have won an Oscar for his impressive performance, but if anyone ever did teach a law school class like his 
Professor Kingsfield, no one at Chicago does today. Instead, our students discover quickly that the Socratic 
Method is a tool and a good one at that used to engage a large group of students in a discussion, while using 
probing questions to get at the heart of the subject matter. The Socratic Method is not used at Chicago to 
intimidate, nor to "break down" new law students, but instead for the very reason Socrates developed it: to 
develop critical thinking skills in students and enable them to approach the law as intellectuals.   
 
See University of Chicago Law School Website, Prospective Students, Studying Law at Chicago, The Socratic 
Method, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/prospectives/lifeofthemind/socraticmethod, accessed July 1, 2013. 
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For all of the above reasons, legal education in Italy is not likely to produce judges who 
are activist in orientation.  In other words, legal education does not explain the relatively recent 
emergence of judicial activism in Italy.  In addition, recent activism such as that seen in the 
Affermazione Civile cases cannot be explained by judicial selection processes.  The selection of 
judges in Italy is not by political process as it is in some parts of the world such as the U.S., 
where most judges are elected or selected by a form of political appointment (and are thus more 
likely to be beholden to political forces).   
The Selection of Judges in Italy 
Selection to the magistracy is based solely on a competitive public examination taken 
upon completion of the laurea in giurisprudenza.127  To ensure that clientelism does not play a 
role in the selection of judges, Article 106 of the Constitution requires that “judges are appointed 
by means of competitive examinations,” and that all employment decisions, including 
assignments, promotions, and disciplinary actions, are the responsibility of the Consiglio 
Superiore della Magistratura (Superior Council of the Magistrature, or “CSM”).128  The written 
part of the exam is marked anonymously.  No consideration is given to recommendations, which 
                                                 
127 A noteworthy factor in the selection process is who chooses to take the examination.  Until 1963, women were 
prohibited from all public civil service positions but since then their participation in the magistracy has consistently 
increased.  In 1987, more women than men sat for the examination and, since this time, about half of the new 
magistrates have been women.  By 1999, approximately one-third of the magistracy consisted of women, and 85% 
of them were under the age of forty-five.  In 1997, Massimo Morisi, a professor of Administrative Science in Italy, 
conducted a study of the magistracy to determine why people entered the Italian judiciary and how they viewed their 
positions.  Morisi sent questionnaires to all of the (at that time) approximately 8,500 magistrates, and received 
responses from 893, or 10.5%.  While self-selection arguably skewed the resulting sample, Morisi’s study portrayed 
a magistracy that is committed to its work and peopled by those who chose the career for altruistic reasons (i.e., “to 
serve the state” – 42.7% cited this as a major factor and another 41.8% cited it as a factor, and “to serve the 
collective” – 70.2% cited this as a major consideration for entering the magistracy and another 18.5% cited it as a 
consideration).    
 
128 The CSM was prescribed by the Italian Constitution of 1948 in order to ensure total independence of the Italian 
judiciary, and as a response to the abuses of power and derogation of citizen rights that occurred during the Fascist 
period.   
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in Italy are seen as politically motivated and all too frequently used for political patronage.  
These factors create a situation where the professional socialization of judges is left almost 
entirely to the law faculties: 
Law students enter the university directly from the equivalent of an American high 
school, but study only within a single discipline.  At the conclusion of approximately four 
years of study, a thesis is written and defended.  Law faculty curricula are strictly 
juridical, focusing on law and legal theory without any significant presence of attendant 
disciplines, such as economics, political science, or sociology that might inform a judge’s 
decision.  There is, moreover, no attention to philosophy or ethics in Italian legal studies.  
Thus, a new judge or prosecutor would enter the magistrature around age twenty-three to 
twenty-five, with no practical experience or training, and receive his or her entire 
professional socialization from within the established ranks of the judiciary (Volcansek 
2006:163). 
 Another interesting aspect to the selection of judges in Italy is the fact that, once admitted 
to the magistracy, promotion is not based on worthy performance.  Instead, it is based primarily 
on seniority, defined as time in career and grade.  A new magistrate beginning a career in his or 
her mid-twenties can therefore expect to steadily advance and eventually reach the highest level 
(at least in terms of remuneration) without ever being subjected to any form of positive selection, 
and a forty- to forty-five year career is practically guaranteed.  By placing such substantial 
emphasis on seniority, the system discourages further professional development.  After being 
selected to the magistracy, there is little incentive to distinguish oneself.  In comparison to their 
common law system counterparts (who are recruited from the ranks of distinguished, 
experienced, and mature practicing lawyers and tend to begin the occupation of judging toward 
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the end of their careers), “Roman law magistrates tend to have the mentality of civil servants, 
rather than that of superintendent over government” (Holland 1991:8). 
Arguably, given the de-politicization of the process, the way that judges are selected in 
Italy should further discourage judicial activism.  However, the selection process has to be 
considered in conjunction with the extraordinary structural independence Italian judges enjoy.  
Judges in Italy are public officials, meaning that they exercise one of the sovereign powers of the 
state.  The judiciary is given special constitutional protection from the other branches of 
government and, once appointed, judges serve for life.  Article 101 of the Constitution states that 
“judges are subject only to the law” and in Article 104 the Constitution declares that “the 
judiciary is an order that is autonomous and independent of all other powers.”  They can only be 
removed pursuant to special disciplinary proceedings conducted before the CSM.  Because the 
CSM has total responsibility for the appointment, discipline, and administration of magistrates, 
the Italian judiciary is guaranteed independence from outside forces.  
In the Italian political system there is no provision of institutional checks and balances 
between the judiciary and other branches of government.  Because there is no formal mechanism 
for balancing the power of the judiciary, there is in theory no limitation set on a magistrate’s 
prerogatives by other governmental powers (Zannotti 1995:200; see also Guarnieri 1995:247).  
Italy’s judges thus enjoy both internal and external independence and are arguably the most 
independent of any liberal-democratic nation.  The internal and external independence of judges 
in Italy creates a situation that encourages judicial activism: 
[Italian judges] recruit themselves (through bureaucratic exams); they determine their 
[own] career pattern, through the Higher Council of the Judiciary and they are 
irremovable.  The minister of justice has no chance of influencing their performance, 
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even in an indirect way.  They have a monopoly of prosecution and through it they 
determine criminal policies, with no control exercised by the executive.  The judges 
determine the inputs of the constitutional review of laws to the Constitutional Court.  …  
With these structural features, how is it possible to imagine self-restraint on the part of 
the Italian judiciary that places limitations on its creative activity as policy maker?  
(Zannotti 1995:201). 
Despite the fact that the Italian judiciary is selected through apolitical process and enjoys 
a high degree of structural independence it still tends to act according to a logic that is heavily 
influenced by the political milieu.  This is due in part to the fact that the bureaucratic mode of 
selection and lack of controls exercised by the judicial hierarchy do not foster the development 
of professional competence and values by Italian judges (Di Federico 1981).  Instead, these 
factors encourage judges to affiliate with factionalized unions (within the organized 
magistrature) that reflect varying political and judicial ideologies.  Divided along political lines 
and lacking a strong commitment to a professional culture, various interactions with politicians 
are tolerated and Italian judges are susceptible to influence from the value systems of outside 
groups (Della Porta 2001; see also Morisi 1999).   
All of these factors lead to a situation that encourages judicial activism.  Indeed, as seen 
in the context of the Affermazione Civile campaign, judicial activism is alive and well in Italy.  In 
fact, the phenomenon is so prevalent that it is plausible to speak of the “judicialization” of Italian 
politics.  Before I get to this, however, I need to explain what judicial activism is, and what I 
mean when I talk about politics becoming "judicialized." 
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Judicial Activism and the Judicialization of Politics in General 
Kenneth Holland, a U.S. political scientist whose research has focused on judicial 
process, notes that judicial activism occurs when judges go beyond the adjudication of legal 
conflicts in the case at hand and begin to make social policy, thereby affecting many more 
people and interests beyond the dispute being decided (1991).   According to this view, “[t]he 
activism of a court … can be measured by the degree of power that it exercises over citizens, the 
legislature, and the administration” (Holland 1991:1).  While I like much about Holland’s 
definition of judicial activism, I would be remiss if I did not note that Holland’s definition is but 
one among several.  “Judicial activism,” much like beauty, is somewhat “in the eye of the 
beholder” and has been defined in a number of dissimilar and even conflicting ways.129  
Nevertheless, I choose to adopt Holland’s definition because it is fairly straightforward and 
relatively easy to apply in the Italian and other civil law contexts.  This is because it is a 
definition that focuses on judicial outcomes, something that is more easily discerned than judicial 
motivations.  Judicial activism does not have to be inherently good or bad; it can be useful to 
describe a certain type of judicial activity and points to essential questions about the role of the 
judiciary in a democratic order, which is what I am exploring here.     
                                                 
129   Instead of cataloging all of the possible definitions, I will (paraphrasing Yung 2011) list the essential elements 
that, according to the scholarship in this area, have been held to be indicative of judicial activism:  striking down the 
actions of other federal branches or state governments, ignoring textual meaning, failing to follow tradition or 
history, issuing expansive (rather than tailored) holdings, using broad remedial powers, deciding cases based on 
partisan politics, failing to adopt an “originalist” view of the Constitution (the degree to which constitutional 
provisions are interpreted in ways that are clearly contrary to the language used or the intentions of their drafters), 
failing to follow precedent, exercising a power beyond the court’s competence, creating new rights or theories, 
altering established doctrines or interpretations, making substantive policy, failing to use accepted interpretive 
methodology; and the degree to which a judicial decision supersedes consideration of the same problems by other 
(usually duly elected) political actors (Yung 2011:10; see also Lindquist and Cross 2009; Cross and Lindquist 2007; 
Green 2009; Marshall 2002; Young 2002; Kmiec 2004; Cannon 1983).   
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By judicialization, I here mean that the courts are politically relevant or, in other words, 
that the courts are performing a political role or doing something that one might expect the 
legislature or executive to do.  In general, “to judicialize” means “to convert or integrate into a 
judicial system; to bring under the remit of the law.”130  To “judicialize” is thus “to treat 
judicially,” and “judicially” means “in the way of legal judgment, or in the office or capacity of 
judge; in, by, or in relation to, the administration of justice; by legal process; by sentence of a 
court or justice,” or in “the manner of a judge; with judicial knowledge and skill.”131  The 
judicialization of politics simply means that the domain of the judiciary has or is expanding at 
the expense of politicians, political appointees, and civil servants, and that there has been a 
transfer of decision-making power from the legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the 
judiciary (Vallinder 1995:13).  It is “the process by which courts and judges come to make or 
increasingly to dominate the making of public policies that had previously been made (or, it is 
widely believed, ought to be made) by other governmental agencies, especially legislatures and 
executives” (Tate 1995:28).      
Several conditions facilitate the expansion of judicial power, many of which appear to be 
present in Italy, including:  the existence of democracy; a system that evokes the notion of 
separation of powers; the presence of a “politics of rights” (an acceptance of the principle that 
individuals or minorities have rights that can be enforced against the alleged majority); interest 
group use of the courts (this is something that seems to be just now occurring in Italy, in the 
context of the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples and the Affermazione 
                                                 
130 Wiktionary, “Judicialize,” http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/judicialize, accessed February 28, 2014. 
 
131 Oxford English Dictionary.  1989.  2nd ed.  Prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, Vol. 8, p. 297.   
Oxford:  Clarendon Press. 
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Civile project); opposition use of the courts (as in use by the political opposition to obstruct the 
functioning of the government); ineffective majoritarian institutions (definitely present in Italy); 
perceptions of the policy-making institutions as self-serving, halted, ineffective, or corrupt 
(definitely present, especially in the context of the struggle over rights for same-sex couples); 
and willful delegation by majoritarian institutions (that is, the deliberate transfer of controversial 
policy decisions to the courts to avoid political fall-out) (Tate 1995:28-33).  Of course, the 
presence of these conditions does not guarantee the judicialization of politics and judicialization 
is unlikely to occur absent the presence of judges with the suitable personal attitudes and policy 
preferences and values (Tate 1995).  For the judicialization of politics to occur judges must 
decide that they should participate in making policy decisions that could be made by the 
legislature or executive and (at least on occasion) be willing to replace policy solutions rendered 
by the legislature or executive with their own. Thus, while certain structural features of the 
Italian system noted above make judicial activism possible, the structure itself does not explain 
why judges in Italy have suddenly decided to advance the recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples in Italy.     
The concept of judicialization can be best explained by reference to two decision-making 
models, each of which exemplifies a different principle and corresponding role, and both of 
which are essential to the functioning of a democratic state (Vallinder 1995:14).  The first model 
emphasizes the role of reason and of principle in decision-making processes and is typically 
associated with the courts.  Following this model, it is up to the courts to protect the fundamental 
rights of citizens.  By contrast, the model typically associated with the legislature or executive 
highlights the appraisal of conflicting values (Wechsler 1959-1960:16).  In this vein, the 
legislature is responsible for taking care of the rights and duties of the majority.  The 
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judicialization of politics signifies the prioritization of the first principle at the expense of the 
second.   
In the past, Italy has subscribed to the second model and, for the most part, the political 
class continues to follow this model.  This can be seen in political debates surrounding marriage 
and family where Catholic social values compete with secular notions of rights.  In the interim, 
the EU has continued to develop as a protector of rights and this has direct bearing on the 
member states.  In Italy, where the legislature and executive have failed to live up to EU 
standards, the courts have been encouraged to step in and fill the void.  As I stated in the 
introduction to this chapter, judicial activism in Italy is largely a response to the failure of the 
legislative and executive to adapt to changing social conditions and is encouraged by the 
influence of the EU law on the national legal system.    
Italian Judicial Activism 
 The term “activismo” began appearing in relation to the Italian judiciary a little over 25 
years ago.  As is the case elsewhere, the term when used in reference to Italian courts lacks a 
coherent definition, although its connotation is usually pejorative in Italy.132  In general, judicial 
activism in Italy is tied to policy-making by the judiciary through processes of judicial review or 
interpretation (Volacansek 1991).  As set forth above, the postwar constitution resulted in an 
independent self-governed judiciary, in part through the creation of the CSM, which oversees the 
                                                 
132 In these cases, however, the public expression of displeasure appears to be more about judicial abuses of power 
and more specifically, abuses of power on the part of public prosecutors, than a critique of judicial activism per se.  
Few, if any, scholarly studies have dealt with the subject of judicial activism in Italy outside the criminal justice 
system.  The situation I describe here enables one to approach the subject of Italian judicial activism from outside 
the criminal justice system and from the broader perspective of the relationship between the EU and Italy, without 
sacrificing appreciation for the internal workings of the Italian political and legal systems.     
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recruitment, transfers, promotions, and discipline of Italian judges.  The insularity and 
independence of the Italian judiciary has encouraged judges to render fresh interpretations of the 
laws in order to remedy perceived problems or to realize personal ideals of the proper political 
order (Volcansek 1991).  The significance of this independence and insularity cannot be 
overemphasized.   
Many Italian judges see themselves as part of a larger civic mission with a responsibility 
to the citizenry (as opposed to aligned with the State) (Della Porta 2001).  To this end, judges 
more readily seek to assert the principle of “equity” and take account of their own moral 
convictions and collective consequences in decision-making.133  This professional culture 
encourages “role substitution”:  “Especially when the political class appears to have failed, many 
of the judges tend to perceive themselves as the last line of defence for the community …” 
(Della Porta 2001:16).   
In the Affermazione Civile cases discussed in Chapter 2, the Italian courts are using 
provisions of EU and European law as a starting point to advance the recognition of rights for 
same-sex couples in Italy.  In the process of recognizing rights for same-sex couples, the Italian 
courts are creating new policy in an area of law where Italian politicians have deliberately failed 
to act.  As observed by the ILGA-Europe:   
Positive developments in Italy result mainly from court decisions rather than legislative  
initiatives, in large part because of unwillingness from the political class to respond to  
calls from the LGBTI community to open the discussion around marriage equality or 
other rights (ILGA-Europe Annual Review 2013 on Italy).  
                                                 
133  "In its broadest and most general signification, this term denotes the spirit and the habit of fairness, justness, and 
right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men"  Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Law 
Dictionary, 2nd ed., http://thelawdictionary.org/equity/#ixzz2qE3EARrx. 
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This occurs within a nation-state that continues to face a crisis of legitimation and where, as 
shown in Chapter 3, politicians on the right frequently invoke notions of the "traditional" family 
to bolster a sense of Italian national identity based on Catholic social values.  By contrast, the 
Italian courts are looking to the EU, and in the process, increasing Italian support for a more 
integrated "Kantian" version of the EU through the delineation of an EU citizenship.  In the 
struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples, the increased political significance of 
judicial activity in Italy must be understood in the context of profound transformations of the 
citizen-state relationship (Pederzoli and Guarnieri 1997a), which occur in the face of an 
emergent supranational entity that serves to disentangle this relationship and provides new 
opportunities for the assertion of rights.   
 Italy’s status as a member of the EU renders the Italian judiciary disposed to extra-
political influences beyond the nation-state.   Due to its membership in the EU, Italian 
hierarchical legal sources have been modified, repositioning the Italian judiciary in a wider EU 
context that locates EU law at the national constitutional level.  Marinella Marmo, a Lecturer at 
Flinders University School of Law, argues that, by granting EU law constitutional effect, the 
Italian legal system has created a situation whereby EU law is not subject to Italian legislation.  
The result is that in certain areas the sovereignty of the Italian nation-state is effectively 
subrogated to the EU.  The implementation of EU provisions requires their harmonization with 
the Italian legal system, and the setting aside or elimination of conflicting provisions of domestic 
law is left to Italian judges who are duty bound to interpret Italian law in accordance with EU 
provisions.  Marmo explains that the Italian judiciary plays an increasingly important role in 
politics due to its responsibilities for integrating new legislation at both the national and 
supranational (i.e., “EU”) levels into a coherent whole.  She states: 
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 The consequence of such activism is that judges are no longer fulfilling a mere 
interpretative role within the law, but are examining a more dynamic system and are 
choosing and selecting sources and instruments with which to pilot the system in 
directions not necessarily in line with the national legislative intention. …  In pursuing 
different aims and in selecting means and sources, Italian senior judges are shaping 
internal policy and introducing relevant changes (2007:115). 
As I will show in the last section of this chapter, the Italian courts have consistently used 
EU law when relevant to advance the recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  Although not a 
foregone conclusion, this is not particularly surprising given the fact that the implementation of 
EU law requires a harmonization with the Italian legal system that in situations of conflict leads 
to the subrogation of Italian laws.  What is unexpected is not only the general direction the courts 
seem to be taking in those cases where EU law does not specifically apply, but also the relative 
speed and force with which such decisions are being rendered by the Italian courts.  In what 
follows, I will discuss the aspects of these cases that demonstrate judicial activism and explain 
how the Affermazione Civile cases, considered in aggregate, reveal the increasing judicialization 
of politics in Italy.   
The Affermazione Civile Project and the Judicialization of Italian Politics 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, over the past few years, several domestic courts, including the 
Italian Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) and Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione), 
have issued historic decisions recognizing limited but expanding rights on behalf of same-sex 
couples.  In the first of the Affermazione Civile cases, Italy's Constitutional Court upheld the 
existing ban in the Italian Civil Code against same-sex marriages, finding that the constitutional 
definition of marriage neither imposes nor opposes the introduction of a law providing for same-
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sex marriage.134  Although the decision was controversial and confusing in parts, the Court made 
several important statements regarding the constitutional status of same-sex couples in Italy.  For 
the first time, an Italian court recognized that same-sex relationships fall within the "social 
groups where humanity is expressed" mentioned in Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, thereby 
entitling such couples to some form of legal recognition.135  The Court was not willing, however, 
to take the next step and judicially create a legal status.  Instead, the Court indicated that it was 
up to the Parliament to enact legislation introducing some form of legal recognition for same-sex 
relationships, and that the Parliament should take action to guarantee same-sex couples the 
enjoyment of their constitutional rights.136   
 It is important to note that the Italian Constitutional Court looked to European policy and 
jurisprudence in reaching its decision, most notably to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  At the time of the Italian Constitutional Court's decision, Mata Estevez v. Spain 
(ECtHR No. 56501/00 May 2001), was the leading ECtHR case on the issue.137   In Mata 
Estevez, a Spanish man whose same-sex partner of more than 10 years died in a road accident, 
was denied a surviving spouse pension and filed a case.  The ECtHR declared the complainant's 
                                                 
134 Decision No. 138/2010, decided April 15, 2010. 
 
135 Translated into English, Article 2 of the Italian Constitution provides:  "The Republic recognizes and guarantees 
the inviolable rights of man, as an individual, and in the social groups where he expresses his personality, and 
demands the fulfilment of the intransgressible duties of political, economic, and social solidarity" (emphasis added). 
 
136  This type of decision constitutes a "monito,” or warning, where the Constitutional Court does not declare a 
provision unconstitutional but "warns" the Parliament that legislative reform is necessary to cure the 
unconstitutionality of a provision.  This is not something that is not done in U.S. courts, but is commonly used by 
the Italian Constitutional Court to signal to the Italian Parliament that it needs to take action or the Court will step in 
and act instead. 
    
137  The Italian court reached its decision two months before the ECtHR decision in Schalk and Kopf, which will be 
discussed in more detail below and again in Chapter 6. 
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case inadmissible.  Although the court recognized that a same-sex relationship related to a 
person's "private life," the ECtHR found that the Spanish authorities' refusal to pay the 
complainant a survivor pension did not violate his right to a private life and was, therefore, not 
discriminatory.  The ECtHR relied on consensus analysis to validate its position that same-sex 
relationships do not constitute a form of "family life" cognizable under the European Convention 
on Human Rights.   
 The second Affermazione Civile case of import was the February 2012 decision by a court 
of first instance in Reggio Emilia, which recognized the right of an Italian citizen's Uruguayan 
same-sex husband to live in Italy as a "family member" of an EU citizen entitled to certain rights 
under EU law.  As noted in Chapter 2, this was the first time an Italian court recognized a right to 
family reunification on behalf of a same-sex spouse.  In the case, the lower court relied on EU 
law to overturn the action of the Italian state in denying a residence permit to the Uruguayan 
husband of an Italian citizen of the same-sex. 138  In prioritizing EU law over Italian law, the 
court demonstrated a willingness to act in a political manner at the expense of the nation-state.   
 A month after the Reggio Emilia decision, in March 2012, the Court of Cassation 
delivered a judgment in the case of an Italian same-sex couple who had married in the 
Netherlands and were subsequently denied transcription of their marriage into the local Public 
Registry by municipal authorities in Italy. 139  Although the Court affirmed the refusal on the part 
of the Italian authorities to allow the applicants to register their marriage in Italy, it was 
compelled to correct the legal justification for the refusal put forward by the courts of first and 
                                                 
138   In reaching its decision, the court relied specifically on the EU's freedom of movement directive (Directive 
2004/38/EC).  I discuss the EU's free movement provisions at length in Chapter 5. 
 
139  Court of Cassation, I Civ. Sect., Judgment no. 4184/2012. 
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second instance.  The Court of Cassation stated that it is not the "inexistence" of a same-sex 
marriage (caused by the lack of a necessary requirement of the difference of sex between the two 
partners) that enables the refusal, but rather the inability of a same-sex marriage to produce legal 
effect in Italy under existing legislation.  In doing this, the Court overruled previous Italian 
jurisprudence that considered the heterogeneity of the partners as a necessary condition of 
marriage.   
 More surprisingly, however, was the Court's further statement that, although a same-sex 
couple married abroad could not be considered "married"  under Italian law, the couple did have 
the right to "a family life" and, in certain circumstances to be treated the same as married couples 
under Italian law.  Here, the Court of Cassation created a new category in the recognition of 
foreign legal acts regarding family status.  In addition, the Court went on to state that it will serve 
as the guarantor of these rights in the absence of the Italian Parliament to recognize such rights.  
In articulating its argument, the Court of Cassation mobilized European law in significant 
ways, making extensive references to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), and to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  I will discuss this in detail in Chapter 6 where I take up 
the subject of the European Courts and their role in advancing recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples.  Although the Court of Cassation was ultimately unwilling to change the laws governing 
marriage in Italy, it did indicate its readiness to ensure that similarly-situated individuals are 
treated fairly in terms of benefits and rights under the law, and promised to do so in the case of 
Parliamentary inaction. The decision was clearly an indication of the willingness on the part of 
the judiciary to move toward further recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy in the 
absence of political action on the part of the Italian Parliament.   
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, in a subsequent case also initiated as part of the Affermazione 
Civile campaign, the Court of Appeal for Milan cited both the Court of Cassation case and the 
2010 judgment of the Constitutional Court for the proposition that the court will guarantee 
certain rights for same-sex couples, treating them in certain circumstances as married couples.  
The Court of Appeal for Milan then found that the cohabitating same-sex partner of a beneficiary 
of a mutual fund could not be denied benefits.  Significantly, this case did not involve the EU 
free movement provisions or EU law; rather, it involved an issue that was within the competence 
of the nation-state.  It is also important to note that the Court cited the decisions of the Italian 
Constitutional Court and Court of Cassation in support of its conclusion that, in this case, the 
couple had the right to be treated the same as a couple legally married under Italian law.   
 What the Italian courts are ultimately doing in recognizing the “constitutional dignity” of 
same-sex partnerships, asserting that such couples have the right to be treated as “married” 
couples in certain circumstances, urging the Parliament to take action, and stating that they will 
serve as the guarantor of rights in the absence of action on the part of Italian politicians to 
recognize such rights, goes well-beyond the simple prioritization and interpretation of EU law. 
Through the Affermazione Civile cases, the Italian courts are demonstrating boldness in the face 
of the legislature's unwillingness to take action.  These cases point to an acceleration of judicial 
activism and demonstrate the ways in which the EU is influencing the judicial making of public 
policy in Italy.  In the Affermazione Civile cases, the Italian courts are taking advantage of the 
limited tools they have at their disposal (most notably, the EU free movement provisions) to 
initiate an advancement in the recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy. The Italian 
courts are conspicuously changing public policy with respect to the treatment of same-sex 
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couples. The activity of the Italian courts follows the idiom: “Give an inch, take a mile.”  The 
EU creates an opening and the Italian courts are taking full advantage of this opportunity.   
In the process of using EU law to advance recognition of rights for same-sex couples, 
Italian courts also simultaneously reinforce a transnational European citizenship based on a 
secular notion of rights.  In doing so, they bolster the "Kantian" vision of the EU.  Such changes, 
however, occur at the expense of the nation-state, which finds itself confronting an increasingly 
powerful supranational context.  The judicial activism present in the Affermazione Civile cases 
arises from the activities of Italian citizen activists, not from the state or judicial system as in 
previously referenced studies.  Here, social actors in Italy ultimately make use of EU law in an 
attempt to gain recognition of rights denied by elected officials in Italy and, as a by-product, 
resituate Italian identity within a larger EU identity.  Through the lens of the Affermazione Civile 
project, it is possible to trace the effects of increased judicial activism in Italian society and shed 
light on how the Italian legal and political systems (and ultimately, Italian culture) are being 
incrementally transformed through such processes.   
In the following chapter, I turn my attention to Europe and the EU.  Although the EU and 
Europe are frequently conflated, there are differences, and a more complete understanding of the 
struggle over rights for same-sex couples in Italy necessitates an appreciation of these 
differences.  When LGBTI activists in Italy invoke "Europe," they are, for the most part, 
appealing to a "Kantian" vision of the EU as a progressive defender of human rights based on 
secular notions of justice.  The same is true of the Italian courts, albeit to a lesser extent.  In both 
cases, "Europe" is frequently (over-)infused with meaning, and used as a trope to support taking 
action at the expense of the nation-state.   
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Figure 
Figure 8.  Structure of the Italian Judiciary.  Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judiciary_of_Italy. 
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Chapter 5:  The EU and Italy:  Living Outside Imagined Borders 
In the foregoing chapters, I have often referred to Europe and the European Union (EU) 
as if they are self-evident entities.  They are not.  Because the struggle for recognition of rights 
for same-sex couples in Italy occurs in the larger context of the relationship between Italy and 
the EU, in order to better understand the circumstances in which the Italian struggle transpires, 
one must know about the EU’s position(s) and undertakings with respect to rights for same-sex 
couples.  For this reason, I now move away from Italy to take a closer look at the EU.  In this 
chapter, I deal with the EU as a conception, set of institutions, and arrangement of expectations, 
focusing specifically on the governing bodies, associations, laws, and ideas that influence or 
directly affect the struggle for recognition of same-sex unions in Italy.  One of the points I make 
in this chapter is that, while Italy is very much a part of the EU, it is simultaneously 
conceptualized by Italian LGBTI activists as "outside" the EU.  I explore this paradox and what 
it means in terms of the struggle over rights for same-sex couples.  
While some of the information I provide in this chapter may read as descriptive “meta” 
data, the material is necessary to ground the central thesis of this dissertation.  As stated, the 
argument that I make is that advancement in the recognition of rights on behalf of same-sex 
couples in Italy is a consequence of the influence of the EU on the Italian nation-state in general 
and the Italian judiciary in particular.  This carries implications for the nation-state and its 
subparts, especially for Italian lawmakers and the national judicial system, and speaks to the 
changing role of the nation-state in the face of an emergent supranational entity.  Although it has 
not become irrelevant, one can see the decreasing importance of the nation-state through the lens 
of LGBTI activists’ struggle for recognition of rights in Italy.  For the most part, in the specific 
case of the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, the EU’s influence is 
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neither direct nor intentional.  It occurs as a by-product of larger processes of personal, political, 
national, and supranational identification.  In order to better understand how EU identity 
formation comes about in the context of the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples in Italy, it is necessary to first tease out relationships between Italy and the EU in this 
domain.   
In what follows, I show how the EU structures and inspires LGBTI activism in Italy.  I 
also point out particularities inherent in the Italian nation-state that render it especially 
susceptible to EU influence.  I begin this chapter with a discussion of what Europe and the EU 
are (and are not), and identify the various institutions within the EU that have been active in 
promoting rights for same-sex couples in the EU member states.  Two institutions in particular 
have played an important role in the advancement of rights for same-sex couples and warrant 
special consideration:  the Council of Europe (mostly through the work of the European Court of 
Human Rights [ECtHR] and the European Court of Justice [ECJ]).  Because of the direct 
influence these institutions have had on the Italian courts in recognizing rights on behalf of 
same-sex couples, I have devoted a separate chapter to their discussion.   
As mentioned in the introduction, I first became acquainted with LGBTI activism at the 
European level through my involvement with ILGA-Europe at their Annual Conference held in 
Turin October 27-30, 2011.  ILGA-Europe is the European Region of the International Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association, a non-governmental umbrella organization 
comprised of approximately 408 organizations from 45 of the 49 countries in Europe.140  
                                                 
140 The following is a list of Italian LBGTI organizations that are part of ILGA-Europe:  Arcigay; Arcigay Catania; 
Arcigay Frida Byron Ravenna; Arcigay Gioconda Reggio Emilia; Arcigay il Cassero;  Arcigay La Giraffa; Arcigay 
Piacenza;  Arcigay Pisa; Arcigay Roma Gruppo Ora; ArciLesbica; ArciLesbica Bologna; Associazione Genitori di 
Omosessuali AGEDO; Associazione InformaGay; Associazione Omosessuale Articolo 3 di Palermo; Associazione 
Radicale Certi Diritti; Centro Risorse LGBT; CUBE – Centro Universitario Bolognese di  Etnosemiotica; Circolo di 
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Established as a separate region of the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) and an 
independent legal entity in 1996, ILGA-Europe’s mission has been to work for equality and 
human rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and intersex people at the European level 
before entities such as the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).141  ILGA-Europe works closely with European institutions 
and engages in strategic litigation efforts before the ECJ and ECtHR.  Some of its other activities 
include providing training events and support to its member organizations and other LGBTI 
groups on lobbying, advocacy, fundraising, litigation, organizational development, and 
communications.  ILGA-Europe enjoys both participative status at the Council of Europe (since 
1997) and consultative status at the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC) (since 2006).  Much of its work is done in cooperation with national and regional 
LGBTI organizations throughout Europe. 
Certi Diritti is one of the non-governmental organizations that is part of ILGA-Europe.  
In fact, Certi Diritti has worked to strengthen its ties to ILGA-Europe since the ILGA-Europe 
Annual Conference held in Turin in 2011.  In October 2013, Yuri Guiana, the current Secretary 
for Certi Diritti, was elected to the board of ILGA-Europe.  In his election bid, Guiana was 
supported by several Italian LGBTI associations in Italy in addition to Certi Diritti.  At the 
                                                 
Cultura Omosessuale Mario Mieli; Circomassimo – Associazione gay e lesbica; Comitato Provinciale Arcigay di 
Rimini "Alan Mathison Turing"; Comitato Provinciale Arcigay Bergamo Cives; Comitato Provinciale Arcigay CIG 
– Milano; Comitato Provinciale Matthew Shepard – Arcigay Modena; Coordinamento Torino Pride GLBT; Di'Gay 
Project: Famiglie Arcobaleno; Fondazione FUORI; Ireos – Centro Servizi Autogestito Comunita Queer; Lambda; 
Omphalos Gay and Lesbian Life; and Rete Genitori Rainbow. 
141 ILGA was founded in 1978, with the goal of working for the equality of gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals around 
the world.  The mandate was later expanded to include transgender and intersex people.  ILGA maintains an office 
in Brussels, Belgium. 
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present moment, Certi Diritti is working to formulate a strategic Roadmap for Italy in 
conjunction with ILGA-Europe. 
In its 2012 report on the status of LGBTI rights in Europe, ILGA-Europe notes that 
achieving family recognition is a primary concern of LGBTI communities in Europe.  For this 
reason, one of ILGA-Europe's Strategic Objectives for 2011-2013 was to work for full equality 
in particular relation to the family.  In order to secure equal and social recognition for the 
diversity of LGBTI families and family relations, ILGA-Europe adopted several strategies, 
including engagement with the European courts through strategic litigation, supporting national 
LGBTI organizations working to increase legal recognition of partnerships and parental rights at 
the national level, working to improve the application of the EU freedom of movement laws and 
the recognition of family relationships in national legal contexts, and working to achieve explicit 
inclusion of matters of importance to LGBTI families in the areas within EU competence (for 
example, cross-border social security schemes and freedom of movement).142       
The demand for recognition of same-sex partnerships has extended southward and 
eastward and family issues have become a visible symbol of struggle for equal rights.  In recent 
years there have been many positive developments.143  However, not all recent developments 
                                                 
142  See "Standing Stronger.  Building on Achievements.  Progressing towards Equality."  ILGA-Europe Strategic 
Plan 2011-2013. 
 
143  For example, the positive developments noted by ILGA-Europe in 2012 included:  "(i) Denmark’s introduction 
of gender neutral marriages; (ii) the Spanish Constitutional Court’s affirmation that the marriage equality law 
introduced in 2005 is constitutional; (iii) the introduction of marriage equality bills in the Parliaments of France, 
Finland, the United Kingdom and Scotland; (iv) the tabling of bills in the Belgian and Dutch Parliaments providing 
the non-biological co-mother in a lesbian couple with automatic legal parent recognition, and the discussion of the 
issue in Sweden; (v) continued progress towards the adoption of the marriage equality bill in Luxembourg; (vi) 
Ireland’s opening of a Constitutional Convention aimed at discussing key chapters in the Constitution that may need 
to be revised prior to allow for the opening up of marriage to same-sex partners in the country; (vii) Switzerland’s 
Council of State’s approval of a motion opening the right to adoption by same-sex partners; (viii) German Courts’ 
narrowing down of differences between same-sex registered partnerships and heterosexual marriages; and (ix) a 
growing political support towards the legal recognition of same-sex partners in Croatia, Estonia, Italy, Malta and 
Montenegro" ( ILGA-Europe Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
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have been so positive.  For example, a new Family Code in Slovenia that could have provided 
greater recognition of same-sex couples and their children was rejected in a popular referendum.  
In Hungary, the Family Protection Act entered into force, weakening the legal status of same-sex 
couples, and the Parliament in Portugal rejected proposals to grant access to medically-assisted 
reproduction and adoption entitlements to same-sex couples.  In most of Europe, the rights of 
LGBTI persons to sexual and reproductive health remain generally disregarded or actively 
restricted by national laws. And while the EU has stepped in on certain matters such as the 
Employment Directive mentioned below, with respect to issues like recognition for same-sex 
couples, the EU has indicated an unwillingness to involve itself in what it deems to be an area of 
family law that falls under the domain of the member states.  In order to better understand the 
quagmire of LGBTI activism and recognition of rights that exists now in Europe (and where 
Italy fits in) it is necessary to know something about the differences between Europe and the EU, 
as well as the legal frameworks of each.  In the following section, I seek to clarify what the EU is 
and what it is not, in order to better explain the significance of Europe and the EU to the rights of 
same-sex couples and to the struggle for marriage equality in Italy.     
What the EU is not 
Although much effort has been put into delineating what is meant by the term “European 
Union,” a quick survey of EU publications on the subject reveals that the EU is as often defined 
by what it is not as by what it is, and many of the attempts to demarcate it fall short.144  On the 
                                                 
Intersex People in Europe 2013, p. 16, https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1369137411_ilga-europe-annual-
review-2013.pdf, accessed March 7, 2014). 
144  In his “Ambassador’s Welcome,”  João Vale de Almeida, EU Ambassador to the United States, attempts to 
clarify what the EU is in the following statement:   “The European Union is the most successful experiment in 
economic and political integration in the world. It is a community of law and values, and an area of cooperation and 
solidarity” (European Union, External Action, The European Union:  A Guide for Americans, 2013, Ambassador’s 
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website of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States, the EU is described as 
follows: 
 The EU is unlike anything else – it isn’t a government, an association of states, or an 
international organization.  Rather, the 28 Member States have relinquished part of their 
sovereignty to EU institutions, with many decisions made at the European level.145    
In the EU External Action publication titled “The European Union:  A Guide for Americans,” the 
EU is similarly introduced as follows: 
The European Union is not a federation like the United States.  It is neither a state 
intended to replace existing states, nor an organization for cooperation between 
governments, like the United Nations.  It is much more than any other international 
organization. 
 
The EU is, in fact, unique.  Never before have countries voluntarily agreed to set up 
common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions 
on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at a higher, in this case, 
European level, and are directly applicable to citizens of all the countries. 
 
                                                 
Welcome, p. 1, http://www.euintheus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/GUIDE_UPDATE_2013_DECEMBER_HIGH_RES.pdf, accessed March 2, 2014).   
145  Website of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States, http://www.eurunion.org/eu/What-Is-the-
European-Union/What-Is-the-European-Union.html, accessed March 2, 2014.  Also, by way of reference, the 28 
Member States include:  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   
 
  
193 
 
All EU decisions and procedures are based on the treaties agreed to by all EU countries, 
under which sovereignty is shared in specific areas.  The result is a union of 28 Member 
States covering 1.7 million square miles with more than half a billion people producing 
almost a third of the world’s gross national product and speaking dozens of languages, 
bound together by a desire to promote peace, democracy, prosperity, stability, and the 
rule of law.146   
The EU is not “Europe”   
“Europe” and “the EU” are frequently used interchangeably.  While I understand the 
convenience of this practice, Europe and the EU are not one and the same.  It is generally agreed 
that “Europe” is one of the world’s seven conventional continents; however, it is also sometimes 
seen as a peninsula or subcontinent of “Eurasia”: 
 Europe is geologically and geographically a peninsula or subcontinent, forming the 
westernmost part of Eurasia.  Europe is conventionally considered a continent; this is 
more of a cultural distinction than a geographic one.  Europe is bounded to the north by 
the Arctic Ocean, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean, to the south by the Mediterranean 
Sea, and to the east its boundary is culturally determined and unclear.  However, the Ural 
Mountains are considered by some to be a geographical and tectonic landmark separating 
Europe and Asia.  When considered a continent, Europe is the world’s second-smallest 
continent in terms of area, with an area of 10,600,000 km2 (4,140,625 square miles).  In 
                                                 
146 European Union, External Action, The European Union:  A Guide for Americans, 2013, Chapter 1:  Introducing 
the European Union, p. 2, http://www.euintheus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/GUIDE_UPDATE_2013_DECEMBER_HIGH_RES.pdf, accessed March 2, 2014. 
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terms of populations, it is the third-largest continent.  The population of Europe is 
roughly 700,000,000:  about 11% of the world’s population.147   
The eastern borders of Europe remain somewhat arbitrary, and Europe is imagined in 
cultural and political terms as often as it is thought of geologically and geographically.   Europe 
and in particular ancient Greece, is seen as the birthplace of Western culture and has played a 
major role in in the world order since the 15th century.  In an opinion article published in the New 
York Times, author Frank Jacobs asks, “Where is Europe?”  He notes that, for the ancient 
Persians, Europe represented the stepping stone that separated them from Greece.  There is also 
the "Europe” that emerged in the 13th century in response to the Russian Tatars’ (or Tartars’) and 
(later) the Ottoman Empire’s attempts to invade Europe.  It was during this time period (and in 
opposition to the invading “others”) that Europe became identified with western Christendom.  
Here, Europe is perceived as ending where Turkey begins, and when the Ottoman Empire 
controlled the Balkans, these areas were also considered outside Europe.148  This is a notion that 
continues to this day and is invoked by those who wish to deny Turkey entrance into the EU.  
Finally, there is a relatively recent (although generally unaccepted) theory that views Europe as 
spanning half of the globe, ranging from Iceland to the Bering Strait, and stopping just short of 
Alaska.   
Perhaps surprisingly or perhaps not, the British seldom see themselves as part of Europe.  
To the British, Europe is the “Continent,” the large, contiguous landmass that sits (at its closest 
                                                 
147  Greenwichmeantime.com, “Europe,” http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/europe, accessed March 2, 
2014.  
 
148  Jacobs, Frank, “Where is Europe?” The Opinion Pages, Opinionator, New York Times, 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/where-is-europe/, accessed March 2, 2014. 
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point) a mere 22 miles off its southeast corner separated only by the English Channel (never 
mind the fact that Great Britain and Ireland are situated on the continental shelf of Europe, 
making both so-called continental islands of Europe, thereby rendering them part of Europe 
according to some definitions of “continent”).  Today, attempts on the part of Britain to 
distinguish itself from “Europe” generally have more to do with anti-EU sentiment than 
geographic accuracy.  By contrast, Cyprus, Malta, and Iceland all consider themselves part of 
Europe, even though none of them is located entirely on Europe’s continental shelf.  And most 
would agree that Switzerland and Norway are firmly entrenched in and part of Europe, although 
neither is a member of the EU.  This, of course, has little to do with geography and much to do 
with historical, political, and cultural ties.149  Although sometimes conflated, it is important to 
note that the EU is not coterminous with the Schengen Area, the Eurozone, or the Council of 
Europe.   
The EU is not the “Schengen Area”   
While there is substantial overlap, the EU is not the same thing as the Schengen Area.  
The Schengen Area consists of the twenty-six European countries that have implemented the 
Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985, in the town of Schengen, Luxembourg.  The 
point of the agreement was to create a geographic space that acts like a single state for purposes 
of international travel, meaning that, while there is an external border, there are no internal 
border controls when traveling between the Schengen countries. The Schengen rules were 
incorporated into EU law in 1999, with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty; however, the area 
officially includes the non-EU member states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
                                                 
149 See note 9 above. 
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Switzerland.  It also effectively includes the “micro” states of Monaco, San Marino, and the 
Vatican.  Two EU member states, Ireland and the United Kingdom, are not required to 
implement the Schengen rules and three member states, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania, have 
yet to comply.  The agreement requires parties to eliminate internal border controls and 
simultaneously strengthen external border controls.  In addition, the Schengen rules include 
provisions on a common policy on the temporary entry of persons, the harmonization of external 
border controls, and cross-border police and judicial cooperation. 
The EU is not the Eurozone   
The eurozone, officially known as the euro area, is an economic and monetary union 
comprised of the 17 EU member states that have adopted the euro as their common and exclusive 
currency.  While one must be a member of the EU to be part of the eurozone, there are members 
of the EU that are not (yet) part of the eurozone.  The European Central Bank (ECB) is 
responsible for setting the monetary policy of the eurozone.  The ECB is administered by a 
president and by the heads of the respective national central banks and its most important task is 
to keep inflation in check.  Although there is no common representation, governance or fiscal 
policy for the euro area, the Euro Group provides an arena for cooperation and makes political 
decisions about the eurozone and euro.  The Euro Group is made up of the finance ministers 
from the respective eurozone states.  In emergencies, national leaders are also involved with the 
Euro Group. 
At present, the eurozone includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Spain.  Ten EU member states do not use the euro:  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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Denmark and the United Kingdom opted out of the euro and are legally exempt from joining the 
eurozone, and Sweden gained a de facto opt-out through use of a legal loophole.  Otherwise, 
most of the remaining EU member states are bound to join the eurozone once they have met the 
requisite criteria.  Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican City have all concluded formal 
agreements with the eurozone to adopt the euro as their official currency.  In addition, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, and Andorra have adopted the euro unilaterally but are not formally part of the 
eurozone and do not have representation in the ECB or Euro Group.  To date, no state has left, 
and there are no provisions for doing so or for expelling a state.   
Since the financial crisis of the late-2000s, the eurozone has created and utilized 
provisions for granting emergency loans to member state in exchange for certain economic 
reforms.  It has also begun to implement limited fiscal integration.  For example, the members 
now conduct peer reviews of one another’s national budgets.  At the present moment, due to the 
continuing crisis, the issue is highly charged and in a state of flux.   
What the EU is 
Something that becomes increasingly clear as one begins to study the EU is the fact that it 
is very much a work-in-progress.  The EU that exists today is far removed from the EU as 
originally envisioned.  A predecessor of the EU was created following World War II, and began 
its existence as the European Coal and Steel Community.  It was initially imagined as an 
economic union:  the idea being that countries that trade with each other are economically 
interdependent and therefore more likely to avoid war.  In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed, 
creating the European Economic Community.  The Treaty of Rome allowed people and products 
to move throughout the signatory nation-states.  The European Economic Community (EEC) was 
a cooperative venture with six members:  Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
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Netherlands.  Over the past 55 years, what began as an economic union has morphed into an 
unwieldy organization traversing all policy areas, from human rights to the environment to 
foreign policy.  In 1993, the name was changed from EEC to the European Union (EU) to reflect 
this evolution.   
The EU acts as a single market, enabling most goods, services, people, and money to 
move freely between its member states.  Increasingly, however, the EU has taken the promotion 
of human rights (both within and outside the EU) as one its main goals.  The EU sees “human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” as its core 
values.150  With the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights brings all of these rights together in a single document, legally binding the EU’s 
institutions and member state governments (when they are applying EU law) to uphold the rights 
set forth in the charter.  In addition to the 28 official Member States of the EU, there are several 
“candidate countries,” for whom an EU membership application has been accepted by all 
relevant EU institutions and who have begun to negotiate accession.  These include Macedonia, 
Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey.  Finally, there are the “potential candidate countries” 
from the rest of the Western Balkan nations, some of whom have applied for EU membership 
and others who have not:  Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.  In order to join the EU, 
member states must (in principle) embrace certain fundamental values, which include: a belief 
that democracy is the best form of government; a belief in societies that embrace pluralistic 
political thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion; support for free market 
economies; a belief that prosperous nations have a duty to assist poorer, less developed nations; 
                                                 
150 Europa website, Treaty of Lisbon, The Treaty at a Glance, “A Europe of Rights and Values,” 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/rights_values/, accessed March 7, 2014. 
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living together in peace; and a desire to promote these tenets globally.  To gain admission, a 
candidate country must satisfy the so-called “Copenhagen Criteria” by proving that the country 
has a stable democratic government that supports the rule of law and respect for minorities and 
human rights, as well as a functioning market economy and the capacity to adopt and implement 
the body of EU laws, regulations and policies enacted to ensure cooperation between member 
states (known as the acquis communautaire).151   
The EU operates through a system of supranational independent institutions and 
intergovernmental decisions negotiated by the member states.  In general, the EU’s priorities are 
set by the European Council, which is made up of leaders from the member states and EU.  The 
European Council does not, however, have authority to pass laws.  The EU’s decision-making 
processes operate through three main institutions:  the European Parliament (EP); the European 
Commission; and the Council of the European Union.  Together, the EP, European Commission, 
and the Council of the European Union produce the policies and laws that apply throughout the 
EU, usually through co-decision processes.  Three other institutions that play a vital role in the 
EU are the ECJ, tasked with upholding the rule of EU law, the Court of Auditors, which is 
responsible for checking the financing of EU activities, and the European Central Bank, which is 
the central bank for the Eurozone and controls monetary policy within that area.  The European 
Central bank is tasked with maintaining price stability and it is at the center of the European 
System of Central Banks, which includes all EU national banks.  The powers and responsibilities 
of all EU institutions are set forth in relevant treaties, which form the foundation for everything 
the EU does and also lay down the rules and procedures that must be followed by EU 
                                                 
151  European Commission website, “Conditions for Membership,” 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm, accessed March 7, 2014. 
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institutions.  The treaties are agreed to by the presidents and/or prime ministers of the EU 
member states, and ratified by their respective parliaments.152   
A Rule of Law 
 The EU relies exclusively on the rule of law to achieve European unification.153  EU 
"law" is an independent legal system consisting of the body of Treaties and legislation 
(regulations, directives, and decisions) that have either direct or indirect effect on the laws of the 
member states.  The three sources of EU law are primary law (consisting mainly of the Treaties 
of the EU), secondary law (the regulations, directives and decisions enacted by the law-making 
bodies of the EU to pursue the objectives set forth in the Treaties), and supplementary law 
(which includes ECJ case law, international law, and general principles of EU law).  The EU also 
issues non-binding recommendations and opinions, and rules that govern the functioning of EU 
institutions and programs.  Treaties and other agreements with similar status (as well as any 
                                                 
152 As noted, the main institutions of the EU include:  the European Council; the European Parliament (EP); the 
European Commission; the Council of the European Union; the European Court of Justice; the Court of Auditors; 
and the European Central Bank.  In addition, the EU has a number of other institutions and inter-institutional bodies 
that perform specialized functions.  These include:  1) the European Economic and Social Committee, which 
represents civil society, employers and employees; 2) the Committee of the Regions, which represents regional and 
local authorities; 3) the European Investment Bank, which finances EU investment projects and assists small 
businesses through the European Investment Fund; 4) the European Ombudsman, which investigates complaints 
about EU institutions and bodies; 5) the European Data Protection Supervisor, which safeguards the privacy of 
people’s personal data; 6) the Publications Office, which publishes information about the EU; and 7) the European 
Personnel Selection Office, which recruits staff for EU institutions and bodies; the European School of 
Administration, which provides training in specific areas for members of EU staff; 8) the European External Action 
Service, which assists the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently 
Catherine Ashton); and 9) a host of specialized agencies and decentralized bodies that handle a range of technical, 
scientific, and management tasks. 
 
153 The "rule of law" is a tricky concept that (in general) refers to the authority of law within society and stands for 
the proposition that no one is above the law, including the government and government officials (i.e., a government 
of laws rather than of men and women).  In the case of the EU, this means that actions taken by the EU are founded 
on treaties that have been voluntarily and democratically approved by all of the EU member states.  (See Europa.eu, 
European Union, “EU Treaties,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-
making/treaties/index_en.htm, accessed March 7, 2014.)    
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amendments to such treaties and agreements) are determined through direct negotiation between 
member state governments, and are subject to ratification by national parliaments.     
 Regulations are the most direct form of EU law, and are on par with the national laws of 
the member states.  They are passed jointly by the EU Council and EU Parliament and by the 
Commission on its own.  EU regulations have a binding legal effect throughout the member 
states from the moment they are passed and member states do not have to take action to 
implement them.  By contrast, directives set forth end results that must be achieved by the 
member states.  National governments must take action to make them a part of national law by a 
certain date, but they have discretion regarding how to accomplish the desired end result.  
Directives may apply to one or more or all of the member states and are used to harmonize 
different national laws.  Decisions are EU laws that relate to specific cases.  A decision is 
binding upon those to which it is addressed and may be addressed to individuals, enterprises or 
any or all member states.  The EU Council (sometimes in conjunction with the EP) and the 
Commission issue decisions, which confer rights and require individuals, enterprises, and 
authorities in member states to do or refrain from doing something.    
 EU law takes precedence over national laws and is therefore binding on national 
authorities.  In general, EU law is applied by the courts of the member states.  In situations where 
the laws of the member state provide lesser rights than the laws of the EU, the courts of the 
member states can step in to enforce EU law.  In cases where EU law should have been 
transposed into the laws of the member states (such as in the case of Directives), the European 
Commission can initiate proceedings against the non-complying EU member state.  The ECJ is 
the highest court with jurisdiction to interpret EU law.   
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Bringing the EU to the People 
In its institutional formations, the EU has made a concerted effort to bring the EU into the 
lives of its citizens, to explain its existence, functions, processes, and decisions.  I was astounded 
by the plethora of information available in multiple languages on the Internet. There is an almost 
overwhelming abundance of information explaining the EU and its institutions, much of it 
participatory in nature.154  The EP, for example, has dedicated an entire webpage to “visiting” 
that explains options available to individuals, families, and groups when in Brussels or 
Strasbourg.  Interested parties can spend time at the “Parlamentarium,” the Parliament’s Visitors’ 
Center in Brussels, and partake of its “[d]ynamic, interactive, multimedia displays [that] will 
guide you through the journey of European integration and its impact on our everyday lives.”155  
                                                 
154  By way of example, the EP’s welcoming webpage states: 
  This is your assembly, the only directly-elected European Union institution. On these pages you will find a 
short introduction to how the parliament works. We present its powers and functions, explain how 
Members of Parliament organise their work and explain how you can contact us. A last chapter is devoted 
to past events that have shaped the Parliament's role in the EU. 
 At your service  
Strasbourg and Brussels seem remote from where you are? Stay informed about what is happening in the 
Parliament through our information pages and document services and via the information office in each EU 
country, where you find everything in your language. 
You have something to say? Then make your voice heard. Petition the Parliament if you think that EU laws 
are being breached where you are. Or contact the European Ombudsman if you need a mediator. From 
2012, EU citizens will also be able to start pan-European initiatives and call for new laws themselves with 
the new citizens' initiative. 
You want to get personally involved in our work, or experience the Parliament first hand? Check out the 
possibilities of working with us as a trainee, during a study visit or as a new colleague.  (Website of the 
European Parliament, European Parliament/About Parliament, “At Your Service,” 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00b3f21266/At-your-
service.html;jsessionid=B4539892A69BFD1F75B7D7FEF96A322F.node1, accessed March 7, 2014 [bold 
in original]). 
155 Website of the European Parliament, European Parliament/Visiting, Homepage, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/visiting/en/, accessed March 7, 2014. 
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Another option is the Chamber Tour:  “Are you in Brussels? Then why not get one of our 
handheld media guides to take you around the European Parliament's plenary chamber. This 
portable guide will take you on a one-hour journey through EU democracy from past to 
present.”156  Other activities include a “role play game for schools” that enables students to “step 
into the shoes” of a Member of the European Parliament (MEP).157  A 2007 edition of the 
newsletter EU Focus published by the Delegation of the European Commission to the United 
States discusses the EU role in building a European consciousness: 
 What is it that is making many Europeans feel more European today?  In large part, and 
not always acknowledged, it is the role of the EU in bringing the citizens of Europe 
closer together by breaking down barriers, ensuring fundamental rights, and helping 
foster an enduring peace that indeed makes war between European nations unthinkable 
for EU citizens today (2007:2). 
The article goes on to note that chief among the fundamental rights guaranteed to EU 
citizens are the free movement provisions, which make it possible for people, goods, services, 
and capital to move freely throughout the EU.  The issue of free movement is something I will 
return to later in the chapter.  According to the Delegation of the European Commission to the 
United States:  “The changing face of Europe today is not about geography as much as a new 
way of living for all Europeans” (2007:1).   In the following section, I turn my attention to the 
relationship between the EU and LGBTI persons, with an eye to parsing the ways in which the 
struggle over recognition of rights supports this vision of the EU as a "new way of living for all 
Europeans."  I assert that the current struggle over rights for same-sex couples in the EU is a key 
                                                 
156 See note 16 above. 
 
157  See note 16 above. 
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part of a larger struggle that pits the vision of a unified EU based on its "Christian" roots against 
those who see the EU as a role model in the recognition of rights based on secular notions of 
social justice.       
LGBTI in the EU 
 The EU as the EU 
 Acceptance of LGBTI persons varies throughout the EU member states.  The principles 
of non-discrimination and equal treatment are found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which has the same legal status as the EU treaties following the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.  Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on "sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation."  The 
right to marry and found a family is enshrined in Article 9:  "The right to marry and the right to 
found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise 
of these rights."  Although Article 9 is notably gender-neutral, it leaves it up to the national laws 
of the member states to define marriage and family.   
 Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is also prohibited by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU, Articles 10 and 19).158  Article 19 of the TFEU states that:  
"Without prejudice to other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the powers 
                                                 
158  Initially, there was uncertainty over whether the general non-discrimination principle set forth in the TFEU 
applied beyond the single market objectives relating to employment and industrial relations; however, the inclusion 
of a new Article 13 into the Treaty of Amsterdam (now Article 19 of the TFEU) erased this uncertainty.  The 
Amsterdam Treaty was signed on October 2, 1997, and went into force on May 1, 1999.  The treaty made substantial 
changes to the Maastricht Treaty and placed greater emphasis on citizenship and the rights of individuals.  It 
represented an attempt to achieve more democracy and increased powers for the European Parliament, among other 
things.     
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conferred by it on the Community, the Council may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation."  This provision has led to specific directives to combat discrimination on the bases 
of religion, belief, disability, age or sexual orientation in employment (Article 1 of Directive 
2000/78, November 27, 2000) and discrimination on the bases of racial or ethnic origin in and 
beyond employment and occupation (Articles 1 and 3 of Directive 2000/43, June 29, 2000, also 
known as the "Race Directive").159  On July 2, 2008, the European Commission proposed a 
directive that would expand the employment directive and ban discrimination on the bases of 
age, disability, religion or belief, and sexual orientation in all areas of EU competence, including 
areas of social protection, social advantages, and access to goods and services.  If enacted, this 
directive would eliminate the hierarchy of rights that currently exists by extending the 
protections guaranteed under the Race Direction to all protected classes.   
The directive, however, has been stalled in the Council, despite the strong support of the 
EP.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU preserves certain political, social, and 
economic rights for EU citizens and residents.  As mentioned above, the Charter was given full 
legal effect with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009.  The Charter 
gives the EU courts the power to strike down legislation adopted by EU institutions that violates 
                                                 
159  The Employment Directive, also known as the Employment Equality Directive, established a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation.  The Directive, which was unanimously adopted by the Member 
States in 2000, compelled member states to adopt, within 3 years, minimum requirements prohibiting discrimination 
on the bases of religion and belief, age, disability, and sexual orientation in employment and occupation, vocational 
training, and membership and involvement in organizations of employers or workers or organizations with members 
of a particular profession.  As of today, all of the Member States have transposed the Directive into law.  In practice, 
this protects EU citizens from being denied a job or losing a job due to their sexual orientation.  It also protects them 
from harassment by a work colleague.  It does not cover the refusal of medical services or treatment, refusal of a 
double room in a hotel, protection against bullying in a school, or refusal of social security schemes (for example, 
survivors' benefits or financial assistance to careers).  These protections are extended under EU law, however, on the 
bases of race and gender.  
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the provisions of the Charter.  While the Charter applies to member states when they are 
implementing EU law, it does not extend the competences of the EU to the legislative efforts of 
the member states when acting within their purview. 
For the most part, the EU institutions noted above have played a part in advancing the 
recognition of rights for LGBTI persons in the member states and in the world at-large.160  In 
October 2012, the EP released a study on a potential EU roadmap for LGBT equality.161  The 
proposed roadmap would consolidate new laws and policies to combat discrimination and 
increase equality for LGBT persons.  The EP also has an "Intergroup on LGBT Rights," which is 
an informal forum for members of the European Parliament who are interested in issues that 
affect the lives of LGBT people, as well as their families and employers.  At the moment, the 
LGBT Intergroup is the largest of the EP's 27 Intergroups, with over 150 members.  Its work 
involves monitoring the work of the EU and the situation of LGBT people in the EU member 
states and beyond, as well as liaising with civil society groups to make sure their concerns are 
heard at the European level.  One of the intergroup's priorities is to advance the freedom of 
movement of LGBT people in the EU.   
                                                 
160 Another EU agency that warrants mention because of its involvement in promoting the rights of LGBTI people is 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).  FRA was established in 2007, to provide independent, 
evidence-based advice on fundamental rights.  It has 90 staff members, which include legal experts, political and 
social scientists, statisticians, and communications and networking experts.  FRA takes the place of the European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), and was granted a much broader mandate to promote 
advice on a wide range of fundamental rights, in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.   
In 2012, FRA carried out an extensive survey of approximately 93,000 LGBT people living in the EU to collect data 
on LGBT experiences of hate crime and discrimination, as well as levels of awareness about their rights.  The survey 
results were published in May 2013, and showed that many LGBT persons hide their identity and avoid certain 
locations due to fear.  Others have experienced discrimination and violence and most do not report these incidents to 
the police or other authorities.  The purpose of the report is to assist in the development of effective and targeted EU 
and national legal and policy responses to address the needs of LGBT persons and to protect their fundamental 
rights.      
161  Roadmaps are policy documents that summarize and provide a plan for EU action in a given area.    
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 The European Commission has also played a part in advancing LGBT interests through 
its establishment of an action program (entitled "A Community Action Programme to Combat 
Discrimination), which resulted in the expenditure of 100 million Euro between 2001-2006, in 
support of concrete measures to combat discrimination in a number of areas, including sexual 
orientation.  The program was designed to supplement the (mostly legislative) activities of the 
EU and the member states.  In January 2007, the program was replaced by the PROGRESS 
Community program, a financial instrument that supports the development and coordination of 
EU policy in the areas of employment, social inclusion and protection, working conditions, anti-
discrimination, and gender equality.  The program is open to EU member states, candidate, and 
potential candidate countries, and the EFTA/EEA countries of Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein.   
 To facilitate a proactive response to violations of the human rights of LGBT people and 
to address the structural causes leading to such violations, the European Council's working group 
on human rights (in cooperation with ILGA-Europe) adopted the "Toolkit to Promote and Protect 
the Enjoyment of Human Rights by Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LBGT) People" on 
June 8, 2010.162  The "toolkit" is designed to provide EU institutions and their staff, member 
states, EU Delegations, Representations, and Embassies with an operational set of tools that can 
be used to promote human rights for LGBT persons in external contacts with countries outside 
the EU, as well as with international and civil society organizations.  The Council upgraded the 
toolkit in June 2013, instructing EU diplomats to defend the human rights of LGBTI persons in 
the world. 
                                                 
162 The "toolkit" is available on the Council's website at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st11179.en10.pdf. 
 
  
208 
 
 The Rainbow Map, Europe, and the EU:  Is There a Place for Italy? 
 Although homosexuality is officially legal in all EU member states, LGBT rights are 
protected under the EU's treaties and laws, and discrimination in employment has been 
prohibited since 2000, the laws of the individual EU member states vary widely when it comes to 
additional protections, same-sex relationships, and LGBT adoption.  Prior to the beginning of the 
ILGA-Europe annual conference, staffers (myself included) spent a great deal of time setting up 
a room with literature from various LGBTI interest groups throughout Europe.  In addition to the 
"Delegate Packs" (which included an overview of the conference, detailed information regarding 
the workshops to be held, and information on the evening social programs, along with useful 
information about local transportation, etc.), "touristic" bags stuffed with goodies (including both 
male and female condoms and a DVD of the history of "FUORI!,"), and the "Torino + Piemonte" 
card (granting free access to public transportation and admission to local museums and cultural 
sites) the participants received, conference attendees had access to the  press room, which was 
stuffed with pamphlets, information sheets, posters, cards, reports, and other documents that 
detailed the work of various EU and European governmental agencies, NGOs and other groups 
and associations of interest to LGBTI activists.  One of the items that circulated widely among 
participants was the "Rainbow Europe, May 2011," map produced by ILGA-Europe in 
cooperation with Transgender Europe.   
The “Rainbow Europe” map provides a visual display of the legal and policy situation for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual people in 49 European countries with respect to six 
thematic categories:  equality and non-discrimination; family; bias motivated speech/violence; 
legal gender recognition; freedom of assembly, association, and expression; and asylum.  It 
reflects the various countries' legislation and policies that have a direct effect on the enjoyment 
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of human rights by LGBTI persons, and the main criteria is whether sexual orientation and 
gender identity (or its equivalent) are clearly referred to in the respective law or policy, or 
whether LGBTI people are treated equally under the law and by the state.  It does not represent 
the social state of affairs of LGBT persons in Europe but is instead a reflection of the European 
countries' laws and administrative practices, which protect or violate the human rights of LGBT 
persons.163 
 The first ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map was published in July 2009, and its simplicity 
made it a huge success among activists, as well as a useful benchmarking tool.  The 2011 version 
was transformed to include gender identity for the first time (making the map inclusive of 
transsexual issues), and a color scheme was introduced to indicate which countries are moving 
toward full legal respect for the human rights of LGBTI persons (green), and which countries 
continue to lag behind (amber or red).  The scale on the 2011 map ranged from 17 (indicating a 
state that provides full respect for human rights and full equality) to -7 (indicating a state that is 
guilty of gross violations of human rights and discrimination against LGBTI persons).  
Corresponding to each number on the scale was a color, with dark green representing a score of 
17, through increasingly lighter green shades (indicating scores of 16 down to 4), to three 
increasingly lighter shades of yellow (corresponding to scores of 3 down to 1), to gray 
(indicating a score of 0) and then devolving into seven shades of red that increase in darkness as 
the state progresses down the scale (from -1 to -7).   
                                                 
163 For a more detailed explanation of the map and to see a copy of the most recent version of the map, please go to 
http://www.ilga-
europe.org/media_library/ilga_europe/publications/reports_and_other_publications/rainbow_map_2013. 
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The scores on the 2011 map ranged from 12.5 (the United Kingdom) to -4 (Ukraine).164  
As indicated in Table A, with respect to EU member states only, the scores ranged from 12.5 
(United Kingdom) down to -2 (Cyprus).  Just above Cyprus at the bottom of the scale, were Italy, 
Latvia, and Malta, all with scores of 0.  Of the four states at the bottom, Italy was the only one 
that was one of the founding states of the EU.  During the course of the ILGA-Europe 
conference, there was a lot of discussion regarding the Rainbow Map, and Italy’s score.  In 
addition to the general conversation, tittering, pointing at the map, and nodding of heads that I 
observed while working at the registration desk, which was situated next to a blown-up copy of 
the map on an easel, I was personally involved in at least four separate conversations regarding 
the Rainbow Map during the conference, of which the following is an example. 
On the second day of the ILGA-Europe conference, V2 and I were working together at 
the registration desk.  She pointed at the Rainbow Map and indicated disgust at the "0" that 
represented Italy.  I used this as an opportunity to ask her why she thought Italy lagged behind 
most of the EU with respect to recognizing rights for LGBTI persons.  She, like others before her 
I had queried, unhesitatingly blamed it on the Church.  According to V2, the Church has the 
purse strings and uses its money and power to control the majority of politicians in Italy.  The 
result is that nothing changes.  On a surface level, V2's explanation made perfect sense.  Yet, as I 
thought about it more I had to wonder how the Church manages such control over politicians in 
Italy but is not able to do so in other "Catholic" countries such as Spain, France, and Ireland.  In 
my conversations with Italian activists the Church was presented as a united front, a huge wall or 
obstacle that needed to be overcome that did not completely reconcile with my personal 
                                                 
164 Please refer to Table 1 at the end of this chapter for a summary of the Rainbow Europe Map scores for EU 
member states for the years 2011 and 2013. 
  
211 
 
experiences with Catholicism.  This, however, is a subject I will table for now and take up again 
in chapter 7.  The thing that struck me about the Rainbow Map was the "0" score (and the 
corresponding gray color) assigned to Italy.  The only other country in gray with a "0" score was 
Latvia.  Of the original six founding members of the EU (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and the countries involved in the first enlargement (the UK, 
Denmark, Ireland, and Norway), Italy was the only "non-green" country.   
 For the most part Italian LGBTI activists feel left "outside" of the rest of Europe.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, LGBTI activists in Italy frequently invoke the trope of Europe to garner 
credibility and shame Catholic politicians who adhere to Church dogma in their decision- and 
law-making duties.  At the end of the ILGA-Europe conference, the local staff was given T-shirts 
as tokens of appreciation for our work.  My T-shirt was from the May 21, 2011, Pride March 
held in Turin.  The design on the T-shirt contains part of a ruler in pink print and states "Quanto 
Dista il Piemonte dall'Europa?" (translated:  How far is Piedmont from Europe?).165  Piedmont 
borders France and Switzerland, but is surrounded on three sides by the Alps.  While Piedmont 
literally bumps up against "Europe," there is a sense that it is a world apart in terms of treatment 
of LGBTI persons.  The idea conveyed in the T-shirt slogan is one of geographic proximity but 
vast social, cultural and political distance between Piedmont and Europe.   
 As mentioned above, throughout the ILGA-Europe annual conference in Turin, 
participants made repeated references the so-called "Rainbow Map" and Italy's "0" rating on the 
map, and bemoaned the fact that Italy is not like the rest of "Europe."  Indeed, the map seemed to 
support this idea.  The Rainbow Map is updated to reflect changing conditions, and ILGA-
                                                 
165  Piedmont is one of the 20 regions of Italy.  Next to Sicily, it is the second largest region and covers a territory of 
9.808 square miles.  The population of Piedmont is around 4.6 million and its capital is Turin. 
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Europe decided to transform the index on the 2013 map to enhance its benchmarking aspect.  
The 2014 version grades European states on a percentage scale, with 100% representing optimal 
support for human rights and full equality, and 0% reflecting gross violations of human rights 
and discrimination.  The new index makes for easier readability and comparisons over time of 
the situation in different countries.  This time Italy ranked dead last among the EU member 
states, with a score of 19%, indicating that Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta are showing more rapid 
signs of improvement than Italy.166   
Same-Sex Couples in the EU Member States 
In many EU countries, same-sex couples can seek recognition of their unions.  
Recognition takes a variety of forms ranging from full marriage equality to civil partnership to 
regulation of cohabitation rights.  In May 2013, France became the ninth European country to 
allow and recognize same-sex marriage.  At the present time, ten European countries (eight of 
which are EU member states) specifically recognize (or will soon specifically recognize) same-
sex marriage:  Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
and Sweden, and the United Kingdom (the law covers England and Wales only, and will take 
effect in 2014).  Thirteen additional European countries (ten of which are EU member states) 
recognize some form of civil union or unregistered partnership:  Andorra, Austria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and 
Wales (which, as of 2014, will provide for same-sex marriage)).167  Several other European 
                                                 
166  Italy ranked 36th with respect to the 49 European countries considered by ILGA-Europe on the map. 
 
167 As mentioned, England and Wales have adopted same-sex marriage.  While same-sex marriage is not recognized 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland, both provide for civil partnerships. 
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countries are in the process of considering some form of recognition for same-sex partnerships.  
 All-in-all twenty-two European countries (considering the United Kingdom as one entity) 
grant some form of recognition for same-sex couples, seventeen of which are EU member states.  
This means that eleven EU member states have no provision for the recognition of same-sex 
unions:  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovakia.  Of these, four have specific constitutional bans against same-sex marriage that define 
marriage as between a man and a woman:  Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.168  Unlike 
Italy, single LGBT persons can adopt children in Bulgaria and Poland.169  Also unlike Italy, 
Bulgaria and Lithuania have both adopted equality and anti-discrimination provisions (providing 
for non-discrimination based on sexual orientation in delivery of goods and services and other 
spheres of life), as have Romania and Slovakia.  Greece, Malta, and Romania all have hate 
speech or hate crimes laws on the books, prohibiting bias motivated speech and violence against 
LGBTI persons.  This leaves Italy in the company of Cyprus, Latvia, and Estonia, as one of the 
four EU member states that provides no recognition for same-sex partnerships, no law against 
hate speech or hate crimes committed against LGBTI persons, and that does not prohibit 
discrimination in the provision of goods and services and other spheres of life for LGBTI 
persons.  These factors indicate that Italy is, in fact, "outside" of Europe and the EU with respect 
to recognizing the rights of LGBTI persons in general, and of same-sex couples in particular.  
However, the point I want to make in the remainder of this chapter (and reinforce in the 
                                                 
168 Croatia and Hungary also have constitutional bans against same-sex marriage, but both allow for other forms of 
recognition of same-sex unions. 
 
169 In Bulgaria, single men are rarely allowed to adopt regardless of sexual orientation but there is no prohibition 
against single LGBT women adopting. 
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following chapter) is that Italy is not so far "outside" of Europe and the EU as appears from the 
data set forth above.   
Integrating the EU through EU Citizenship and the Civil Religion of “Rights” 
While the foregoing helps to explain the EU in its institutional formations, it does not 
clarify what the EU means to those who live within and around it.  A notion that is often 
associated with the EU is that of European integration, a term used to describe processes of 
economic, political, legal, social and cultural integration occurring in Europe, primarily under the 
auspices of the EU and the Council of Europe.  The project of European integration is an 
ongoing project, evolving through the negotiations of various actors in an open-ended system 
(Bellier and Wilson, eds. 2000).  According to anthropologists Irene Bellier and Thomas Wilson, 
“[T]he EU is a space which is built and imagined in processes which are simultaneously political 
and cultural” (2000:20).  There have been attempts to carve out a common European identity, 
and the EU shapes European identity in part through the promotion of a typology of European 
features referred to by the European Commission as “a European model of society.”  The 
purported key features of this model include similar family structures, the democratic 
distribution of power, and the freedom of the individual vis-à-vis the state (Bellier and Wilson, 
eds. 2000).  I submit, however, that these so-called “key features” lack significance in the 
absence of a clear understanding of the values that underlie them.  For example, what do “similar 
family structures” look like in Europe?  And, more importantly, what is it about “similar family 
structures” that would serve to identify one as “European”?  In Spain, same-sex couples are 
allowed to marry and adopt children.  In Italy they are not.  Consequently, family structures in 
Spain may look very different from acknowledged family structures in Italy.  
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Another way that European integration occurs is through the development and adoption 
of a shared culture of “rights.”  In Culture and Rights, anthropologists Jane Cowan and Richard 
Wilson, along with lecturer in law Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, observe that over the past few 
decades there has been a surge in negotiations between various groups of social actors and 
political institutions at the local, national, and supranational levels, all framed in terms of 
“rights” (2001:1-2).  Due to processes of globalization, rights discourses have been picked up in 
many parts of the world, far from their original incarnation in the French and American 
revolutions.  In order to understand the specificities of a particular struggle one cannot look only 
at the local scene.  This is because in the process of seeking recognition of their rights, claimants 
are increasingly embroiled in legal and political processes that transcend the nation-state.  
Although the model of rights is today “hegemonic” and “imbued with an emancipatory aura,” the 
articulation of claims within this model is subject to a multitude of interpretations and inferences 
(Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson, eds. 2001:1).   
Who Is an EU Citizen? 
One of the main components of European integration is the provision of an EU 
citizenship status.  EU citizenship signals an attempt to bring Europe closer to the people (i.e., to 
create a shared “identity” for Europeans).  Maarten Vink argues, however, that this attempt has 
yet to meet with much success (2004).  Part of the problem is that EU citizenship is derivative of 
member state citizenship:  an EU citizen is a person who holds the nationality of a member state.  
The rights of EU citizenship are held in addition to national citizenship.  EU citizenship falls 
short because it is not a status that arises out of a positive commitment on the part of its citizens.  
Instead, as Vink has noted, it is “a status that arises ‘by default’ after the hollowing out of 
national citizenship” (2004:30).  Further, it is not obvious what the rights of EU citizenship 
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entail, much less the values upon which those rights are based.  A 2010 Eurobarometer flash 
survey found that, while three-quarters of respondents were familiar with the term “citizen of the 
European Union,” only about 43% said that they know what it means to be a European citizen 
and less than one-third (32%) considered themselves to be well-informed about their rights as 
European citizens.  Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that EU citizens have rights as EU 
citizens that are to be recognized and protected.  It is the precise content and lack of consensus 
about the basis for such rights that is controversial.        
In We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (2004), Étienne 
Balibar asserts that there is no such thing as a “European people.”  He observes that, although the 
EU has increasingly separated notions of citizenship from notions of nationhood, there are still 
formidable obstacles to the creation of a transnational European citizenship.  According to 
Balibar, these obstacles arise because European unification brings into question the different 
means of laying a foundation for a democratic state and thereby reopens issues of sovereignty 
(2004:ix).  Balibar talks about the formation of national identity as a dual process entailing both 
differentiation from groups situated outside the national body and the creation of internal 
homogeneity through the expulsion or alienation from the privileges of national citizenship of 
elements considered antithetical to the ethnic and cultural identity of the state.  As a 
consequence, for “historical and structural reasons, a European ‘constitution of citizenship’ can 
only emerge on the condition of being more democratic than the traditional constitutions of the 
‘national’ states -- or it will be deprived of any legitimacy, any capacity to ‘represent’ the 
populations and solve (or mediate) their social conflicts . . ." (Balibar 2004:ix).    
In Symptoms of Modernity, anthropologist Matti Bunzl similarly contends that nation-
building depended on the “foundational construction of constitutive outsides” (2004:13).  He 
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shows how Jews and queers in Austria functioned as social signifiers and were positioned 
outside the imagined “ethnically homogeneous and inherently masculine” contours of the nation-
state (2004:13).170  According to Bunzl, Jews and queers served as the “principal indices of a 
European modernity characterized by the homogenizing forces of nationalism and the nation-
state” (2004:216).  As such, Jews and queers constituted “symptoms of modernity,” and it is this 
notion that enables one to see the late twentieth century in terms of an “epochal shift” (Bunzl 
2004:216).  In the 1990s, Jews and queers in Vienna began to resist their respective positions as 
“Others” and subsequently emerged in the city’s public sphere.  With the support of the state, 
they were subsequently celebrated as symbolic of a diversified polity.  Bunzl reads this as an 
indication that Austria had transitioned to a kind of postmodernity.  Bunzl writes: 
 For if we understand the abject creation and constitutive silencing of Jews and 
homosexuals as a specifically modern phenomenon for which the Holocaust served as the 
catastrophic telos, and if we understand the groups’ continued subordination in the 
postwar era as a function and indicator of late modernity, then we can comprehend the 
developments of the late twentieth century in terms of a social and cultural transition to a 
kind of postmodernity … characterized by a constitutive pluralism (2004:216). 
One can apply Bunzl’s ideas to the Italian situation.  Although conservative politicians in 
Italy continue to support a vision of national identity based on the patriarchal family and 
Catholic social values, and thereby indirectly constitute LGBTI persons in general (and same-sex 
couples in particular) as imagined “Others,” there are indications that large parts of Italian 
society have moved on.  In 2012, the Italian National Institute of Statistics published the results 
                                                 
170 I am using Bunzl’s terminology here. 
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of its first survey entitled La popolazione omosessuale nella società italiana (translated:  “The 
Homosexual Population in Italian Society”).  The study revealed that 43% of the Italian general 
population supports full marriage equality, and that 62.8% are favorable to registered 
partnerships.  Confronted with a political impasse that continues to alienate them from the full 
privileges of Italian citizenship, it is no surprise that LGBTI persons living in Italy look to 
Europe as better able to “represent” them.  They look to Europe as an entity that can potentially 
resolve their social conflicts with the nation-state.  This is conceivable because notions of EU 
citizenship have moved well beyond their original economic bases and are increasingly discussed 
and debated within the framework of “rights.” 
In the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, the rights being 
sought by activists originate at the level of the supranational.  In order to access these rights, 
Italian same-sex couples must achieve recognition in the context of a nation-state whose very 
identity is tied up in opposing notions of family formation.  In chapter 3, I looked at the 
importance of family and the role it plays as a primary social institution in Italy.  As discussed, 
political actors in the Italian state have successfully alienated same-sex couples from the full 
privileges of national citizenship by denying them recognition of the fundamental right to form a 
family.  In Italy, relationships based on anything other than so-called traditional marriage are 
antithetical to the heretofore privileged Catholic cultural identity of the state.  In other words, the 
ideal of the alleged traditional family is so entwined with privileged notions of national identity 
that those who do not subscribe to its structure are frequently left outside the state.  The 
displacement of LGBTI families from the full enjoyment of citizenship in Italy creates an 
incentive to look beyond the nation’s borders for recognition, and leads to greater identification 
with Europe in general and the EU specifically.   
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What It Means to Be an EU Citizen in Italy 
In the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples, one can begin to see the 
instantiation of a more substantial EU citizenship in Italy.  This is bolstered by the fact that 
national identity in Italy is weak and the nation-state has never really enjoyed a solid ideological 
basis for its existence.  Most scholars agree that the Italian state is perceived as possessing a low 
degree of legitimacy and that Italian citizens react to it with distrust (Ginsborg 2003; Barański 
2001).  Patrick McCarthy argues that the appearance of Berlusconi on the political scene ushered 
in a “clan-like” age and evidenced an extension of the practices of clientelism and political 
corruption.  According to McCarthy, Italians must create a new state “which is neither 
overbearing nor absent because it is no longer overworked, in which the market functions and 
public goods are not sold to the highest bidder but are distributed in a manner that is 
recognizably fairer and more efficient  (1997:24).”  I submit, however, that the issue is not really 
the creation of a new state but rather the making of what anthropologist Virginia Dominguez 
refers to as a "peoplehood" (1989).  Dominguez's notion of "peoplehood" reflects an interest in 
collective identities, in the socio-historical construction of an object (created by objectifying 
people into a collectivity) that requires continued creation, nurture, and legitimization.  Italy has 
never enjoyed a real sense of "peoplehood."               
The political and social process that led to the unification of Italy is known as the 
Risorgimento, which means “Resurgence” or "Revival" in English.  While it is difficult to 
identify precise dates for the beginning and end of the Risorgimento, most scholars hold that it 
began with the end of Napoleonic rule and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and ended with the 
Franco-Prussian War in 1871.  Unlike the French and American Revolutions, and even possibly 
German unification, the Risorgimento cannot be personified as a unifying set of ideals struggling 
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for realization.  Any attempt to summarize the Risorgimento is necessarily messy and complex.  
Massimo Taparelli, Marquis d'Azeglio, an Italian statesman, novelist and painter, however, 
adequately summed up the outcome of the Risorgimento nicely in his famous phrase of 1861:  
"L'Italia è fatta.  Restano da fare gli italiani" (translated literally as "Italy has been made.  It 
remains to make Italians" but more commonly as "We have made Italy.  Now we must make 
Italians").  In many ways, Italy has yet to "make Italians."     
While I was in Italy, certain topics came up repeatedly in conversations with my contacts.  
One such topic was that of Italian national identity.  This subject came up with so often that I 
began to take note.  Many of my contacts in both Rome and Turin casually referred to Italians as 
having a “weak” national identity as if it were a foregone conclusion.  The so-called weak 
national identity was commonly used to explain, for example, why the Church perspective on 
moral issues regularly prevails over popular will.  The frequency with which my Italian contacts 
referred to the weak national identity indicated to me that this was a common notion that 
circulated among Italians.  As the following examples from my fieldwork show, conversations 
about regional, national, and supranational identities indicate that identity is still up for grabs in 
Italy.     
When I arrived in Turin in September 2011, I could not help but notice a number of 
Italian flags hanging from apartment balconies.  While not every house displayed a flag, there 
were a noticeable number of such flags on display throughout the various residential areas of the 
city.  I had not seen anything like this when I was in Rome the previous year.  In 2011, Italy 
celebrated the 150-year anniversary of its unification.  Because I had not noticed such flag 
displays when I was previously doing field work in Italy in 2009 and 2010, I suspected that the 
flags had something to do with this.  One day, I asked M, one of the LGBTI activists I had met 
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during fieldwork, about the flags, and he confirmed my suspicions.  The flags were indeed a 
show of support for Italy in honor of its 150 year anniversary.  M then proceeded to tell me about 
the various events staged throughout the year in Turin to mark the anniversary.  Curious, I asked 
him about his perceptions on Italian national identity:  Did he think such a thing existed?  I told 
him that I had not noticed so many flags on display before when I was in Rome.  He scoffed a bit 
and said, “Of course we are all Italians.  But in Rome you will not see anything like what we 
have done in Turin [to mark the 150-year anniversary].  In Rome, they do nothing.”  He went on 
to state that, while sometimes there is talk from certain quarters about dividing Italy between 
north and south, most agree (including himself) that “we are all Italians” and that being Italian 
means something.   
M’s response did not surprise me.  It is no secret that in Italy, regional and local identities 
commonly trump national identity.  Italians largely derive their sense of identity from 
associations with territorial and ideological communities (Malagreca 2006).  In our conversation 
M expresses his opinion that, while everyone is Italian, there is something different about the 
attitudes of the Torinesi (i.e., the people from Turin) and contemporary Romans toward Italy.  
The Torinesi attempt to be patriotic where the Romans cannot be bothered to muster national 
enthusiasm.  In his comments, M manages to differentiate himself from his fellow citizens in 
Rome while simultaneously attempting to embrace Italy as a united whole.   
The conversation with M reminded me of a conversation I had with T in Rome the year 
before.  One day at lunch, while chatting over bowls of soup, I asked T for his thoughts on how 
the Church was able to wield such power in Italy, given the fact that the majority of its citizens 
are not practicing Catholics and Italy is known for being a place where attitudes toward the EU 
tend to be more favorable than in some of the other member states.  T responded by telling me 
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that in his opinion, the EU is not a union, at least not in any social sense.  In a similar way, Italy 
is not a country.  According to T, Italy is just a group of people who share a geographical space.  
But if forced to choose an identity, T explained, “In general people in Italy don’t see themselves 
as `European,’ they see themselves as ‘Italian.’” That said, T admitted that there is awareness in 
Italy that things are different in other parts of Europe.  “In Spain, for example, the police 
function as police; they are not just a guy in a nice pair of Ray Bans,” T explained.  By contrast, 
in Italy, everyone has his or her own agenda, his or her own pet social issues, and most people 
are unwilling to join together to support a cause that does not serve one’s personal interest or 
benefit the entire society.  Everything is about having power and making money and working 
hard means nothing.  It is always a matter of money and power:  there are no principles.  Instead, 
people rely on celebrities to guide them, to show them how to act.  Also, according to T, there is 
so much money in being a politician in Italy that it becomes a career.  The Vatican is very 
wealthy (and therefore powerful) and has money to throw behind its causes.  Politicians who 
want Vatican support must follow its edicts.   
All of this is, of course, complicated by the fact that there is no sense of competition in 
Italy, no way to maneuver.  Everything is prearranged:  jobs go to offspring and people who can 
do favors for the job provider.  To the extent that there is any sort of system in Italy, it is an 
elaborate system made up of complex arrangements between many “somebodies.”  There is no 
perception of anything moving forward or developing.  According to T, this is because in Italy 
there exists a “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” mentality that is carried to extremes.  
Everyone in public administration was put there by someone else with more power.  Those with 
a little bit of power crave more power, and they use the power they have to make things easier or 
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more difficult depending on what is most convenient.  In Italy, anything can be “arranged.”  
There is no solution because it is an issue of mentality.    
“If this is the case,” I asked, “how do people manage to get by?  How do they make 
enough money to pay taxes, buy a car, and afford auto insurance, housing, utilities, food, and the 
all-important cellular phone?”   
“They are forced to adopt an ‘illegal mentality’ to get around the system,” he replied.   
I do not know whether T's assessment is entirely accurate but I do know that the 
sentiment he expressed was shared by several of my other friends in Italy.   
The following incident is also illustrative of the sense of weak national identity that 
circulates in contemporary Italy.  While I was in Turin, Professor Jane Desmond, one of my 
dissertation committee members and mentors, was invited to teach a two-week course entitled 
“Beyond Literature” at La Sapienza in Rome.  She graciously invited me to visit one of her 
classes.  There were approximately 13 students in the class and they were working in smaller 
groups on a project that involved pretending to be curators at a museum.  They were tasked with 
designing an exhibit that captured the culture of the United States.  During the class, I traveled 
among the groups and assumed the role of a “consultant.”  Since I was an American working in 
Italy and trying to sort out Italian culture, I found the mirrored perspective educational.   
 One group was discussing how to define persons in the United States in terms of their 
music.  One young woman mentioned the national anthem.  The rest of the members in her group 
were quick to concur and there was much nodding and making note of this suggestion.  They all 
readily agreed that the national anthem was something that is shared, revered, important, and 
common to all Americans in the United States.  Initially, I was a bit taken aback.  A certain 
rejection of the nation’s symbols (the flag, the pledge of allegiance, the national anthem) seems 
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to be in vogue, at least in the academic circles in which I frequently travel.  This has to do in part 
with a sense that these symbols have been co-opted by the right and that nationalism is 
something to be moved past.  My knee-jerk response was to explain that this is not really an 
accurate assessment but, as I thought more about it, I realized that the circles in which I travel, 
think, read, and write are not mainstream.  I am one of the outliers.  I resolved to pay more 
attention to the singing of the national anthem in the United States. 
The students in the class unequivocally agreed that people in the United States are much 
more patriotic than Italians.  They were of the opinion that Italians are not particularly patriotic 
and that people in the United States are much more united around a love of nation than their 
Italian counterparts.  This, to me, has little to do with a love or fondness for a geographical 
location and everything to do with differing perspectives on nationalism.  The U.S., by virtue of 
its size and the diversity of its people, requires national symbols to remain unified.  Italy, too, 
may require such symbols and, of course, they do exist (take, for example, the green-white-red 
tricolor flag), but there is a difference in the degree to which such symbols are embraced in Italy 
and the United States.   
Many elementary school students in the U.S. begin their school day by reciting the 
“Pledge of Allegiance” to the United States.  In the U.S., sporting events at all levels of 
competition (including my son’s Little League play-off and 5th grade basketball games) begin 
with the national anthem.  There is also an etiquette surrounding treatment of the nation’s flag 
that is taught to children in elementary school:  there are certain times that the flag can/cannot be 
displayed, the flag must be taken down in bad weather, and there is a particular way to fold the 
flag.  If this is also the case in Italy, one would never know:  the flags that hung from the 
balconies in Turin remained hanging from the balconies in Turin, day and night, rain or shine.  
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Emanuel Rota talks about the “impotence of the Italian nation-state, which manifests 
itself daily in the transformation of politics into a spectacle” (2011).  Regarding the phenomenon 
of Silvio Berlusconi and the current status of the Italian nation-state, he writes: 
 The majority of Italians who have repeatedly voted for him no longer expects solutions 
from the state in the spectacle of the struggle for power.  Some of the most successful 
literary creations of the past decade openly present an anarchical situation presenting the 
impotence of the state in all of its nakedness and attributing to it a conspiratorial role 
(Rota 2011).  
The “impotence of the Italian nation-state” has been keenly felt by LGBTI activists in the 
struggle over recognition of rights.  Until recently there was no sense of movement or anything 
going forward in terms of recognition for same-sex couples.  Now LGBTI activists in Italy are 
beginning to see progress.  This, however, is due to the influence of the EU and the Italian 
judiciary, rather than to Italian lawmakers.  
It is questionable whether EU citizenship emerges on the condition of being more 
democratic in Italy, especially if one defines "democratic" as something characterized by free 
and equal participation in government or in governmental decision-making processes.  I say this 
because developments in this area have been (as discussed in the foregoing chapters) at the 
behest of the Italian courts and are a product of judicial law-making rather than politics.  Further, 
the processes that have led to further delineation of a European citizenship in Italy have been 
neither direct nor necessarily intentional.  Yet despite this, there is a palpable sense that the EU is 
competent to mediate or resolve the social conflict inherent in the contemporary struggle for 
recognition of rights on behalf of same-sex couples in Italian society. 
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Creating EU Citizens through Free Movement   
As “rights” become increasingly attached to European citizenship, differences in member 
states’ recognition of rights become more pronounced.  In response, there is a push to articulate 
and integrate a framework of rights for the EU, and much of this has been accomplished 
haphazardly through interpretation of EU laws concerning the rights of EU citizens.  To date, 
much of the existing substance of EU citizenship is to be found in the “free movement” rights.171  
EU citizenship confers the right to move and reside freely within the member states.  The rights 
associated with free movement are essential not only for the functioning of the internal market 
but also to promote a shared sense of European identity.   
The original underlying logic of the “free movement provisions” was of an economic 
nature:  free movement of workers was the natural economic counterpart of the free movement 
of goods, services, and capital.  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of April 29, 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of member states defines free movement of EU 
citizens and their "family members" as a basic right.  Because it is a directive, its text is not 
                                                 
171  The Treaty on European Union (one of the two texts known as the Treaty of Lisbon) highlights the importance 
of freedom of movement: 
 
 The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in 
which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.  Article 3, 
paragraph 2, Treaty on European Union. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights also stresses the importance of free movement: 
 
 1.  Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States. 
 
 2.  Freedom of movement and residence may be granted, in accordance with the Treaties, to nationals of 
third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State.  Article 45, Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  
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directly applicable but has to instead be transposed into the national legislation of the EU 
member states.  The member states were given a deadline of April 30, 2006, to transpose the 
directive but several states missed the deadline by a few months.172   
 The increased economic interconnectedness of the EU countries means that more and 
more same-sex couples choose, or are required, to relocate to or live in another country that may 
not recognize their union.  Due to substantial differences in the recognition of same-sex 
partnerships in the EU, married and cohabitating same-sex couples from EU member states that 
grant rights lose many of those rights when they move to Italy or another EU member state that 
does not recognize their partnership.173  Same-sex couples in the EU thus face obstacles to free 
movement that married heterosexual couples do not, and this leads to a situation where 
differences between the national legal systems create barriers to the full attainment of a common 
European identity in the form of European citizenship.  This is recognized as a problem.  Viviane 
Reding, the current EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, has been 
quoted as stating: 
If you live in a legally-recognised same-sex partnership, or marriage, in country A, you 
have the right – and this is a fundamental right – to take this status and that of your partner 
to country B.  If not, it is a violation of EU law, so there is no discussion about this.  This 
is absolutely clear, and we do hesitate on this.174  
                                                 
172  In Italy, the directive was implemented into Italian legislation with Legislative Decree n. 30 of February 6, 2007.  
In order to obtain permission to reside in Italy, an EU citizen or family member of an EU citizen must submit an 
application to the Questura (the general headquarters of the local police) of the province where the applicant is 
residing.   
 
173 For example, two women legally married in Spain may lose pension, inheritance, next-of-kin, and/or child 
custody rights when moving to Italy. 
 
174  Viviane Reding, European Parliament, Discrimination of same-sex married or in civil-partnership couples 
(debate), September 7, 2010, European Parliament (Strasbourg).  A summary of the debate is available here:  
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In reality, however, this is not always been the case.  Several EU member states discriminate 
against same-sex couples who want to move or travel within their country, and the failure to 
harmonize recognition of family relationships among member states has resulted in the 
attribution of different statuses of EU citizenship linked to sexual orientation.  Same-sex couples 
continue to be denied the full benefits of EU citizenship.  Instead of “unifying” Europeans, this 
creates division by separating people into different classes of citizenship. 
An EU of "Rights"? 
The ongoing battle underlying discussions about “rights” in the EU is one that must be 
resolved if further integration is to occur.  At its heart, this battle is not only about what 
constitutes a "right" but also about where they come from, who holds them, who does not -- a 
battle whose outcome has important repercussions for notions of European citizenship and the 
project of European integration.  This clash pits those who look to Europe as a potential world 
leader in the recognition of human rights and see these rights as originating in secular, human-
made rules against those who envision a united Europe founded on its “Christian” roots and see 
“natural law” as the legitimate source of rights. 
In their book, Religious America, Secular Europe, authors Peter Berger, Grace Davie, 
and Effie Fokas briefly talk about the notion of civil religion (2008).  Civil religion has to do 
with the search for a core of values around which a nation-state can be created and sustained 
(Bellah 1967; Ferrari 2010).  When a particular religion or culture is unable to fulfill the unifying 
role, civil religion steps in and offers a set of values, symbols and rituals upon which the social 
                                                 
http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/press-releases/european-parliament-debates-recognition-of-same-sex-unions/, accessed March 
7, 2014. 
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cohesion of the nation can be constructed (Ferrari 2010).   According to professor of law and 
religion Silvio Ferrari, “This cluster of historically rooted values and principles constitutes the 
framework within which national identity is redefined, thus allowing changes to take place 
without breaking too sharply from the past” (2010:750).   
Professor of American Studies at the University of Copenhagen Helle Porsdam queries 
whether human rights can be molded into a common set of transcendent principles that can form 
the basis of a civil religion for Europe (2012).  She notes that, for some time now, one can see an 
attempt to develop a European version of a specific U.S. discourse on human rights that Mary 
Ann Glendon referred to as "rights talk."  Glendon's "rights talk" is a perspective on human 
rights that grants law the status of a civil religion of sorts (1991).  According to Porsdam, the 
counter-argument to "rights talk" requires Europeans to forego the legal and cultural discourse of 
right as "trumps" and focus instead on political discourse about conflicting conceptions of “the 
good,” regardless of whether such conceptions are expressed in terms of "rights" (2003).        
The current struggle over rights for same-sex couples in Italy is indicative of this critical 
deadlock in the project of European integration, the resolution of which will significantly 
influence the future personality of the European Union (EU).  By contextualizing the struggle 
over recognition of rights within the project of European integration, I expose the larger battle 
within the EU over “rights” and their foundations.  This battle pits the vision of a unified Europe 
based on its “Christian” roots against those who see the EU as a potential role model in the 
recognition of rights based on secular notions of social justice.  This represents a shift from a 
previous conception of European integration in the context of rights that viewed market 
integration as a means of securing the welfare state, and the development of rights as a side 
effect of this process.  Although this battle over “rights” and their foundations can be seen in 
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other areas as well (for example, the arguments  surrounding the new Hungarian Constitution), 
the struggle over rights for same-sex couples in Italy highlights many of the salient issues at 
stake in the resolution of this conflict and is, therefore, worth consideration.     
These values and principles serve to distinguish who belongs from who does not belong, 
and it is in this way that civil religion relates to citizenship.  Civil religion works to demarcate 
“full” citizens from “legal” citizens:  it is understood that “full” citizenship is more than a matter 
of status and rights.  It requires shared values.  As Ferrari states, “[B]eing a good citizen . . . 
entails sharing a common narrative, partaking in some foundational myths, and developing a 
sense of belonging, solidarity, and commitment” (2010:750).  According to this view, rights and 
their underlying values are situated at the beginning of a much longer and complicated process of 
nation-building.  It is, therefore, important to determine such matters from the outset of the 
process or risk running afoul of the goal (which in this case is unification).   
This also holds for the building of an entity such as the EU.  In the case of the EU, 
however, the establishment of a common set of values, symbols and rituals around which a 
cohesive citizenry can form has proven elusive.  Anything akin to a “civil religion” of the EU is 
subject to contestation, thereby continuously shifting and evolving.  As I will discuss in Chapter 
7, the Roman Catholic Church (henceforth, Church) is a major proponent of the latter vision.  
The absence of a unifying civil religion in Europe creates a space in which the Church is also 
able to insert itself.  In the debates surrounding recognition of rights for same-sex couples in 
Italy, one can see the waging of this much larger battle for the soul of Europe.  As I will 
illustrate, it is through processes such as this struggle that a “European” identity is nourished or 
refuted, that European integration is furthered or mired.  In the fight over rights for same-sex 
  
231 
 
couples in Italy, the persistent division between a secular notion of the origins of rights and the 
idea of a transcendental “God” as the source of rights is crystallized.   
In the next chapter, I consider two European institutions in particular:  the Council of 
Europe and its European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).  Both are central to the EU and have played an important role in the recognition of rights 
on behalf of LGBTI persons in Europe.  The ECJ is an institution of the EU; the Council of 
Europe is not.  Through the jurisprudence of the European courts, one can see an attempt to bring 
disparate national laws into “harmony” and the development of a European policy with respect to 
treatment of same-sex couples.  Again, as in the Italian situation, these processes are occurring in 
the courts and indicate unwillingness on the part of the law-makers to take charge and articulate 
a comprehensive framework.    
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 9.  ILGA-Europe Rainbow Map, May 2013 
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Figure 10.   Flag displays in Turin.  (Author's photo, taken October 2, 2011.) 
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Figure 11.  Signs outside Officine Grandi Riparazioni "Fare Gli Italiani” exhibit commemorating the 150 year 
anniversary of Italy's unification in Turin. (Author's photo, taken October 12, 2011.)  
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Table 
EU Member State Rainbow Europe, May 2011, Score Rainbow Europe, May 2013 
Austria 6 43% 
Belgium 10 67% 
Bulgaria 2 18% 
Croatia 6 48% 
Cyprus -2 20% 
Czech Republic 3 35% 
Denmark  9 57% 
Estonia 2 29% 
Finland 6 47% 
France 5 64% 
Germany  10 54% 
Greece 2 28% 
Hungary 7 55% 
Ireland 5 36% 
Italy 0 19% 
Latvia 0 20% 
Lithuania 1 21% 
Luxembourg 4 28% 
Malta 0 35% 
Netherlands 10 60% 
Poland 1 22% 
Portugal 10 65% 
Romania 2 31% 
Slovakia 1 27% 
Slovenia 5 35% 
Spain 12 65% 
Sweden 10 65% 
United Kingdom 12.5 77% 
 
Table 1.  Table showing Rainbow Europe Map scores for EU member states for years 2011 and 2013. 
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Chapter 6:  The Council of Europe and the European Courts:  Creating European Families 
In the last chapter, I sought to distinguish between and parse out the roles played by 
Europe and the EU in advancing the recognition of rights for LGBTI persons in general and 
same-sex couples in particular.  As I demonstrated, while Europe and the EU are often conflated, 
there are differences and these differences are important to understanding the legal framework 
that structures same-sex relationships throughout Europe.  In this chapter I want to flip the 
inquiry to look at how Europe and the EU interrelate and influence one another in the articulation 
of this legal framework.  More importantly, I will show how the European courts have and 
continue to influence the Italian courts in advancing rights for same-sex couples in Italy.    
One of the points that I make in this chapter is that it is the European courts, more than 
any other European institutions, that have worked to advance the recognition of rights for same-
sex couples throughout Europe and the EU.175  Indeed, the Italian courts have relied extensively 
on the jurisprudence of the European courts to advance rights for same-sex couples in Italy.  As I 
will illustrate, recent Italian court decisions commonly reflect the language and ideas of the 
European courts and demonstrate the relevance of European law to judicial decision-making in 
Italy.   
As I broached in Chapter 1, there is something to be said about the practices, trends, and 
methodologies of legal anthropology and, to that end, this chapter is an anomaly of sorts.  Unlike 
previous chapters where I have relied on ethnography and participant-observation to lend support 
to my claims, in this chapter I adopt an approach usually undertaken by legal scholars -- that is, 
doctrinal analysis.  This is different from the customary anthropological approach to law, which 
                                                 
175 By "European courts," I am referring specifically to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) because these are the courts of relevance to the issue. 
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explores the social, political, economic, and intellectual context of enforceable norms (Moore 
2005).  From the lawyer’s perspective, legal doctrine is the law.  Comprised of judicial decisions 
that create rules or standards, legal doctrine is what is known as precedent.  It “sets the terms for 
future resolution of cases in an area” (Tiller and Cross 2006:517).  Doctrinal analysis seeks to 
explain, analyze, and criticize judicial decisions.  For the most part, social scientists (including 
legal anthropologists) tend to ignore the importance of legal doctrine as conceptualized by 
lawyers (Tiller and Cross 2006).   
In general, legal anthropologists attempt to explain the ordering of society and are likely 
to study a specific setting to find out about important issues such as “power, control and justice:  
who makes the rules, who can undo them, how they are normalized and enforced, and how they 
are morally justified” (Moore 2005:2).  They also look outside the normative setting to see what 
the possibilities are for individual and group intervention.  One of the ways legal anthropologists 
access this is by looking at “disputes,” which provides a method for entering a contested arena 
and studying vast fields of action that are not amenable to direct observation (Moore 2001:95).176  
The status of the nation-state is a subject of particular interest to legal anthropologists today, and 
many contemporary studies reckon with transnational processes.177  Up to this point, this is what 
I have tried to do.  In what follows, I will look adopt the perspective of a legal scholar, tracing a 
series of judicial decisions from the European courts to the Italian courts in order to show how 
the European courts have influenced judicial decision-making in Italy.  
In an essay published in Anthropology News entitled “Who is an Anthropologist,” 
Professor Jane Desmond talks about her experiences as an “intellectual migrant” (2009:6).  She 
                                                 
176  E.g., Greenhouse (1986); Hirsch (1998); Lazarus-Black (1997); Merry (1990); Monahan and Just (2000).  
 
177  E.g., Coutin (2000); Merry (1992, 1997); Ong (1999).   
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argues for a future anthropology “that will proactively embrace cross-disciplinary interlocutors 
in the humanities, other social sciences, the arts, law and engineering” (Desmond 2009:6).  One 
of the ways to do this is by building relationships and establishing partnerships with those in 
other intellectual arenas.  Another way is by adopting suitable methodologies from other 
disciplines.  I want to “push the envelope” here and borrow a method commonly embraced by 
legal scholars.  I do this to supplement and “round out” my analysis of the struggle over 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy.   
In 1994, legal anthropologist Annelise Riles critiqued the rigid opposition between the 
disciplines of law and anthropology in a piece titled “Representing In-Between:  Law, 
Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity.”  In this article, Riles suggests that lawyers 
and anthropologists have learned little from each other, and that there is a sense of ambivalence 
among legal anthropologists with respect to the terrain they share with lawyers (1994:650).  She 
concludes that the contribution of interdisciplinary scholarship to legal studies lies in its exposé 
of the tension between normative and reflexive approaches to legal problems (Riles 1994).  My 
goal here is not to expose this underlying tension so much as to reckon with the normative 
aspects of my project.  Many legal anthropologists have studied relationships between language 
and law (e.g., Conley and O’Barr [1990, 1998]; Mertz [1988, 1992]), but few take the time to 
confront the normative aspects of judicial decision-making by systematically analyzing how one 
court decision influences another, especially in a transnational perspective.  In a study dealing 
with the ways in which the EU influences the judicial recognition of rights for same-sex couples 
in Italy, I would be remiss if I did not show how the case law has developed over time in Italy, 
and how it has been directly influenced by the legal doctrine of the European courts.  I see this as 
an important piece of evidence. 
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I will begin this chapter with a general discussion regarding family law in Europe.  I offer 
a brief history of efforts at family law reform in the EU and a statement of the current legal 
situation in terms of the relationship between the EU and its member states.  While there have 
been attempts to “harmonize” the family law of the member states, to date such efforts have 
made little progress.  The EU continues to invoke notions of subsidiarity to declare family law a 
matter best left to the discretion of the member states.  This is problematic as it affects the free 
movement of European citizens and their “family” members, and creates disparate categories of 
EU citizenship that privilege traditional hetero-normative families and all-too-often 
disenfranchise so-called alternative families.   
Despite the fact that the EU has been unwilling to directly involve itself in the 
formulation and implementation of a supranational family law, through piecemeal legislation and 
the activities of the CJEU and the ECtHR, the EU is increasingly embroiled in the national 
family laws of its member states.  This frequently occurs in addition to the opportunities created 
in member states such as Italy where, as we saw in Chapter 4, the courts have taken it upon 
themselves to adopt creative solutions to the potentially problematic legal situations that arise 
due to differences between national law and EU law, especially with respect to the free 
movement provisions. Through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU, one can see the 
emergence of a “European family law” in the area of rights for same-sex couples.    
The ECtHR is part of the Council of Europe.  In order to properly situate the ECtHR, I 
will begin the following section with a discussion regarding the Council of Europe, its 
relationship to the EU, and some of its pertinent activities with respect to LGBTI persons.  
Although the ECtHR is not an institution of the EU, its decisions are binding on the EU member 
states, all of which are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.  For this 
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reason, I will conduct a doctrinal analysis of recent case law from the ECtHR dealing with 
relationships between same-sex couples.  The current trajectory of ECtHR case law shows that, 
as rights increasingly attach to opposite-sex unmarried couples, it is unlikely that the state will be 
able to deny those same rights to same-sex couples in Europe.  This trend shows that, over time, 
same-sex couples can expect the ECtHR to function as an ally in the assertion of their rights.  
The particular relationship between the ECtHR and the EU will also be elaborated in this section 
dealing with the ECtHR.   
In the last section of this chapter I will discuss the CJEU and the recent spate of 
jurisprudence emanating from the Court with respect to same-sex couples.  I will relate this to 
ECtHR case law and show how the recent CJEU trajectory demonstrates an expansive 
understanding regarding the rights that attach to same-sex couples living together in legally 
recognized relationships other than marriage.  While, according to ECtHR and CJEU 
jurisprudence, it is up to the member states to determine whether to provide legal recognition to 
same sex couples, once the state decides to do this, a panoply of rights attaches to the legal 
institution.  If the member state, as in the case of Italy, refuses to grant recognition such rights do 
not necessarily attach.  Nevertheless, CJEU case law has influenced Italian case law in this area.  
The finding by the Court of Appeals of Milan that the cohabitating same-sex partner of a 
beneficiary of a mutual fund could not be denied benefits (discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 
and 4) is reminiscent of the recent line of CJEU cases in its treatment of same-sex couples as 
comparable to married couples.   
A Family Law for the EU? 
 As people move around more, the potential for international relationships or marriages 
increases and this creates a need for harmonization of the laws governing these relationships 
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among member states.  Within the EU, however, there is a notion that family law in general and 
the regulation of marriage in particular is something that is to be left to the discretion of the 
member states.  As the EU has become increasingly integrated and EU citizens have become 
more mobile, this has led to all sorts of problems in the area of family law, including issues 
concerning the recognition of same-sex marriage, spousal maintenance, child support, parental 
responsibilities, divorce, and inheritance.  And while the European Council of Ministers is 
empowered to pass regulations requiring cross-state recognition of marriages, it has yet to do so 
(Weiss 2007).   
As it stands today in Europe, and more specifically in the EU, family law is a matter that 
is left to the nation-state.  The EU can only make laws in areas where the treaties give it the 
specific competence to do so, and it has no specific competence to make laws regulating divorce, 
maintenance, or parental responsibility.  Problems arise when the parties are not living in the 
same country or are not nationals of the same country.  When this happens, it is not always clear 
which country’s courts should make the decisions, which country’s laws should apply, nor how a 
decision made in one country can be implemented in another.  To further complicate matters, 
each country has its own rules about how this conflict of laws should be dealt with.  These 
problems are not particular to the EU and fall within the domain of private international law.178  
Private international law encompasses the interrelated areas of jurisdiction, applicable law, and 
recognition and enforcement of decisions.        
Fortunately, the EU does have competence to promote judicial cooperation in civil 
matters which have cross-border implications, and has enacted a number of regulations dealing 
                                                 
178   These types of conflicts are also common in the United States, where family law is generally a matter left for the 
states.   
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with judicial cooperation in civil matters.  In general, these regulations are based on the principle 
of mutual recognition, which is a fancy way of saying that decisions that are lawfully made in 
one member state should be recognized and enforced in other member states and that the 
procedures for accomplishing this should be as simple as possible.  So, while there is no unified 
family law in the EU, the EU does have an interest in making sure that decisions made in one 
country can be implemented in another, and in determining which country has jurisdiction to 
hear a particular case.  Since 2001, the EU has had rules in effect that govern the enforcement of 
matrimonial orders (i.e., divorce, separation, and annulment) and parental responsibility (mainly 
custody and access).  
In fact, it can be argued that there has been an increased unification at the EU-level of 
rules governing conflicts of laws in family matters.  However, although there may be increasing 
unification at the level of conflicts-of-laws, the same is not true for the substantive family law of 
the member states.  At the EU level, there is no standard legal definition of "family" or 
"marriage."  It is, therefore, within the discretion of the hosting member state to decide whether a 
same-sex marriage is recognized as "marriage" in that state.      
 While at the present moment, there is no unified EU family law, there is a movement to 
“harmonize” the family laws of EU member states.  Over the past two decades, various political, 
professional and academic groups have been pushing for the development of a European Civil 
Code.179  Those who advocate this position believe that the creation of a common European legal 
                                                 
179 E.g., Resolution [of the European Parliament] on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member 
States, Off J EC 1989 C158/400 (May 26, 1989); Resolution [of the European Parliament] on the Harmonization of 
Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member States, Off J EC 1994 C205/518 (May 6, 1994).  Both resolutions 
call for a “European Code of Private Law.”  See also Boele-Woelki (2005); Hartkamp et. al. (1994); Lando (1992); 
Smits (1998). 
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culture through a shared code in the areas of private law represents one of the last barriers to the 
realization of a common European identity (Boele-Woelki 2005; Marella 2006; Smits 1998).180  
There is also discernible “top down” pressure at the European level to harmonize the respective 
national family laws of the EU member states.  The European Parliament has vocalized its 
support for a code of private law and there is growing concern within the Council that 
differences in family law between member states undermine the free movement of persons 
(Boele-Woelkl 2005; Bradley 2004).   
 In 2001, a group of self-appointed scholars and experts on European family law from 
various EU member states got together and established the Commission on European Family 
Law (CEFL).  One of the main reasons or justifications for the CEFL project is that laws 
regulating domestic relationships are a major component of political economy.  Family law 
complements taxation, social and labor market policies, and therefore has implications for 
income and class equality.  The main goal of the CEFL is to develop Principles of European 
Family Law that will establish the most suitable means for the harmonization of family law 
within Europe.181  What this means is that the CEFL is looking at the existing family laws of the 
EU member states and trying to identify a “common core” of legal policy among them and to 
suggest models of a “better” family law.  This is a purely academic initiative and the CEFL has 
no recognized authority.   
                                                 
180 Private law is that part of the law that deals with relationships between individuals and includes (for example) 
family law, contract law, torts, and property law.  It is distinguished from public law which governs relationships 
between individuals and the state and includes constitutional law, criminal law, and administrative law. 
 
181 Harmonization is not the same as "unification," and refers only to reducing the differences between provisions, 
thereby making them more similar and therefore more compatible. 
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 So far, the CEFL project has been very slow moving and it seems to take around 5-6 
years to develop each set of principles.  In December 2004, CEFL published its first and second 
sets of principles regarding divorce and maintenance between former spouses.  The principles 
developed by CEFL were based on responses to a questionnaire submitted by family law experts 
in the respective member states.  CEFL used these responses to prepare twenty-two national 
reports that set forth the laws governing divorce and maintenance as they existed in 2002, and 
then used this comparative material to formulate its principles for a harmonized family law in the 
areas of divorce and maintenance.  On the basis of national reports, CEFL presented its third set 
of principles dealing with parental responsibilities in 2007, and a fourth set on property relations 
between spouses in 2013.   
CEFL hosts a conference approximately every two years.  I was able to attend its fourth 
conference "Commission on European Family Law:  The Future of Family Property in Europe," 
which was held at Cambridge University in April 2010.  The conference was designed to foster 
the exchange of ideas about international and comparative family law in Europe, and was well-
attended by academics and practitioners from throughout Europe and elsewhere, including 
several academics from U.S. law schools.  One issue that came up during the conference was the 
purely academic nature of the CEFL project.   
During a panel presentation on the initial results of the CEFL project, one of the 
conference participants asked the panel to comment on the chances of implementation.  The 
conference participant wanted to know whether CEFL was looking at the cultural acceptability 
of the principles being proposed.  The point the conference participant was trying to make is that 
implementation requires consent and that this requires people to “buy into” the proposed 
principles.  There was much hemming and hawing as the panel participants passed the 
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microphone down the line.  No one wanted to answer this question and the microphone ended up 
with the CEFL Chair, Professor Katharina Boele-Woelki.  An audible murmur went through the 
audience when she admitted that the CEFL project was a purely academic venture and that CEFL 
had not and did not intend to explore the sociological implications of the proposed principles.   
  The CEFL project largely ignores the wider historical, political, and social settings in 
which a nation's family law is embedded (see e.g., Jeppesen-de Boer 2008; Antokolskaia, ed. 
2007; Boele-Woelki, et. al. 2007; 2004; Marella 2006; Antokolskaia 2003).  By focusing on the 
law as something that is written and able to be universally transplanted into the respective EU 
member states, the CEFL project overlooks the cultural power of law by ignoring its capacity “to 
produce meanings, shape identities, and define relationships in the context of state power” 
(Goldstein 2003:23).  Further, because the principles formulated by the CEFL are of an academic 
nature and not grounded in historical or ethnographic detail, it is likely that they will prove 
difficult to implement in a country such as Italy, where vital and organized resistance to change 
continues to thwart legislative efforts to change the law. So far, there is little evidence that the 
development of these principles is having any real effect on the family laws of the member 
states.   
As noted in chapter 3, family law plays a special role in establishing and reinforcing a 
particular vision of the social order (Bradley 2004).  At the present moment, the absence of a 
harmonized EU family law presents an obstacle to the formation of a unified legal space and the 
creation of a common European identity (Boele-Woelki 2005; Bradley 2004).  Boele-Woelki 
argues:   
Family law touches upon the very essence of people’s daily lives as no other field of law 
does.  The large-scale differences between the national legal systems within a Europe 
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without frontiers constitute a serious impediment to attaining a common European 
identity in the form of a European citizenship.  It is generally acknowledged that to date 
in cross-border situations people cannot rely on the continuity of their family 
relationships when changing residence (2005:161).  
This is especially true in the case of same-sex relationships, where differences between the 
national legal systems create barriers to the attainment of a common European identity in the 
form of European citizenship. The failure to harmonize recognition of family relationships 
among member states results in the attribution of different statuses of EU citizenship linked to 
sexual orientation and gender identity, and same-sex couples are all too frequently denied the full 
benefits of EU citizenship.  Given the reluctance of lawmakers to develop a harmonized family 
law, persons living in the EU are forced to look to the European courts to resolve family law 
disputes with cross-border implications.    
The Council of Europe    
 The Council of Europe is often confused with the European Council and the Council of 
the European Union.  The European Council is made up of the heads of state or government of 
the member states along with its president and the president of the EU Commission.  It is the 
institution responsible for defining the general political direction and priorities of the EU, and 
does not have a legislative function.  By contrast, the Council of the European Union, also 
informally known as the EU Council, is the EU institution where the member states' 
governmental representatives (i.e., the ministers of each member state responsible for a given 
area) meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies.  The frequency and composition of the Council 
of the European Union meetings vary depending on the issues under consideration.  Although 
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there is overlap, the Council of Europe is not a body of the EU.182  What leads to confusion, 
perhaps, is the fact that the Council of Europe shares certain symbols, such as the flag and the 
anthem, with the EU.   
 The Council of Europe is an international organization headquartered in Strasbourg, 
France, with the goal of promoting cooperation among all European countries in the areas of 
legal standards, human rights, democratic development, the rule of law, and cultural cooperation.  
Founded in 1949, it now has 47 member states, which include all of the 28 EU member states.183  
The Council of Europe has no law-making authority but can and does make use of standards, 
charters, and conventions to facilitate its work.      
The most well-known institutions of the Council of Europe are the ECtHR, which 
enforces the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Pharmacopoeia 
Commission, which is responsible for setting quality standards for pharmaceutical products in 
Europe.  The Council of Europe’s statutory bodies include the Committee of Ministers, which 
consists of the foreign ministers of each member state, the Parliamentary Assembly, which is 
made up of MPs from the parliament of each member state, and the Secretary General, who is in 
charge of the secretariat of the Council of Europe.  Finally, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
is an independent institution situated within the Council of Europe tasked with promoting 
awareness of and respect for human rights in member states.   
                                                 
182 It is also separate and distinct from the International Court of Justice, which is a judicial body of the United 
Nations and is located in The Hague.  
 
183  Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom 
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The Council of Europe has been proactive in monitoring the human rights situation of 
LGBTI persons throughout its member states.  In 2011, the Commissioner for Human Rights 
published a comprehensive report based on the largest study to date regarding homophobia, 
transphobia, and discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
47 member states of the Council of Europe.184  The report, which is intended as a resource for 
dialogue with and between governmental authorities and other stakeholders, contains a socio-
legal analysis of the situation of LGBTI persons in the Council of Europe member states.  It is 
based on data and information made available by public authorities, national human rights 
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic experts in the member states.  
Representatives from the Council of Europe disseminated copies of the report (in both print and 
USB formats) at the ILGA-Europe Annual Meeting in Turin, and held a special workshop to 
present the report and explore how it could be used by ILGA-Europe and other human rights and 
civil society organizations to achieve the recommendations set forth in the report.   
In 2010, prior to the release of the Commissioner's report, the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe adopted the first ever international instrument dealing specifically with 
LBGTI issues:  Committee of Ministers Recommendation (2010) 5 (CM/Rec(2010)5).  The 
recommendation sets forth a range of measures to be undertaken by the member states to combat 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity.  According to the 
general statement that corresponds with CM/Rec(2010)5 on the Council of Europe's website:  
"The purpose [of the recommendation] is not to create new rights, but to ensure that every person 
enjoys equal rights and dignity.  CM/Rec(2010)5 affirms the principle that 'neither cultural, 
                                                 
184 Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011, "Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
in Europe."  Strasbourg, France:  Council of Europe Publishing.   
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traditional nor religious values, nor the rules of a "dominant culture" can be invoked to justify 
hate speech or any other form of discrimination, including on grounds of sexual orientation or 
gender identity.'"185  Of note in CM/Rec(2010)5 are the following specific recommendations 
related to right to respect for private and family life:  
 23. Where national legislation confers rights and obligations on unmarried couples, 
member states should ensure that it applies in a non-discriminatory way to both same-sex 
and different-sex couples, including with respect to survivor’s pension benefits and 
tenancy rights.  
 
 24. Where national legislation recognises registered same-sex partnerships, member 
states should seek to ensure that their legal status and their rights and obligations are 
equivalent to those of heterosexual couples in a comparable situation. 
 
 25.  Where national legislation does not recognise nor confer rights or obligations on 
registered same-sex partnerships and unmarried couples, member states are invited to 
consider the possibility of providing, without discrimination of any kind, including 
against different sex couples, same-sex couples with legal or other means to address the 
practical problems related to the social reality in which they live. 
 
 26.  Taking into account that the child’s best interests should be the primary 
consideration in decisions regarding the parental responsibility for, or guardianship of a 
                                                 
185 See Council of Europe website, Democracy, “Combating Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual 
Discrimination or Gender Identity,” http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/lgbt/default_EN.asp, accessed March 7, 2014. 
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child, member states should ensure that such decisions are taken without discrimination 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity.  
 
 27. Taking into account that the child’s best interests should be the primary consideration 
in decisions regarding adoption of a child, member states whose national legislation 
permits single individuals to adopt children should ensure that the law is applied without 
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.  
  
 28. Where national law permits assisted reproductive treatment for single women, 
member states should seek to ensure access to such treatment without discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation.    
Thus, while the recommendation stops far short of calling for marriage equality, it does ask 
member states to consider providing a means for same-sex couples to give legal order to their 
family lives, and includes consideration of the specific situation of same-sex families with 
children.  
The European Court of Human Rights 
 The Relationship of the ECtHR to the EU  
The most significant way that the Council of Europe influences the struggle for 
recognition of rights on behalf of same-sex couples in Italy and the rest of its member states is 
through the judgments of the ECtHR.  As mentioned above, the ECtHR is the enforcement body 
of the ECHR, which offers protection of fundamental civil and political rights.  Individuals who 
believe their rights have been violated in a member state can bring their case before the ECtHR 
upon exhaustion of domestic remedies. Although all of the EU member states are also parties to 
the ECHR, at the present time, the EU is not.  The EU is, however, legally obligated under the 
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Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on December 1, 2009, to accede to the ECHR.  This 
means that (for the moment) the ECHR and its judicial mechanism do not formally apply to acts 
undertaken by the EU.  Proponents of the EU's accession to the ECHR believe that it will 
strengthen the protection of human rights in Europe by subjugating the EU's legal system to 
independent external control and by closing gaps in legal protection by giving European citizens 
the same protection against acts of the EU as they now enjoy from member states.  In the interim, 
the member states of the EU, because they are parties to the Convention, are obligated to 
conform to the ECHR even when they are applying or implementing EU law. 
 Certain aspects of the EU's accession to the ECHR are complicated.  For example, to 
ensure the proper functioning of the EU's judicial system (and to comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity inherent in the ECHR) requires a mechanism empowering the CJEU to hear and deal 
with questions concerning the validity of an EU act before the matter is brought before the 
ECtHR.186  Nevertheless, as can and will be seen through its case law (discussed below), the 
CJEU habitually applies the ECHR and refers to the case law of the ECtHR in its decisions.  
   The ECHR and LGBTI Rights 
The provisions of the ECHR that are most frequently invoked by LGBTI litigants to 
assert rights are Articles 8, 12 and 14, which provide as follows:   
 Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
                                                 
186 I.e., the idea that political power should be exercised by the smallest or least central unit of government – in this 
case that certain matters are best left to the member states. 
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 Article 12 – Right to marry and found a family 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to 
the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
 Article 14 – Prohibition against discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.  
Recognizing Same-Sex Couples as "Families":  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria 
 The ECtHR's most notable case to date regarding the rights of same-sex couples is Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria, which was decided on June 24, 2010.  In the Schalk and Kopf case, the 
applicants were a same-sex couple in a stable partnership living in Vienna.  In September 2002, 
they requested permission to marry from the Austrian authorities.  Their request was denied by 
the Vienna Municipal Office, which took the position that marriage could only be contracted 
between two persons of the opposite sex.  This position was upheld by the Austrian courts.  After 
their case was dismissed by the Austrian Constitutional Court, the couple lodged an application 
with the ECtHR on August 5, 2004.  In their complaint, the applicants argued that the refusal of 
the authorities to allow them to marry violated ECHR Article 12.  In addition, relying on Article 
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14 in conjunction with Article 8, they asserted that they were discriminated against due to their 
sexual orientation because they did not have the right to marry and had no other possibility for 
having their relationship recognized under the law.    
 Before the case was heard by the ECtHR, the Registered Partnership Act entered into 
force in Austria, on January 1, 2010.  The act provided same-sex couples with a formal 
mechanism for giving recognition and legal effect to their relationships.  Many of the same rights 
and duties granted to married couples were extended to registered partners, but substantial 
differences remained.  For example, registered partners are not allowed to adopt children.  In 
addition, step-child adoption and artificial insemination are available only to married couples.  
 In its decision, the ECtHR first considered whether the right to marry granted to "men 
and women" under Article 12 of the ECHR could be applied to same-sex couples.  The ECtHR 
found that the procreation of children is no longer a decisive element of civil marriage and 
considered that in another case it had held that the inability to conceive a child could not in itself 
remove the right to marry.  The Court observed that, looked at in isolation, the wording of 
Article 12 does not prohibit marriage between two men or two women.  However, when Article 
12 is juxtaposed with other provisions of the ECHR, which grant rights and freedoms to 
"everyone" and state that "no one" is subject to certain types of prohibited treatment, the choice 
of wording in Article 12 must be regarded as deliberate, especially when one considers the 
historical context in which the ECHR was adopted (i.e., the 1950s, when marriage was 
understood in the so-called “traditional” sense of being between a man and a woman).  The fact 
that the case law of the Court requires that the ECHR be interpreted in light of present day 
conditions was not enough, however, to save the applicants' claim.  The ECtHR noted that, while 
there had been major social changes, among the Council of Europe member states there was no 
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consensus regarding same-sex marriage, and found that present-day conditions did not permit the 
conclusion that Article 12 should be interpreted as requiring member states to provide access to 
marriage for same-sex couples: 
 [I]t cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants' complaint.  However, 
as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to 
regulation by the national law of the Contracting State. 
 
 In that connection the Court observes that marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural 
connotations which may differ largely from one society to another.  The Court reiterates 
that it must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national 
authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society.  Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria (ECtHR 30141/04 June 24, 2010), ¶¶ 61 and 62.187 
 The Court also considered whether there was a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 8.  The Court noted that it has been established in case law that in order for there to be a 
violation of Article 14, there must be a difference in the treatment of person "in relevantly 
similar" situations, and that the difference in treatment is deemed discriminatory if it has no 
"objective and reasonable" justification.  The Court first addressed the issue of whether same-sex 
relationships like that of the applicants' fell within the notion of "private life" and constituted 
"family life" within the meaning of Article 8.  Because over the past decade there had been a 
rapid evolution of social attitudes toward same-sex couples and because a considerable number 
                                                 
187 It is worth noting that the ECtHR referenced Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union in its argumentation as support for the proposition that the right to marry protected in Article 12 of the ECHR 
is not necessarily limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex:  “Regard being had to Article 9 of 
the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all 
circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex."    
  
255 
 
of member states now granted such couples legal recognition, the Court concluded that the 
applicants' relationship fell within the notion of "family life."  In previous cases, the ECtHR had 
held repeatedly that particularly serious reasons were required to justify different treatment based 
on sexual orientation.  However, reading the ECHR as a whole, and considering the conclusion 
the Court had just reached that Article 12 did not require member states to grant same-sex 
couples the right to marry, the Court was unable to agree with applicants' position that such an 
obligation could be derived from Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
 The Court considered the effects of the entry into force of the Registered Partnership Act 
in Austria, observing that the new act gave applicants the right to have their relationship formally 
recognized.  The Court determined that it was not up to it to decide whether the lack of any 
means for legal recognition for same-sex couples (as is the case in Italy) would violate Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8.  Further, the Court was not persuaded by the argument that if 
a State chose to provide legal recognition to same-sex couples, it was obligated to confer a status 
on them which corresponded to marriage in every respect.  Although there were substantial 
differences between the Registered Partnership Act and marriage law in Austria, this 
corresponded to the trend in other member states and the Court did not have to examine each of 
these differences in detail.  In light of these findings, the Court concluded (by a margin of four 
votes to three) that there was no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.   
 While the results were disappointing to LGBTI activists fighting for marriage equality in 
Europe (including in Italy, where the results of the decision were discussed in detail at the Certi 
Diritti 4th Annual Congress held in Rome in November 2010), this was the first time that the 
ECtHR referred to same-sex unions as "families" in reference to Article 8.  The decision 
therefore represented an important shift in the Court's reasoning.  In addition, the ECtHR did not 
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foreclose the possibility of marriage equality in the future, stating that it "would no longer 
consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 [of the ECHR] must in all circumstances 
be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex."  Although to date the ECtHR 
continues to refuse to recognize a right to marry on behalf of same-sex couples, in subsequent 
cases, the Court has found discrimination where same-sex couples are treated differently than 
similarly situated unmarried couples.  This has led to some interesting results, which I will 
discuss below after a brief reconsideration of the Italian Court of Cassation case (n. 4184/2012).  
In the Italian Court of Cassation case, we see a direct link to the ECtHR's decision in Schalk and 
Kopf. 
 Schalk and Kopf Speaks to the Italian Court of Cassation 
 As noted in Chapter 4, in articulating its argument, the Italian Court of Cassation 
mobilized European law in significant ways, making extensive references to the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU), and to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria played an integral role in the Court of Cassation's decision.  As in Schalk and Kopf, the 
Italian case involved a same-sex couple who was refused registration of their marriage by Italian 
authorities and appealed.  Although in Schalk and Kopf the ECtHR ultimately rejects the appeal 
and finds that marriage regulation is to be left to the member states, the European judges pave 
the way for the Italian Court of Cassation to find in favor of the existence and validity of same-
sex marriages and make it possible for the Italian court to affirm that same-sex relationships fall 
within the notion of "family life."   
 To begin, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria makes it possible for the Italian Court of Cassation 
to read Article 12 of the ECHR as recognizing that the "right to marry" includes the "right for 
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same-sex couples to marry" (4184/2012:64).  With respect to Article 14 of the ECHR, the 
ECtHR for the first time finds that same-sex marriages fall within the notion of "family life," 
making it conceivable for the Italian judges to interpret Schalk and Kopf as doing away with 
heterosexuality as a necessary condition of marriage.  In this way, Schalk and Kopf generates the 
possibility of same-sex marriage in Italy.  In its statements, the Court of Cassation goes well 
beyond what the EU provisions and jurisprudence require.  In fact, in its interpretation of Schalk 
and Kopf, the Court of Cassation arguably calls into question Article 12 of the ECHR and Article 
9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), both of which establish 
that marriage is to be regulated by national laws.   
In its invocation of Schalk and Kopf the Italian Court of Cassation looks to "Europe" as a 
place of sexual emancipation and the locus of recognition for same-sex couples and, in doing so, 
the Court conflates "Europe" with certain European countries that denote a more progressive 
stance toward same-sex couples.  This conflation is necessary to sustain its position.  After all, if 
one considers "Europe" (or even the member states of the Council of Europe), there are many 
places like Italy that exist on the so-called periphery and cannot be said to embrace the 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  One only has to look to Russia and its "anti-gay 
propaganda" law for an acute example.  Although the Court of Cassation arguably over-infuses 
the Schalk and Kopf case with meaning, its decision to treat similarly-situated same-sex couples 
the same as married couples in certain circumstances is in line with subsequent ECtHR 
jurisprudence recognizing rights on behalf of same-sex couples. 
 Recent Case Law from the ECtHR  
 In Gas and Dubois v. France (ECtHR, Application No. 25951/07 March 15, 2012), two 
women who were living together in a stable relationship applied for a simple adoption order, 
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which would have allowed the non-biological parent to establish a second legal parent-child 
relationship in addition to the original parent-child relationship based on blood ties between the 
child and the child's mother.  At the time of the application, simple adoption was open only to 
married couples and the French authorities denied the application.  In finding no violation of 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the ECtHR maintained that the applicants' legal 
situation was not akin to that of married couples.  In addition, it saw no evidence of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation because unmarried opposite-sex couples who had 
entered into a civil partnership were similarly prohibited from obtaining a simple adoption order.   
 In a factually similar case decided approximately one year after Gas and Dubois v. 
France, the ECtHR did find discrimination.  In X and Others v. Austria (ECtHR, Application No. 
19010/07 February 19, 2013), two women who lived together in a stable relationship applied for 
a second-parent adoption order, which would allow one of the partners to adopt the son of the 
other partner without severing the mother's legal ties with the child.  The Austrian authorities 
refused and the women filed an application with the ECtHR, asserting a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 and complaining that there was no reasonable and objective 
justification for allowing the adoption of one partner's child by the other partner in the case of 
opposite-sex couples (whether married or unmarried) while prohibiting second-parent adoption 
in the case of same-sex couples.  The ECtHR agreed, holding that the Convention was violated 
on account of the difference in treatment of the applicants in comparison with unmarried 
opposite-sex couples.  This was because the difference in treatment (between unmarried same-
sex and opposite-sex couples) was based on sexual orientation, and the Austrian authorities had 
not presented convincing reasons to show that the difference in treatment was necessary for the 
protection of the family or the protection of the child's interests.  The ECtHR reiterated that the 
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ECHR does not oblige states to extend the right to second-parent adoption to unmarried couples 
and distinguished the case from Gas and Dubois v. France.  What both Gas and Dubois v. 
France and X and Others v. Austria make clear, however, is the fact that, once the state opens 
adoption, second-parent adoption, or any similar right to opposite-sex unmarried couples, it is 
unlikely that the state will be able to deny that same right to same-sex couples.  Indeed, this has 
been the trend in subsequent cases. 
 Joint cases that deserve mention because they clearly demonstrate this new direction 
undertaken by the ECtHR are Vallianatos and Mylonas v. Greece (ECtHR, Application No. 
29381/09 July 11, 2013) and C.S. and Others v. Greece (ECtHR, Application No. 32684/09 July 
11, 2013).  In those cases, the ECtHR determined that Greece violated the ECHR when it 
excluded same-sex couples from a "civil union" law that created an alternative legal form of 
recognition for opposite-sex couples.  According to the position taken by the Greek authorities, 
the law had been enacted to protect women and their children born within cohabiting unions.  It 
was intended to allow couples to register their relationship within a more flexible arrangement 
than that provided by marriage and was needed to assist women and their children who had been 
left without support after substantial periods of cohabitation and to deal with the social reality of 
single-parent families in general.  In a Grand Chamber decision, the majority of judges (16 to 1) 
determined that same-sex couples should have the same access to civil unions as opposite-sex 
couples.  The ECtHR observed that "same-sex couples are just as capable as different-sex 
couples of entering into stable committed relationships" and that they had "the same needs in 
terms of mutual support and assistance as different-sex couples."  The Court also observed that 
"a trend is currently emerging with regard to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships."  This trend is especially visible in the EU member states.   
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   As noted in Chapter 5, ten European countries recognize marriage equality and, of these, 
eight are EU member states.  An additional thirteen European countries recognize some form of 
civil union or unregistered partnership, of which ten are EU member states.  This indicates that in 
the push for recognition of rights for same-sex couples, it is the EU rather than Europe in general 
that is leading the way.  However, when it comes to the work of the judiciary and the 
development of case law, it is evident that the ECtHR has taken the lead and that the CJEU has 
adopted a more conservative approach to the recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  In fact, 
in terms of recognition of rights on behalf of LGBTI persons in Europe, it can be argued that the 
CJEU will not act unless the ECtHR has already taken action to provide some protection 
(Wintemute 2011).   
Robert Wintemute is a professor of human rights law at King's College London School of 
Law.  In a summary of the case law of the ECtHR and ECJ regarding sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination, he offers several examples that support his position that the CJEU 
relies on the ECtHR to take action before providing recognition of rights (Wintemute 2011).  For 
example, Wintemute shows that P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council (ECJ Case C-13/94 April 
30, 1996), a case involving the dismissal of transsexual employee where the ECJ found that there 
had been sex discrimination, was made possible by B. v. France (ECtHR, no. 13343/87 March 
25, 1992).  In B. v. France, a male-to-female transsexual complained regarding the French 
authorities' refusal to amend the civil status register in accordance with her wishes.  She argued 
that French authorities were required to change her legal sex on her birth certificate.  The ECtHR 
agreed, and concluded for the first time that there had been a violation of ECHR Article 8 (right 
to respect for private and family life).  The Advocate General in the P. case cited to B. v. France 
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in support of its position that the transsexual employee had been discriminated against and the 
ECJ agreed.   
Another example offered by Wintemute is the case of K.B. v. National Health Service 
Pensions Agency (ECJ Case C-117/01 Jan. 7, 2004), which involved the denial of a survivor’s 
benefit to the transsexual male partner of a non-transsexual female employee.  The Pensions 
Agency asserted that it was not obliged to pay the survivor’s benefit because the couple was not 
married.  The ECJ found the agency’s determination of ineligibility invalid.  Because the couple 
was not legally able to marry, the denial of the survivor’s benefit to the employee’s partner 
constituted sex discrimination in violation of Article 141 of the EC Treaty.  According to 
Wintemute, this decision was made possible by the ECtHR decision in Christine Goodwin v. the 
United Kingdom (ECtHR, Application No. 28957/95 July 1, 2002).  In Christine Goodwin, the 
ECtHR found a violation of ECHR Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 
Article 12 (right to marry and found a family) after the applicant complained about the lack of 
legal recognition of her changed gender.188 
Wintemute also offers examples of cases where the CJEU has demonstrated an 
unwillingness to recognize rights in the face of ECtHR inaction.  In Grant v. South-West Trains 
(ECJ Case C-249/96 Feb. 17, 1998), the ECJ found that there had been no sex discrimination in a 
case where an employment benefit was denied to a female employee's unmarried female partner 
but a male employee's unmarried female partner qualified for that same benefit.  Similarly, in D. 
& Sweden v. Council (ECJ C-122/99 and C-125/99 May 31, 2001), the ECJ found that the failure 
                                                 
188 Another ECJ case cited by Wintemute that was made possible by Christine Goodwin is Richards v. Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions (ECJ Case C-423/04 April 27, 2006).  In the Richards case, the court found that EU 
Council Directive 79/7/EEC requires that a post-operative transsexual woman be granted a retirement pension at 60, 
like other women, not 65, as in the case of men. 
  
262 
 
to treat a Swedish registered partnership as equivalent to civil marriage for the purpose of an 
employment benefit was neither sex nor sexual orientation discrimination.  The claim failed 
because there was not yet any favorable case law on couples that are factually and legally same-
sex (as in, where neither partner has undergone gender reassignment).  
The Court of Justice of the European Union 
The CJEU is located in Luxembourg and is the EU institution that encompasses the entire 
judiciary.  Its purpose is to make sure that "the law is observed" "in the interpretation and 
application" of the [EU] Treaties.  The CJEU reviews the legality of acts undertaken by EU 
institutions, makes sure that member states comply with their treaty obligations, and interprets 
EU law at the request of the national courts and tribunals of the member states.   It is comprised 
of two major courts, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (established in 1952) and the General 
Court (established in 1988), as well as a number of specialized courts.189  The specialized courts 
are set up as needed to deal with specific areas and hear and determine cases at first instance.  
The decisions of the specialized courts can be appealed to the General Court.  Judges who 
preside over these cases are appointed by the Council, acting unanimously.  The General Court, 
formerly known as the Court of First Instance, is an independent court attached to the ECJ.  It is 
responsible for hearing actions taken against EU institutions by individuals and member states, 
although certain matters are reserved for the ECJ.  Decisions of the General Court can be 
appealed to the ECJ, but only with respect to points of law.  The General Court is made up of at 
                                                 
189 Another integral part of the CJEU is the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, which rules on matters arising 
from conflicts between the EU institutions and their official or other civil servants. 
 
  
263 
 
least one judge from each member state, and a registrar.  The judges are appointed for a term of 
six years that is renewable by agreement of the governments of the member states.   
 The supreme court of the European Union is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and is 
made up of one judge from each member state who is appointed by consensus of the 
governments of the member states for a term of six years.  In reality, ECJ and General Court 
judges are now appointed after consultation with a panel whose responsibility is to provide an 
opinion on each candidate's fitness to perform the duties of judge.  The panel is comprised of 
seven persons selected from among former members of the two Courts, members of national 
supreme courts, and lawyers of recognized competence, one of whom is proposed by the 
European Parliament. 
 The ECJ is an important unifier in the articulation of a common legal framework for the 
EU.  In a community made up of 28 member states it is likely that the rules adopted by EU 
decision-making bodies will be interpreted and applied differently if left solely to the devices of 
the national courts of the member states.  For this reason, it is the general task of the ECJ and the 
General Court to make sure the EU law is observed in a uniform manner in the interpretation and 
application of the treaties, directives, and regulations.  Although in theory EU law is a statutory 
law passed by legislative bodies, these laws are often elaborated or amended according to ECJ 
case law.  The ECJ has played and continues to play an important role in European integration 
processes (Alter 1996; Dehousse 1998; Starr-Deelen and Deelen 1996; Stone Sweet 2004). 
 In addition to providing a coherent and uniform interpretation of EU law, the ECJ makes 
certain that member states and their citizens comply with EU law.  While national governments 
may prefer to interpret EU law in the interest of their own nation, the fact remains that many EU 
laws are simply new and unknown.  In these cases, the national judges, who are the judges of 
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first instance in cases involving rules and actions relative to EU law, may refer to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling, asking the ECJ to adopt a position on the interpretation or evaluation of the 
validity of an EU provision (TFEU Article 267).  In its issuance of preliminary rulings, the ECJ's 
opinions are binding on the parties.  The referral process stimulates cooperation between the 
national courts and the CJEU.  In this capacity, the CJEU fosters a sense of community between 
itself and the judiciary of the member states.  
 The ECJ rules on actions brought before it by a member state, an institution or a natural 
or legal person; issues preliminary rulings at the request of courts or tribunals of the member 
states on the interpretation of EU law or the validity of acts adopted by EU institutions; and rules 
in other cases as provided for in the EU treaties.  The ECJ is also responsible for reviewing the 
legality of legislative acts, of the acts of the Council, Commission and the European Central 
Bank (other than recommendations and opinions), and acts of the European Parliament and the 
European Council that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  Finally, the 
ECJ also has jurisdiction to review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the EU 
that are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.  Under certain conditions, any 
natural or legal person may initiate proceedings against an act addressed to that person or if the 
act is of direct and individual concern to them.  A natural or legal person may also initiate 
proceedings against regulatory acts which are of direct consequence to them and do not entail 
implementing measures (TFEU Article 263).  
 As discussed in Chapter 5, Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union governs the right to marry and found a family and provides that "[t]he right to 
marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise of these rights."  Article 9 is gender-neutral and, while it leaves it to the 
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member states to regulate marriage, it does not foreclose the possibility of same-sex marriage.  I 
talked about the role of a developing "European international family law" in regulating cross-
border relationships within the EU in the section dealing with European family law above.  Here, 
we see a unification of conflicts-of-law provisions rather than harmonization or unification of 
substantive family laws or general agreement on concepts such as "marriage" or "family.”  At the 
same time, with respect to cross-border regulation of same-sex relationships, the ECtHR has 
spoken to this and made it clear that such relationships fall within the ambit of "family life" and 
must be treated accordingly.  Problems arise when the law of the host state, or state where the 
couple resides, does not provide the same recognition as the state where the marriage, civil 
union, or partnership agreement was entered into.  This creates legal uncertainty for such couples 
and their children and serves to divide Europe and the EU into camps where citizens hold 
different rights.  Instead of taking the bull by the horns, so to speak, EU and member state 
legislators are instead leaving it largely to the courts (European and national) to sort out the 
factual and legal reality of same-sex couples.        
 Recent ECJ case law  
 Initially, ECJ jurisprudence appeared to secure a privileged position for heterosexual 
marriage.190  At that time, however, EU law did not yet recognize discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  With entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 6a), this began to 
change.191  The Treaty of Lisbon and entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
                                                 
190 See e.g., Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains [1998] ECR I-621and Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D. 
and Kingdom of Sweden [2001], cases that are sometimes cited for the proposition that the CJEU upholds only 
"traditional" families. 
. 
191  Article 6a of the Treaty of Amsterdam states:  "Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and 
within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
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European Union, as well as the development of ECtHR case law (notably Schalk and Kopf 
discussed above) and rapid changes in the substantive family laws of several member states have 
secured this change and EU law now clearly recognizes discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  When read together, Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and Article 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon (prohibiting discrimination based on "sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or other 
opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation") can be argued to create a right to recognition of cross-border same-sex marriages.  
To hold otherwise could be seen as direct discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
(Vaigè 2012). 
 Directive 2004/38 governing the right of EU citizens to move and reside freely in the 
member states of the EU ensures the unconditional right to bring a "spouse" pursuant to Article 
2(2)(a), and the European Commission has shown no-compromise on this position.  In April 
2011, the Commission threatened to bring action against Malta for refusing to interpret the 
directive as granting freedom of movement to same-sex spouses.  While the member states are 
not required to adopt special rules regarding same-sex unions, they are required to respect the 
rights of free movement granted to EU citizens.  Given this, although member states do not have 
to provide for same-sex marriage, it does not necessarily follow that they are not required to 
recognize marriages that are legally concluded in another member state. 
 According to CJEU case law interpreting the Employment Equality Framework Directive 
(Directive 2000/78/ EC), which established a general framework for the equal treatment in 
                                                 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
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employment and occupation (and prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation), 
employees who are in a same-sex civil partnership must be granted the same benefits as their 
colleagues who are married in situations where marriage is not possible for same-sex couples.  In 
2008, the ECJ issued a landmark decision in the case of Maruko v. VddB.192  The case involved a 
same-sex couple who had entered into a registered partnership in Germany.  Mr. Maruko was the 
life partner of a costume designer by the name of Mr. Hettinger.  The compensation scheme for 
Germany's theaters requires employers to take out an old-age pension and a survivor's pension 
for the artists they employ.  The institution responsible for insuring the employee was the 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen (VddB), which is deemed a legal person governed by 
public law.  Certain provisions of the compensation scheme provide that a "wife" or "husband" is 
entitled to a "widow's" or "widower's" pension.  In January 2005, Mr. Hettinger died, and the 
next month Mr. Maruko applied for a widower's pension.  VddB refused, asserting that the 
regulations make no provision for survivors' benefits to be paid to registered partners.  Mr. 
Maruko appealed but was unsuccessful and brought an action before the Court arguing that the 
terms "widow" and "widower" must be interpreted broadly to include partners in the case of 
registered partnerships.  The proceedings were stayed and the Court referred five questions to the 
ECJ regarding the interpretation of EU Directive 2000/78/EC.   
 The ECJ's judgment in the case constituted the first time the Court ruled against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  The Court also provided concrete rights which were 
unforeseen by the national system:  a same-sex "widower" was granted a pension denied to him 
under national law.  The pension was not denied on the basis of the beneficiary's sexual 
                                                 
192 Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buehnen [2008]. 
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orientation, which would have been direct discrimination; rather, on the basis of the fact that a 
registered partnership is not the same as marriage.  However, since marriage is only open to 
opposite-sex couples, the refusal to grant a survivor's benefit to a surviving life partner is indirect 
discrimination.  In essence, the ECJ is saying that once a member state creates a legal status for 
same-sex couples (in the Maruko case, a registered partnership) that is comparable to that of 
spouses (i.e., marriage), they have to provide both institutions with comparable benefits.  If, in 
this case, Germany had no such scheme (as is the case in Italy) and did not recognize same-sex 
relationships, there would be no such requirement.  All of this means that it remains with the 
member states to determine whether to provide legal recognition for same-sex couples.  And if 
the member state refuses to do so, there is no protection against discrimination where it is 
arguably most needed.   
In the subsequent case of Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, the question 
of whether same-sex partners should have equal access to employment benefits was presented to 
the Court.193  According to the position advanced by the Advocate General, discrimination 
cannot be justified on the basis of protecting marriage and the family because there are other 
means to protect family and marriage that do not involve discriminating against same-sex 
couples.  The Court found that different treatment based on sexual orientation is direct 
discrimination and is therefore prohibited.  Considered together, Maruko and Römer apply in 
cases where partnerships are reserved to same-sex couples, marriage is reserved to opposite-sex 
couples, and same-sex partnerships and marriage are comparable in fact and law. 
                                                 
193  Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [May 12, 2011]. 
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 The decisions articulated in Maruko and Römer have been further reinforced and 
extended by the recent decision in the matter of Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutual de 
Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sévres wherein the ECJ was asked to issue a preliminary 
ruling.194  In this case, Mr. Hay, an employee of Crédit agricole, entered into a PACS with his 
same-sex partner on July 11, 2007.195  Mr. Hay applied for the days of special leave and the 
marriage bonus granted to employees who marry that was provided by his employer in 
accordance with Crédit agricole's national collective agreement.  Crédit agricole refused to give 
Mr. Hay those benefits, arguing that, under the collective agreement, the benefits were only 
available to those who marry.  Mr. Hay brought action before the Labor Tribunal but it was 
dismissed.  The Tribunal held that the bonus is linked to marital status and the French Civil Code 
differentiates between marriage and the PACS.196  The French Court of Appeals upheld the 
judgment on the basis that the PACS is not comparable to marriage. 
 Mr. Hays brought another appeal before the French Court of Cassation.  He argued that 
Crédit agricole's refusal to grant him the special leave days and bonus constituted discrimination 
based on his sexual orientation contrary to the French Labor Code, Article 14 of the ECHR, and 
Articles 1-3 of Directive 2000/78/EC.  The Court of Cassation stayed the proceedings and 
referred the following question to the ECJ: 
                                                 
194 Case C-267/12, Frédéric Hay v. Crédit agricole mutual de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sévres [December 12, 
2013]. 
 
195 A PACS is a civil solidarity pact, a form of civil union recognized in France. 
 
196 The Tribunal noted, however, that the national collective agreement had been amended on July 10, 2008, to 
extend the benefits under that agreement (relating to the bonus and special leave for marriage) to people who entered 
into a PACS arrangement, but that extension could not be given retroactive effect. 
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 Must Article 2(2)(b) of [Directive 2000/78] … be interpreted as meaning that the choice 
of the national legislature to allow only persons of different sexes to marry can constitute 
a legitimate, appropriate and necessary aim such as to justify indirect discrimination 
resulting from the fact that a collective agreement which restricts an advantage in respect 
of pay and working conditions to employees who marry, thereby necessarily excluding 
from the benefit of that advantage same-sex partners who have entered into a [PACS]? 
The Court noted that, in reaching a decision, it must consider whether persons who enter into 
marriage and persons who, unable to marry a person of their own sex, enter into a PACS, are in 
comparable situations.  The Court found that, although there were general differences between 
the PACS system and the system governing marriage, at the time of the facts giving rise to the 
case, the PACS was the only possibility under French law for same-sex couples to obtain legal 
status for their relationship.   
 According to the ECJ, "Thus, as regards benefits in terms of pay or working conditions, 
such as days of special leave and a bonus like those at issue in the main proceedings … persons 
of the same sex who cannot enter into marriage and therefore conclude a PACS are in a situation 
which is comparable to that of couples who marry."197  In this context, a member state's rules 
which restrict benefits in terms of pay or conditions of work to married employees, and where 
marriage is only open to opposite-sex couples, gives rise to direct discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and can only be justified on the bases of public security, the maintenance of public 
order and the prevention of criminal offenses, the protection of health, and the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others, none of which were relied on in the dispute at hand.  The ECJ 
                                                 
197 See note 194. 
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further found that the fact that the PACS is not limited to same-sex couples and may include 
heterosexual couples (who are legally capable of entering into marriage) was irrelevant and did 
not change the nature of the discrimination against same-sex couples.   
 Although the foregoing cases do not speak directly to the situation in Italy and other 
places where there is no legal recognition for same-sex partnerships, they involve an increasingly 
expansive interpretation regarding what constitutes a comparable situation to marriage.  The 
relevance of this line of European cases to the Italian situation becomes apparent when one 
considers them in conjunction with the recent decision of the Court of Appeal for Milan where 
the court found that a mutual fund could not deny benefits to the same-sex partner of one of its 
members in a situation where the two were permanently residing together.  Despite the fact that 
Italy does not have a scheme for the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, the Italian court 
opted in this case to treat a same-sex couple in a stable relationship the same as a married couple.  
This decision of the Court of Milan was in line with the Italian Constitutional Court and the 
Italian Court of Cassation decisions calling for the courts to treat same-sex couples the same as 
married couples in certain situations.   
The jurisprudence of the European courts, however, does not require this.  When one 
looks closely at the relationship between European and Italian case law, recent developments in 
Italian judicial decisions regarding the rights of same-sex couples appear to be more of a choice 
than an imposition.  This indicates that Italian judges are, at least in part, electing to look to 
European law as a source of law in this area rather than being obliged to do so by the existing 
legal structures that frame relationships between Europe, the EU, and Italy.  
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Looking to the Future 
 As more nation-states within Europe and the EU recognize same-sex partnerships, it will 
become increasingly difficult for the ECtHR to use "lack of consensus" as a basis for denying 
recognition to same-sex marriages.  In December 2013, the Registry of the ECtHR announced 
that a set of consolidated appeals known as Oliari and others v. Italy had passed the first hurdle, 
establishing an adversarial proceeding against the Italian government.  The case involves five 
same-sex couples from Italy who allege that the Italian government has done nothing to provide 
a legal instrument for the recognition of their rights as couples.  Although the ECtHR has not yet 
expressed an opinion on the admissibility and merits of the appeal, it has opened the adversarial 
proceeding against the Italian state, requiring the parties to submit written comments on the 
merits of the appeal by March 26, 2014.  For the first time, the ECtHR will be required to 
address the situation where a nation-state provides no legal recognition for same-sex 
partnerships.   
 In this case, the fight for recognition of rights on behalf of same-sex couples in Italy 
comes full circle back to Europe.  It remains to be seen whether Europe as lived will live up to 
the trope of Europe invoked in Italian LGBTI activists' claims to rights.  As it stands, much of 
the policy with respect to recognition of same-sex couples and their rights is being articulated on 
a piecemeal basis by the European Courts in a process reminiscent of slapping a Band-Aid on a 
severed artery.     
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Chapter 7:  Church, State, and Marital Relations in Italy 
In this chapter, I return to the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in 
Italy, and look specifically at how Church and State relationships in Italy shape the 
contemporary battle.  Although I have discussed Church and State relationships in various 
sections throughout the preceding chapters, I have attempted to avoid the reification of the 
Church that all-too-frequently accompanies the discourse surrounding the struggle over 
recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy.  While the Church is definitely an interested 
party and influences the struggle over rights for same-sex couples in Italy, I do not see the 
Church as the primary opponent.  One of the points I want to make is that, while parts of the 
Church have served as a major opponent to the recognition of rights for same-sex couples in 
Italy, in many ways the Church is scapegoated.  The Church is a multi-faceted entity that, while 
slow-moving, is subject to change.  This creates possibilities for dialogue between LGBTI 
activists and the Church hierarchy.  Given the unexpected resignation of Pope Benedict the XVI 
and his replacement by Pope Francis, an event that signals a change in Church attitudes and 
responses to same-sex couples, as well as to the future of the EU, these possibilities now seem 
ripe.  I address this and talk about recent Church events that gesture toward a change in Church 
attitudes and responses to same-sex couples, as well as to the future of the EU.   
The Reality of “Being Catholic” in Italy 
Attending Mass 
 The first time I attended mass in Italy was a bit of a shocker.  We were staying near C 
and exploring the nearby hill town of P.  It was a Saturday evening and we checked the mass 
schedule at the local church and noticed that there was a mass starting at 5:00 pm.  We decided 
to go to the Saturday evening mass so we would not feel compelled to get up and out of the 
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apartment so early on Sunday.  The church was an imposing building in the middle of the town, 
surrounded by narrow brick streets.  The doors were open and we entered and found a seat in the 
pews toward the back of the church.  
 Inside, the church was dark and stifling.  The structure had thick stone walls and high 
ceilings that had never been penetrated by direct sunlight.  The air was cloying and I began to 
sweat a bit.  The mass began unceremoniously without an opening hymn.  The priest got right 
down to business, reciting the litany that makes up the Catholic mass.  At the beginning of the 
mass I counted the number of people present.  There were approximately 35-40 women who 
appeared to be over 60 years of age, 3-4 women in the 30-50 year range, approximately 5 men 
over 60 years of age and one man who looked to be in his mid-40’s.  My son was the only child 
present.  During the course of the mass up through the homily another 10-15 people filtered in.  
There were no ushers to greet or seat people and there was no collection of money during the 
mass.  Instead, an offrette was positioned at the entrance to the Church and I noticed that most of 
the attendees dropped a euro into the offrette.  The homily was about the Virgin Mary and 
motherhood and delivered by the priest in a monotone drone.  Fortunately, it was relatively short.  
At communion, my son, who had not yet received his first communion, approached the altar with 
his arms crossed to receive the priest’s blessing but none was forthcoming.  Shortly after 
communion, the mass ended as abruptly as it had begun, marked by a quick blessing and the exit 
of the priest.  
 This experience stands in contrast to my experience of mass in the United States.  My son 
attends a private Catholic school and, as a family, we attend mass on a regular basis.  As 
someone who was raised Catholic, I have attended masses throughout the U.S., including in New 
Mexico, California, Arizona, Washington, D.C., Vermont, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Illinois.  
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One thing I have consistently observed is the number of families with children.  When my mind 
wanders I often find myself looking to the children in the pew in front for entertainment.  It is not 
unusual for children under a certain age (usually around five years old) to be facing toward the 
back or playing “cars” or coloring on the pew seat.  Occasionally, one can overhear something 
funny being said by the child to the parent.  More than occasionally, one can witness parental 
reprimands and the parents’ refereeing of a fight between siblings.  Masses in the U.S. are 
invariably punctuated with the sound of crying babies and, at any given Sunday mass, at least 
one parent can be seen exiting the Church with a baby and diaper bag in tow.   
 This is very different from what I experienced attending mass at various churches in 
Rome and Turin over the course of the year I spent in Italy.  I attended approximately 30 masses 
at no less than 15 different Italian churches.  In the Italy I experienced the pews were not 
teeming with children.  Mass attendance was heavily slanted toward the elderly and seemed to 
favor women.  When I was growing up, mass attendance was non-negotiable.  It was what we 
did as Catholics.  This does not appear to be the case in Italy and indicates a waning interest in 
Catholicism and its rituals.     
Italy is commonly perceived as a “Catholic” country:  approximately 90% of Italians are 
nominally Catholic.  In the past, the "exceptionalism" of Italy as a Catholic nation has been 
endorsed by the Popes who reside within its borders.  John Paul II talked and wrote about this at 
length.  In his self-titled "Great Prayer for Italy" (1994), John Paul II stated: 
 Italy as a nation has so much to offer all of Europe. […]  To Italy, in keeping with its 
history, is entrusted in a special way the task of defending on behalf of all Europe the 
religious and cultural heritage established in Rome by the apostles Peter and Paul. 
  
276 
 
And in a speech to the general leadership of the Italian Church that took place on October 19, 
2006, in Verona, Benedict XVI is quoted as saying: 
 Italy constitutes a rather favorable terrain for Christian testimony.  The Church, in fact, is 
here a very lively reality, which retains a grassroots presence among people of every age 
and condition.  The Christian traditions are often still rooted here and continue to bear 
fruit.  […]  The Italian Church and Italian Catholics are therefore called to seize this great 
opportunity.  […]  If we are able to do this, the Church in Italy will render a great service 
not only to this nation, but also to Europe and to the world. 
These statements, however, seem at odds with my experience of Catholicism in Italy, and recent 
surveys confirm my suspicions.  Statistics show that only about one-third of Italians actually 
practice the religion (CIA 2011 World Fact Book - Italy).  One of the numbers that would appear 
to prove the religiosity and vitality of Catholicism in Italy is Sunday Mass attendance.   Two 
studies, in particular, demonstrate that actual Mass attendance is much lower than what the 
statements of the popes would lead us to believe.   
 In 2004-05, the Patriarchate of Venice conducted a study of Sunday Mass attendance.  
The results showed that approximately 22.7% attended Mass on a given Sunday, with only 15% 
attending regularly.198  Another survey by Professor Paolo Segatti of the University of Milan 
published in the magazine Il Regno on May 15, 2010, found that Mass attendance was even 
lower among younger Italians.  According to the Segatti, the results of the survey showed that 
among those born after 1981 Mass attendance, self-identification as Catholic, and adherence to 
                                                 
198  Hilary White, “Italy’s Last Catholic Generation? Mass Attendance in ‘Collapse’ among Under-30s,” 
LifeSiteNews.com, August 8, 2010, http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/italys-last-catholic-generation-mass-
attendance-in-collapse-among-under-30s, accessed July 8, 2014.  
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Catholic teaching are "in collapse."  Given this scenario Segatti predicted a near future in which 
Catholicism holds mere "minority status" in Italy.  Segatti remarks:  "Catholicism's future 
minority status in Italy can already be glimpsed.  It is imaginable that when the children of the 
younger generation become parents, they will make a further contribution to secularization."199 
“Voting Catholic?” 
As noted in previous chapters, LGBTI activists frequently blame the Church for the 
failure of politicians to act in recognizing rights on their behalf.  Despite what appears to be 
minority status, the Church remains an active participant in Italian politics, frequently wielding 
power disproportionate to its popular support.  One day over lunch my consultant and friend T 
and I were discussing his experiences working security for the Vatican.  I was asking him what 
he thought about Pope Benedict XVI in relation to Pope John Paul II (at this time, Pope Benedict 
XVI was still the pope), and whether he noticed any major differences between the two popes.  
The conversation turned to the broader subject of Church and State relationships in Italy.  I asked 
him for his opinion on why the Church wielded so much power over the family and family law in 
Italy.  “Given that so few people actually practice Catholicism in Italy, why does it seem like the 
Church has such control over policy issues concerning marriage, cohabitation and same-sex 
couples?” I asked.  “Because Italy is controlled by the Vatican.  Morals are based on Catholic 
values,” he responded.  I pressed him further:  “Yeah, but why is this the case, and do you think 
Italy will ever recognize rights for same-sex couples?”   
                                                 
199 Sandro Magister, “Chi va a messa e chi no. L'incerto domani dell'Italia cattolica,” www.chiesa.espressoonline.it, 
August 6, 2010, http://chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/1344389?eng=y, accessed July 8, 2014. 
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T sighed and explained (as he had on previous occasions) that everything has to do with 
money and power in Italy and this situation is no different.  The Vatican has a lot of money and 
uses it to control politicians who want its support.  Also, Italian politics is such a mess that the 
Vatican is able to insert itself and assume power disproportionate to its popular support in the 
larger society.  T further explained that, with respect to certain social issues like rights for 
LGBTI persons, groups seeking recognition face staunch opposition from the Vatican.  It 
becomes a daily war with the media, and the group with control of the media (i.e., the 
person/group with the most money in the case of Italy) wins out as the role model.  T stated his 
belief that Italy would eventually recognize rights on behalf of same-sex couples.  According to 
T, the Church knew it was losing the battle (especially in light of recent developments in Europe) 
but, in the interim, intended to continue to fight for the so-called traditional family. T observed 
that there is an “invisible tolerance” that goes both ways between the Church and the LGBTI 
community.  He cited politician Nichi Vendola as an example.   
Vendola is currently the president of Apulia, a region located at the southeastern tip of 
Italy (the part that forms the high heel of the boot).  Born in the town of Terlizzi, near Bari on the 
Adriatic coast, Vendola joined the Communist Youth Federation when he was 14 years of age.  
He studied literature at the university and then worked as a journalist for L’Unità, a left-wing 
Italian newspaper founded in 1924 by Antonio Gramsci as the official paper of the Italian 
Communist Party.  Vendola is openly gay and has been a leading gay-rights activist.  He was one 
of the founding members of Arcigay.  In 1992 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, where 
he served until 2005, and was a member of the Anti-mafia Commision.  He became well-known 
as a major opponent of organized crime.  In 2005, Vendola ran in the first primary election held 
by the center-left coalition, L’Union, and beat opponent Francesco Boccia.  Many of the 
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moderates in the alliance were critical of the choice of Vendola as their candidate.  They did not 
see how Vendola, who was both communist and homosexual, could be elected president of a 
southern Italian region, especially one considered to be traditionally conservative and Catholic.  
This was the case despite the fact that Vendola claims his Catholic roots, and considers himself a 
“believer” (albeit of the Pax Christi type).  He recalls growing up with a portrait of Pope John 
XXIII on his family’s wall, and has been quoted as stating that the Bible “is the most important 
book for a Communist like me.”  Thus, Vendola, like much of Italy and its progeny, is a bit of a 
paradox.  The election results were similarly paradoxical:  Vendola narrowly defeated outgoing 
president Raffaele Fitto, the candidate for the center-right coalition, to become the first member 
of the Communist Refoundation Party (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, PRC) to be 
elected president of an Italian region.   
In the Italian situation, the religious neutrality of institutions and of the “rule of law” has 
been subsumed within a concordat system where the Church’s influence is consistently used for 
political ends (Ferrara 2009).  At the EU level, Italy is usually among those member states 
defending Catholic moral and social values.  Despite low mass attendance, approximately 94% 
of parents enroll their children in religious instruction provided in the public elementary schools 
and 84% of high school students voluntarily register for these courses.  The fact that a vast 
majority of students opt to receive religious education in the Italian public schools and at the 
same time refuse to "practice" this religion indicates a disconnection between teaching and 
practice.  I submit that much of this has to do with the fact that Church teachings on sexuality, 
marriage, and family do not resonate with the experiences of young Italians.    
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The Church's Teaching on Sexuality, Marriage, and Family 
The Church attempts to justify its opposition to same-sex marriage based on values and 
norms derived from “natural law.”  Natural law can be juxtaposed to legal positivism, which 
grounds rights in humanly-enacted rules (Dershowitz 2004).  The tradition of legal positivism 
holds that the existence and content of law depends on social facts.  In this view, law is not 
founded upon the eternal or the universal.  By contrast, natural law finds the foundation for rights 
in external sources such as God, nature, reason, or some concept of objective reality.  Natural 
law refers to moral norms that are:  1) "universal" (meaning that they apply in all times and 
places); 2) "objective" (as in, given in the nature of things and not created by social convention); 
and 3) "reasonable" (meaning that such norms can be arrived at through use of reason to discern 
the purposes, ends, or good of things given in nature).  Generally speaking, the Church defines 
natural law as the rule of conduct prescribed to us by God in the constitution of the nature with 
which he has endowed us.    
Catholic teaching is associated with a particular sexual ethic that deems it "natural" and 
"reasonable" that procreation is the main "end" or "purpose" of sexual intercourse.   Natural law 
supports the claim that sex is proper only in life-long, monogamous, and heterosexual marriages.   
This is because this type of relationship ensures that parents will know their children and will be 
more likely to care for them and provide lifelong support and love, which is essential to their 
development.  According to Catholic teaching, homosexual acts are “intrinsically disordered,” 
which means that they are unnatural and not a legitimate source of rights, because same-sex 
coitus cannot be procreative. 
In 2003, four years prior to the introduction of the DICO in Italy, the Vatican released a 
12-page document (signed by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, and approved by Pope John Paul 
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II) in which it condemned the legal recognition of unions between persons of the same-sex, and 
called on Catholic politicians to defend marriage as a social institution and to reject any and all 
attempts to extend marriage (or anything resembling marriage) to same-sex couples.  The 
document reiterated the Church’s teaching on marriage, affirming that marriage is not just any 
relationship between human beings; rather, it was established by God with its own nature, 
essential properties, and purpose.  According to the Church’s view, the three fundamental 
elements for marriage, as set forth in the Book of Genesis, are: 1) the requirement of one man 
and one woman (equal as persons and complementary as male and female); 2) marriage as an 
institution in which a communion of persons is realized involving the use of sexual faculty; and 
3) the union of man and woman for the purpose of procreation.  The Church further asserts that 
the marital union was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament.  For these reasons, there 
are no grounds for considering homosexual unions as in any way analogous to God’s plan for 
marriage and family.  Simply put, homosexual acts go against the “natural” moral law. 
Anthropological Perspectives on Sexuality, Marriage, and Family  
The Church’s teachings on sexuality, marriage, and family stand at odds with not only 
with those being advanced by LGBTI activists from Certi Diritti in the context of the Amore 
Civile project, but also with anthropological findings on these subjects.  The study of kinship has 
long been a staple of anthropological analysis.  There is a lengthy history extending back over 
140 years of anthropologists who have been captivated by the varieties of understandings of 
kinship, family, marriage, descent, and parenthood that exist throughout the world.200  When it 
comes to kinship and the family, anthropologists have demonstrated that there are no universal 
                                                 
200 E.g., Morgan (1871); Davis and Warner (1937); Dumont (1953); Geertz and Geertz (1975); Goodale (1981).  
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rules that apply to all.  There are radical differences in family organization and notions about the 
family’s purpose.  Ideas about birth and conception differ, as do ideas about the substances that 
link children to parents.  There may or may not be larger structures such as descent groups based 
on certain ideas of relatedness.  What these groups do and what these groups are established on 
(for example, relatedness through the sharing of some substance, co-residence, or a mixture of 
the two) varies.  There is also considerable variation with respect to the purpose and form of 
marriage.   
In American Kinship (1968), anthropologist David Schneider accused his predecessors 
and contemporaries of being mired in a genealogical way of thinking that ultimately rested on a 
Eurocentric view of kinship as based on biological reproduction.  Schneider asserted that this 
view was essentially a Western folk model that failed to account for many indigenous views in 
other parts of the world.  Schneider insisted on a cultural, “emic,” or “insider’s” account of 
kinship.  Schneider’s view was not entirely novel.  Rodney Needham (1971) had expressed a 
similar opinion in his assertion that kinship components such as marriage and incest rules were 
too ethnographically variable to make any generalizations.  Largely because of Schneider, 
anthropologists reformulated kinship studies around themes of culture, human agency, and 
process.     
In the twenty or so years following Schneider’s study, kinship, marriage, and the family 
experienced profound transformations in Europe and the United States.  Rising rates of divorce, 
the prevalence of single-parent households, gay and lesbian movements, and advances in new 
reproductive technologies (e.g., surrogate motherhood, artificial insemination, in vitro 
fertilization) transformed notions of kinship in Europe, the United States, and Canada, and 
challenged cultural conceptions of kinship as based on biology.  As the following examples 
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show, notions of kinship as something that is culturally constructed have been a common theme 
in anthropological studies over the past two decades. 
In Reproducing the Future:  Essays on Anthropology, Kinship and the New Reproductive 
Technologies (1992), Marilyn Strathern argued that the new reproductive technologies 
introduced the idea of “consumer choice” into the area of human reproduction.  This in turn 
destabilized notions of “nature,” which could no longer be seen as independent of cultural 
construction.  In her study of surrogate motherhood, Helena Ragoné investigated the tension 
between kinship as choice and older notions of kinship as grounded in biological reproduction 
(1994).  In Reproducing Jews (2000), Susan Martha Kahn looked at sperm processing, egg 
donation, and IVF at an Israeli infertility clinic.  She noted that Jewish identity is primarily 
transmitted matrilineally (and only secondarily through religious conversion), and she explored 
the ramification of this in Israel, including for questions of belonging and citizenship.  In this 
work she shows how Israeli rabbis re-conceptualize new reproductive technologies in cultural 
terms to meet traditional notions of religious identity and kinship.    
Additional anthropological studies dealing with relationships between nature and culture 
have been conducted in the area of infancy and child-rearing.  In their book, A World of Babies:  
Imagined Childcare Guidelines for Seven Societies (2000), Alma Gottlieb and Judy DeLoache 
use fiction as a way to show that there are in fact many models of child-rearing and each model 
is shaped by particular values and widely varying social contexts.  Similarly, in The Afterlife is 
Where we Come From:  The Culture of Infancy in West Africa (2004), Gottlieb uses data gleaned 
from extensive ethnographic study with the Beng in West Africa to demonstrate how babies are 
“deeply constructed by culture” (xvi).  She reintroduces social context and culture into studies of 
infants and infancy, something that Europeans, Canadians, and people from the United States 
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have largely constructed as universal.  Gottlieb notes that babies raise fundamental questions 
about the “nature of nature and the nature of culture” (2004:60).   
 I point out these studies to highlight the fact that the Church’s teachings on sexuality, 
marriage, and family are in no way universal.  Yet, arguments based on anthropological notions 
of kinship as culturally constructed have only recently begun to make their way into Italy.  We 
see them alluded to in the Amore Civile project and hinted at in the recent decision of the Court 
of Cassation to award custody of a child to a lesbian mother when the Court declares that it is 
“mere prejudice” to assume that a child raised by a same-sex couple would suffer developmental 
harm.  I have tried to demonstrate in this dissertation how kinship structures and is structured by 
law.  In the case of Italy, attempts to reformulate the family law to meet the demands of changing 
patterns of kinship have met with much resistance.  Italy has one of the more stringent laws 
regulating the use of new reproductive technologies and there is no formal legal recognition for 
same-sex couples.  As I have shown, in the past, the Church has consistently been one of the 
main opponents of change, dating back to the divorce referendum.  One of the questions that 
plagued me during the course of this study was related to the question that I asked my friend T 
about:  namely, the Church’s disproportionate control over matters related to the family in Italy.  
I really wanted to know why the Church was so vested in controlling the policies of the nation-
state in this area.   
 As part of my fieldwork (and as I stated in the introduction to this dissertation), I spent 
two weeks with the Faculty of Canon Law at a prestigious European University.  I wanted to talk 
to the members of the faculty to get a better sense of the role of Canon Law in contemporary 
society, but I also really wanted to know why, in their opinion, the Church was so vehemently 
opposed to the recognition of rights for same-sex couples in civil society.  I understood the 
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Church's views on sexuality, marriage and family, and why the Church would not sanction same-
sex marriage for its adherents, but what about the rest of society?  What about those who were 
not members of the Church?  Why should they be subject to the Church’s definitions of marriage 
and family?  In other words, why is the Church so interested in maintaining a particular view of 
marriage and family in the world outside the Church?201    
Church and State in General and Church and State in Italy 
While at the Faculty of Canon Law I was able to delve into these questions.  My meetings 
with faculty members were instructive, and offered several plausible explanations of the 
Church's interest in civil society.  I discussed sources of law with Professor I, who explained to 
me the Church view that natural law applies to everyone because it is a sign of God’s will, and 
that divine positive law is “God’s will” as formulated and expressed in texts.  We discussed the 
fact that this can lead to interesting results.  A person who is a member of the Church, for 
example, has an “obligation of canonical form,” whereas a non-Catholic does not.  For this 
reason, a Catholic who marries outside the Church and gets divorced is considered by the Church 
to never have married and is free to subsequently marry in the Church.  By contrast, a non-
Catholic who marries outside the Church and gets divorced cannot subsequently marry in the 
                                                 
201  Under the direction of Pope Benedict, the Church elevated its opposition.  For example, in April, 2012, the 
Vatican reprimanded a group of nuns opposing the Paul Ryan budget passed by the U.S. Republican-dominated 
House of Representatives for focusing too much of their work on poverty and economic justice, while ignoring 
abortion and same-sex marriage (the nuns opposed the Ryan budget because it appeared to favor wealthy U.S. 
citizens through tax breaks and disregarded those struggling to make ends meet).  According to an article published 
by CBS news, the Vatican accused the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, a group representing 
approximately 80% of the U.S.’s Catholic nuns, of promoting “radical feminist themes.”  Nuns close to the 
Leadership Conference were “stunned” by the reprimand, stating that there is no evidence of the group being 
doctrinally out of line with the church.  The group of nuns completed a bus tour through nine U.S. states to highlight 
the work of Catholic nuns, meet the people they serve, and learn about the harm that would be caused by the 
proposed federal budget cuts.  The tour received a lot of publicity and highlighted a schism within the Church 
between "social justice" Catholics and more conservative Catholics who see the need to protect the allegedly 
traditional family from secularization. 
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Church:  in this case, the marriage that occurred outside the Church is recognized by the Church 
and the subsequent marriage would result in polygamy because the Church does not recognize 
divorce.   
According to Professor I, while [God’s] law never changes, our understanding of it can 
and does.  It is important to understand that canon law governing marriage has been heavily 
influenced by history.  For example, since the 1960’s the Church has adopted a more personal 
vision of marriage, which has not been entirely translated into the 1983 Code of Canon Law.  
Lurking behind all of this, according to Professor I, is the idea that the Church has the truth.   
Another faculty member offered a more cynical vision of the Church’s position.  
According to Professor U, Catholic seminaries are filled with gay men so it is not really about 
homosexuality.  Marriage regulation has always been a source of earthly power for the Church.   
When the state began assuming responsibility for marriage regulation, the Church resisted in an 
attempt to retain some of its earthly power.   
Yet another faculty member (Professor W) told me that the “fundamental structure” of 
society depends on natural law and divine law as set forth in the Bible.  Without this structure, 
society lapses into relativism.  According to Professor W, laws based on the mere agreement of 
men lead to atrocities such as the Holocaust.  Professor W stated that the Church uses its 
influence for the common good, for the sake of human dignity, and the Pope has a duty to inform 
on moral issues.  
Finally, Prof Y told me that marriage has always been the cornerstone of the Church.  
Personally, she believes that the Church’s interest in marriage has to do with power; however, on 
a more positive note, she believes that the Church is trying to save marriage (as an institution) 
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against external corruption and is fighting against a “divorce mentality.”  Marriage is, after all, a 
sacrament and this comes from divine law/natural law.  It is not something we created.   
Prof Y further stated that she has been disappointed with the results of the Code of Canon 
Law of 1983.  Contrary to expectations, canon law has become more conservative than it was 
under the Code of 1917.  The canon law system is a “top down” working system and Professor Y 
senses the Church has been retrenching in an effort to keep control and regain some of the power 
it lost due to the Church sex scandals.202  The problem with each of these explanations is that, 
while they explain what the Church is trying to accomplish and why, they do not explain the 
"buy in" on the part of Italian politicians nor do they explain the voting patterns of Italian 
citizens.   
When I posed this to Professor Y, I was taken aback by her response, not because of its 
novelty, but because of its adherence to cliché.  In her opinion it had to do with a particular 
mentality said to exist in Italy.  She repeated what I had so often heard and read:  in Italy, you 
just have to accept the norm, and then can live as you want.  According to her view, it was all 
about maintaining appearances, about “la bella figura.”  One can dislike the Pope but, in Italy, 
one will still act “nice” to him. 
This may or may not be the case, but does it really explain anything?  It does not explain, 
for example, who sets the norm, how or why a norm changes or does not change, and why the 
Church is so influential in everything having to do with norms in Italy.  Most of us have been 
“nice” or civil to a person with whom we disagree; it does not mean we would vote for that 
                                                 
202  Professor Y is referencing the Catholic sexual abuse cases, which consisted of a series of allegations, 
investigations, trials, and convictions of child sexual abuse crimes committed by Catholic clergy against children.  
Many of the cases extended over several decades.  Investigations revealed that, in many instances, the Church failed 
to report the sexual abuse and deliberately moved priests believed to be sexually abusing children to other parishes 
where the abuse sometimes continued.  
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person or vote in the same way as that person.  Once one steps behind the curtain, one is free to 
exercise one’s will.  There is no censorship in the voting booth.  One does not have to maintain 
“la bella figura.”    
Enter "La Bella Figura" 
One day, I was walking down the street from my apartment to the bus stop in Turin when 
I noticed a new “cake” shop had opened.  I was curious because, while there were a multitude of 
pasticcerie near my apartment and, while I had discovered a couple that sold what passed for 
cupcakes in Italy, I had never seen an entire shop devoted to cakes and cupcakes the likes of this.  
The window display was stunning.  A literal bridal dream:  beautiful layered cakes with white 
and pink icing, coordinating cupcakes, and huge sugar cookies iced in pastels intermingled with 
flowers taunted me each time I passed, which was at least twice a day (never mind that I 
intentionally walked on this side of the street to catch a glimpse of the display and make a mental 
note of what I might like to try).  As I passed, my mouth watered, sending me into a virtual sugar 
coma.  I made a promise to myself to stop in and sample the offerings. 
Late one afternoon, about 10 days after I first noticed the shop, I decided to go in and 
pick up something to have for dessert.  I entered the shop.  The shop was set up like a cross 
between an English tea room and American ice cream shop, with bistro-style tables and chairs.  
A set of stairs led up to a loft, which provided additional seating and overlooked the main floor.  
To the left of the entrance were glass display cases and a long bar, set up for ordering and 
drinking coffee.  The space behind the bar counter held the usual coffee-making apparatuses.  A 
couple of middle-aged men were ordering coffee and I took advantage of the wait to decide what 
I wanted.  I searched the glass display case for items that resembled those in the window display.  
My heart sank as I realized that the items in the window display were not also behind the glass 
  
289 
 
display cases from which one ordered.  Gone were the beautiful cakes, cupcakes, and huge sugar 
cookies, replaced by the usual Italian pastries.  
When it was my turn to place my order, I asked the woman behind the counter if the 
items in the window were available for purchase.  Alas, they were not!  As it turned out, the 
items in the window were not even edible.  They were plastic.  Disappointed, I settled on what 
appeared to be a miniature version of the sugar cookies and ordered three.  They were the only 
thing being offered for sale that resembled something in the window display.  The woman behind 
the counter placed them on a piece of cardboard wrapped in gold foil, then wrapped the foil-
covered cardboard plate with the cookies in pretty floral paper and tied it up with a fancy bow.  It 
took her several minutes to fuss with the bow but, when she finished, she handed me a 
beautifully wrapped package, I paid, and left. 
Afterward, while enjoying my cookies (the relative merits of which I will not go into 
here), I could not help thinking about my experience at the cake shop.  What was it about the 
shop that left me feeling so deflated, perhaps even a bit betrayed, like a person on the losing end 
of a used car purchase?  I suspected that it had something to do with false advertising.  As I 
thought more about it, I realized what annoyed me was the unabashed exhibition of “la bella 
figura.”  Never mind the substance, what was important here was the presentation.   
"La bella figura" means "the beautiful figure" and signifies a way of life that emphasizes 
beauty, one's image, aesthetics, and proper behavior.  Italians tend to be well-dressed and 
groomed.  They are known for their style, and there is an inherent appreciation for color, design, 
and form.  It is about more than just what one wears, however, and involves knowing the rules of 
etiquette and presentation of oneself.  La bella figura explains why my friend was made to feel 
like an inferior mother when she failed to wrap her five year old daughter in a scarf before 
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sending her to school in 50˚F weather.  It explains why I was compelled to put on make-up 
before leaving my apartment to take out the trash.  La bella figura is also about loyalty to family, 
friends, neighbors, and co-workers.  It involves behaving "properly," which means appropriately 
and respectfully. 
Italy's Particular Form of Secularism 
In his work Nationalism and Sexuality:  Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in 
Modern Europe (1985), George Mosse observes that, with the rise of nationalism, the nuclear 
family assumed a privileged position in society.  The nuclear family’s newfound status was 
inherently tied to the relationship between nationalism and respectability.  According to Mosse, 
respectability indicates both “decent and correct” manners and the proper attitude toward 
sexuality (1985:1).  A distinction between normal and abnormal is essential to the notion of 
respectability.  These ideas were rooted in Romanticism and ideals of manliness that set forth an 
image of order against “the chaos of modernity” (1985:7).  Society was looking for a means to 
cope with the changes that resulted from industrialization and political upheaval in a 
modernizing world.  The nineteenth century attempt to control sex and regulate the family was 
part of this effort.  Society sought to establish controls and impose restraint on modernization; 
however, in order to be effective, the methods deployed had to be informed by an ideal.   
Nationalism fit the bill: 
[Nationalism] absorbed and sanctioned middle-class manners and morals and played a 
crucial part in spreading respectability to all classes of the population, however much 
these classes hated and despised one another.  Nationalism helped respectability to meet 
all challenges to its dominance, enlarging its parameters when necessary while keeping 
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its essence intact....  But however flexible, nationalism hardly wavered in its advocacy of 
respectability (Mosse 1985:9).   
In the new relationship between nationalism and respectability, the nuclear family served as 
society’s “policemen” of sexuality.  Sexual acts for purposes other than procreation were viewed 
as contrary to the interests of the state and the state increasingly intervened in matters concerning 
sexuality and family life.  What was once considered to belong to the private sphere became a 
matter of public policy.   
Michel Foucault makes a similar argument in The History of Sexuality (1978).  He asserts 
that the end of the eighteenth century saw the emergence of “population” as an economic and 
political problem.  And at the heart of the “population” problem one found “sex.”  The state 
began to take the sexual conduct of the population as both an object of analysis and a target of 
intervention.  “Sex” thus became a public issue between the individual and the state, and an 
entire web of discourses, specialized knowledges, analyses, and injunctions (all operating within 
different institutions) appeared.  Prohibitions against sex were primarily juridical, and 
heterosexual monogamy became the accepted norm.  The sexuality of children, the insane, 
criminals, and homosexuals was delineated as “unnatural.”  As Foucault notes, this new 
persecution of “peripheral sexualities” involved an incorporation of perversions and a new 
ordering of individuals that was manifested by the encroachment of a type of power on bodies.   
Moreover, in this same work, Foucault identified four strategic unities that formed 
specific mechanisms of power and knowledge centering on sex:  a hysterization of women’s 
bodies, a pedagogization of children’s sex, a socialization of procreative behavior, and a 
psychiatrization of perverse pleasure.  Foucault saw this deployment of sexuality as an 
instrument of the bourgeois, a self-affirmation, defense, and exaltation employed as a means of 
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social control.  By providing itself with a body that had to be cared for, protected, and cultivated, 
the bourgeois enabled it to retain its differential value.  For Foucault, the body constituted the 
intersection of power and knowledge.  This constitution of the body as an intersection of 
knowledge and power reveals itself in Italy as "La bella figura."   
In Formations of the Secular (2003), Talad Asad explores the secularization thesis with 
reference to the formation of modern nationalism.203  As he notes, the secularization thesis has 
always been both descriptive and normative, and the following three elements of the thesis have 
generally been held essential to the project of modernization:  1) increasing structural 
differentiation of social spaces that create a separation of religion from politics, economics, and 
science; 2) the privatization of religion; and 3) the declining social significance of religion (in 
terms of its beliefs, commitments, and institutions).  According to Asad, many contemporary 
observers see the increased incidence of politicized religion in the world as evidence that the 
thesis is false.  Others have asserted that the explosion of politicized religion in recent years is 
simply indicative of widespread disillusionment with modernity.  Asad argues, however, that 
both the critics and supporters of the secularization thesis fail to consider the concept of “the 
secular” in terms of the historical and particular way in which it emerged and was assigned 
specific practical tasks.  He makes the point that de-privatized religion is placed in the position 
of having to appeal to those who do not necessarily share its values.  Further, the possibility of 
negotiation depends on an agreement between the parties involved that the values in question are 
open to negotiation, which is not always the case in modern society.  For these reasons, religious 
                                                 
203
  The "secularization thesis" is the idea that nonreligious considerations overtake religious considerations in the 
course of social evolution.  
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leaders are forced to adopt the strategies of secular politicians in a liberal democracy.  And when 
secular leaders cannot persuade others to negotiate, they attempt to manipulate the conditions in 
which others act or refrain from acting through deployment of various communicative devices 
that target their constituents’ desires and fears.   
 Asad does not subscribe to the view of nationalism as a form of religion.  He contends 
that, instead of looking for corresponding forms in the process we refer to as “secularization,” we 
should look at the differential results.  “We have to discover what people do with and to ideas 
and practices before we can understand what is involved in the secularization of theological 
concepts in different times and places (Asad 2003:190).”  As Asad notes, even the most 
conservative Muslim relies on experiences in the modern world to give relevance to his 
theological interpretations.  Islamism takes as a given the modern nation-state, and recognizes 
the need to work through it.  “It is this statist project and not the fusion of religious and political 
ideas that gives Islamism a ‘nationalist’ cast (Asad 2003:198-199).”  Whether Islamists are using 
religion for political ends is not what is relevant here; rather, what matters are the circumstances 
that require “Islamism” to emerge as a public political discourse, and whether (and if so in what 
ways) Islamism presents a challenge to the “deep structures” of secularism (Asad 2003:199).   
Secularism holds that religion should either remain in the private sphere or enter into 
public dialogue without making any actual demands on life.  This, however, is problematic for 
those who want to reform the idea of the secular state itself.  This, according to Asad, is what 
drives modern Islamism’s preoccupation with state power.  It is not the result of its commitment 
to nationalist ideas but, rather, an objection to the modern nation-state’s “enforced claim to 
constitute legitimate social identities and arenas” (Asad 2003:200).  Any movement that wants to 
create change in the world cannot ignore state power in a secular world.  Islam is no exception.  
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Although Asad is talking about Islam, his arguments hold for Catholic Italy as well.  As 
Alessandro Ferrara has observed, in the case of Italy political secularization has occurred at a 
faster pace than social secularization (2009).  Although the secular character of state institutions 
was declared a “supreme constitutional principle” by the Constitutional Court in 1989, crucifixes 
continue to be prominently displayed in state-owned buildings and religion continues to be 
taught in public schools.  The particularity of the Italian situation results in large part from the 
fact that the religious neutrality of state institutions is based on their fitting the terms of a 
“concordat” between two powers:  the state and the Catholic Church.  Each reigns with full 
sovereignty within its separate realm yet both occupy the same geographical territory. 
In Italy, religious neutrality is understood as a function of a “negotiating balance” 
realized by two powers.  As Ferrara states: 
 In the case of Italy, furthermore, the effect of this “use of spiritual authority for political 
ends” is compounded by the newly emerging bipolar division of the political space, 
which assigns great influence to citizens, movements and organizations located at the 
centre of the bipolar division and susceptible of switching allegiance.  These political 
forces are overwhelmingly Catholic and thus the spiritual authority of the Church can 
receive additional political leverage from the decisive influence of the addresses of its 
messages (2009:89). 
At a conference at the American University in Rome held in November 2010, 
anthropologist Michael Herzfeld asserted that, in Italy, collective social alliances are fragile: the 
country as a whole merges and splits at different levels.  As Bodei argues, contemporary 
pluralism in Italy borders on corporatism and even on a modern version of feudalism.  Where 
mass individualism prevails, a perception of the general interest appears increasingly distant and 
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difficult (2010).  I assert that it is in the crevices of these merges and splits that the Church 
inserts its power.  The Church provides a ready-made vision of the general interest.  The lack of 
a strong national identity thus enables the Church to assert its social will by capitalizing on the 
void left by the fragmented nation-state.  The Church holds itself out as a pillar of certainty in an 
uncertain world.  According to anthropologist David Kertzer: 
 Today there is little doubt in Rome who is the most powerful leader.  One man alone is 
the object of great reverence, one man alone is seen as embodying society’s deepest 
aspirations, a man whose every act is the object of adulatory front-page coverage in the 
press, even of the left (2004:295). 
Of course, Kertzer is referring to the Pope, or “il Papa,” as he is affectionately called by 
Catholics in Italy.         
In 1999, the archbishop of Bologna, Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, published a small book on 
the Italian Risorgimento in which he argued that once Italy had achieved unification and political 
independence it lost its ability to teach something to everyone.  According to Cardinal Biffi, 
“once they had achieved the hoped-for unity and political independence, they tried only to 
imitate a bit of everyone, especially the French and the English, up to the present day, when they 
have resigned themselves to being a cultural colony of the United States.”  Cardinal Biffi 
believed that the big mistake, made by both the leaders of the Risorgimento and liberals in 
general, was their failure to recognize Catholicism as the keystone of Italian national identity 
(Kertzer 2004:294-295).  This battle over national identity continues to wage in Italy.  And, as 
evidenced by the debates surrounding rights for same-sex couples, it is not likely to be resolved 
anytime soon.   
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In Italy, the nation-state is fragmented and this serves as a source of anxiety.  As my 
Italian consultant I explained, “People in Italy want certainty.  The Church provides this.”  For 
those who need certainty and security, the Church’s perspectives on sexuality, marriage, and 
family tie well into larger notions of nationalism and respectability and serve as a reassuring 
source of identity.  To maintain respectability, however, requires a distinction between what is 
“normal” and what is not.  This in turn pits so-called “traditional” families against “non-
traditional” families and leads to an overabundance of interest in what other people are doing in 
their private lives.  
The Church, however, does not hold sway over the EU to the same extent that it wields 
power in Italy.  Today, natural law doctrine has largely fallen out of vogue, especially among 
advocates of legal positivism.204  Notions of pluralism slip into claims of ethical relativism or 
ethical nihilism, which deny the existence of objective and universal moral norms.  Skepticism 
refutes the possibility of objective, universal reason, and claims to it ring false.  The autonomous 
modern individual, free to define her own morality, is arguably the quintessential existentialist.  
In shifting the battle site from Italy to the EU, members of Certi Diritti take advantage of this 
difference, seeking to further delineate a European identity, while simultaneously forcing the 
nation-state to recognize them as citizens with rights.  These groups attempt to undermine the 
stronghold of the Church’s influence in Italy through the creation of a stronger European 
citizenship based on rights that originate in secular humanistic notions of social justice.      
The Vatican is well-aware of this trend and of its implications and, under Pope Benedict 
XVI, became increasingly vocal in its response, framing the debate in terms of the proper 
                                                 
204  In general, legal positivists hold that the only legitimate sources of law are written rules, regulations, and 
principles that have been expressly enacted, adopted, or recognized by a governmental entity or political institution.    
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foundation for law.  In an address to the lower house of the German Parliament on September 22, 
2011, Pope Benedict XVI urged politicians to seek justice over success and took up the topic of 
the foundation for law, stating that "it is evident that for the fundamental issues of law, in which 
the dignity of man and of humanity is at stake, the majority principle is not enough.  Everyone in 
a position of responsibility must personally seek out the criteria to be followed when framing 
laws."205  The Pope acknowledged that it is not easy to know what is right and what is wrong. To 
this end, he offered some points of reflection on the development of natural law, and its place in 
modern society.  "Unlike other great religions," he began, "Christianity has never proposed a 
revealed law to the state and to society, that is to say a juridical order derived from revelation. 
Instead, it has pointed to nature and reason as the true sources of law -- and to the harmony of 
objective and subjective reason, which naturally presupposes that both spheres are rooted in the 
creative reason of God."206  Referring to the current situation in Europe, Benedict XVI noted that 
"there are concerted efforts to recognize only positivism as a common culture and a common 
basis for law-making, reducing all the other insights and values of our culture to the level of 
subculture."207  "In its self-proclaimed exclusivity," the Pope explained, "the positivist reason, 
which recognizes nothing beyond mere functionality, resembles a concrete bunker with no 
windows, in which we ourselves provide lighting and atmospheric conditions, being no longer 
willing to obtain either from God's wide world."208  Pope Benedict subsequently made similar 
                                                 
205 A full translation into English of then Pope Benedict XVI’s speech to the German Parliament is available at 
news.va, the official Vatican Network, http://www.news.va/en/news/pope-benedict-addresses-the-german-
parliament-2, accessed March 8, 2014.  
 
206 News.va, http://www.news.va/en/news/pope-benedict-addresses-the-german-parliament-2, accessed March 8, 
2014.  
 
207 See note 206. 
 
208 See note 206. 
  
298 
 
speeches on January 19, 2012, in an address to U.S. Bishops, and again on January 21, 2012, on 
the occasion of the opening of the judicial year in Italy. 
   For those seeking certainty, the Church provides a ready-made vision of a unified 
Europe based on its “Christian” roots and “natural law” as a foundation for human rights.  As can 
be seen in the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, this vision 
excludes a large number of persons who, because of their sexual orientation, are denied all of the 
potential benefits of EU citizenship.  If the project of European integration is to move forward, 
the issue of rights and where they come from must be resolved in a way that unifies Europeans.  
At the present moment, there is little consensus in Europe about the content and bases of such 
rights.  
Moving Forward? 
On February 28, 2013, something unprecedented happened:  Pope Benedict XVI resigned 
after eight years as the head of the Catholic Church.  In his resignation statement, the former 
Pope declared that his decision to step down was due to the nature of "today's world, subject to 
so many rapid changes and shaken by questions of deep relevance."209  Pope Benedict XVI's 
resignation spurred a media frenzy, with the Italian press reporting that the Pope resigned after 
receiving the results of an internal investigation, delivered in a 300-page, two-volume file, that 
reported blackmail, corruption, and gay sex at the Vatican.  According to well-respected Italian 
national newspaper La Repubblica, the report was based on countless interviews with bishops, 
                                                 
 
209 “Pope Benedict’s Resignation Statement in Full,” Guardian, February 11, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/11/pope-benedict-resignation-statement-in-full, accessed March 8, 
2014. 
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cardinals and lay members of the Church.  Vatican spokesman, the Reverend Federico Lombardi, 
refused to comment on the reports, stating: 
 Neither the cardinals' commission nor I will make comments to confirm or deny the 
things that are said about this matter. Let each one assume his or her own responsibilities. 
We shall not be following up on the observations that are made about this. 
After his resignation, Pope Benedict XVI was replaced by Pope Francis.  When asked about gay 
people in the Catholic Church, Pope Francis stated, "Who am I to judge?" signaling a change in 
Church rhetoric on LGBTI issues.  Pope Francis has also shifted power away from Italy and 
Europe.  Eleven of the 19 Catholic leaders he chose to become part of the newest class of 
cardinals come from outside Europe and the North Atlantic.  As part of this same effort, Pope 
Francis removed Bishop Tebartz-van Elst, who was dubbed "Bishop Bling," after spending $42.7 
million on a new residence and renovations.  In the United States, Pope Francis removed the 
ultra-conservative Cardinal Raymond L. Burke from the Congregation of Bishops, which is 
responsible for selecting bishops around the world, and replaced him with the more moderate 
Cardinal Donald Wuerl.  
 Unlike his predecessor, Pope Francis has shown little interest in debates surrounding 
rights for same-sex couples.  Yet, despite Pope Francis' now-iconic statement "Who am I to 
judge?" and his declaration that the Church has become too “obsessed” with gay people and 
abortion, and his focus on economic equality, there is no real indication that there will be 
doctrinal changes regarding the Church's positions on homosexuality, same-sex marriage, or 
same-sex adoption.  Pope Francis' words and actions, however, do point to a major change 
regarding Church involvement in the debate over recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  
Pope Francis seems to be "rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," so to speak.  By 
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withdrawing from public debate on these issues, Pope Francis clears a space in Italian politics for 
the politicians to take action.   
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
In this dissertation I have shown how law acts on society and society acts on law.  I have 
provided an analysis of the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, 
using this topic to explore how Europe and the EU shape law and public policy in Italy with 
respect to the treatment of same-sex couples and in the process shift the balance of power from 
the legislature to the judiciary.  I have used the ongoing struggle over legal recognition of rights 
for same-sex couples as a window on larger processes of Europeanization and European 
integration.  Specifically, I have argued that recent legal and policy changes with respect to the 
treatment of same-sex couples in Italy are a direct consequence of the stimulus of Europe and the 
EU on the national judicial system and evidence of a burgeoning judicial activism.  Judicial 
activism in Italy occurs at the expense of national politics and in the context of a dysfunctional 
polity that evidences a crisis of legitimation.  It also occurs at the expense of the nation-state in 
favor of the EU.   
I have illustrated how social actors in Italy invoke "Europe" as a trope of progressivism 
to advance the recognition of rights they hold as EU citizens.  In a similar fashion, the Italian 
courts look to "Europe" to justify acts of judicial activism.  In doing so, the activities of the 
Italian activists and courts are helping forge a European identity – so while I have told a story 
about compromised sovereignty and the judicialization of Italian politics I have at the same time 
been telling a story about the formation of new post-national identities.  One of the things that is 
new or novel about this situation is that Italy is a place where, in general, people have little faith 
in state institutions and are skeptical about the ability of law to transform society (Ginsborg 
2003; Sciolla 1997).  Through the Affermazione Civile campaign, Italian LGBTI activists 
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demonstrate a new degree of faith in the “rule of law,” a faith made possible by Europe and the 
EU.    
In Chapter 2 (“A Description of the Struggle over Rights for LGBTI Persons in Italy”), I 
provided a description of the struggle for recognition of rights on behalf of same-sex couples and 
its history.  I looked closely at the activities of Italian LGBTI activist groups currently fighting 
for marriage equality, and focused specifically on the Affermazione Civile campaign initiated by 
Italian LGBTI activist groups Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford.  Through the Affermazione Civile 
project, Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford have embraced court action as a mechanism for change in 
an area of law that has long been subject to political impasse.  By framing the relevant issues in 
terms of “rights,” and more specifically, "rights" they hold as EU citizens, these groups have 
been able to take advantage of the opening created by the EU and use European and EU law to 
access the national legal system.  Not only do the activities of Certi Diritti and Rete Lenford 
demonstrate unprecedented faith in the ability of state institutions and the rule of law to serve as 
societal transformers, they also reinforce a (notion of) European citizenship based on rights that 
originate in secular humanistic notions of social justice.  As a side effect, the activities of these 
activist groups further the formation of a European identity and thereby aid the project of 
European integration.     
One of the points I made in Chapter 2 is that, due to particularities in the Italian 
Constitution, any result less than full marriage equality will ultimately prove discriminatory with 
respect to same-sex couples.  This is because the Italian Constitution recognizes the "rights of the 
family" as a "natural society founded on marriage" (Article 29).  In other words, "marriage" is 
the cornerstone of "family."  In Italy, resistance to same-sex marriage is in large part a response 
to the opponents' perceived need to protect the so-called "traditional" family.  As I demonstrated 
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in Chapter 3 (“The (Not So) Traditional Family and the Failure of Italian Family Law”), 
however, the "traditional" family has lost substantial ground in Italy.  In contemporary Italy, as 
elsewhere, there exists an abundance of family arrangements.  Despite the substantial changes to 
family structures resulting from delayed marriage, low fertility, longer life expectancies, and a 
declining welfare state, the family remains a central institution in Italy and fulfills an important 
social support role that compensates for the State's inability to deal with the ongoing economic 
crisis in Italy.  Although the structure of the Italian family has changed dramatically in recent 
years, Italian family law has not.  This is problematic because it leads to an erasure of alleged 
non-traditional families in the eyes of the State.   
In Chapter 4 (“Policy-Making in the Courts and the Judicialization of Italian Politics”), I 
turned my attention to the Italian courts to show how in their recognition of rights for same-sex 
couples, they display signs of a flourishing judicial activism and attendant judicialization of 
politics.  Although not unprecedented, this is unexpected in a civil law nation-state where judges 
are viewed as "technicians" and the law is presumably based on self-contained codes.  According 
to this perspective, the job of the Italian judge is limited to interpreting laws enacted by the 
Parliament and judges are not authorized to make policy or law.  As I illustrated in the context of 
the Affermazione Civile campaign, however, this is not what happens in reality.  Recent Italian 
court decisions have significantly advanced the recognition of rights for LGBTI persons in Italy 
and are changing public policy with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples.  The Italian 
court decisions are not only important to the advancement of LGBTI rights in Italy, but also 
work to further delineate a transnational EU citizenship and reinforce processes of European 
integration.   
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In chapters 5 and 6, I moved away from Italy to take a closer look at Europe and the EU.  
In chapter 5 (“The EU and Italy:  Living Outside Imagined Borders”), I explained what "Europe" 
is and how it is different from the EU.  I also talked about the EU, and explored how various 
institutions within the EU structure and generate contemporary debate over LGBTI rights in 
general and marriage equality in particular in the member states.  I looked at the current status 
with respect to recognition of rights for same-sex couples in the EU member states.  I explained 
how, in the struggle over recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy, one can begin to see 
the instantiation of a post-national identity that looks to Europe in the face of a feeble national 
identity.  In chapter 6 (“The Council of Europe and the European Courts:  Creating European 
Families”), I discussed efforts to harmonize family law in the EU.  While there have been 
attempts to “harmonize” the family law of the member states, to date such efforts have made 
little progress.  The EU continues to invoke notions of subsidiarity to declare family law as a 
matter best left to the discretion of the member states and this is problematic because it affects 
the free movement of EU citizens and their “family” members, and creates disparate categories 
of EU citizenship that privilege hetero-normative families and too often marginalize alternative 
families.   
In chapter 6 I also devoted special attention to the activities of the ECtHR and the CJEU 
and to the development of a line of jurisprudence dealing with the rights of same-sex couples in 
Europe and the EU.  So far, the European courts' attempts to deal with the legal and factual 
existence of same-sex families have been provisional and have resulted in a situation in the EU 
where same-sex couples in member states that recognize the rights of same-sex couples enjoy 
privileges that those in states with no recognition do not.  The current situation is antithetical to 
processes of European integration and illuminates a split in the conceptualization of the EU.      
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As I mentioned in Chapter 5, this "split" is largely about the proper foundation for 
"rights," and divides those who subscribe to a secular, human-made notion of rights from those 
who see rights as emanating from "natural law."  The idea that rights emanate from “natural law” 
is one that is shared and promoted by the Catholic Church.  The Church is also seen as a major 
opponent to the recognition of rights for same-sex couples in Italy.  For these reasons, in Chapter 
7 (“Church, State and Marital Relations in Italy”), I looked specifically at the relationship 
between Church, State, and marriage in Italy.  I explained how the Church uses values and norms 
derived from “natural law” to justify its opposition to same-sex marriage.  I also pointed out how 
the Church’s teachings on sexuality, marriage, and the family stand in contrast to over 140 years 
of anthropological research, analysis, and writing on the multiplicity of understandings about 
kinship, family, marriage, descent, and child-rearing that exist throughout the world.  However, 
for those seeking certainty, the Church provides a ready-made vision of human rights based on 
“Christian” values, a vision that also excludes a large number of persons who are denied all of 
the potential benefits of EU citizenship due to their sexual orientation.   
However, the resignation of Pope Benedict XVI and installation of Pope Francis signal a 
possible change in the Church’s approach to public policy concerning same-sex couples.  As 
stated in chapter 7, unlike his predecessor, Pope Francis has shown little interest in debates 
surrounding rights for same-sex couples.  Although there has been no real indication that there 
will be doctrinal changes regarding the Church's positions on homosexuality, same-sex marriage, 
or same-sex adoption, Pope Francis' words and actions do point to a major change regarding 
Church involvement in public debate over recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  By 
withdrawing from public debate on these issues, Pope Francis clears a space in Italian politics for 
politicians to take action.   
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Implications and Contributions  
In the last section of this dissertation, I will devote attention to what all of this “adds up” 
to, and will explain some of the implications and potential contributions of this study.  Writ 
large, this project is about sovereignty, extraterritoriality, and religion.  It is about the 
relationship of a supranational entity to a nation-state in an emerging “post-national” situation.  
On a more modest level, this study also constitutes a contribution to several bodies of 
anthropological literature, the most obvious of which include:  the anthropology of Italy, legal 
anthropology, and the anthropology of Europe and the EU.  I will discuss each of these before 
concluding with an exploration of the dissertation’s more ambitious aims.   
With respect to the anthropology of Italy, I have illustrated how Italy has been deeply 
transformed as a result of its membership in the European Union (EU).  This can be seen in the 
struggle for rights on behalf of same-sex couples and the effects of recent European and EU 
court cases on both the Italian judicial system and domestic law and policy concerning same-sex 
couples in Italy.  Yet, despite the relationship between EU membership and many of the dramatic 
changes occurring in Italy, recent anthropological studies of modern Italy have largely ignored 
the role played by the EU and Europe in shaping Italian society, especially in terms of the 
making of national law and public policy outside the economic realm (see e.g., Herzfeld 2010; 
Krause 2005b; Krause and Marchesi 2007; Molé 2012, 2009; and Muehlebach 2012).  One 
reason for this, perhaps, is that transnational relationships are difficult to follow using more 
traditional anthropological methods (of which participant-observation is the most obvious 
example).  However, Italy is deeply entrenched as a member of the EU.  Consequently, in order 
to more fully understand the current situation in Italy, it is incumbent upon anthropologists who 
choose this nation-state as a field site to consider the relationship between Italy and the EU.  One 
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way to trace transnational relationships is through the law.  As previously noted, legal 
anthropologists have long used law as a means of reckoning with transnational processes that are 
not otherwise amendable to observation (Moore 2005).  This is what I have done here. 
In addition, I have borrowed a method often used by legal scholars (i.e., doctrinal 
analysis) to trace the influence of European court decisions on recent Italian judicial decisions. 
In doing so, I have been able to show how the Italian courts have mobilized European case law 
in significant ways, pushing Italian law and policy with respect to the treatment of same-sex 
couples beyond what the jurisprudence of the European courts requires.  Consequently, when 
one analyzes the relationship between European and Italian case law, one sees that recent 
developments in Italian judicial decisions regarding the rights of same-sex couples appear to be 
more of a choice than an imposition.  As stated in chapter 6, this indicates that Italian judges are, 
in the case of recognition of rights for same-sex couples, electing to look to European law as a 
source of law rather than being obliged to do so by the existing legal structures that frame 
relationships between Europe, the EU, and Italy.  It also constitutes evidence of judicial activism 
on the part of Italian courts.  This is data and evidence that would likely be overlooked if one did 
not pursue a doctrinal analysis of the case law in this area and, following Riles (1994), 
underscores the importance to legal anthropologists of confronting the normative aspects of 
judicial decision-making through doctrinal analysis to systematically analyze how one court 
decision influences another. 
This study also contributes to and expands on previous anthropological studies of EU 
identity formation that have approached the subject by:  1) looking at attempts to bring about an 
EU identity through various cultural policies such as the adoption of EU symbols and the 
launching of campaigns to foster popular awareness (e.g., Shore 2000); 2) focusing on EU 
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institutions and  how officials within these institutions work to bring about EU integration (e.g., 
Thedvall 2006; Zabusky 2000); and 3) adopting a “from below” perspective that explores how 
the EU provides a new framework for identity construction as persons and organizations 
increasingly define themselves in relation or opposition to the EU (e.g., Holmes 2008; Nic Craith 
2009).   
In the first of the two “from above” approaches, anthropologists have looked at attempts 
to bring about an EU identity through various cultural practices that understand EU identity 
formation as a cultural project designed to create a “European” people for a “European” state 
(Shore 2004, 2000, 1993).  Historically, “culture” has been viewed as a fundamental building 
block for establishing the legitimacy of a political system (Shore 2003:3).  In its attempts to 
develop a European identity, the EU has increasingly relied on cultural politics designed to 
encourage a popular European consciousness or, to borrow Anderson’s language (1991), to 
create an “imagined community” of Europeans.  Much of this has been done through the creation 
of EU symbols, invented traditions, rewriting history, developing Euro-statistics, forging an EU 
citizenship, and the adoption of a single currency in the form of the Euro (Shore 2000). 
 Anthropologist Cris Shore has become skeptical about the possibilities for a European 
identity, and sees it as unlikely that the people of Europe will ever embrace the EU’s cultural 
policies.  This is because, according to Shore, the factors that give the nation-state its substance 
and legitimacy are not only social and historical, but also embedded in everyday culture, which 
took many decades to develop (2004:40).  The point that I make here, however, is that in a 
nation-state such as Italy where there is arguably a weaker sense of national identity, the 
possibility for advancement of European identity is greater.  Although Italians are not any more 
likely to embrace the EU’s cultural symbols than other so-called EU citizens, they may be more 
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susceptible to the idea of a pan-EU identity that is capable of compensating for the nation-state’s 
inadequacies.  At a minimum, disadvantaged segments of the Italian population, such as the 
LGBTI activists in this study, have demonstrated a propensity to take advantage of opportunities 
made possible by the EU or at the EU level to advance their cause(s).  In doing so, such groups 
embrace and invoke a form of cultural politics that encourages the further development of a 
European consciousness.   
In addition to the two “from above” approaches, there is a third approach to EU identity 
formation that adopts a “from below” perspective and looks at the way that European integration 
provides a new framework for identity construction as persons and organizations increasingly 
define themselves in relation or opposition to the EU (Wilken 2012:126).  These groups have 
included, among others:  1) “kin-state minorities” that ended up on the wrong side of the national 
border following centuries of war in Europe; 2) stateless “micro nations”; and 3) linguistic 
minorities that have struggled to keep their languages alive in the face of nation-states’ attempts 
to eradicate them.  European integration provides an opportunity for these groups to reframe 
their culture and identity.  As previously noted, through their engagement in various forms of 
political cooperation with the EU, many of these groups have been able to reposition themselves 
vis-à-vis the nation-state and reframe their identities in a European context.   
What I have shown here is that there is yet another way that EU identity is forged.  
Significantly, in terms of EU identity formation, the Italian LGBTI activist groups I worked with 
are acting on their own, unsolicited by any EU institution or official.  The processes I describe 
are not part of a larger cultural project initiated by the EU.  In fact, the opposite can be stated.  
With respect to the family laws of its member states, the EU has been generally unwilling to 
interfere, citing principles of “subsidiarity” and proclaiming that family law is a matter best left 
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to the member states’ discretion.  In addition, although LGBTI activists have asserted an interest 
in becoming more “European,” at least in terms of the recognition of rights for LGBTI persons, 
EU identity formation largely occurs as a side-effect (rather than as a deliberate goal) of the 
activists’ activities.  Finally, the delineation of an EU citizenship that overrides the interests of 
the nation-state in this particular area of law (and thereby fosters European identity) requires the 
cooperation of the Italian courts.  While the activists play a fundamental role in carving out a 
transnational citizenship, in the end it is the Italian courts that are largely responsible for actually 
advancing processes of European integration.   
The bottom-line is that identity affiliation with the EU occurs as the result of a 
fragmented nation-state in Italy that is unable to meet the demands of a changing society.  While 
segments of the nation-state attempt to maintain a sense of national identity based on Catholic 
social teachings, especially those concerning the so-called traditional family, this no longer 
resonates with large parts of contemporary Italian society.  In the struggle over recognition of 
rights for same-sex couples and calls for family law reform in Italy one can see that large 
portions of society have moved on and no longer see kinship as grounded in biological notions of 
reproduction.  Politics remain at an impasse, however, and while the battle over identity takes 
place through law, it is situated primarily in the European and national courts.  As evidenced by 
Certi Diritti’s recent formulation of a “Roadmap” for a national strategic litigation project that 
will involve multiple LGBTI associations throughout Italy, Italian LGBTI activists are looking to 
the national courts as a viable alternate avenue for the recognition of rights in the face of a 
parliament that is unwilling or unable to take action.           
The fact that recent changes with respect to the treatment of same-sex couples in Italy are 
a direct result of the EU’s influence on the nation-state points as well to larger issues regarding 
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sovereignty and territoriality.  This study demonstrates how major changes in the status of the 
nation-state frequently occur through unintended and peripheral processes of post-national 
identity formation in which the state itself is implicated.  In this situation, to the extent that the 
EU is being “integrated,” it is in large part due to the desire of activists in the national context to 
see the Kantian vision of the EU succeed, rather than to processes of market integration.   
Law and policy with respect to same-sex couples in Italy, Europe, and the EU continues 
to develop, even as I write this.  For example, in May 2013, a civil court in Milan ordered the 
City of Milan to enter a same-sex partnership contracted abroad in the city register.  The couple 
had signed a civil partnership in London in 2010.  When the City of Milan refused to enter the 
civil partnership in the local registry the couple appealed to the court.  As a result of the court’s 
order to record the civil partnership in local registry, the couple will now be able to access local 
welfare benefits.  This example and the many others discussed in this dissertation demonstrate 
the continued development of law in the area of recognition of rights for same-sex couples.  
While Italian politicians continue to debate the possibility of civil unions, Certi Diritti activists 
demand full marriage equality, something that was virtually unthinkable when I began this 
project.  Meanwhile, in the absence of comprehensive family law reform, the Italian and 
European courts continue to plug away at defining the rights of same-sex couples and the current 
trend indicates an expansion of those rights, something that bodes well for the future of the 
Kantian vision of the EU.  
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